





































































































































































This	 thesis	 assesses	 the	 key	 changes	 which	 occurred	 within	 international	 law	 in	
addressing	the	situation	of	women	in	the	aftermath	of	conflicts.	These	changes	were	
marked	 by	 developments	 concerning	 gender,	 armed	 conflict	 and	 post-conflict	
situations	 in	 specialised	branches	of	 international	 law,	 such	as	 International	Refugee	
Law	(IRL),	International	Criminal	Law	(ICL),	and	International	Human	Rights	Law	(IHRL).	
Furthermore,	the	developments	took	place	in	the	context	of,	and	have	been	partially	
influenced	 by,	 other	 changes	 within	 the	 discipline,	 including	 the	 increased	
fragmentation	and	specialisation	of	branches	of	international	law,	greater	attention	to	
the	role	of	gender	within	international	law,	and	the	emergence	of	the	idea	of	jus	post	
bellum	 as	 a	 legal	 framework	 addressing	 post-conflict	 situations.	 Whilst	 these	





of	 international	 law	 (International	Humanitarian	Law,	 IHRL,	 IRL,	and	 ICL)	 reveals	 that	
the	past	30	years	resulted	in	proliferation	of	rules	applicable	to	the	challenges	faced	by	
women	in	post-conflict	situations.	However,	with	the	exception	of	 ICL,	the	responses	
of	 international	 law	 to	 this	 problem	 are	 predominantly	 of	 soft	 nature	 and,	
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ECtHR	 	 	 European	Court	of	Human	Rights	
EU		 	 	 European	Union		
ExCom		 	 Executive	Committee	of	the	High	Commissioner’s	Programme	
GC		 	 	 Geneva	Convention		






IAC	 	 	 International	armed	conflict	
ICC		 	 	 International	Criminal	Court	
ICC	Statute		 	 Rome	Statue	of	the	International	Criminal	Court	1998	
ICC	EOC	 	 ICC	Elements	of	Crimes	
ICCPR	 	 	 International	Covenant	on	Civil	and	Political	Rights	1966	
ICESCR	 International	Covenant	on	Economic,	 Social	 and	Cultural	Rights	
1966	
ICISS	 The	 International	 Commission	 on	 Intervention	 and	 State	
Sovereignty	
ICJ	 	 	 International	Court	of	Justice		
ICL		 	 	 International	Criminal	Law	
ICRC		 	 	 International	Committee	of	the	Red	Cross		
ICTR		 	 	 International	Criminal	Tribunal	for	the	Former	Yugoslavia		
ICTY		 	 	 International	Criminal	Tribunal	for	Rwanda	
IDMC	 	 	 Internal	Displacement	Monitoring	Centre		
IDPs	 	 	 Internally	Displaced	Persons		
IHL	 	 	 International	Humanitarian	Law	
IHRL		 	 	 International	Human	Rights	Law	
ILC			 	 	 International	Law	Commission		
IMTFE			 	 International	Military	Tribunal	for	the	Far	East		
IMTN	 	 	 International	Military	Tribunal	at	Nuremberg	
IRL		 	 	 International	Refugee	Law	
JCE	 	 	 Joint	criminal	enterprise		
NIAC	 	 	 Non-international	armed	conflict		
OTP	 	 	 Office	of	the	Prosecutor	
PCIJ	 	 	 Permanent	Court	of	International	Justice		
PIL		 	 	 Public	International	Law	
R2P	 	 	 Responsibility	to	Protect	
Refugee	Convention	 The	Geneva	Convention	Relating	to	the	Status	of	Refugees	1951	
SCSL		 	 	 Special	Court	for	Sierra	Leone	
SGBV	 	 	 Sexual	and	gender-based	violence	
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TFV	 	 	 Trust	Fund	for	Victims		
UDHR	 	 	 Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights	1948	
UKAIT			 	 United	Kingdom	Asylum	and	Immigration	Tribunal		
UN		 	 	 United	Nations	
UNGA	 	 	 United	Nations	General	Assembly	
UNHCHR	 	 United	Nations	High	Commissioner	on	Human	Rights		
UNHCR		 	 United	Nations	High	Commissioner	for	Refugees		
UNSC		 	 	 United	Nations	Security	Council	
UNSG	 	 	 Secretary-General	of	the	United	Nations		
UNSCR		 	 United	Nations	Security	Council	Resolution		
UN	Women		 United	 Nations	 Entity	 for	 Gender	 Equality	 and	 the	
Empowerment	of	Women	
VAW		 	 	 Violence	Against	Women		
VCLT	 	 	 Vienna	Convention	on	the	Law	of	Treaties	1969	








This	 thesis	 considers	 one	 of	 the	 most	 compelling	 challenges	 facing	 post-conflict	
societies:	the	situation	of	women	in	the	aftermath	of	war	and	the	adequacy	(or	not)	of	
international	 law	in	addressing	that	situation.	Although	the	rules	of	 international	 law	
have	a	profound	effect	on	 interstate	 relations,	 they	also	have	 real	 consequences	 for	
individual	 lives.	 Contemporary	 developments	 demonstrate	 that	 despite	 the	
heightened	interest	in	the	impact	of	armed	conflict	on	women,	international	 law	and	
the	 United	 Nations	 do	 not	 respond	 to	 this	 problem	 in	 a	 synchronised,	 holistic	 nor,	
most	importantly,	adequate	manner.		
	
International	 law	 managed	 for	 centuries	 to	 evolve	 without	 paying	 any	 real	
consideration	to	gender.	The	analysis	of	seemingly	neutral	rules	demonstrates	that	in	
fact	 international	 law,	 not	 unlike	 domestic	 law,	 is	 highly	 gendered.1	As	 such,	 the	
international	 legal	 system	 represents	mostly	male	experiences	and	 is	based	on	male	
assumptions	which	are	reflected	both	in	substantive	law	but	also	in	its	processes	and	
in	 international	 organisational	 structures.	 Chinkin	 and	 Charlesworth	 aptly	 note	 the	
absence	of	women	from	international	law-making	and	their	rather	limited	participation	
in	 international	 courts	 and	 tribunals,	 international	 organizations	 and,	more	 broadly,	
strategic	 state-level	 functions	which,	 despite	 some	 improvements,	 continues	 today.2	






1 	Hilary	 Charlesworth,	 Christine	 Chinkin,	 The	 boundaries	 of	 international	 law.	 A	 feminist	 analysis	
(Manchester	University	Press	2000);	Hilary	Charlesworth,	Christine	Chinkin,	‘The	Gender	of	Jus	Cogens’	
(1993)	15	Human	Rights	Quarterly	 63;	Hilary	Charlesworth,	 ‘The	Hidden	Gender	of	 International	 Law’	
(2002)	16	Temple	International	and	Comparative	Law	Journal	93.	
2	Charlesworth,	Chinkin	(2000),	supra	1,	70-88.	




analysis	of	 some	of	 the	 key	aspects	of	 international	 law	presented	by	 these	authors	
opened	 the	 gates	 to	 feminist	 international	 legal	 scholarship	 which	 has	 been	
successfully	 growing	 and	 developing	 for	 the	 past	 three	 decades,	 contributing	
substantive	 analyses	 of	 various	 aspects	 of	 general	 international	 law	 as	 well	 as	
specialised	branches	of	the	subject.	
	
One	of	the	areas	 in	which	feminist	critique	has	become	particularly	prominent	 is	 the	
law	on	the	use	of	force	and,	consequently,	the	law	of	armed	conflict.4	The	law	on	the	
use	 of	 force	 (jus	 ad	 bellum)	 and	 the	 law	 of	 armed	 conflict	 (jus	 in	 bello)	 reflect	 the	
gender	bias	of	 international	 law.	 International	humanitarian	 law	(IHL)	 in	particular,	 it	
will	be	argued,	was	designed	in	such	a	way	as	to	allow	its	rules	to	respond	more	readily	
to	harms	sustained	by	men	than	 those	experienced	by	women.	Undoubtedly,	armed	
conflicts	 affect	 everyone	 who	 is	 caught	 up	 in	 them:	 women,	 men	 and	 children.	
However,	it	is	crucial	to	acknowledge	that	the	type	of	impact	and	its	nature	depend	on	
a	 number	 of	 factors,	 including	 the	 gender	 of	 the	 affected	 person.	 This	 issue	will	 be	
explored	 further	 in	Chapter	2	 in	 the	analysis	of	 the	gender-specific	 impact	of	 armed	
conflict	 on	 women,	 demonstrating	 that	 gender	 plays	 a	 major	 role	 in	 shaping	 one’s	
experience	 of	 armed	 conflict.	 Furthermore,	 the	 discussion	 presented	 in	 Chapter	 2	














5	Judith	Gardam,	 ‘A	feminist	analysis	of	certain	aspects	of	 international	humanitarian	 law’	(1988-1989)	
12	 Australian	 Year	 Book	 of	 International	 Law	 265;	 Judith	 Gardam,	 ‘Gender	 and	 Non-Combatant	
Immunity’	(1993)	3	Transnational	Law	&	Contemporary	Problems	345;	Judith	Gardam,	‘Women	and	the	





international	human	rights	 law	(IHRL)	 including	prevalently	“high	 levels	of	systematic	
and	 organised	 sexual	 violence”.6	Whilst	 the	 topic	 of	 conflict-related	 sexual	 violence	
certainly	 dominated	 the	 recent	 international	 legal	 scholarship	 on	 the	 scope	 and	
applicability	 of	 the	 modern	 law	 of	 war,	 a	 number	 of	 scholars	 have	 begun	 to	 look	
beyond	 sexual	 violence	 to	 analyse	 and	 comment	 on	 a	 broader	 spectrum	 of	
consequences	 of	 armed	 conflict	 on	 women,	 such	 as	 socio-economic	 and	 cultural	
dimensions	 of	 conflict-related	 violations,	 the	 role	 of	 women	 as	 perpetrators	 of	
international	crimes,	the	role	of	women	in	transitional	justice	and	their	involvement	in	
peace	 processes. 7 	Nonetheless,	 developments	 in	 some	 specialised	 branches	 of	
international	law	have	remained	strongly	focused	on	SGBV.	For	instance,	the	adoption	
of	the	ICC	Statute	with	its	rich	array	of	provisions	explicitly	classifying	SGBV	as	a	crime	
against	 humanity,	 war	 crimes	 and	 genocide	 as	 well	 as	 subsequent	 practice	 of	 the	
																																																																																																																																																																		
Judith	 Gardam,	 Hilary	 Charlesworth,	 ‘Protection	 of	 Women	 in	 Armed	 Conflict’	 (2000)	 22(1)	 Human	





International	 Law	 326;	 Alexandra	 Stiglmayer	 (ed),	Mass	 Rape.	 The	 War	 against	 Women	 in	 Bosnia-
Herzegovina	 (University	 of	 Nebraska	 Press	 1994);	 Kelly	 Dawn	 Askin,	 War	 Crimes	 Against	 Women:	
Prosecution	 in	 International	War	Crimes	Tribunals	 (Martinus	Nijhoff	1997);	Rosalind	Dixon,	 ‘Rape	as	a	
crime	 in	 International	 Humanitarian	 Law:	 Where	 to	 from	 Here?’	 (2002)	 13(3)	 European	 Journal	 of	
International	Law	697;	Noëlle	Quénivet,	Sexual	Offences	in	Armed	Conflict	and	International	Law	(2005	
Transnational	 Publishers);	 Anne-Marie	 de	 Brouwer,	 Supranational	 Criminal	 Prosecution	 of	 Sexual	
Violence.	The	ICC	and	the	Practice	of	the	ICTY	and	the	ICTR	(Intersentia	2005).	
7	Charlotte	Lindsey,	Women	Facing	War:	 ICRC	Study	on	the	 Impact	of	Armed	Conflict	on	Women	 (ICRC	
2001);	Charlesworth,	Chinkin	(2000),	supra	1,	250-257;	Judith	Gardam,	‘The	neglected	aspect	of	women	
and	 armed	 conflict-	 progressive	 development	 of	 the	 law’	 (2005)	 52(2)	 Netherlands	 International	 Law	
Review	197;	Carolyn	Nordstrom,	‘Women,	economy,	war’	(2010)	Vol.92	No.877	International	Review	of	
the	 Red	 Cross	 161;	 Christine	 Bell,	 Catherine	 O’Rourke,	 ‘Peace	 agreements	 or	 pieces	 of	 paper?	 The	
impact	of	UNSC	resolution	1325	on	peace	processes	and	their	agreements’	(2010)	59	International	and	
Comparative	 Law	 Quarterly	 941;	 Fionnuala	 Ní	 Aoláin,	 Dina	 Francesca	 Haynes,	 Naomi	 Cahn,	 On	 the	
Frontlines.	Gender,	War	and	the	Post-Conflict	Process	 (OUP	2011);	Catherine	O’Rourke,	Gender	Politics	
in	Transitional	Justice	(Routledge	2013);	Fionnuala	Ní	Aoláin,	‘Political	violence	and	gender	during	times	
of	 transition’	 (2006)	 15(3)	 Columbia	 Journal	 of	 Gender	 and	 Law	 829;	 Nicole	 Hogg,	 ‘Women’s	









of	 IHL	 and	 brought	 into	 question	 their	 responsiveness	 to	 contemporary	 warfare.	 It	
became	evident	that	actors	in	modern	armed	conflicts	have	little	concern	for	the	rules	
of	IHL	and	that	there	exist	major	gaps	in	compliance	with	the	rules	of	IHL.	Moreover,	
many	modern	 armed	 conflicts	 (e.g.	 in	 the	 Former	 Yugoslavia,	 Rwanda,	 Sierra	 Leone	
and	the	Democratic	Republic	of	Congo)	have	continued	to	show	alarming	patterns	of	
gender-specific	 violations	 and	 the	 gendered	 effects	 of	 contemporary	 warfare	 on	
women.	The	provisions	of	the	Geneva	Conventions	1949	and	their	Additional	Protocols	
affording	special	protection	to	women	appeared	to	have	had	little	actual	impact	on	the	
protection	 of	 women	 from	 atrocities	 and	 violations	 which	 very	 often	 have	 taken	
gender-specific	forms.	What	 is	more,	the	precarious	reality	of	the	aftermath	of	these	







United	Nations	 Security	 Council	 (UNSC)	 adopted	 Resolution	 1325	 on	Women,	 Peace	
and	Security,	which	marked	the	first	official	recognition	by	the	UNSC	of	the	gendered	
dimensions	 of	 armed	 conflicts	 and	 their	 impact	 on	 women,	 the	 role	 of	 women	 in	
peacekeeping	and	women’s	participation	in	peace	processes.9	United	Nations	Security	
Council	 Resolution	 (UNSCR)	 1325	 was	 a	 catalyst	 for	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	
Women,	 Peace	 and	 Security	 (WPS)	 Agenda	 at	 the	 UNSC,	 which	 has	 since	 passed	
further	 resolutions	 addressing	 these	 topics. 10 	Furthermore,	 in	 the	 context	 of	
																																																								
8	Crimes	 involving	SGBV	have	been	included	in	the	majority	of	 indictments	 issued	by	the	ICC,	however	
there	have	been	no	successful	prosecutions	to	date.		
9	UNSCR	1325	(31	October	2000)	UN	Doc.	S/RES/1325.		








However,	 a	 normative	 gap	 appears	 to	have	been	 created	whereby	 international	 law	
provides	 special	 protection	 to	 women	 (through	 IHL)	 in	 recognition	 of	 the	 fact	 that	
women	may	be	affected	by	conflict	 in	particular	ways,	but	ceases	to	engage	with	the	
scope	of	 legal	protection	for	women	 in	the	aftermath	of	conflict.	 It	 fails	 to	recognize	
that	the	very	nature	of	violations	that	IHL	is	attempting	to	protect	women	from	have	a	




around	 a	 war	 /	 peace,	 IHL	 (lex	 specialis)	 /	 IHRL	 dichotomy.	 Whilst	 the	 distinction	





and	 can	 involve	 cessations	 of	 conflict	 and	 then	 slippages	 back	 into	 conflict	 -	 a	 cycle	
that	can	continue	for	long	periods	of	time”.11	Furthermore,	exclusive	reliance	on	such	
a	 dichotomy	 ignores	 the	 development	 of	 various	 highly	 specialised	 branches	 of	
international	law,	such	as	international	refugee	law	(IRL)	and	international	criminal	law	
(ICL),	 that	often	emerged	 in	 response	 to	 the	 challenges	of	 armed	 conflicts	 and	 their	
aftermath.	IHL	and	IHRL	are	specific	bodies	of	law,	but	they	are	essentially	specialised	
branches	of	the	same	discipline:	public	international	law.	Whilst	scholarship	engages	in	
great	 depth	 with	 progressive	 developments	 of	 individual	 specialised	 branches	 of	
international	 law	 (and	 at	 times	 examines	 the	 theme	 of	 gender	 and	 armed	 conflict	













The	 aim	 of	 this	 thesis	 is	 to	 examine	 the	 type	 and	 adequacy	 of	 international	 law’s	










This	 thesis	 recognizes	 that	 the	 actual	 impact	 of	 armed	 conflicts	 on	 women	 is	 not	
universal	per	se	and	does	vary	depending	on	a	number	of	factors.	These	may	include,	
but	 are	 not	 limited	 to,	 the	 geo-political	 context	 in	 which	 the	 conflict	 occurred;	 the	
diverse	 roles	 that	 women	 played	 during	 armed	 conflict;	 and,	 the	 socio-economic	
position	 of	 women	 within	 the	 particular	 society	 prior	 to	 conflict.	 Therefore,	 the	
category	of	‘impact’	is	not	homogenous.	Nonetheless,	amongst	these	types	of	impact	








12	Fionnuala	Ní	Aoláin,	Dina	 Francesca	Haynes,	 ‘The	Compatibility	 of	 Justice	 for	Women	with	 Jus	 Post	





nature	of	 conflicts	 and	 their	 aftermath	 and	 also	 analyses	 the	diverse	 implications	of	
armed	conflict	on	women,	which	are	by	 far	not	 limited	to	SGBV.	The	examination	of	





address	 (or	 are	 capable	 of	 addressing)	 some	 of	 the	major	 and	 prevalent	 challenges	
associated	 with	 the	 gendered	 impact	 of	 armed	 conflicts.	 These	 selected	 areas	 of	
international	law	deal	with	the	core	aspects	of	the	conflict	and	post-conflict	reality	for	








into	 the	 overall	 discussion	 of	 the	 themes	 of	 conflict-related	migration,	 post-conflict	
accountability	 and	 redress.	Whilst	 these	 are	 not	 the	 only	 areas	 of	 international	 law	
which	 may	 play	 a	 role	 in	 addressing	 the	 gendered	 impact	 of	 armed	 conflicts,	 they	
represent	the	main	areas	of	 IL	which	have	seen	developments	related	to	gender	and	
armed	 conflict.	 In	 fact,	 this	 thesis	 recognizes	 that	 other	 disciplines	 (such	 as	 security	
studies,	development	studies,	psychology	or	public	health)	may	be	even	more	suitable	
and	better	equipped	to	provide	certain	types	of	assistance	to	women	in	post-conflict	
situations.	 However,	 this	 thesis	 focuses	 on	 an	 examination	 of	 responses	 to	 the	









The	 research	 presented	 in	 this	 thesis	 is	 a	 result	 of	 the	 examination	 of	 primary	 and	
secondary	 sources	 relevant	 to	 the	 international	 legal	 responses	 to	 the	 gendered	
impact	 of	 armed	 conflict	 on	 women.	 The	 research	 consisted	 primarily	 of	 the	
examination	 of	 treaties,	 international	 case-law,	 reports	 of	 international	 bodies	 and	
organisations,	books,	journal	articles	and,	where	applicable,	online	commentary.		
	
Some	 chapters	 in	 this	 thesis	 draw	 on	 examples	 from	 specific	 armed	 conflicts	 and	
jurisdictions.	 This	 is	 particularly	 the	 case	 in	 Chapters	 4	 and	 5,	 which	 examine	 the	
prosecution	of	gender-based	crimes	before	international	criminal	courts	and	tribunals.	
Case-law	analysed	 in	 these	chapters	originates	 from	the	 jurisprudence	of	 the	two	ad	
hoc	international	criminal	tribunals	(the	International	Criminal	Tribunal	for	the	Former	
Yugoslavia	 (the	 ICTY)	and	 the	 International	Criminal	Tribunal	 for	Rwanda	 (the	 ICTR)),	
the	 Special	 Court	 for	 Sierra	 Leone	 (SCSL)	 and	 the	 ICC.	 These	 four	 courts	 have	 been	
chosen	 due	 to	 normative	 and	 jurisprudential	 developments	 advanced	 by	 them	 in	
relation	 to	 international	 prosecution	of	 gender-based	 crimes.	Although	 the	 SCSL	 is	 a	
hybrid	 court	and	 therefore	 classified	as	 ‘internationalised’	 rather	 than	 ‘international’	
per	 se,	 its	 jurisprudence	 on	 forced	 marriage	 as	 a	 gender-based	 crime	 necessitated	
reference	to	its	work	in	Chapters	4	and	5.	Furthermore,	the	thesis	draws	upon	relevant	
developments	 from	 regional	 courts	 and	 regional	 legal	 systems,	 such	 as	 the	 EU	




scope	 of	 the	 thesis,	 no	 single	 theoretical	 approach	 seemed	 to	 provide	 an	 adequate	
structure	 for	 the	 examination	 of	 the	 research	 questions.	 In	 fact,	 the	 reliance	 on	 a	
single	 theory	 of	 IL	 could	 be	 seen	 as	 constraining	 the	 scope,	 exploration	 and	
presentation	 of	 arguments	 discussed	 in	 this	 work.	 Rather,	 this	 research	 has	 been	
																																																								
13	Directive	 2011/95/EU	 of	 The	 European	 Parliament	 and	 of	 the	 Council	 of	 13	 December	 2011	 on	
standards	 for	 the	 qualification	 of	 third-country	 nationals	 or	 stateless	 persons	 as	 beneficiaries	 of	
international	 protection,	 for	 a	 uniform	 status	 for	 refugees	 or	 for	 persons	 eligible	 for	 subsidiary	













question,	 it	 borrows	 from	 what	 Charlesworth	 describes	 as	 ‘feminist	 methods	 in	
international	 law’.14	This	 approach	 also	 mirrors	 Charlesworth’s	 caution	 against	 the	
“tendency	 in	 feminist	 scholarship	 to	 pigeonhole	 theorists	 into	 fixed	 categories”	 and	
the	 increased	 occurrence	 of	 divisions	 amongst	 feminist	 legal	 scholars	 themselves.15	
Chinkin	 further	observes	 that	 “(a)	 feminist	approach	 takes	as	 its	 central	 concern	 the	
position	 of	 women	 and	 denotes	 a	 form	 of	 analysis.	 It	 takes	 gender	 as	 its	 primary	





the	 aftermath	 of	 conflicts.	 Are	 women’s	 concerns	 adequately	 addressed?	 Do	 these	
legal	developments	take	into	account	a	gender	perspective,	and	if	so,	how?	By	posing	
these	questions,	this	thesis	aims	to	uncover	the	gaps	and	silences	 in	the	response	of	
international	 law	 to	 the	 gendered	 impact	 of	 conflicts	 on	 women.	 In	 doing	 so,	 the	
research	presented	in	this	thesis	employs	gender	as	a	key	category	of	analysis.	For	the	
purposes	of	 this	 thesis,	 the	term	 ‘gender’	 is	understood	as	 the	social	construction	of	
																																																								
14 	Hilary	 Charlesworth,	 ‘Feminist	 Methods	 in	 International	 Law’	 (1999)	 93(2)	 American	 Journal	 of	
International	Law	379-394.	
15 	Ibid.,	 381;	 Hilary	 Charlesworth,	 ‘Feminist	 Ambivalence	 about	 International	 Law’	 (2005)	 11	
International	Legal	Theory	1,	2-4.	









The	 thesis	 analyses	 international	 legal	 responses	 to	 the	 gendered	 impact	 of	 armed	
conflict	 on	 women	 through	 the	 lens	 of	 three	 ‘trends’/	 developments	 in	 modern	
international	 law.	 It	 considers	 the	 role	 and	 place	 of	 gender	 in	 the	 development	 of	
international	law;	secondly,	it	draws	upon	the	concerns	surrounding	the	fragmentation	







Gender	 as	 a	 category	 of	 analysis	 entered	 the	 realm	 of	 international	 law	 fairly	 late.	
However,	 since	 the	 opening	 of	 the	 ‘feminist	 project	 in	 IL’	 in	 the	 early	 1990s	 by	
Charlesworth,	 Chinkin	 and	 Wright,	 attention	 to	 gender	 and	 gender	 analysis	 has	
increased	within	 international	 (but	 still	mostly	 feminist)	 scholarship	as	well	as	at	 the	




The	 first	 and	 immediately	 noticeable	 change	 related	 to	 the	 language	 used	 at	 an	
international	level.	The	terminology	of	‘gender’	as	well	as	‘gender	mainstreaming’	has	
become	 common	 at	 the	 UN,	 in	 international	 organizations	 and	 in	 international	 law	
more	 broadly.	 Gender	mainstreaming	 became	 a	 commonly	 (albeit	 often	 incorrectly)	
																																																								
17	This	definition	of	the	term	‘gender’	draws	upon	the	definition	of	‘gender’	in	Article	3(c)	of	the	Council	
of	 Europe	 Convention	 on	 preventing	 and	 combating	 violence	 against	 women	 and	 domestic	 violence	







the	 mainstream	 international	 law	 but	 also	 within	 initiatives	 and	 activities	 of	




including	 legislation,	 policies	 or	 programmes,	 in	 any	 area	 and	 at	 all	 levels.	 It	 is	 a	
strategy	 for	making	women’s	 as	well	 as	men’s	 concerns	 and	experiences	 an	 integral	
dimension	 in	 the	 design,	 implementation,	monitoring	 and	 evaluation	 of	 policies	 and	
programmes	 in	 all	 political,	 economic	 and	 societal	 spheres	 so	 that	women	 and	men	
benefit	 equally	 and	 inequality	 is	 not	 perpetuated.	 The	 ultimate	 goal	 is	 to	 achieve	
gender	equality”.20	
	
However,	 these	 efforts	 have	 yielded	 rather	 mixed	 results.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	







discrimination	 or	 structural	 causes	 of	 discrimination	 and	 violence	 against	 women.22	
The	 consequence	 of	 these	 shortcomings	 was	 the	 ‘add	 women	 and	 stir’	 approach,	
resulting	 in	a	 limited	genuine	engagement	with	root	causes	of	violations	of	women’s	
																																																								
19	See	 generally:	 Hilary	 Charlesworth,	 ‘Not	Waving	 but	 Drowning:	 Gender	Mainstreaming	 and	Human	
Rights	at	the	United	Nations’	(2005)	18	Harvard	Human	Rights	Journal	1.	









gender-equality-rights-resources-voice>	 accessed	 17	 November	 2015;	 UN	 Human	 Rights	 Council,	





rights	 and	 in	 producing	 limited	 knowledge	 about	 the	 factors	 underpinning	 the	
continued	discrimination	and	subordination	of	women.		
	
Furthermore,	 Charlesworth	 and	 Chinkin	 aptly	 observe	 that	 “the	 major	 practical	
problem	 with	 the	 process	 of	 gender	 mainstreaming	 has	 been	 translating	 worthy	
commitments	into	action”.23	This	is	particularly	evident	in	relation	to	the	international	
legal	responses	to	issues	surrounding	women,	conflicts,	peace	and	security.	No	doubt,	
the	 past	 two	 decades	 have	 seen	 important	 developments	 in	 that	 area,	 including	
institutional	 and	 attitudinal	 changes.	 In	 general,	 the	 topic	 of	 women	 and	 armed	
conflict	 is	 no	 longer	 neglected	 at	 an	 international	 level	 which,	 at	 the	 very	 least,	 is	
evident	from	multiple	engagements	of	the	UNGA,	the	UNSC	and	some	of	the	UN	treaty	
bodies	 regarding	 these	 matters.	 The	 adoption	 of	 the	 UNSCR	 1325	 in	 2000,	 the	
establishment	 of	 the	 WPS	 Agenda	 and	 subsequent	 UNSC	 WPS	 Resolutions,	 the	
establishment	of	the	Office	of	the	Special	Representative	of	the	Secretary-General	for	
Sexual	Violence	in	Conflict	(SRSG-SVC)	in	2009,	annual	reports	of	the	UNSG	on	Conflict-
Related	 Sexual	 Violence	 (since	 2012)	 and	 the	 CEDAW	 Committee’s	 General	
Recommendation	No.	 30	on	women	 in	 conflict	 prevention,	 conflict	 and	post-conflict	
situations	 (2013)	 illustrate	 some	 of	 these	 fairly	 recent	 developments. 24 	Rather,	
questions	remain	about	the	quality,	real	impact	and	efficiency	of	such	engagements.	In	
particular,	have	these	international	legal	developments	brought	about	substantive	and	






24 	The	 Office	 of	 the	 SRSG-SVC	 was	 established	 by	 UNSCR	 1888	 (30	 September	 2009)	 UN	 Doc.	
S/RES/1888,	para.4.	The	first	Special	Representative,	Margot	Wallström,	took	office	in	April	2010.	Since	
September	 2012,	 the	 position	 of	 the	 SRSG-SVC	 is	 held	 by	 Zainab	 Bangura	 (information	 correct	 as	 of	
November	2015);		
UNGA,	UNSC,	 Conflict-related	 sexual	 violence.	 Report	 of	 the	 Secretary-General,	 UN	Doc.	 A/66/657*	 -	
S/2012/33*,	13	January	2012;	UNGA,	UNSC,	Sexual	violence	in	conflict.	Report	of	the	Secretary-General,	








Adoption	 of	 the	 UNSCR	 1325	marked	 the	 first	 official	 recognition	 by	 the	UNSC	 that	
women	are	not	just	victims	in	armed	conflict.	The	resolution	emphasizes	diverse	roles	
of	 women	 in	 conflict,	 conflict	 prevention	 and	 in	 peace	 building,	 stressing	 the	
importance	 of	 involving	women	 in	 post-conflict	 decision-making	mechanisms,	 peace	




conflict	 and	 in	 countering	 violent	 extremism	 as	 well	 as	 the	 urgent	 need	 to	 involve	
women	in	all	stages	of	post-conflict	decision-making	and	peace	processes,	others	took	
a	 step	 back,	 focusing	 exclusively	 on	 sexual	 violence	 and,	 what	 is	 more,	 reinforcing	
stereotypes	attached	to	the	issue	of	women	and	conflict.	Otto	notes	the	peculiarity	of	
the	 “conservative	 gender	 politics”	 of	 UNSCR	 1820,	 which	 perpetuated	 a	 number	 of	
myths	surrounding	conflict-related	sexual	violence	resulting	in	a	resolution	“grounded	
in	the	old	script	of	biological	certainties,	which	accepts	women’s	inequality	as	natural	
and	 armed	 conflict	 as	 inevitable”.25	Furthermore,	 whilst	 welcoming	 the	 inclusion	 in	
UNSCR	2243	of	provisions	related	to	the	needs	of,	and	harms	experienced	by,	women	
in	 the	 contexts	of	 terrorism,	 counter-terrorism	and	countering	violent	extremism,	Ní	
Aoláin	 warns	 against	 the	 risk	 of	 securitizing	 women’s	 lives,	 especially	 in	 what	 may	
appear	to	be	an	already	complex	and	fragile	reality.26	Nonetheless,	a	major	weakness	
of	UNSCR	1325	and	subsequent	WPS	resolutions	is	that	they	were	not	enacted	under	
Chapter	VII	of	 the	UN	Charter	and,	 therefore,	are	not	 legally	binding.	As	such,	whilst	
WPS	resolutions	succeed	in	bringing	the	diverse	issues	surrounding	women,	peace	and	




25	Dianne	 Otto,	 ‘Power	 and	 Danger:	 Feminist	 Engagement	 with	 International	 Law	 through	 the	 UN	
Security	 Council’	 (2010)	 32(1)	 Australian	 Feminist	 Law	 Journal	 97,	 102-103;	Dianne	Otto	 ‘The	 Exile	 of	
Inclusion:	 Reflections	 on	 Gender	 Issues	 in	 International	 Law	 over	 the	 Last	 Decade’	 (2009)	 10(1)	
Melbourne	Journal	of	International	Law	11,	24.	
26		Fionnuala	Ní	Aoláin,	‘The	UN	Security	Council’s	New	Resolution	on	Women,	Peace	and	Security’	(Just	







form	 of	 the	 provisions	 of	 the	 ICC	 Statute	 listing	 sexual	 violence	 as	 an	 international	
crime,	Article	7(1)(h)	of	the	ICC	Statute	listing	gender	as	a	ground	for	persecution	as	a	
crime	against	humanity	(CAH),	as	well	as	jurisprudence	of	international	criminal	courts	
and	 tribunals	 (Chapters	4	and	5).27	In	 addition,	 the	Arms	Trade	Treaty	2013	 requires	





of	 gender-based	 persecution	 (Chapter	 3)	 as	 gender	 is	 not	 included	 as	 a	 ground	 for	
persecution	 under	 the	 the	 Geneva	 Convention	 Relating	 to	 the	 Status	 of	 Refugees	
1951.29	In	recognition	of	this	gap	and	the	pressing	need	to	address	the	issue,	in	2002	
the	UNHCR	issued	official	guidelines	on	gender-related	persecution	which	encouraged	
gender-sensitive	 interpretation	of	 the	 five	convention	grounds.30		 In	contrast,	gender	
aspects	 of	 conflict-related	migration	 have	 been	much	 less	 explored,	 both	 at	 the	UN	
level	and	 in	 international	 legal	scholarship.	 In	fact,	there	exists	a	single	UNHCR	study	
comprehensively	addressing	 these	 interconnected	 issues,	with	a	majority	of	 relevant	





27	However,	the	 limitations	caused	by	the	constrained	definition	of	 ‘gender’	 in	the	 ICC	Statute	remain:	
see	section	2.3.1.	of	chapter	4.		
28	Article	7(4)	Arms	Trade	Treaty	2013	(2	April	2013)	(hereinafter:	ATT	2013).	
29	The	Geneva	Convention	Relating	 to	 the	Status	of	Refugees	1951	 (28	 July	1951),	189	UNTS	150	 (the	
Refugee	Convention).	
30	UNHCR,	 ‘Guidelines	 on	 International	 Protection:	 Gender-	 Related	 Persecution	 within	 the	 context	 of	
Article	1A(2)	of	the	1951	Convention	and/or	its	1967	Protocol	Relating	to	the	Status	of	Refugees’,	7	May	
2002,	HCR/GIP/02/01.	








persecution	 or	who	 flee	 indiscriminate	 violence	 (including	 gender-based	 violence)	 in	




An	 attempt	 to	 address	 the	 situation	 of	 women	 in	 post-conflict	 situations	 has	 been	
demonstrated	in	some	recent	developments	in	IHRL.	The	CEDAW	Committee	General	
Recommendation	 30	 focuses	 specifically	 on	 addressing	 the	 situation	 of	 women	 in	
conflict	 and	 post-conflict	 settings,	 not	 only	 in	 light	 of	 CEDAW	 but	 also	 other	
international	law	instruments.33	Importantly,	and	in	contrast	to	many	developments	in	





aftermath,	 especially	 in	 relation	 to	 reparations. 35 	The	 need	 for	 transformative	
reparations	 was	 also	 emphasized	 in	 the	 Nairobi	 Declaration	 on	Women’s	 and	 Girls’	
Rights	 to	 a	 Remedy	 and	 Reparation	 2007	 (a	 document	 created	 by	 women’s	 rights	
organizations	 and	 activists)	 and	 further	 mirrored	 in	 the	 UNSG’s	 Guidance	 Note	 on	











36	Nairobi	 Declaration	 on	 Women’s	 and	 Girls’	 Rights	 to	 a	 Remedy	 and	 Reparation	 (hereinafter	 the	
Nairobi	Declaration)	<https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/NAIROBI_DECLARATIONeng.pdf>	accessed	17	July	
2015,	Article	3;	UN	OHCHR,	 ‘Guidance	Note	of	the	Secretary-General:	Reparations	for	Conflict-Related	





There	 can	 be	 no	 doubt	 that	 the	 last	 two	 decades	 saw	 some	 significant	 changes	 in	
relation	 to	 international	 legal	 responses	 to	 the	 gendered	 impact	 of	 conflicts	 on	
women.	 The	 topic	 has	 not	 only	 gained	 attention	 at	 an	 international	 level,	 but	 the	
increased	interest	in	the	gendered	aspects	of	armed	conflict	has	also	triggered	a	range	
of	advances	that	are	more	substantively	examined	in	this	thesis.	However,	despite	the	
issue	 finally	 reaching	 international	 agendas,	 the	 majority	 of	 initiatives	 and	 legal	
developments	in	this	field	have	focused	on	sexual	violence.	Only	in	some	instances	the	
analysis	of	gender	and	gender	relations	as	a	key	factor	shaping	women’s	experiences	




conflicts	 and	 their	 aftermath	 has	 gained	 considerable	 momentum.	 Analyses	
surrounding	gender	and	armed	conflict,	gendered	dimensions	of	post-conflict	criminal	
and	 transitional	 justice,	 the	 role	 of	 gender	 in	 peacekeeping	 and	 peacebuilding	 (to	
name	 just	a	 few	aspects)	became	the	 focus	of	much	of	 the	 feminist	 commentary	on	
international	law.	However,	Charlesworth	challenges	Halley’s	assertion	that	“feminism	
is	 running	 things”	 in	 international	 law	 and	 remains	 doubtful	 about	 the	 actual	
engagement	 of	 mainstream	 international	 law	 with	 feminist	 perspectives	 on	 the	
discipline.38	Warning	 of	 an	 emergence	 of	 a	 feminist	 scholarly	 ghetto	 in	 international	
law,	 Charlesworth	 notes	 that	 “major	writings	 in	 international	 law	 and	 theory	 hardly	
engage	 with	 feminist	 perspectives	 on	 IL	 or,	 in	 fact,	 any	 outsider	 perspectives	
whatsoever”. 39 	Rather,	 feminist	 engagements	 with	 mainstream	 international	 law	
continue	 to	 be	 a	 “decorative	 frill	 on	 the	 edge	 of	 the	 discipline”.40	Mindful	 of	 these	
																																																								
38	Janet	Halley,	Split	Decisions	–	how	and	why	 take	a	break	 from	 feminism	 (Princeton	University	Press	
2006)	 20;	Hilary	Charlesworth,	 ‘Talking	 to	Ourselves:	 Should	 International	 Lawyers	 Take	a	Break	 from	
Feminism?’	in:	Sari	Kouvo,	Zoe	Pearson	(eds),	Feminist	Perspectives	on	contemporary	International	Law.	
Between	Resistance	and	Compliance?	(Hart	Publishing	2011)	22.	
39	Hilary	 Charlesworth,	 ‘Feminist	 Ambivalence	 about	 International	 Law’	 (2005)	 11	 International	 Legal	
Theory	1,	 2	 (noting	 the	exception	of	 Fernando	Tesón,	who,	 albeit	 very	 critically,	 responds	 to	 feminist	
perspectives	 on	 international	 law);	 Sadat	 also	 raises	 the	 issue	 of	 a	 ‘gender	 ghetto’	 in	 context	 of	
international	 criminal	 law:	 Leyla	Nadya	 Sadat,	 ‘Avoiding	 Creation	 of	 a	Gender	Ghetto	 in	 International	
Criminal	Law’	(2011)	11	International	Criminal	Law	Review	655.	











In	 2006,	 the	 International	 Law	Commission	 (ILC)	 issued	 a	 report	 authored	 by	Martti	
Koskenniemi	addressing	 the	 impending	 issue	of	 fragmentation	of	 international	 law.41	
Fragmentation	of	IL	refers	to	the	substantive	change	in	the	discipline	whereby	matters	
that	used	to	be	governed	by	‘general	international	law’	have	become	addressed	by	the	
specialised	 regimes	 within	 the	 discipline,	 such	 as	 IRL,	 ICL,	 IHRL,	 law	 of	 the	 sea	 or	
environmental	 law.	 The	 key	 concern,	 and	 the	 ultimate	 rationale	 for	 the	 report,	was	




In	 addition	 to	 ‘substantive	 fragmentation	 of	 IL’	 which	 refers	 to	 the	 emergence	 of	
specialised	 and	 relatively	 autonomous	 branches	 of	 international	 law	 addressing	
specific	 issues	 (such	 as	 IRL,	 ICL,	 international	 environmental	 law)	 an	 ‘institutional	
fragmentation’	 is	 taking	place,	marked	by	 the	proliferation	of	 specialised	 institutions	
within	 the	 individual	 branches	 of	 international	 law.	 One	 example	 of	 such	
fragmentation	was	 the	 emergence	 of	multiple	UN	 agencies	 addressing	 the	 issues	 of	
women	and	women’s	 rights,	which	were	unified	 in	 June	2010	under	a	 single	 agency	
called	UN	Women.43		Similarly,	an	expansion	and	greater	specialisation	of	 institutions	
within	the	 field	of	 IHRL	can	be	observed.	 It	 is	marked	by	co-existence	of,	at	 the	very	
																																																								
41	International	 Law	 Commission,	 “Fragmentation	 of	 International	 Law:	 Difficulties	 Arising	 from	 the	




Research	 and	 Training	 Institute	 for	 the	 Advancement	 of	 Women	 (INSTRAW),	 Office	 of	 the	 Special	







treaty	 bodies,	 all	 of	 which	 have	 powers	 of	 pronouncing	 on	 interpretation	 of	
international	and	regional	human	rights	treaties	as	well	as	general	IHRL.	Another	layer	
of	 complexity	 is	 added	 by	 the	 jurisprudence	 of	 international	 criminal	 courts	 and	
tribunals	 which	 frequently	 invoke	 international	 human	 rights	 norms	 in	 their	
judgments,	offering	further	interpretations	of	IHRL.			
	
In	 this	 busy	 context,	 is	 fragmentation	 something	 international	 lawyers	 should	worry	
about?	The	fragmentation	debate	unveiled	polarised	views	reflected	in	a	rich	literature	
on	 the	 subject.44	Some	 international	 lawyers	 have	 referred	 to	 this	 development	 in	
terms	 of	 a	 threat	 to	 the	 unity	 of	 international	 law,	 ‘dangers’,	 ‘risks’	 and	 expressing	
general	 anxiety	 about	 the	 effects	 of	 fragmentation.45	In	 contrast,	 other	 scholars	 and	
practitioners	 acknowledge	 that	 ending	 fragmentation	 is	 an	 unrealistic	 project	 and	
instead	point	towards	the	benefits	of	fragmentation	and	potential	transformative	and	
modernising	 effects	 of	 its	 occurrence	 within	 the	 discipline. 46 	In	 addition,	 some	
commentators	 also	 draw	 attention	 to	 further	 fragmentation	 taking	 place	 within	
already	specialised	branches	of	PIL,	such	as	 ICL	or	 IHRL,	some	examples	of	which	are	
covered	 in	 this	 thesis.47	Arguing	 in	 favour	 of	 fragmentation,	 Simma	 noted	 that	 the	
emergence	of	 specialised	branches	of	 international	 law	and	proliferation	of	 tribunals	
did	not	prevent	the	development	of	 international	 law,	but	in	fact	“these	sub-systems	
																																																								
44	Gerhard	 Hafner,	 ‘Pros	 and	 Cons	 Ensuing	 from	 Fragmentation	 of	 International	 Law’	 (2004)	 25(4)	
Michigan	 Journal	 of	 International	 Law	 849;	 Joost	 Pauwelyn,	 ‘Bridging	 Fragmentation	 and	 Unity:	
International	 Law	 as	 a	 Universe	 of	 Inter-Connected	 Islands’	 (2004)	 25(4)	 Michigan	 Journal	 of	
International	 Law	 903;	 Margaret	 A.	 Young,	 Regime	 Interaction	 in	 International	 Law.	 Facing	
Fragmentation	 (CUP	2012);	Philippa	Webb,	 International	 Judicial	 Integration	and	Fragmentation	 (OUP	
2013);	Mads	Andenas,	Eirik	Bjorge	(eds),	A	Farewell	to	Fragmentation.	Reassertion	and	Convergence	in	
International	Law	(CUP	2015).	
45	Martti	Koskenniemi,	Paivi	Leino,	 ‘Fragmentation	of	 International	Law?	Postmodern	Anxieties’	 (2002)	
15	 Leiden	 Journal	 of	 International	 Law	553;	 ICJ,	 The	Proliferation	of	 international	 judicial	 bodies:	 The	
outlook	for	the	international	legal	order.	Speech	by	His	Excellency	Judge	Gilbert	Guillame,	President	of	
the	 International	 Court	 of	 Justice,	 to	 the	 Sixth	 Committee	 of	 the	 General	 Assembly	 of	 the	 United	
Nations,	 27	 October	 2000,	 <http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?pr=85&pt=3&p1=1&p2=3&p3=1>	
accessed	17	October	2015.		
46	Bruno	Simma,	 ‘Universality	of	 International	Law	from	the	Perspective	of	a	Practitioner’	 (2009)	20(2)	
European	 Journal	 of	 International	 Law	 265;	 Mads	 Andenas,	 Eirik	 Bjorge,	 ‘Introduction:	 from	
fragmentation	to	convergence	 in	 international	 law’	 in:	Mads	Andenas,	Eirik	Bjorge	(eds),	A	Farewell	to	
Fragmentation.	Reassertion	and	Convergence	in	International	Law	(CUP	2015)	1.	
47	Carsten	Stahn,	Larissa	van	der	Herik	(eds),	The	Diversification	and	fragmentation	of	international	law	




of	 international	 law	may	 show	 (…)	 the	way	 forward	 for	 general	 international	 law”.48	
Furthermore,	Simma	accurately	notes	that	“the	expertise	that	lawyers	will	accumulate	
by	 working	 within	 them,	 as	 well	 as	 bodies	 of	 case	 law	 of	 the	 various	 courts	 and	
tribunals	 mandated	 to	 interpret	 and	 enforce	 these	 regimes,	 will	 contribute	 to	 a	
growing	 and	 ever	 more	 dense	 corpus	 of	 law	 which	 responds	 to	 the	 needs	 of	 the	
specific	regime”.49	
	
However,	 the	 question	 paramount	 to	 the	 topic	 explored	 in	 this	 thesis	 is	 how	 the	
phenomenon	 of	 fragmentation	 influences	 the	 type	 and	 nature	 of	 international	 legal	
responses	 to	 the	 gendered	 impact	 of	 armed	 conflict	 and	 position	 of	 women	 in	 the	







	As	 explored	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 this	 chapter,	 the	 traditional,	 unitary	 system	 of	
international	 law	 has	 proven	 not	 to	 respond	 adequately	 to	 the	 position	 of	 women	
whether	 in	peacetime,	during	armed	conflicts	or	 in	their	aftermath.	 In	particular,	the	
masculine	 structures	 of	 international	 law	 reinforced	 the	 strict	 application	 of	
public/private	 dichotomies,	 largely	 ignoring	 their	 gendered	 impact	 on	 women. 50		
Furthermore,	 for	 many	 decades	 the	 gendered	 aspects	 of	 armed	 conflict	 and	 the	
breadth	 of	 their	 impact	 were	 occupying	 the	 boundaries	 of	 the	 discipline	 with	 very	
little,	if	any,	real	engagement	from	the	‘mainstream	international	law’.	For	instance,	in	
the	 aftermath	 of	 World	 War	 II,	 harms	 sustained	 by	 women	 during	 that	 conflict	
remained	 largely	 unaddressed.	 The	 lack	 of	 international	 prosecutions	 of	 sexual	
violence	 committed	 in	 the	 course	 of	 that	 conflict	 at	Nuremberg	 and	 the	 absence	 of	
																																																								









apologies	 and	 reparations	 for	 comfort	 women	 on	 the	 Far	 East	 front	 are	 classic	
examples	of	such	silences.	It	was	not	until	1979	(i.e.	over	30	years	since	the	adoption	





Set	 against	 this	 background,	 Koskenniemi’s	 claim	 that	 “only	 a	 coherent	 legal	 system	
treats	 legal	 subjects	 equally”	 is	 questionable.52	Feminist	 international	 lawyers	 have	
long	questioned	the	equal	status	of	women	under	 international	 law	as	well	as	within	
its	structures.	Until	the	relatively	recent	engagement	of	certain	parts	of	 international	
law	 with	 women’s	 issues,	 women’s	 rights	 were	 marginalised	 and,	 despite	 a	 few	
examples	 to	 the	 contrary,	 little	 attention	 continues	 to	 be	 paid	 to	 the	 gender	
dimensions	 in	 the	 development	 of	mainstream	 international	 law.	 This	 is	 despite	 the	
clear	 commitment	 of	 the	 UN	 to	 the	 principles	 of	 equality	 and	 non-discrimination,	
which	are	embedded	in	Article	1	of	the	UN	Charter,	the	UDHR,	and	have	more	recently	
been	 considered	 as	 one	 of	 eight	UN	Millennium	Development	Goals.53	Furthermore,	
not	only	do	these	two	principles	underpin	the	key	IHRL,	IHL	and	ICL	treaties,	they	are	
also	 thought	 to	 constitute	 jus	 cogens.	 In	 the	 view	 of	 the	 Inter-American	 Court	 of	










53	Article	 1(3)	 of	 the	 UN	 Charter	 list	 as	 one	 of	 the	 purposes	 of	 the	 United	 Nations	 “to	 achieve	
international	 co-operation	 in	 solving	 international	 problems	 of	 an	 economic,	 social,	 cultural,	 or	










on	women.	 The	 emergence	 of	 increasingly	 specialised	 branches	 of	 international	 law	
has	 generally	 allowed	 for	more	 precise	 addressing	 of	 issues	 through	 normative	 and	
institutional	developments.	The	exception	to	this	general	pattern	of	fragmentation	of	
responses	 is	 the	WPS	 agenda,	 which	 arguably	 sits	 within	 ‘mainstream	 international	
law’	 due	 to	 its	 positioning	 within	 the	 UNSC	 structures.	 Still,	 the	 WPS	 resolutions	
consistently	 engage	 with	 ‘fragmented’	 branches	 of	 international	 law	 and	 call	 upon	
state	obligations	under	particular	treaties.	
	
However,	 the	 rapid	 development	 of	 ICL	 and	 the	 increased	 specialisation	 within	 the	
field	 of	 IHRL	were	 placed	 at	 the	 forefront	 of	 shaping	 responses	 to	 some	 aspects	 of	
gendered	impact	of	conflicts	on	women.	International	prosecutions	of	conflict-related	
gender-based	 crimes,	 albeit	 demonstrative	 of	 some	 shortcomings	 (explored	 in	
Chapters	 4	 and	 5),	 marked	 a	 significant	 step	 towards	 ending	 impunity	 for	 gender-
based	crimes,	especially	those	involving	conflict-related	sexual	violence.	The	normative	
impact	of	 ICL	developments	should	not	be	undervalued	either.	The	work	of	 the	 ICTR	
and	 the	 ICTY	 initiated	 the	 closing	of	 certain	 normative	 gaps	 in	 international	 law,	 for	
instance	 by	 creating	 a	 definition	 of	 rape	 as	 well	 as	 of	 other	 sexual	 offences	 in	
international	 law.55	Subsequent	 advances	 such	 as	 the	 coming	 into	 force	 of	 the	 ICC	




effects	 on	 women	 could	 be	 observed	 within	 the	 IHRL	 framework,	 particularly	 with	
regard	to	reparations	(discussed	in	Chapter	6).	The	2005	Basic	Principles	on	the	Right	
to	a	Remedy	and	Reparation,	whilst	not	referring	to	gender	directly	and	articulated	in	
a	 soft	 law	 form,	 nonetheless	 provided	 long-overdue	 guidance	 on	 reparations	 for	
violations	of	IHRL	and	IHL.56	The	topic	of	gender	and	reparations	was	further	explored	
																																																								
55	The	normative	advances	made	by	 the	 ICTY	and	 the	 ICTR	are	discussed	 in	detail	 in	 chapter	4	of	 this	
thesis.		




in	 the	Nairobi	Declaration	 and	 formed	a	 key	 focus	of	 the	UNSG’s	Guidance	Note	on	
Reparations	 for	 Conflict-Related	 Sexual	 Violence. 57 	In	 comparison,	 despite	 the	
proliferation	of	the	UN	human	rights	treaty	bodies	highlighted	in	the	2006	ILC	Report,	
their	involvement	with	issues	surrounding	gendered	effects	of	armed	conflicts	and	the	
situation	 of	 women	 in	 their	 aftermath	 is	 rather	 scarce.58	With	 the	 exception	 of	 the	
CEDAW	 Committee’s	 General	 Recommendation	 No.30,	 which	 specifically	 addresses	
the	rights	of	women	in	conflict	and	post-conflict	contexts,	other	treaty	bodies	have	so	
far	resisted	addressing	these	issues	in	a	substantive	and	comprehensive	manner	from	
the	 perspective	 of	 their	 respective	 treaties.	 In	 its	 most	 recent	 work,	 the	 CEDAW	
Committee	also	considered	issues	of	gender-sensitive	and	transformative	reparations,	
conflict-related	 forced	 marriage	 and	 gendered	 aspects	 of	 conflict-related	
displacement. 59 	Furthermore,	 General	 Recommendation	 No.30	 emphasizes	
complementarity	 between	 state	 obligations	 under	 CEDAW	 with	 IHL,	 ICL	 and	 IRL	 in	
relation	to	securing	and	delivering	women’s	rights	 in	post-conflict	contexts.60	The	UN	
Committee	 Against	 Torture	 commented	 on	 a	 gender-inclusive	 understanding	 of	
torture,	 and	 stressed	 the	 state	 obligation	 to	 prevent	 acts	 of	 torture	 perpetrated	 by	
non-state	 actors,	 including	 various	 forms	 of	 GBV. 61 	In	 addition,	 the	 Committee	
emphasized	the	gender	aspect	of	redress	and	compensation	for	victims	of	torture	and	
the	 need	 for	 gender-sensitive	 procedures	 accompanying	 judicial	 and	 non-judicial	
proceedings.62	However,	 the	Human	Rights	Committee	 (HRCttee)	and	the	Committee	
on	Economic,	Social	and	Cultural	Rights	 (CESCR),	which	overlook	 the	 two	key	human	
rights	treaties,	ICCPR	and	ICESCR,	have	demonstrated	little	engagement	with	the	topic	
																																																																																																																																																																		






of	 the	 Committee	 on	 the	 Rights	 of	 the	 Child	 on	 harmful	 practices,	 UN	 Doc.	 CEDAW/C/GC/31-	
CRC/C/GC/18,	 14	 November	 2014,	 para.22	 (forced	marriage);	 CEDAW	GR	 30,	 paras.53-57	 &	 CEDAW,	










of	 gender,	 armed	 conflict	 and	 post-conflict	 situations.	 The	 HRCttee	 limited	 its	
comments	 on	 women’s	 rights	 in	 and	 after	 armed	 conflict	 to	 brief	 and	 general	




Fragmentation	 of	 international	 law	 enabled	 the	 shaping	 of	 international	 legal	
responses	to	the	gendered	effects	of	armed	conflicts,	but	at	the	same	restricted	these	
efforts	predominantly	to	soft	law.	Some	mainstream	international	law	developments,	
such	 as	 the	 much	 celebrated	 WPS	 agenda	 at	 the	 UNSC,	 offer	 merely	 “rhetorical	
comfort”	by	bringing	issues	of	women,	conflicts	and	peace	to	the	institutional	realm	of	
international	 law,	 but	 fail	 to	 create	 mechanisms	 to	 ensure	 implementation	 and	
observance	of	the	key	goals	of	the	WPS	agenda.64	This	feature	has	serious	implications	
for	the	accountability	of	states	in	relation	to	addressing	the	situation	of	women	in	the	
aftermath	 of	 conflicts.	 Ní	 Aoláin	 also	 warns	 of	 the	 difficulties	 of	 reforming	 a	
fragmented	 system	 comprised	 of	 multiple	 arenas	 addressing	 issues	 concerning	
women,	peace	and	security.65	Furthermore,	the	disjointed	nature	of	international	legal	
responses	to	these	issues	appears	to	prioritise	some	areas	of	response	over	others,	for	
instance	 international	 criminal	 justice	 over	 securing	 and	 giving	 effect	 to	 economic,	
social	and	cultural	rights	of	women	in	the	aftermath.		
	
Overall,	 the	 developments	 regarding	 women	 and	 armed	 conflict	 show	 that	
fragmentation,	whilst	 resisted	by	 some,	enabled	 international	 law	 to	 respond	 to	 the	
events,	 demands	 and	 problems	 arising	 in	 a	 highly	 politicised	 and	 increasingly	
globalised	 modern	 international	 scene,	 including	 the	 gendered	 impact	 of	 armed	












From	 the	 perspective	 of	 this	 thesis,	 the	 areas	 of	 international	 law	 to	 which	 the	
research	 questions	 relate	 may	 be	 perceived	 as	 an	 already	 specialised	 regime	
comprised	of	a	range	of	international	legal	responses	to	the	situation	of	women	in	the	
aftermath	of	conflict.	Some	may	even	argue	that	this	is	sub-system	of	jus	post	bellum-	
a	 new	 and	 highly	 specialised	 branch	 of	 IL	 in	 the	 making	 (discussed	 in	 section	 3.3.	






The	third	and	final	perspective	which	 informs	the	research	presented	 in	this	thesis	 is	
jus	 post	 bellum	 as	 an	 emerging	 field	 of	 international	 law	 designed	 to	 address	 and	







armed	 conflicts,	 the	 rise	of	 internal	 violence	and	 the	 increased	participation	of	 non-
state	 actors	 in	modern	 conflicts	mean	 that	 the	 applicability	 of	 the	 jus	 in	 bello	 is	 no	
longer	determined	by	a	formal	declaration	of	a	state	of	war	by	the	state.	Furthermore,	
it	 has	 become	 increasingly	 difficult	 to	 draw	 a	 clear	 distinction	 between	 different	
phases	 of	 modern	 armed	 conflict. 66 	Similarly,	 peace	 processes,	 especially	 those	
following	 non-international	 armed	 conflicts,	 have	 become	 internationalised	 affairs	
rather	 than	 matters	 left	 to	 the	 discretion	 of	 individual	 states. 67 	Finally,	 modern	
																																																								









in	 post-conflict	 reality	 and	 that	 cessation	 of	 the	 conflict	 requires	 further	 steps	 to	
facilitate	peacebuilding.	As	such,	international	law	created	mechanisms	which	address	
some	 of	 the	 challenges	 arising	 in	 the	 process	 of	 transition	 from	 conflict	 to	 peace,	
including	 international	 accountability	 for	 IHL	 and	 IHRL	 violations	 (Chapters	 4	 and	 5),	
return	 of	 property	 and	 post-conflict	 reparations	 (Chapter	 6)	 and	 conflict-related	
migration	(Chapter	3).			
	
Although	 Schwarzenberger	 and	 Jessup	 considered	 issues	 of	 international	 legal	
regulation	 of	 the	 transition	 between	 war	 and	 peace	 as	 long	 ago	 as	 the	 1940s	 and	
1950s,	 it	 was	 not	 until	 the	 early	 2000s	 that	 the	 topic	 of	 jus	 post	 bellum	 attracted	
immense	 interest	 of	 international	 legal	 scholars.68	Thus	 far,	 the	debates	 surrounding	
jus	post	bellum	have	yielded	more	questions	than	answers.	Not	surprisingly,	there	are	
various	 views	 on	 the	 status	 of	 jus	 post	 bellum	 and	 the	 substantive	 content	 of	 this	
newly	 forming	 area	 of	 international	 law.	 The	 name	 itself	 gives	 rise	 to	 some	 basic	
questions	regarding	the	scope	of	jus	post	bellum:	what	law	does	it	comprise	(jus);	what	
is	 its	 temporal	 and	 contextual	 scope	 (post);	 what	 types	 of	 conflicts	 are	 addressed	
(bellum)?69	Jus	post	bellum	is	often	considered	a	part	of	other	fields	and	concepts	such	
as	 international	conflict	and	security	 law,	 lex	pacificatoria,	peacebuilding,	transitional	
justice	or	 R2P.70	It	 is	 referred	 to	 as	 ‘the	 right	way	 to	 end	 the	war’,	 but	 also	 as	 ‘new	
																																																								
68	Georg	 Schwarzenberger,	 ‘Jus	 Pacis,	 Ac	 Belli?’	 (1943)	 37	American	 Journal	 of	 International	 Law	460;	
Phillip	 Jessup,	 ‘Should	 International	 Law	 Recognize	 an	 Intermediate	 Status	 Between	 Peace	 and	War’	
(1954)	48	American	Journal	of	International	Law	98.		
Carsten	Stahn,	 ‘“Jus	ad	Bellum”,	“Jus	 in	Bello”,	 “Jus	post	Bellum”?	–	Rethinking	 the	conception	of	 the	
Law	of	Armed	 	Force’	 (2006)	17(5)	European	 Journal	of	 International	 Law	921;	Carsten	Stahn,	 Jann	K.	
Kleffner	 (eds),	 Jus	Post	Bellum:	 Towards	a	 Law	of	 Transition	 From	Conflict	 to	Peace	 (TMC	Asser	Press	
2008);	 Vincent	 Chetail	 (ed),	Post-Conflict	 Peacebuilding.	 A	 Lexicon	 (OUP	 2009);	 Larry	May,	 Andrew	 T.	
Forcehimes	 (eds),	Morality,	 Jus	 Post	Bellum,	 and	 International	 Law	 (CUP	2012);	 Larry	May,	After	War	
Ends:	a	Philosophical	Perspective	 (CUP	2012);	Brett	Bowden,	Hilary	Charlesworth,	 Jeremy	Farrall	 (eds),	
The	 Role	 of	 International	 Law	 in	 Rebuilding	 Societies	 after	 Conflict.	 Great	 Expectations	 (CUP	 2012);	







Peace.	 Peace	 Agreements	 and	 the	 Lex	 Pacificatoria	 (OUP	 2008);	 Vincent	 Chetail	 (ed),	 Post-Conflict	
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wine	 in	 old	 bottles’.71	There	 exists	 a	 general	 lack	 of	 consensus	 amongst	 scholars	
regarding	the	scope	and	status	of	jus	post	bellum:	some	consider	it	to	be	a	completely	
new	 and	 separate	 branch	 of	 international	 law	 which	 will	 require	 creation	 of	 new	
principles	and	norms,	whilst	others	see	it	as	an	umbrella	term	for	various	instruments	
applicable	 to	 the	 situations	 of	 transition	 from	 conflict	 to	 peace. 72 	However,	
approaching	jus	post	bellum	as	a	brand	new	branch	of	international	law	which	is	yet	to	
be	created	carries	some	potential	risks	and	limitations,	especially	from	a	practical	law-
making	 point	 of	 view.	 Arguably,	 the	 formation	 of	 a	 new	 regime	 within	 the	 existing	
structure	of	public	international	law	and	in	accordance	with	principles	of	international	
law	making	would	require	the	creation	of	a	number	of	multilateral	treaties	as	well	as	
soft	 law	 instruments.	 This	 raises	 an	 immediate	 issue	 of	 consensus	 being	 reached	
between	 states	 regarding	 the	 content	 of	 such	 a	 treaty	 (or	 treaties).	 An	 attempt	 to	
codify	 jus	 post	 bellum	 would	 test	 the	 general	 willingness	 of	 states	 to	 engage	 in	 a	
complex	 and	 time-consuming	 process	 of	 interstate	 treaty	 negotiations	 as	 well	 as	
states’	readiness	to	be	bound	by	international	obligations	set	out	in	new	instrument(s).	





the	 construction	 and	 application	 of	 a	 jus	 post	 bellum	 regime	 does	 not	 need	 to	 rely	
exclusively	 on	moral	 obligations.	 In	 fact,	 it	 can	 be	 argued	 that	 it	 is	 paramount	 that	
																																																																																																																																																																		
Peacebuilding.	 A	 Lexicon	 (OUP	 2009;	 Carsten	 Stahn,	 ‘R2P	 and	 Jus	 Post	 Bellum:	 Towards	 a	 Polycentric	




72	For	 instance,	 Stahn	 (supra	 67	 and	 68)	 as	 well	 as	 Österdahl	 &	 van	 Zadel	 (supra	 66)	 advocate	 the	
creation	of	the	new	framework	of	 jus	post	bellum.	 In	contrast,	Cryer	remains	skeptical	about	the	need	












international	 law	 principles	 and	 norms	 underpin	 the	 very	 structure	 and	 substantive	
content	 of	 this	 legal	 framework.	 Positioning	 the	 ‘jus’	 of	 jus	 post	 bellum	 within	
international	 law	 allows	 the	 placement	 of	 greater	 emphasis	 on	 international	
obligations	of	states,	which	is	of	particular	relevance	in	the	context	of	the	enforcement	
of	states’	human	rights	obligations	as	well	as	ensuring	compliance	and	accountability.	
In	 addition,	 Österdahl	 and	 van	 Zadel	 suggest	 that	 labelling	 of	 the	 law	 applicable	 to	
post-conflict	 situations	 may	 help	 “put	 the	 post-conflict	 phase	 in	 the	 centre	 of	 the	




This	 thesis	 approaches	 jus	 post	 bellum	 as	 an	 emerging	 regime	 in	 the	 context	 of	
fragmented	 international	 law.	However,	as	this	 thesis	suggests,	 there	 is	a	great	need	











of	 a	 gender	 dimension	 of	 the	 new	 jus	 post	 bellum	 framework,	 particularly	 from	 a	
feminist	 perspective.76 	This	 stands	 in	 stark	 contrast	 with	 the	 amount	 of	 feminist	
critique	 of	 the	 law	 on	 the	 use	 of	 force	 and	 of	 IHL.	 Yet	 the	 nature	 and	 type	 of	








Viewed	 from	 the	perspective	of	 the	 aftermath,	 the	 transition	 from	conflict	 to	peace	
can	be	seen	as	an	opportunity	to	revisit	social,	political	and	legal	structures,	including	
those	that	perpetuated	gender	inequality	and	structural	discrimination	of	women.	But	




entrench	 and	 perpetuate,	 the	 gender	 biases,	 shortcomings	 and	 silences	 permeating	
these	areas.	As	such,	it	may	replicate	systems	and	processes	which	effectively	exclude	
women’s	 active	 involvement	 in	 post-conflict	 processes	 and	 limit	 the	 transformative	
potential	of	post-conflict	reconstruction	by	ignoring	the	gendered	aspects	of	conflicts	




citizen”	 puts	 in	 question	 the	 responsiveness	 of	 such	 a	 framework	 to	 the	 needs	 of	
women.78	This	 approach	 carries	 a	potentially	dangerous	assumption	 that	 female	and	
male	 experiences	 of	 conflict	 are	 universal	 and	 therefore	 do	 not	 warrant	 a	 more	
nuanced	 and	 gender	 inclusive	 approach	 within	 the	 jus	 post	 bellum	 framework.	




general	 international	 law)	 does	 not	 privilege	 the	 experiences	 of	 men	 over	 those	 of	
women.	Furthermore,	the	focus	of	jus	post	bellum	needs	to	include	legal	responses	to	
a	wide	range	of	factors	and	issues	arising	from	the	gendered	impact	of	armed	conflict.	
While	 jus	 post	 bellum	 is	 rightly	 not	 limited	 in	 its	 application	 to	 women	 only,	 it	 is	
nevertheless	 important	 that	 the	 framework	 provides	 meaningful	 legal	 responses	 to	







throughout	 the	 stages	 of	 its	 development.	 As	 such,	 it	 is	 crucial	 that	 the	 framework	
focuses	 not	 only	 on	 addressing	 sexual	 violence	 (which	 currently	 dominates	 the	
international	 legal	 discourse	 surrounding	 women	 and	 war)	 but	 also	 takes	 into	
consideration	 a	 broad	 range	 of	 issues	 relevant	 to	women	 in	 post-conflict	 situations,	
such	 as	 conflict-related	 migration	 (Chapter	 3),	 provision	 of	 adequate	 and	 gender-
sensitive	 reparations	 (Chapter	 6)	 or	 securing	 economic,	 social	 and	 cultural	 rights	 for	
women.		
	
Ní	 Aoláin	 and	 Haynes	 question	 the	 implications	 of	 jus	 post	 bellum	 for	 women,	
especially	 its	potential	 to	become	“another	normative	 framework	which	may	merely	
clutter	 the	 legal	 landscape,	with	 the	 overall	 outcome	 of	 less	 rather	 than	more	 legal	
enforcement	for	women”.79	For	instance,	would	a	new	jus	post	bellum	framework	add	
anything	to	the	existing	UNSC	resolutions	on	women,	peace	and	security	which	already	








post	 bellum	 is	 treated	 as	 an	 international	 legal	 framework	 bringing	 together	 the	













mechanisms	 which	 emphasize	 existing	 positive	 obligations	 of	 states	 and	 strengthen	




International	 legal	 responses	 to	 the	 gendered	 impact	 of	 armed	 conflict	 on	 women,	
which	form	the	core	of	this	thesis,	 inherently	belong	to	the	conceptual	notion	of	 just	
post	 bellum.	 However,	 a	 prudent	 approach	 to	 jus	 post	 bellum	 would	 involve	
identification	 of	 relevant	 existing	 laws	 pertinent	 to	 the	 situation	 of	 women	 in	 the	
aftermath,	 assessment	of	 their	 scope	and	effectiveness	 and,	 finally,	 consideration	of	
possible	 augmentation	 of	 these	 principles	 within	 the	 broader	 jus	 post	 bellum	
framework.80	A	 similar	 approach	 has	 been	 adopted	 for	 this	 thesis	 and	 is	 presented	




As	 demonstrated	 by	 this	 research,	 individual	 components	 of	 international	 legal	
principles	and	norms	with	regard	to	the	situation	of	women	in	post-conflict	situations	
are	identifiable	and	are	being	continuously	developed.	Furthermore,	the	relationships	
and	 interactions	 between	 those	 individual	 developments	 have	 hitherto	 been	 only	
partially	explored	and	conceptualised,	resulting	in	the	existence	of	disharmonised	legal	
principles	and	mechanisms.	However,	each	of	 these	 legal	 responses,	when	examined	




developments	 and	 therefore	 bridging	 the	 gap	 between	 increased	 specialisation	 of	














four	chapters	 (chapters	3-6)	 focus	on	analysis	of	 international	 legal	 responses	 to	 the	




examining	 the	 impact	of	 conflict-related	migration	and	displacement	on	women,	 the	
chapter	 reviews	 the	 nature	 of	 responses	 of	 IRL	 to	 issues	 of	 conflict-related	 gender-
based	persecution	as	well	as	challenges	faced	by	women	who	flee	conflict	situations.	
Chapters	4	and	5	focus	on	international	criminal	law	and	international	prosecutions	of	
gender-based	crimes.	Chapter	4	provides	analysis	of	 the	 jurisprudence	of	 the	ad	hoc	
international	 criminal	 tribunals,	 the	 SCSL	 and	 the	 ICC	 with	 regard	 to	 gender-based	
crimes	committed	in	contemporary	armed	conflicts.	Chapter	5	considers	points	raised	
in	 the	 preceding	 chapter	 in	 the	 context	 of	 limitations	 of	 ICL	 in	 relation	 to	 achieving	
‘post	conflict	gender	justice’.	It	suggests	that	various	shortcomings	in	the	prosecution	
of	gender-based	crimes	at	an	 international	 level	can	be	attributed	to	procedural	and	





part	 of	 the	 process	 of	 transition	 from	 conflict	 to	 peace	 and	 securing	 post-conflict	
justice,	the	chapter	applies	gender	analysis	to	the	existing	international	framework	in	

















conflict	 to	durable	peace.	 It	 challenges	 the	 traditional	dichotomy	between	 ‘war’	 and	




equally	 relevant	 to	 girls.	 However,	 girls	 may	 also	 have	 additional	 needs	 which	 are	
addressed	 through	 instruments	 relevant	 to	 children’s	 rights.	 The	 situation	 of	 girls	 is	
discussed	in	greater	detail	in	the	context	of	child	soldiering	(Chapters	4	and	5).		
	
























participating	 in	 hostilities,	 IHL	 foresees	 special	 protection	 for	 women.	 Nevertheless	
violations	 of	 IHL	 and	 IHRL	 occur	 on	 a	mass	 scale	 in	 contemporary	 armed	 conflicts.1	





experiences	 of	 armed	 conflict,	 albeit	 those	 may	 vary	 depending	 on	 individual	
circumstances.	 For	 instance,	whilst	men	might	 particularly	 fall	 victims	 to	 killings	 and	





This	 chapter	 examines	 the	 scope	 of	 protection	 afforded	 to	 women	 under	 IHL	 and	
analyses	the	positioning	of	gender	within	it.	The	broader	international	legal	framework	













The	 international	 law	 of	 armed	 conflict	 is	 traditionally	 divided	 into	 two	 main	
categories:	 jus	 ad	 bellum,	 which	 relates	 to	 the	 use	 of	 force,	 and	 jus	 in	 bello,	which	





“international	 rules	 established	 by	 treaties	 or	 custom,	 which	 are	 specifically	
intended	to	solve	humanitarian	problems	directly	arising	from	international	or	
non-international	 armed	 conflicts	 and	 which,	 for	 humanitarian	 reasons,	 limit	
the	right	of	parties	to	a	conflict	to	use	methods,	and	means	of	warfare	of	their	
choice,	 or	 to	 protect	 persons	 and	 property	 that	 are,	 or	may	 be,	 affected	 by	
conflict”.4			
They	 are	 granted	 to	 all	 men	 and	 women	 without,	 at	 least	 in	 principle,	 any	
discrimination.5	All	four	Geneva	Conventions	of	1949	and	their	Additional	Protocols	of	
1977	clearly	state	that	all	persons	falling	under	a	specific	category	of	protection	must	
be	 “treated	 humanely	 (...)	 without	 adverse	 distinction	 founded	 on	 sex”. 6 	The	






the	 Field	 of	 12	 August	 1949	 (GC	 I);	 Geneva	 Convention	 for	 the	 Amelioration	 of	 the	 Condition	 of	
Wounded,	Sick	and	Shipwrecked	Members	of	Armed	Forces	at	Sea	of	12	August	1949	 (GC	 II);	Geneva	
Convention	Relative	to	the	Treatment	of	Prisoners	of	War	of	12	August	1949	(GC	III);	Geneva	Convention	
Relative	 to	 the	 Protection	 of	 Civilian	 Persons	 in	 Time	 of	 War	 of	 12	 August	 1949	 (GC	 IV);	 Protocol	
Additional	 to	 the	Geneva	Convention	of	12	August	1949,	 and	Relating	 to	 the	Protection	of	Victims	of	
International	 Armed	 Conflict	 (Protocol	 I),	 of	 8	 June	 1977	 (AP	 I);	 Protocol	 Additional	 to	 the	 Geneva	

















character.	 Common	Article	 3	 to	 the	Geneva	 Conventions	 prohibits	 discrimination	 on	
various	grounds,	including	sex:		
“Persons	taking	no	active	part	in	the	hostilities,	including	members	of	armed	forces	
who	have	 laid	down	 their	 arms	and	 those	placed	 '	 hors	de	 combat	 '	 by	 sickness,	
wounds,	 detention,	 or	 any	 other	 cause,	 shall	 in	 all	 circumstances	 be	 treated	
humanely,	 without	 any	 adverse	 distinction	 founded	 on	 race,	 colour,	 religion	 or	
faith,	sex,	birth	or	wealth,	or	any	other	similar	criteria”.	
This	 provision	 is	 highly	 important,	 especially	 in	 the	 context	 of	 contemporary	 armed	
conflicts,	the	majority	of	which	are	of	internal	character.		
	




them	 further,	 additional,	 protection	 and	 rights.	 Therefore,	 under	 the	 Geneva	 law	






The	 specific	needs	of	women	may	vary	according	 to	 the	 situation	 in	which	 they	 find	
themselves	during	armed	conflict.	Although	the	majority	of	women	experience	armed	









IHL	 contains	 a	 range	of	provisions	 regarding	 special	 kinds	of	protection	 for	women.9	
However,	Gardam	aptly	notes	that	although	over	40	provisions	of	IHL	deal	specifically	
with	women,	they	focus	on	women’s	relationship	with	others	in	the	context	of	armed	
conflict	 rather	 than	 protecting	 women	 in	 their	 own	 right.10	For	 instance,	 the	 IHL	





Furthermore,	 IHL	prohibits	 acts	 of	 sexual	 violence	 against	 both	 sexes,	 but	 additional	
emphasis	 is	 added	 in	 the	 language	of	 the	Geneva	Conventions,	 aimed	 at	 preventing	




7	Charlotte	 Lindsey,	Women	 facing	war.	 ICRC	 study	 on	 the	 impact	 of	 armed	 conflict	 on	women	 (ICRC	
2001)	23.	
8	The	 topic	of	girl	 soldiers	as	well	 as	prosecution	of	 crimes	committed	against	 them	was	discussed	 in,	
section	3.2.2.1.	of	Chapter	4.	
9	J.	 de	 Preux,	 ‘Special	 protection	 of	women	 and	 children’	 (1985)	 248	 International	 Review	of	 the	 Red	
Cross	292-302.		
10	Judith	 Gardam,	 ‘A	 New	 Frontline	 for	 Feminism	 and	 International	 Humanitarian	 Law’	 in:	 Vanessa	




Gardam,	 ‘Women	 and	 the	 law	 of	 armed	 conflict:	 why	 the	 silence?’	 (1997)	 46(1)	 International	 and	
Comparative	 Law	 Quarterly	 55,	 58-60;	 Judith	 Gardam,	 ‘An	 alien’s	 encounter	 with	 the	 law	 of	 armed	
conflict’	in:	Ngaire	Naffine,	Rosemary	J.	Owens,	Sexing	the	subject	of	law	(Sweet	&	Maxwell	1997)	241-
246;	 Hilary	 Charlesworth,	 Judith	 Gardam,	 ‘Protection	 of	 women	 in	 armed	 conflict’	 (2000)	 22	 Human	
Rights	 Quarterly	 148;	 Judith	 Gardam,	Michelle	 Jarvis,	Women,	 Armed	 Conflict	 and	 International	 Law	
(Kluwer	International	2001)	Chapters	3	&	4.	
12	See:	Articles	16-18,	21-23,	38,	50,	89,	91	and	127	GC	IV;	Article	70	(1)	and	Article	76	(2)	AP	I.		








that	women	 shall	 be	 protected	 “in	 particular	 against	 rape,	 enforced	 prostitution,	 or	
any	 form	 of	 indecent	 assault”.14 	IHL	 views	 these	 forms	 of	 conflict-related	 sexual	






degrading	 treatment”.16	When	 classified	 as	 torture	 or	 cruel	 and	 inhuman	 treatment,	
rape	may	also	be	a	grave	breach	of	 the	Geneva	Conventions	as	“torture	or	 inhuman	
treatment	(…)	wilfully	causing	great	suffering	or	serious	injury	to	body	and	health”.17			
Additionally,	 in	 light	 of	 modern	 developments	 in	 IHL	 and	 advances	 in	 the	 field	 of	
international	 criminal	 law	 (ICL),	 acts	 of	 CRSV	 have	 been	 recently	 recognized	 as	 war	
crimes	and	crimes	against	humanity	(CAH).	As	such	they	have	also	been	prosecuted	on	
the	 international	 level	 by	 the	 ad	 hoc	 international	 criminal	 tribunals	 (International	
Criminal	Tribunal	for	the	Former	Yugoslavia	(ICTY)	and	International	Criminal	Tribunal	


















Whilst	 principles	 of	 equality	 and	 non-discrimination	 underpin	 the	 IHL	 framework,	 a	
gender	analysis	of	IHL	reveals	that,	similarly	to	general	international	law,	IHL	is	highly	
gendered.19	To	 a	 great	 extent,	 this	 is	 revealed	 by	 the	 way	 in	 which	 women	 are	
portrayed	as	subjects	of	 IHL.	The	core	emphasis	of	 IHL	on	 the	mothering,	caring	and	
reproductive	roles	of	women	shapes	a	particular	picture	of	women	within	 IHL,	which	
attributes	special	protection	to	them	not	as	to	independent	and	equal	subjects	but	due	
to	 their	 association	 with	 others,	 especially	 children.	 Such	 positioning	 effectively	
diminishes	 the	 level	of	protection	afforded	to	women	who	do	not	have	children	and	
emphasizes	 the	 stereotypical	 and	 essentialist	 view	 of	 women	 and	 their	 traditional	
gender	roles.		
By	 failing	 to	 conceptualise	 gender-based	 violations	 as	 rooted	 in	 inequality	 and	
structural	discrimination,	 IHL	also	appears	 to	assume	 that	 its	 rules	apply	 in	a	gender	
equal	 society.	 IHL	 provisions	 largely	 ignore	 these	 issues,	 although	 they	 are	 the	 root	
causes	 of	 gender-based	 violations	 against	 which	 the	 framework	 is	 attempting	 to	
protect.	 The	 language	 of	 IHL	 reflects	 the	 lack	 of	 understanding	 of	 the	 gendered	




Although	 the	 decisions	 of	 the	 ad	 hoc	 international	 criminal	 tribunals	 provided	much	
needed	 clarification	 on	 the	 gendered	 nature	 of	 IHL	 violations	 (see	 Chapter	 4),	 the	
framework	of	Geneva	law	nonetheless	remains	uninformed	by	such	a	perspective.21			
																																																								
19 	For	 a	 critique	 of	 IHL	 see:	 Helen	 Durham,	 Katie	 O’Byrne,	 ‘The	 dialogue	 of	 difference:	 gender	













prioritizes	 men	 as	 combatants	 and	 addresses	 the	 interests	 and	 rights	 of	 women	
(particularly	 those	 on	 the	 enemy	 side)	 to	 a	much	 lesser	 extent.	 Gardam	 rejects	 the	





even	more	so	 if	 that	civilian	belongs	to	the	“enemy”	State.	 (…)	The	military	resist	
strongly	 the	 notion	 that	 combatants	 should	 assume	 risks	 to	 protect	 the	 civilian	
population.	But	 their	position	 is	not	 immune	 to	challenge.	 It	assumes	 that	war	 is	
inevitable	(…)”.22	
Furthermore,	 whilst	 IHL	 provides	 protection	 to	 civilians	 and	 persons	 no	 longer	
participating	 in	 hostilities,	 it	 does	 not	 take	 into	 account	 protection	 from	 violence	
caused	by	conflict,	for	instance	sexual	violence	within	refugee	camps	or	violence	within	




Finally,	 the	weak	point	of	 the	 IHL	 framework	 lies,	 unsurprisingly,	 in	 its	 enforcement.	
IHL’s	 effectiveness	 is	 brought	 into	 question	 by	 the	 general	 shortcomings	 in	 its	
implementation.	 Although	 the	 four	 Geneva	 Conventions	 1949	 are	 universally	
applicable	and	 the	vast	majority	of	 states	have	 ratified	 the	 two	Additional	Protocols,	
the	warring	parties	in	modern	conflicts	rarely	implement	the	rules	of	IHL.	This	puts	in	
question	 the	 preventative	 aspect	 of	 IHL	 but	 also	 problematizes	 the	 issue	 of	
accountability	 for	 violations	 of	 IHL.	 Whilst	 developments	 in	 ICL,	 most	 notably	 the	
decisions	of	 the	 ICTY,	 the	 ICTR	and	 the	SCSL,	have	given	 some	substance	 to	 IHL,	 the	
ultimate	 responsibility	 for	 establishing	 accountability	 for	 violations	 of	 IHL	 lies	 with	











special	 protection	 to	 women	 in	 armed	 conflict.	 Article	 46	 of	 the	 Hague	 Regulations	
1899	provided	for	“family	honour	and	rights	to	be	respected”	whilst	the	1929	Geneva	
Convention	recognized	that	women	can	be	combatants	and	therefore,	as	prisoners	of	
war,	 should	 be	 “treated	with	 all	 due	 regard	 for	 their	 sex”.24	Beyond	 that	 there	was	
little	of	relevance.	
However,	 since	 the	 adoption	 of	 the	 Geneva	 Conventions,	 there	 has	 been	 greater	
attention	to	issues	of	women	and	armed	conflict,	both	in	mainstream	international	law	
as	 well	 as	 its	 specialised	 branches	 (such	 as	 IHRL	 and	 ICL).25	In	 1974,	 the	 General	
Assembly	 adopted	 the	 Declaration	 on	 the	 Protection	 of	 Women	 and	 Children	 in	
Emergency	 and	 Armed	 Conflict	 followed	 by	 the	 adoption	 of	 the	 two	 Additional	
Protocols	to	the	Geneva	Conventions	1949	in	1977.		
In	 addition	 to	 major	 advances	 in	 ending	 impunity	 for	 conflict-related	 gender-based	
crimes	in	ICL	(discussed	in	detail	in	Chapter	4),	IHRL	also	developed	the	law	applicable	
to	 the	 situation	of	women	 in	 conflicts	 and	 in	 their	 aftermath.	 The	application	of	 the	
Convention	on	All	Forms	of	Discrimination	Against	Women	1979	(CEDAW)	to	conflict	
prevention,	 conflict	 and	 post-conflict	 situations	 was	 confirmed	 by	 the	 CEDAW	
Committee.26	The	Committee	emphasized	states’	obligations	to	apply	the	Convention	
in	 diverse	 situations	where	 they	 exercise	 jurisdiction	 (territorial	 and	 extraterritorial),	
including	 occupation,	 lawful	 and	 unlawful	 military	 actions	 in	 another	 state,	
peacekeeping	 missions	 and	 during	 involvement	 in	 post-conflict	 reconstruction. 27	
States’	 due	 diligence	 obligations	 in	 situations	 of	 armed	 conflict	 and	 in	 its	 aftermath	


















Especially	 in	 the	 past	 15	 years	 or	 so,	 there	 has	 been	 an	 increase	 in	 developments	
regarding	women	and	armed	conflict	at	the	United	Nations.	As	discussed	in	Chapter	1,	
the	UNSCRs	on	Women,	Peace	and	Security	brought	issues	of	the	gendered	impact	of	
armed	 conflict	 on	 women	 and	 their	 position	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 conflicts	 to	 the	
political	 agenda	 of	 the	 UNSC,	 thereby	 increasing	 their	 visibility	 at	 the	 international	
level.30	Nonetheless,	the	UN-level	developments	still	 largely	focus	on	CRSV,	with	little	
attention	paid	to	other	aspects	of	the	gendered	impact	of	armed	conflict	on	women.	
Furthermore,	 they	 do	 not	 generally	 focus	 on	 the	 underlying	 causes	 of	 CRSV	 (e.g.	 by	
linking	 it	 to	 structural	 discrimination	 and	 inequality)	 and	 extremely	 rarely	 engage	 in	




28 	Ibid.,	 para.15;	 CEDAW,	 General	 Recommendation	 No.19	 on	 Violence	 Against	 Women,	 UN	 Doc.	
A/47/38,	 1992;	 CEDAW,	 General	 Recommendation	 No.	 28	 on	 the	 Core	 Obligations	 of	 States	 Parties	
under	Article	2	of	the	Convention	on	the	Elimination	of	All	Forms	of	Discrimination	Against	Women,	UN	









31	Diane	 Otto,	 ‘“Gender	 Comment”:	 Why	 Does	 the	 UN	 Committee	 on	 Economic,	 Social	 and	 Cultural	
Rights	 Need	 a	 General	 Comment	 on	Women?’	 (2002)	 14	 Canadian	 Journal	 of	Women	 and	 Law	 1-52;	
Christine	 Chinkin,	 ‘The	 Protection	 of	 Economic,	 Social	 and	 Cultural	 Rights	 Post-Conflict’,	 paper	 series	
commissioned	 by	 the	 Office	 of	 the	 High	 Commissioner	 for	 Human	 Rights	 (2009)	
<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/women/docs/Paper_Protection_ESCR.pdf>	 accessed	 12	 May	
2010;	 The	 recent	 report	 of	 the	UN	High	 Commissioner	 for	 Human	 Rights	 regarding	 the	 protection	 of	










Women	 experience	 armed	 conflict	 differently	 than	 men	 due	 to	 different	 male	 and	
female	 gender	 roles	 within	 the	 particular	 society	 and	 gender	 relations	 arising	 from	
them.32	The	 detrimental	 and	 gender-specific	 position	 of	 women	 and	 girls	 in	 armed	
conflict	was	recognized	at	the	international	level	during	The	Fourth	World	Conference	
on	 Women	 in	 1995,	 where	 it	 was	 noted	 that	 ‘while	 entire	 communities	 suffer	 the	




particular	 social	 context,	 but	 they	 are	 by	 far	 not	 uniform.	 Whilst	 there	 exist	 some	
common	aspects,	women’s	actual	experiences	depend	on	a	 range	of	 factors,	 such	as	
age,	 race,	 class,	 nationality,	 employment,	 socio-economic	 status	 and,	 finally,	 their	
combatant	or	 civilian	 status.34	Paradoxically	 though,	 situations	of	armed	conflict	may	
also	enable	women	to	take	on	roles,	which	they	would	not	have	been	able	to	perform	
																																																								
32 	Gardam	 (1997),	 supra	 11,	 58;	 Charlesworth,	 Gardam,	 supra	 11,	 150;	 Christine	 Chinkin,	 Hilary	




International	 Expert	Meeting:	 ‘Gender	 Perspectives	 on	 International	 Humanitarian	 Law’,	 4-5	 October	
2007	 Stockholm,	 Sweden	 <http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/ihl-women-report-
051008/$File/ihl%20and%20gender.pdf>	accessed	12	March	2010;	Nevertheless,	Goldstein	argues	that	
there	exists	a	 cross-cultural	 consistency	of	gender	 roles	 in	war:	 Joshua	S.	Goldstein,	War	and	Gender:	
how	gender	shapes	war	system	and	vice	versa	(CUP	2001)	1-3.	
33	United	 Nations,	 Report	 of	 the	 Fourth	World	 Conference	 on	Women,	 UN	 Doc.	 A/CONF.	 177/20;	 17	
October	1995,	para.135.		
34	Christine	 Chinkin,	 ‘Gender	 and	 Armed	 Conflict’	 in:	 Andrew	 Clapham,	 Paola	 Gaeta	 (eds)	 The	 Oxford	
Handbook	of	International	Law	in	Armed	Conflict	(OUP	2014)	677-678.		
Hermann	 and	 Palmieri	 note	 that	 since	 the	 ancient	 times	 women	 have	 engaged	 in	 combat	 roles	 as	






under	 	 ‘normal’	 circumstances.35	For	 instance,	 during	World	War	 II,	 women	 took	 on	
roles	 as	 skilled	 labourers	 and	 workers	 outside	 the	 family	 home.36	More	 recently,	
women	 have	 become	 important	 socio-political	 players	 during	 the	 Arab	 Spring	 by	
publically	 protesting	 against	 their	 governing	 regimes	 as	 well	 as	 taking	 on	 roles	 of	
activists,	 particularly	 using	 social	 media.	 Yet,	 their	 involvement	 did	 not	 generally	





not	 only	 seen	 as	 paramount	 in	 ensuring	 the	 survival	 of	 a	 particular	 social,	 ethnic	 or	
religious	group,	but	also	in	securing	the	maintenance	and	continuity	of	their	traditions	
and	 customs.	 This	 is	 particularly	 the	 case	 in	 societies	 where	 women	 are	 strongly	
associated	 with	 their	 traditional	 gender	 roles,	 but	 also	 in	 the	 context	 of	 particular	
ethnic	and	religious	groups.	However,	that	also	means	that	targeting	women,	often	by	
acts	 of	 sexual	 and	 gender-based	 violence,	 becomes	 a	 politically	 and	 strategically	
important	 aspect	 of	 conflicts,	 especially	 those	 waged	 amongst	 ethnic	 groups,	 as	
illustrated	by	the	conflicts	in	Rwanda	and	in	the	former	Yugoslavia.	
	
The	 situation	 of	 conflict	 reinforces	 the	 already	 existing	 inequalities	 of,	 and	 sex	
discrimination	 against,	 women	 in	 society,	 which	 may	 (and	 often	 do)	 intersect	 with	
other	 factors,	 leading	 to	 gender-based	 crimes	and	 violations	of	women’s	 rights	both	
																																																								
35	Fionnuala	 Ní	 Aoláin,	 ‘International	 law,	 gender	 regimes	 and	 fragmentation:	 1325	 and	 beyond’	 in:	
Cecilia	M.	Baillett,	Non-State	Actors,	Soft	Law	and	Protective	Regimes.	From	the	Margins	(CUP	2012)	55.	
36	Claudia	D.	Goldin,	 ‘The	Role	of	World	War	 II	 in	 the	Rise	of	Women’s	Employment’	 (1991)	81(4)	The	
American	Economic	Review	741-756.	
37	Olga	Jurasz,	‘Women	of	the	Revolution:	the	future	of	women’s	rights	in	post-Gaddafi	Libya’	 in:	Carlo	
Panara,	 Gary	 Wilson	 (eds),	 The	 Arab	 Spring.	 New	 Patterns	 for	 Democracy	 and	 International	 Law	
(Martinus	Nijhoff	2013)	123;	Yara	Bayoumy,	‘Analysis:	Arab	Spring	nations	backtrack	on	women’s	rights,	
poll	 says’	 (Reuters	 11	 November	 2013)	 <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-arab-women-spring-



















by	 the	 acts	 of	 sexual	 violence	 at	 a	 disproportionate	 rate	 to	 men.40	Furthermore,	
women	 are	 primarily	 exposed	 to	 these	 ruthless	 acts	 because	 of	 gender	 roles	 with	
which	 they	are	 associated	 in	 society.	Although	 sexual	 violence	 is	 by	 far	not	 the	only	
example	 of	 the	 gendered	 impact	 of	 armed	 conflict,	 it	 affects	 women	
disproportionately,	 leading	 to	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 short-,	 mid-,	 and	 long-term	
consequences.		
	
However,	CRSV	 is	not	 limited	to	rape,	as	 illustrated	by	 the	extensive	scope	of	Article	
7(1)(g)	 of	 the	 ICC	 Statute.41	Furthermore,	 sexual	 violence	 is	 used	 in	 conflict	 as	 an	
important	 element	 in	 commission	 of	 other	 crimes,	 such	 as	 enslavement,	 torture,	
terrorism,	 persecution	 or,	 as	 argued	 in	 section	 3.2.2.1.	 of	 Chapter	 4,	 the	 crime	 of	
enlistment,	conscription	and	use	of	children	to	participate	in	hostilities.42	Acts	of	sexual	
																																																								










42	Prosecutor	 v.	 Kunarac	 et	 al.,	 Trial	 Judgment,	 IT-96-23-T	&	 IT-96-23/1-T,	 22	 February	 2001,	 para.542	
(enslavement);	Prosecutor	v.	Furundžija,	Trial	Judgment,	IT-95-17/1T,	10	December	1998,	paras.264-269	
(torture);	Prosecutor	v.	 Sesay,	Kallon,	Gbao	 (RUF),	Appeals	 Judgment,	SCSL-04-15-A,	26	October	2009,	





violence	are	often	forced	to	be	performed	by	the	victims	 in	 front	of	 family	members	
(or	even	between	family	members	themselves)	with	a	deliberate	aim	to	assert	power	




The	 sexual	 abuse	 of	women	 during	war	 has	 been	well	 documented.44	For	 centuries,	
sexual	 violence,	 in	 particular	 rape,	 has	 constituted	 a	 seemingly	 inseparable	 and	
omnipresent	 element	 of	 armed	 conflicts,	 whether	 of	 international	 or	 internal	
character,	 severely	 affecting	 women	 and	 crossing	 all	 cultural	 and	 geographical	
boundaries.45		
	
Historically,	 in	ancient	 times,	victory	 in	war	automatically	granted	the	 ‘right	 to	rape’.	




43	Witnessing	 acts	 of	 sexual	 violence	 may	 also	 amount	 to	 torture:	 Prosecutor	 v.	 Furundžija,	 Trial	
Judgment,	IT-95-17/1T,	10	December	1998,	para.267.	
44	UN	Commission	on	Human	Rights,	Report	on	the	Situation	of	Human	Rights	in	Territory	of	the	Former	
Yugoslavia	 submitted	 by	Mr.	 Tadeusz	Mazowiecki,	 Special	 Rapporteur	 of	 the	 Commission	 on	 Human	
Rights	pursuant	to	Commission	Resolution	1992/S-1/1	of	14	August	1992,	UN	Doc.	E/CN.4/1993/50,	10	
February	 1993;	 Christine	 Chinkin,	 ‘Rape	 and	 Sexual	 Abuse	 of	 Women	 in	 International	 Law’	 (1994)	 5	
European	Journal	of	 International	Law	326;	Binaifer	Nowrojee,	Shattered	Lives:	Sexual	Violence	during	
the	Rwandan	Genocide	and	 its	Aftermath	 (Human	Rights	Watch	1996);	Human	Rights	Watch,	 ‘Kosovo:	
rape	as	a	weapon	of	‘ethnic	cleansing’’	(1	March	2000)		
<https://www.hrw.org/report/2000/03/01/kosovo-rape-weapon-ethnic-cleansing>	 accessed	 12	 March	
2010;	 Elisabeth	 Rehn,	 Ellen	 Johnson	 Sirleaf,	 Women,	 War	 and	 Peace.	 The	 Independent	 Experts’	
Assessment	on	the	Impact	of	Armed	Conflict	on	Women	and	Women’s	Role	in	Peace-building	(UNIFEM	
2002);	Human	Rights	Watch,	We’ll	Kill	You	If	You	Cry.	Sexual	Violence	in	the	Sierra	Leone	Conflict	(Human	
Rights	 Watch	 2003)	 <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/01/16/well-kill-you-if-you-cry>	 accessed	 1	
October	2013;	UNGA	/	UNSC,	Conflict-related	sexual	violence.	Report	of	the	Secretary-General,	UN	Doc.	
A/66/657*-S/2012/33*,	 13	 January	 2012;	 UNGA,	 UNSC,	 Sexual	 violence	 in	 conflict.	 Report	 of	 the	
Secretary-General,	UN	Doc.	A/67/792	-	S/2013/149,	14	March	2013;	UNSC,	Sexual	violence	 in	conflict.	
Report	 of	 the	 Secretary-General,	 UN	 Doc.	 S/2014/181,	 13	March	 2014;	 UNSC,	 Conflict-related	 sexual	
violence.	Report	of	the	Secretary-General,	UN	Doc.	S/2015/203,	23	March	2015.	
45	For	 a	 diverse	 account	 of	 historical	 perspectives	 on	 sexual	 violence	 in	 conflict	 see:	 Elizabeth	 D.	
Heinemann	 (ed),	 Sexual	 Violence	 in	 Conflict	 Zones:	 from	 Ancient	 World	 to	 the	 Era	 of	 Human	 Rights	
(University	 of	 Pennsylvania	 Press	 2011);	 Irène	 Herrmann,	 Daniel	 Palmieri,	 ‘Between	 Amazons	 and	
Sabines:	a	historical	approach	to	women	and	war’	(2010)	Vol.92	No.877	International	Review	of	the	Red	
Cross	19-30.	







violence,	 which	 victimised	 women	 from	 all	 parties	 to	 the	 armed	 conflict,	 as	 the	





harms,	 including	 forced	 nudity,	 forced	 sterilization,	 forced	 abortions	 and	 medical	
experimentation,	 primarily	 in	 relation	 to	 their	 reproductive	 functions.48	Sexual	 abuse	
and	sexual	slavery	were	a	common	practice	on	the	Far	East	front,	taking	the	form	of	
‘comfort	 stations’	 where	 ‘comfort	 women’	 were	 forcibly	 held	 and	 forced	 into	
prostitution	by	the	Japanese	military.	Women	held	in	sexual	slavery	were	treated	not	
only	as	a	reward	for	soldiers,	but	also	used	as	an	element	of	 incentive	for	the	future	
fighting.	 Rape	 and	 sexual	 abuse	 perpetrated	 at	 comfort	 stations	 was	 therefore	
considered	essential	 to	 the	successful	pursuit	of	military	goals.	Copelon	explores	 this	
argument	even	further	by	describing	at	least	four	such	military	purposes:	“the	need	of	
soldiers	to	“have	sex”/rape	to	keep	them	fighting;	the	need	to	avoid	antagonizing	the	
local	 populations	 by	 preventing	 rape	 of	women	 in	 communities	 being	 occupied;	 the	






the	 groundbreaking	 judgment	 of	 the	 ICTY	 in	 Kunarac	 that	 elements	 of	 control	 and	
																																																								
47	Jeri	Laber,	‘Bosnia:	Questions	About	Rape’	(25	March	1993)	40(6)	The	New	York	Review	of	Books	3.	












of	Yugoslavia	and	 in	Rwanda,	more	clearly	 than	ever	before	rape	and	other	 forms	of	
sexual	violence	were	employed	as	a	method	of	warfare	“with	aims	similar	to	deliberate	
targeting	 of	 the	 civilian	 population:	 the	 destruction	 of	 its	 culture	 and	 morale”.52	
Specifically	 during	 the	 conflicts	 in	 Yugoslavia	 and	 Rwanda,	 the	 attention	 of	 the	
international	community	was	drawn	to	the	use	of	acts	of	sexual	violence	on	a	massive	
scale	as	an	effective	method	of	conducting	a	policy	of	ethnic	cleansing	and	genocide	




therefore	 resulting	 in	 producing	 babies	 of	 the	 ethnicity	 of	 the	 perpetrator	 and	
therefore,	automatically	not	of	the	victim’s	own	ethnic	group.54	
	
CRSV	 remains	 rife	 in	 situations	 of	 extreme	 political	 violence	 and	 in	 modern	 armed	
conflicts,	 which,	 albeit	 of	 a	 different	 character	 than	 ‘old	 wars’,	 result	 in	 violations	
rooted	 in	 gender	 inequality	 and	 gender	 discrimination.55 	Sexual	 violence	 was	 an	







Yugoslavia	 submitted	 by	Mr.	 Tadeusz	Mazowiecki,	 Special	 Rapporteur	 of	 the	 Commission	 on	 Human	
Rights	pursuant	to	Commission	Resolution	1992/S-1/1	of	14	August	1992,	UN	Doc.	E/CN.4/1993/50,	10	
February	 1993;	 Nowrojee,	 supra	 44;	 Alison	 Des	 Forges,	 ‘Leave	 None	 to	 Tell	 the	 Story.	 Genocide	 in	




particular	group,	targeted	as	such”	(Prosecutor	v.	Akayesu,	 ICTR	96-4-T,	 Judgement,	Trial	Chamber	 I,	2	
September	1998,	para.731).	
54	The	Trial	Chamber	in	Karadžić	et	al.	confirmed	that	‘the	systematic	rape	of	women...	is	in	some	cases	

















impact	 that	 continues	 long	 after	 the	 conflict	 has	 come	 to	 an	 end.	 Yet,	 there	 is	 still	
relatively	little	known	about	this	phenomenon.		
It	is	now	generally	acknowledged	that	CRSV,	in	particular	rape,	constitutes	a	deliberate	
strategy	 of	 war	 which,	 through	 relying	 on	 very	 particular	 sociological,	 cultural	 and	
psychological	 aspects	of	 the	outcome	of	 the	act,	 purports	 to	 attack	and	weaken	 the	
targeted	community.	It	is	understood	that	CRSV	often	serves	other	military	purposes,	
such	 as	 ethnic	 cleansing	 or	 even	 genocide.	 As	 emphasized	 in	 UNSCR	 1820,	 sexual	
violence	is	a	tool	of	war,	contributing	to	the	international	destabilization,	humiliation,	
and	degradation	of	a	population	or	an	ethnic	group.57		
However,	as	 illustrated	by	modern	armed	conflicts,	CRSV	 in	not	uniform	 in	nature.	 It	
manifests	 itself	 through	 various	 patterns,	 occurs	 in	 many	 different	 contexts,	 and	 is	

















to	 their	 gender	 and	 their	 ethnicity.58	The	 conflict	 in	 the	 former	 Yugoslavia	 further	
emphasized	the	intersectionality	of	CRSV,	but	also	exposed	the	public	nature	of	sexual	
violence.	 In	 that	 context,	 women	were	 frequently	 raped	 by	 soldiers,	 policemen	 and	
other	 state	agents,	many	of	whom	were	known	 to	 the	 victims	 from	before	 the	war.	
Furthermore,	the	use	of	rape	camps	(such	as	those	in	the	Bosnian	town	of	Foča)	and	






common	 occurrence	 during	 the	 conflicts	 in	 Libya	 and	 in	 Syria.59	Recent	 UN	 reports	
document	 the	 use	 of	 sexual	 violence,	 particularly	 sexual	 slavery,	 by	 the	 so-called	
Islamic	State	 in	 Iraq	and	 in	Syria	as	a	means	of	“spreading	 terror,	persecuting	ethnic	
and	 religious	 minorities	 and	 suppressing	 communities	 that	 oppose	 its	 ideology”.60	
Furthermore,	 the	 conflict	 in	 Syria	 has	 exposed	 the	 rise	 of	 forced	 and	 child	marriage	
since	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 conflict,	 particularly	 amongst	 refugee	 and	 internally	
dispalced	populations.61	Whilst	forced	marriages	are	arranged	in	order	to	‘protect’	girls	
from	 sexual	 violence	 (or,	 in	 cases	 of	 rape,	 to	 ‘reinstate’	 the	 family	 honour),	 they	
nonetheless	carry	their	own	risk	of	girls	being	sexually	exploited.62		
	

















by	 persons	 from	 the	 same	 community,	 for	 instance	 by	 child	 soldiers.63	Many	 of	 the	
victims	 are	 also	 sexually	 abused	 by	 members	 of	 peacekeeping	 forces	 and	 even	
trafficked	 from	 refugee	 or	 IDP	 camps,	 sometimes	 with	 the	 involvement	 of	
peacekeepers,	 soldiers	 or	 even	 humanitarian	 aid	 personnel.64	Women	 can	 also	 be	
perpetrators	 of	 CRSV,	 including	 rape.	 For	 instance,	 a	 study	 by	 Cohen	 indicates	 that	
female	combatants	in	Sierra	Leone	participated	in	25%	of	RUF’s	gang	rapes.65	
	
Despite	 the	 widespread	 use	 of	 sexual	 violence	 in	 conflict	 and	 the	 involvement	 of	
various	types	of	perpetrators,	relatively	little	is	known	about	the	underlying	causes	of	
CRSV.	Wood’s	 research	 confirms	 that	 there	exist	 variations	 in	 its	 levels	 and	 severity.	
For	 instance,	 Wood	 notes	 the	 absence	 of	 sexual	 violence	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	 Tamil	
insurgent	group,	the	Liberation	Tigers	of	Tamil	Eelam	(LTTE),	during	the	conflict	 in	Sri	
Lanka,	 despite	 their	 engagement	 in	 other	 forms	 of	 violence	 against	 civilians. 66	
According	 to	Wood,	 this	 can	be	explained	by	 the	 strict	 enforcement	of	 the	 absolute	
prohibition	 of	 sexual	 violence	 by	 the	 command	 leadership	 of	 the	 group,	 which	 is	
reflective	of	Tamil’s	social	and	cultural	mores	regarding	sexual	violence.67	Low	levels	of	
sexual	violence	have	also	been	noted	in	the	context	of	the	majority	of	Marxist-Leninist	
insurgent	 groups	 but	 also	 in	 the	 Israeli/	 Palestinian	 conflict	 which	 challenges	 the	
commonly	assumed	view	of	high	occurrence	of	CRSV	in	ethnic	and	religious	conflicts.68	
																																																								
63	The	 Case	 of	 the	 Prosecutor	 v.	 Thomas	 Lubanga	 Dyilo,	 Opening	 Statement,	 ICC-01/04-01/06	 (26	
January	2009)	30.	
64	Jennifer	Murray,	 ‘Who	will	 police	 the	peace-builders?	The	 failure	 to	establish	accountability	 for	 the	
participation	 of	 United	Nations	 Civilian	 Police	 in	 the	 trafficking	 of	women	 in	 post-conflict	 Bosnia	 and	
Herzegovina’	 (2002-2003)	 34	 Columbia	 Human	 Rights	 Law	 Review	 475;	 United	 Nations,	 ‘Secretary	
General’s	 Remarks	 at	 Meeting	 with	 Permanent	 Representatives	 of	 Troop	 and	 Police	 Contributing	
Countries	on	Sexual	Exploitation	and	Abuse’	(17	September	2015)		
<http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=8982>	 accessed	 1	 December	 2015;	 Marie	
















Furthermore,	 a	 study	 of	 conflicts	 in	 20	 African	 countries	 showed	 that	 59%	 of	 177	
armed	groups	participating	in	civil	wars	between	2000	and	2009	were	not	reported	to	
have	engaged	in	sexual	violence.69		
These	 figures	 put	 in	 question	 the	 premise	 that	 sexual	 violence	 is	 the	most	 effective	
tactic	 of	 war:	 if	 it	 is,	 then	 why	 do	 all	 groups	 not	 use	 it?	 Wood	 suggests	 that	 the	
variation	 in	 use	 of	 sexual	 violence	 depends	 on	 the	 culture	 and	 organisation	 within	
individual	 armed	 groups	which	 in	 turn	 influences	 the	 ‘repertoire	 of	 violence’	 of	 the	
particular	 group.70	However,	 even	 where	 sexual	 violence	 is	 not	 explicitly	 ordered,	 it	
may	 nonetheless	 be	 tolerated.	 That	 said,	 a	 study	 of	 perpetrators,	 victims	 and	
witnesses	of	 sexual	violence	 in	 the	DRC	showed	that	only	37%	of	perpetrators	agree	
that	sexual	violence	occurs	because	there	is	no	punishment,	with	a	further	28%	linking	
the	 occurrence	 of	 sexual	 violence	 with	 an	 order	 given	 by	 a	 commander.71 	Also,	
contrasting	 perceptions	 of	 the	 underlying	 causes	 of	 sexual	 violence	 are	 present	
amongst	perpetrators	and	victims	of	CRSV.	In	the	perpetrators’	view,	sexual	violence	is	
committed	out	of	revenge	(62%)	and	frustration	(87%).	They	also	emphasize	that	such	
behaviour	 is	 normal	 within	 the	 armed	 group	 and	 even	 amounts	 to	 a	 group	 activity	
(68%).72	In	 contrast,	 victims	 attribute	 the	 occurrence	 of	 CRSV	 to	 the	 overall	 lack	 of	
control	 and	 impunity	 regarding	 the	 commission	 of	 these	 acts	 as	 well	 as	 to	 the	
perpetrator’s	attempt	to	prove	their	strength	(70%)	and	to	control	communities.73				
Overall,	the	mono-causal	theory	is	unlikely	to	provide	a	comprehensive	explanation	of	
the	 underlying	 causes	 of	 CRSV.	 The	 causes	 are	multiple,	 complex	 and	 often	 co-exist	
together.74	Nonetheless,	 recent	 studies	 confirm	 that	 sexual	 violence	 in	 conflict	 is	not	
																																																								
69	Ragnhild	 Nordås,	 ‘Sexual	 Violence	 in	 African	 Conflicts’,	 Peace	 Research	 Institute	 Oslo	 (PRIO)	 Policy	
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inevitable	 and,	 as	 such,	 can	 and	 should	 be	 prevented.75	However,	 it	 should	 not	 be	
forgotten	that	CRSV	is	yet	another	form	(although	differing	in	the	contextual	aspect)	of	
the	 ‘everyday’	 violence	 against	 women,	 enabled	 by	 structural	 discrimination	 and	
inequality.	 However,	 despite	 the	 greater	 interest	 in,	 and	 the	 acknowledgement	 of,	




Consideration	 of	 the	 impact	 of	 armed	 conflict	 on	 women	 is	 usually	 focused	 on	 the	
consequences	originating	from	the	elevated	level	of	sexual	and	gender-based	violence	
present	throughout	the	conflict,	leading	to	gross	violations	of	women’s	human	rights.		
Although	 this	 aspect	 certainly	 remains	 important,	 it	 is	 not	 the	 only	 way	 in	 which	
women	 experience	 conflict.	 Furthermore,	 the	 consequences	 of	 harms	 sustained	 by	
women	as	a	result	of	conflict-related	violations	of	IHL	and	IHRL	can	last	long	after	the	
conflicts	have	come	to	an	end.	Therefore,	in	order	to	gain	a	full	picture	of	the	ways	in	
which	 conflict	 influences	 women’s	 lives	 in	 the	 aftermath,	 it	 is	 equally	 necessary	 to	
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high	 levels	 of	 violence,	 the	 rise	 of	 militarism	 and	 the	 emergence	 of	 war-specific,	
informal	 and	 highly	 gendered	 economies	 run	 by	warlords	 or	 criminal	militias,	which	
exploit	women	and	girls.79	This	includes	the	risk	of	women	becoming	victims	of	human	
trafficking,	 serving	 as	 sexual	 slaves	 for	militia	 commanders	 and	 soldiers,	 performing	
forced	labour	or	domestic	servitude.80	
	
As	 a	 result	 of	 demographic	 changes	 caused	 by	men	 being	 killed	 during	 atrocities	 or	
fleeing,	 women	 are	 in	 most	 cases	 faced	 with	 undertaking	 suddenly	 emerging,	
additional	roles	that	they	may	not	have	performed	before,	such	as	becoming	the	heads	
of	households	 in	order	to	ensure	the	survival	of	themselves	and	their	dependants.	 In	
addition	to	 their	 traditional	gender	roles	 (e.g.	as	mothers,	wives	and	carers),	women	





Bop	 describes	 further	 obstacles	 to	 the	 new	 gender	 role	 of	 the	main	 family	 provider	










conflict.	 Final	 report	 submitted	 by	 Ms.	 Gay	 J.	 McDougall,	 Special	 Rapporteur,	 UN	 Doc.	






Furthermore,	 Lopez	 and	Wodon	 note,	 as	 a	 result	 of	 armed	 conflict	 there	 is	 an	 increased	 amount	 of	
households	headed	by	children,	especially	girls.	 In	post-conflict	Rwanda,	estimated	85	000	households	






guardians	or	 relevant	authorities.	 Furthermore,	 in	 circumstances	of	 general	 shortage	
of	 food	and	water	 supplies,	 often	exacerbated	by	 imposition	of	 economic	 sanctions,	





sufficient	 income	 and	 necessities	 for	 their	 families.	 As	 a	 result,	 many	 women	 and	
young	girls	may	“engage	in	risky	economic	endeavours	such	as	prostitution,	smuggling,	
and	begging”	as	well	as	 trafficking	of	drugs	and	weapons,	which	entail	 a	high	 risk	of	
violence. 84 	Economically	 desperate	 women	 very	 often	 become	 victims	 of	 human	




When	 viewed	 from	 a	 gender	 perspective,	 CRSV	 carries	 a	 broad	 spectrum	 of	
consequences	 for	women’s	 lives	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 conflict.	 Victims	 of	 CRSV	 suffer	
from	the	traumas	of	witnessing	or	directly	experiencing	rape,	sexual	torture	or	other	
forms	 of	 sexual	 abuse.	 Their	 future	 social/	 community	 life	 is	 often	marked	 by	 these	
tragic	events,	with	the	outcome	of	women	being	often	stigmatized	and	ostracised	by	
their	 partners,	 husbands,	 families	 and	 communities.	 Such	 level	 of	 social	 isolation	 is	
frequently	combined	with	the	lack	of	professional	psychological	assistance	and	further	
exacerbated	by	economic	hardships	characteristic	to	conflict	and	post-conflict	reality.	
Furthermore,	 for	 many	 women	 the	 incidence	 of	 rape	 renders	 future	 marriage	
impossible,	 as	 they	are	 strongly	 associated	with	 the	 stigma	of	having	been	 raped	by	
the	enemy	and/or	bearing	the	enemy’s	children.85	The	latter	issue	has	both	social	and	
																																																								









economic	 aspects:	 experience	 of	 social	 isolation	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 and	 bearing	 the	
financial	burden	of	bringing	up	children	on	the	other.			
Finally,	 the	 mere	 threat	 of	 rape	 often	 forces	 women	 to	 flee	 their	 homes	 and	 seek	





During	 conflict,	 many	 women	 are	 forced	 to	 flee	 their	 homes,	 causing	 the	 greatest	
problem	in	modern	armed	conflicts	-	displacement.86	The	flight	 is	mainly	triggered	by	
the	 surrounding	 circumstances	 of	 continuing	 warfare,	 which	 results	 in	 danger	 to	
women’s	 lives	 and	 personal	 security	 or	 in	 necessary	 evacuation	 of	 civilians,	 the	
majority	of	whom	are	women	and	girls.87	Women	are	also	often	subjected	 to	severe	
sex	 discrimination	 and	 gender-based	 persecution,	 which	 may	 combine	 with	
discrimination	 and	 abuse	on	other	 grounds,	 such	 as	 ethnicity,	 religion	 and	 class	 and	
create	 an	 additional	 reason	 for	 escaping	 a	 particular	 territory.88	Furthermore,	 forced	
evictions	 are	 frequently	 used	 as	 a	 strategy	 of	 war,	 in	 particular	 in	 the	 context	 of	
‘natural	resources	wars’,	aimed	at	gaining	overall	control	over	a	resource-rich	areas.89	
Becoming	 a	 refugee	 adds	 an	 additional	 dimension	 to	 the	 existing	 vulnerability	 of	
women	to	the	effects	of	armed	conflict.	The	 loss	of	property,	 in	particular	the	family	
home,	 has	 serious	 implications	 for	 women’s	 survival	 and	 their	 everyday	 lives.	 The	
absence	of	 traditional,	 long-established,	 community	 support	 networks	 and	often	 the	
lack	 of	 basic	 supplies,	 such	 as	 cooking	 pots	 and	 utensils,	 creates	 obstacles	 to	 the	
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conduct	of	daily	 life.90	It	 also	 leaves	women	 fully	dependent	on	 support	provided	by	
persons	in	charge	of	refugee	camps,	the	majority	of	which	are	run	by	men.	The	gender	
imbalance	 represented	 by	 the	 domination	 of	 male	 personnel	 in	 camps	 plays	 an	
important	 role	 as	 a	 factor	 inhibiting	 the	 adequate	 response	 to	 the	 needs	 of	 female	
refugees.	Gardam	and	Charlesworth	describe	an	example	of	the	provision	of	supplies	
as	 basic	 as	 feminine	 hygiene	 materials	 being	 ignored	 by	 male	 relief	 workers	 and	
officials,	as	well	as	limited	access	to	medical	treatment	and	reliable	birth	control.91	In	
addition,	 Gardam	 identifies	 ‘cultural	 conditioning	 and	 taboos’	 as	 factors	 hindering	
female	participation	 in	decision-making	regarding	planning	and	resource	allocation	 in	
camps,	 “despite	 the	 fact	 that	 women	 are	 generally	 far	 more	 experienced	 in	 food	
production,	distribution	and	preparation	than	men”.92	In	recognition	of	this	particular	
problem,	 the	 need	 for	 inclusion	 of	women	 in	 the	 decision-making	 process	 has	 been	
recognized	and	recommended	by	the	UNHCR:		
	
‘to	 understand	 fully	 and	 address	 the	 protection	 concerns	 of	 refugee	women,	
they	 themselves	 must	 participate	 in	 planning,	 protection	 and	 assistance	
activities.	 Programmes	 which	 are	 not	 planned	 in	 consultation	 with	 the	
beneficiaries,	 nor	 implemented	 with	 their	 participation,	 cannot	 be	 effective.	
Since	 a	 large	proportion	of	 refugees	 are	women,	many	 solely	 responsible	 for	
their	dependent	children,	 it	 is	essential	 that	 they	be	 involved	 in	planning	and	
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when	 women	 use	 public	 washing	 and	 bathing	 facilities,	 which	 are	 rarely	 separated	
from	those	used	by	men	and	often	located	in	distant,	and	therefore	less	secure,	parts	
of	 the	 refugee	 camp.97	This	 arrangement	 significantly	 increases	 the	 risk	 of	 gender-
based	 violence	 and	 victimisation	 of	 women,	 but	 also	 violates	 cultural	 and	 privacy	





A	 lot	 of	 female	 refugees	 living	 in	 foreign	 countries	 face	 distinctive	 difficulty	 in	
rebuilding	their	lives	in	new,	unknown	circumstances.100	Bop	describes	this	particular,	
conflict	 -induced,	 detrimental	 influence	 of	 war	 on	 women’s	 lives	 as	 the	 ‘loss	 of	
identity’.101	The	 sudden	 disintegration	 of	 social	 networks	 –	 separation	 from	 family,	
particular	 ethnic	 group	 or	 community	 -	 results	 in	 loss	 of	 ‘reference	 points	 for	
individuals’,	 whilst	 living	 as	 a	 refugee	 in	 a	 foreign	 country	 introduces	 additional	
challenges.102	Adjustment	 to	 the	 ‘new	 life’	 is	 particularly	hard:	women	 face	 linguistic	
and	cultural	barriers,	which,	 together	with	 lack	of	education	or	vocational	skills,	may	
inhibit	their	chances	to	carry	out	day-to-day	activities	and	decreases	their	chances	for	
















home,	 language,	and	traditions.103	Such	 factors	again	 increase	women’s	vulnerability:	
in	order	to	secure	their	 living	needs	they	might	be	 forced	to	become	 illegal	workers,	
turn	into	prostitution	or	be	trafficked.		
	
Finally,	 women	 seeking	 asylum,	 especially	 victims	 of	 sexual	 violence	 and	 gender-
related	 persecution,	 are	 particularly	 vulnerable	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 gender-insensitive	
system	of	 refugee	 status	determination	 (discussed	 in	Chapter	4).	Although	gender	 is	
not	 included	 as	 a	 ground	 for	 persecution	 within	 the	 meaning	 of	 the	 1951	 Refugee	







the	 Convention	 on	 the	 Elimination	 of	 All	 Forms	 of	 Discrimination	 Against	
Women,	are	obliged	to	interpret	and	apply	the	Refugee	Convention	compatibly	
with	the	commitment	to	gender	equality	in	those	two	instruments’.105				
As	 such,	 gender	 should	 be	 considered	 as	 an	 essential	 factor	 in	 an	 ‘inquiry	 into	 the	
specific	characteristics	and	circumstances	of	the	individual	claimant,	similarly	to	other	
factors	 such	 as	 the	 sex	 and/or	 age	 of	 the	 claimant’.106	Inclusion	 of	 this	 perspective	
would	effectively	encourage	a	gender-sensitive	approach	to	the	definition	of	 refugee	
in	 international	 law,	 inclusive	 of	 gender-specific	 forms	 of	 persecution	 and	 stressing	
“that	persecution	is	not	necessarily	or	only	caused	by	the	victim’s	sex	as	the	ultimate	
factor,	 but	 by	 the	 perpetrator’s	 ideology,	 dictating	 that	 people	 deviating	 from	 their	
attributed	gender	role	shall	be	persecuted”.107	
																																																								























Subsistence	 harms	 are	 commonly	 experienced	 in	 armed	 conflict,	 but	 they	 also	 have	
gendered	 implications.	 According	 to	 Sankey,	 subsistence	 harms	 are	 “deprivations	 of	





Attacks	 on	 homes,	 livelihoods	 as	 well	 as	 forced	 displacement	 result	 in	 subsistence	
harms,	such	as	shortages	of	food,	lack	of	access	to	clean	and	fresh	water	during	armed	
conflict	 and	 in	 its	 aftermath.	 These	 harms	 have	 real	 and	 severe	 implications	 for	 the	
everyday	 lives	of	 the	 survivors,	 taking	 the	 form	of	physical	 and	mental	 suffering	but	
also	impact	on	the	ability	of	women	to	carry	out	the	traditional	roles	of	providing	and	
preparing	 food	 for	 their	 families.109	In	 addition,	 food	 shortages	 in	 conflict	 and	 post-
conflict	situations	mean	that	women	are	likely	to	be	more	susceptible	to	malnutrition	
than	 men	 mainly	 because	 of	 inequitable	 distribution	 of	 food	 and	 ‘gender	
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Furthermore,	 subsistence	 harms	 may	 intersect	 with	 other	 types	 of	 harms,	 as	
demonstrated	 in	 Krstić.	 The	 case	 revealed	 a	 range	 of	 gendered	 subsistence	 harms	
suffered	by	women	as	a	result	of	the	mass	killing	of	men	and	boys	in	Srebrenica	in	July	
1995.	Witness	testimonies	in	Krstić	demonstrated	how	pre-conflict,	patriarchal	gender	








also	 because	 of	 gender-specific	 forms	 of	 harms	 suffered	 by	 women.	 Whilst	 men’s	
health	 remains	strongly	affected	as	well,	primarily	as	a	 result	of	 taking	active	part	 in	








The	 Special	 Rapporteur	 on	 the	 right	 to	 food	makes	 the	 link	 between	 the	 empowerment	 of	 women,	
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result	 in	 increase	 in	 maternal	 and	 infant	 mortality	 rates. 114 	In	 addition,	 conflict	
situations	 aggravate	 any	 already	 existing	 deficiencies	 in	 healthcare.	 These	
shortcomings	 are	 further	 exacerbated	 for	 victims	 of	 sexual	 violence,	 who	 require	
immediate	medical	and	psychological	assistance.		Physical	injuries	originating	from	acts	





prove	 detrimental	 to	 future	 (planned)	 pregnancies	 or	may	 impede	 having	 a	 normal	
sexual	 life. 115 	Further	 consequences	 of	 conflict	 affecting	 women’s	 health	 include	
contracting	 STIs,	 development	of	 fistulas,	mutilation	 and,	 in	 case	of	 adolescent	 girls,	
too	early	pregnancies.116		
	
Acts	 of	 CRSV	 also	 exacerbate	 the	 risk	 of	 contracting	 HIV/AIDS.117	Armed	 conflict	
aggravates	 conditions	where	HIV/AIDS	 thrive,	 such	 as	 poverty,	 displacement,	 lack	 of	
access	 to	 education,	 as	 well	 as	 (especially	 in	 post-conflict	 settings)	 prostitution	 and	
trafficking	for	purposes	of	sexual	exploitation.	Disrupted	access	to	healthcare	and	basic	
medicines	 during	 and	 after	 armed	 conflict	 puts	women	and	 girls	 at	 a	 greater	 risk	 of	
unwanted	 pregnancy,	 reproductive	 injuries	 and	 contacting	 HIV	 or	 AIDS. 118 	The	
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and	 female),	 the	 gender	 aspect	 of	 PTSD	 and	 other	 forms	 of	 psychological	 impact	 of	
conflict	 on	 women	 are	 addressed	 less	 frequently.120	Nevertheless,	 the	 problem	 is	
significant	 as	 it	 continues	 to	 affect	women	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 conflict	 on	 the	 daily	
basis	and	may	continue	long	after	the	end	of	conflict	or	even	for	the	rest	of	their	lives.	



















the	 lived	 experience	of	 a	 discrete	 incident	 of	 violence,	 and	 to	 the	 social	 destruction	of	which	 it	 is	 an	
integral	part.	This	interdependence	of	the	individual	and	social	dimensions	of	the	trauma	of	rape	in	war	
provides	victims	with	an	opportunity	 to	avoid	privatisation	of	 the	damage	and	to	recognise	 the	socio-

















end.	 The	 diverse	 consequences	 of	 armed	 conflict	 for	 women	 (discussed	 in	 the	






conflict	 processes	 is	 expressed	 by	 States	 at	 an	 international	 level	 (e.g.	 by	 adopting	
UNSCR	1325	and	subsequent	WPS	Resolutions),	 these	concepts	are	 rarely	effectively	
implemented	 in	 post-conflict	 reality.	 Despite	 calls	 in	 UNSCR	 1325	 for	 equal	
participation	and	full	involvement	of	women	at	all	decision-making	levels,	especially	in	
peace	 processes,	 conflict-resolution	 and	 post-conflict	 reconstruction,	women	 remain	
in	the	minority	of	the	many	actors	engaged	in	such	processes.124	For	instance,	a	study	


















the	 concerns	 of	 Serbs	 or	 other	minorities	 but	 “culturally	 sensitive”	 to	 ignore	 the	
concerns	of	women?”.126		
Furthermore,	 securing	 women’s	 economic,	 social	 and	 cultural	 rights	 is	 commonly	
neglected	 in	 the	 aftermath	 and	 illustrated	 by	 high	 rates	 of	 unemployment,	 lack	 of	
access	 to	 education,	 as	well	 as	 lack	 of	 access	 to	 an	 adequate	 standard	 of	 living	 and	
food.	However,	state	parties	to	the	International	Convention	on	Economic,	Social	and	
Cultural	 Rights	 have	 positive	 obligations	 to	 protect	 and	 deliver	 such	 rights,	 without	
discrimination.127	In	addition,	as	the	discussion	on	reparations	for	gender-based	harms	
in	Chapter	5	will	 illustrate,	women’s	access	 to	 reparations	 for	harms	 suffered	during	
armed	conflict	remains	problematic.		
	
Finally,	 structural	 discrimination	 and	 gender	 inequality	 remain	 the	 key	 obstacles	 to	
realisation	 of	 women’s	 rights	 in	 the	 process	 of	 transition	 from	 conflict	 to	 durable	
peace.	They	also	contribute	 to	 the	perpetuation	of	 ‘everyday’	gender-based	violence	
that	thrives	in	post-conflict	settings.128	Therefore,	in	order	to	make	a	real	and	practical	
change	 to	 the	 lives	 of	 women	 in	 the	 aftermath,	 addressing	 matters	 of	 gender	





Analysis	 of	 IHL	 from	 a	 gender	 perspective	 reveals	 some	 troubling	 characteristics.	
Whilst	IHL	framework	provides	women	with	special	protection,	it	does	so	primarily	in	
relation	 to	 protection	 from	 certain	 forms	 of	 sexual	 violence	 and	 mostly	 due	 to	
women’s	 association	 with	 other	 persons.	 Furthermore,	 IHL	 fails	 to	 recognize	 the	
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Whilst	 international	 law	 has	 been	 developing	 a	 broader	 framework	 on	 women	 and	
armed	 conflict	 through	 its	 specialised	branches	 (particularly	 IHRL),	 the	prevention	of	
CRSV	 and	 other	 gender-based	 violations	 remains	 the	 key	 challenge.	 Although	 there	
exist	some	studies	on	CRSV,	relatively	little	is	still	known	about	the	underlying	causes	
of	 this	 phenomenon,	 making	 it	 even	 more	 challenging	 to	 tackle.	 Nonetheless,	 the	
exclusive	 focus	 of	 IHL	 in	 granting	 women	 special	 protection	 from	 sexual	 violence	





However,	 they	are	 frequently	exacerbated	by	 the	existence	of	gender	 inequality	and	
structural	 discrimination	 in	 the	 newly	 rebuilt	 political	 and	 legal	 systems,	 leading	 to	
further	violations	of	women’s	civil	and	political	but	also	economic,	social	and	cultural	
rights.	In	that	context,	ensuring	women’s	participation	in	all	stages	of	decision-making	
in	conflict	prevention,	 resolution	and	reconstruction	 is	a	crucial	 step	 towards	gender	
equality	 in	 post-conflict	 settings.	 Finally,	 whilst	 many	 of	 these	 issues	 need	 to	 be	





























significantly	 impair	and	endanger	women’s	 lives	during	 the	war	and	 in	 its	aftermath.	
One	danger	which	proves	particularly	 challenging	 to	 female	victims	of	 contemporary	
armed	 conflicts	 is	 forced	 displacement	 and,	 often,	 the	 subsequent	 attempt	 to	 gain	
asylum.	
	
Modern	 armed	 conflicts	 are	 the	 primary	 cause	 of	 forced	 displacement.	 The	 UNHCR	
estimates	 that	 at	 the	 end	 of	 2014	 there	were	 59.5	million	 forcibly	 displaced	 people	




the	political	 significance	of	women’s	 gender	makes	 them	particularly	 vulnerable	 and	
exposed	 to	 the	 risk	of	 suffering	 serious	harm.2	Although	 IHL	distinguishes	women	as	
persons	 specifically	 vulnerable	 to	 armed	 conflict,	 and	 therefore	 eligible	 for	 special	
protection	during	hostilities,	women	are	continuously	targeted	and	disadvantaged	due	
to	 their	 gender.	 The	 main	 area	 of	 concern	 is	 wartime	 sexual	 and	 gender-based	
violence,	which	victimises	women	in	a	severe,	disproportionate	and	long-term	manner,	
usually	 leading	 to	 further	 violations	 of	 their	 rights	 and	 perpetuation	 of	 gender	
discrimination.	 The	 gender-blindness	 of	 International	 Refugee	 Law	 (IRL)	 additionally	
																																																								







exacerbates	 their	 already	 inferior	 status	 by	 posing	 bars	 to	 women’s	 eligibility	 for	
refugee	status.	This	chapter	explores	how	mechanisms	of	international	law,	and	IRL	in	
particular,	respond	to	the	most	‘practical’	consequence	of	war	experienced	by	women-	
displacement	 and	 the	 struggle	 to	 secure	 asylum	 abroad.	 It	 focuses	 on	 the	 issue	 of	
(mis)treatment	 of	 claims	 of	 gender-based	 persecution,	 both	 within	 the	 decision-
making	system,	by	those	involved	in	refugee-status	determination	procedures	and	also	
on	 the	 international,	 policy-oriented	 level.	 The	 problematic	 aspect	 of	 protection	 of	
internally	 displaced	 women	 is	 also	 addressed.	 The	 gender-focused	 analysis	 of	 the	
protection	 systems	under	 IRL	 leads	 to	 further	 discussion	 about	 the	 scope	of	what	 is	
referred	to	in	this	chapter	as	‘alternative’	systems	of	refugee	protection.	These	include	
complementary	protection	mechanisms	as	well	as	a	proposal	regarding	the	emerging	




The	argument	put	 forward	 in	 this	 chapter	does	not	negate	or	diminish	 the	 fact	 that	
displacement	has	adverse	impact	on	male	refugees	and	IDPs	too.	The	problem	affects	




be	 a	 long	 and	 dangerous	 journey	 to	 the	 destination	 country	 where	 victims	 of	
persecution	 can	 claim	 asylum,	 but	 also	 shortcomings	 in	 the	 international	 system	 of	
refugee	protection.	 It	 is	 argued	 that	 these	key	obstacles	are	 caused	primarily	by	 the	
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Therefore,	given	 that	currently	 the	majority	of	 female	asylum	seekers	originate	 from	
conflict-affected	 regions,	 the	 strengthening	 and	 implementation	 of	 an	 effective	










nationality,	 membership	 of	 a	 particular	 social	 group	 or	 political	 opinion,	 is	
outside	 the	 country	of	his	nationality	 and	 is	unable	or,	owing	 to	 such	 fear,	 is	
unwilling	to	avail	himself	of	the	protection	of	that	country	(...)”.5	
	
The	 Convention	 includes	 the	 principle	 of	 non-refoulement,	 which	 is	 considered	 a	
cornerstone	 of	 international	 protection	 and	 is	 generally	 accepted	 as	 a	 principle	 of	
customary	 international	 law.6	It	 provides	 that	 no	 refugee	 should	 be	 returned	 to	 any	
country	where	he	or	she	is	likely	to	face	persecution,	torture	or	other	ill-treatment	on	
the	basis	of	one	(or	more)	of	 five	grounds	outlined	 in	the	Article	1	A	 (2)	of	 the	1951	
Convention,	 subject	 to	exceptions	 in	Article	33(2)	of	 the	Convention.	These	however	
																																																								




Gender-sensitivity	 in	 interpretation	 of	 the	 Convention	 and	 implementation	 of	 gender-sensitive	 status	
determination	procedures	are	viewed	by	the	author	to	be	crucial	in	ensuring	an	equal	outcome	for	both	
female	and	male	applicants.			




threatened	 on	 account	 of	 his	 race,	 religion,	 nationality,	 membership	 of	 a	 particular	 social	 group	 or	
political	opinion.’	
Elihu	 Lauterpacht,	 Daniel	 Bethlehem,	 ‘The	 scope	 and	 content	 of	 the	 principle	 of	 non-refoulement:	
Opinion’,	in:	Erika	Feller,	Volker	Türk,	Frances	Nicholson	(eds),	Refugee	Protection	in	International	Law:	

















persons	who	 are	 fleeing	 their	 country	 as	 a	 result	 of	 internal	 or	 international	 armed	
conflict.	Although	this	rule	is	not	explicitly	stated	in	the	text	of	the	Convention,	it	has	









which	 would	 fall	 under	 one	 of	 categories	 outlined	 in	 Article	 1	 (A)(2).	 Storey	 and	
Wallace	argue	that	such	view	is	founded	on	two	premises:	firstly,	in	absence	of	racial,	
political,	religious	or	other	motivation	behind	the	harm,	there	exists	no	exceptional	risk	
of	 suffering	 harm	 (i.e.	 other	 than	 generally	 arising	 in	 situations	 of	 indiscriminate	
																																																								








violence);	 secondly,	 if	 the	 risk	 involved	 affects	 all	 alike	 differential	 risk	 cannot	 be	














“(n)either	 the	 text,	 rationale	 or	 purpose	 of	 the	 Convention	 (...)	 entitles	 a	
decision-maker	 to	 reject	 a	 claim	 for	 refugee	 status	 merely	 because	 the	
applicant	 has	 failed	 to	 prove	 that	 he	 or	 she	 is	 exposed	 to	 a	 risk	 of	 harm	
different	from	that	of	others	caught	up	in	that	conflict”.12		
	





open	 to	 create	 avenues	 to	 include	 humanitarian	 refugees,	 who	 are	 in	 need	 of	
international	protection	as	a	 result	of	 increasingly	 serious	dangers	posed	by	modern	
armed	 conflicts.	 The	 existence	 of	 high	 levels	 of	 indiscriminate	 violence	 further	







13	Article	31(1)	of	 the	Vienna	Convention	on	 the	Law	of	Treaties	1969	 (1155	UNTS	331,	23	May	1969)	
requires	that:	“A	treaty	shall	be	interpreted	in	good	faith	in	accordance	with	the	ordinary	meaning	to	be	







such	 acts.	 In	 fact,	 very	 often	 it	 is	 the	 state	 that	 perpetrates	 persecutory	 acts	 and,	
further,	 violates	 some	 of	 its	 core	 non-derogable	 human	 rights	 obligations	 which	
continue	to	apply	in	armed	conflict.14	Therefore,	a	situation	of	armed	conflict	actually	
appears	to	be	precisely	that,	which	refugee	law	is	designed	to	address:	“to	 interpose	




However,	 the	 specificity	 of	 the	 situation	 faced	 by	 asylum	 seekers	 emerging	 from	
conflict	 zones	 has	 been	 legally	 recognized	 at	 regional	 level.	 Article	 15(c)	 EU	
Qualification	 Directive	 extended	 complementary	 protection	 to	 persons	 fleeing	
situations	 of	 indiscriminate	 violence	 (discussed	 in	 further	 detail	 in	 section	 4.3.3.	
below),	while	 the	 1969	 Convention	 of	 the	Organization	 of	 African	Unity	 on	 Refugee	




Alternatively,	 IHL	 offers	 a	 certain	 level	 of	 protection	 for	 refugees.16	However	 it	 is	
limited	to	civilian	refugees	who	find	themselves	 in	a	state	that	 is	 involved	in	ongoing	
armed	conflict.17	
																																																								
14 UN	 Human	 Rights	 Committee,	 General	 Comment	 No.29:	 States	 of	 Emergency	 (Article	 4),	
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11,	31	August	2001,	paras.7-9.	








17	Nevertheless,	 McAdam	 argues	 that	 such	 eligibility	 could	 be	 possibly	 inferred	 from	 the	 conceptual	
interpretation	 of	 Article	 1	 (A)(1)	 of	 the	 Refugee	 Convention.	 The	 article	 broadens	 the	 scope	 of	
beneficiaries	 of	 international	 protection	 to	 include	 any	 person,	who:	 ‘has	 been	 considered	 a	 refugee	







A	 well-founded	 fear	 of	 persecution	 is	 an	 essential	 element	 of	 the	 international	
definition	 of	 a	 refugee.	 Nevertheless,	 persecution	 is	 not	 defined	 in	 the	 1951	
Convention	 which	 leaves	 a	 significant	 margin	 of	 appreciation	 to	 states	 (and	 their	
evolving	 jurisprudence)	 regarding	 the	 interpretation	 of	 this	 important	 term. 18	
Accordingly,	case	law	relating	to	the	interpretation	of	‘persecution’	remains	somewhat	
inconsistent,	 in	 particular	 when	 the	 case	 involves	 an	 act	 of	 persecution,	 which	 falls	
outside	the	scope	of	the	five	Convention	grounds,	e.g.	gender-	related	persecution.			
	
The	 concept	 of	 persecution	 is	 rather	 complex	 and	 may	 encompass	 a	 range	 of	
situations,	which	essentially	 involve	 severe	violations	of	basic	human	 rights.	Because	
acts	 of	 persecution	 may	 vary	 in	 type	 depending	 on	 circumstances,	 they	 should	 be	
assessed	on	a	case	by	case	basis	as	“little	purpose	is	served	by	attempting	to	list	all	its	
known	measures”.19	While	this	indeed	is	true,	there	is	nevertheless	a	pressing	need	to	






expressly	 invoked.	 However,	McAdam	 argues	 that	 it	 conceptually	 broadens	 the	 scope	 of	 eligibility	 of	





Jane	 McAdam,	 ‘The	 Refugee	 Convention	 as	 a	 Rights	 Blueprint	 for	 Persons	 in	 Need	 of	 International	
Protection’,	in:	Jane	McAdam,	Forced	Migration,	Human	Rights	and	Security	(Hart	Publishing	2008)	274.	
18 	UNHCR,	 Handbook	 on	 Procedures	 and	 Criteria	 for	 Determining	 Refugee	 Status	 under	 the	 1951	
Convention	 and	 the	 1967	 Protocol	 relating	 to	 the	 Status	 of	 Refugees,	 UN	 Doc.	 HCR/IP/4/Eng./REV.1,	
Geneva,	2nd	ed.,	(1992),	para.51.		




rights,	 in	 particular	 the	 rights	 from	 which	 derogation	 cannot	 be	 made	 under	 Article	15(2)	 of	 the	
European	Convention	for	the	Protection	of	Human	Rights	and	Fundamental	Freedoms;	or	










Nonetheless,	 the	 Convention	 does	 not	 protect	 from	 any	 and	 all	 types	 of	 serious	
harm.22	Its	application	is	limited	to	recognized	situations,	in	which	‘there	was	a	risk	of	a	
type	of	injury	that	would	be	inconsistent	with	the	basic	duty	of	protection	owed	by	a	
state	 to	 its	 own	 population’23	by	 virtue	 of	 the	 state’s	 core	 human	 rights	 obligations	
recognized	by	the	international	community.24			
	
Gender	 was	 not	 originally	 included	 as	 a	 reason	 for	 persecution	 in	 the	 Convention.	
Therefore,	 asylum	 cannot	 be	 claimed	 solely	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 persecution	 relating	 to	
one’s	 gender.	 Gender	 has	 been	 rather	 described	 and	 treated	 as	 an	 ‘informative	
perspective’	to	the	established	five	grounds	for	persecution.25	Application	of	a	gender	
perspective	 to	 the	 particular	 Convention	 ground	 is	 perceived	 to	 broaden	 the	
interpretative	 aspect	 of	 persecution	 to	 include	women’s	 experiences,	 yet	 it	 has	 not	
been	 thus	 far	 interpreted	 to	 constitute	 an	 actual,	 separate	 ground	 for	 persecution.	
Nonetheless,	gender	can	influence	or	determine	the	way	in	which	women	experience	
persecution	 or	 the	 type	 of	 harm	 that	 they	 suffer	 as	 a	 result	 of	 it.26	Furthermore,	 a	
person’s	gender	can	be	the	basis	for	persecution.		
	
Since	 the	 Convention	 was	 adopted,	 there	 have	 been	 calls	 for	 the	 gender-sensitive	










24	Haines	describes	 core	human	 rights	 as	 the	 rights	 contained	 in	 the	 international	bill	 of	 rights,	which	
comprises	 of	 the	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights	 (UDHR	1948),	 the	 International	 Covenant	 on	
Civil	 and	 Political	 Rights	 (ICCPR	 1966),	 the	 International	 Covenant	 on	 Economic,	 Social	 and	 Cultural	
Rights	(ICESCR	1966),	the	Convention	on	Elimination	of	All	Forms	of	Racial	Discrimination	(CERD	1965),	
the	Convention	on	Elimination	of	All	 Forms	of	Discrimination	Against	Women	 (CEDAW	1979),	and	 the	
Convention	on	the	Rights	of	the	Child	(CRC	1989).	Haines,	supra	21,	327.	
25	Haines,	supra	21,	342.	






first	 expressly	 recognized	 by	 the	 UNHCR’s	 Executive	 Committee	 (ExCom)	 in	 1995,	
which	stated:		
“In	 accordance	 with	 the	 principle	 that	 women’s	 rights	 are	 human	 rights	 [...]	
guidelines	should	recognize	as	refugees	women	whose	claim	to	refugee	status	
is	based	upon	well-founded	fear	of	persecution	for	reasons	enumerated	in	the	
1951	 Convention	 and	 1967	 Protocol,	 including	 persecution	 through	 sexual	
violence	or	gender-related	persecution”.28		
In	 2002,	 following	 the	 process	 of	 Global	 Consultations	 in	 2001,	 the	 UNHCR	 issued	
Guidelines	 on	 International	 Protection:	 Gender-Related	 Persecution	 (the	 Gender	
Guidelines).29	The	 Guidelines	 provide	 interpretative	 guidance	 for	 those	 involved	 in	
refugee	 status	 determination	 procedures.	 Their	 primary	 aim	 is	 to	 encourage	 (in	 the	
form	 of	 soft	 law)	 implementation	 of	 a	 gender	 perspective	 into	 refugee	 law	 and	 to	
explain	the	complexity	of	gender-related	claims:	
“even	though	gender	is	not	specifically	referenced	in	the	refugee	definition,	it	is	
widely	 accepted	 that	 it	 can	 influence,	 or	 dictate,	 the	 type	 of	 persecution	 or	
harm	 suffered	 and	 the	 reasons	 for	 this	 treatment.	 The	 refugee	 definition,	
properly	 interpreted,	 therefore	covers	gender-related	claims.	As	 such	 there	 is	
no	 need	 to	 add	 an	 additional	 ground	 to	 the	 1951	 Refugee	 Convention	
definition”.30	
Haines	however	argues	that	in	fact,	sex	and	gender	are	already	included	in	the	scope	
of	 the	 1951	 Convention,	 as	 ‘the	 text,	 object	 and	 purpose	 of	 the	 1951	 Convention	
require	 a	 gender-inclusive	 and	 gender-sensitive	 interpretation’. 31 	He	 finds	 further	
rationale	 for	 his	 opinion	 in	 the	 ICCPR,	which	 prohibits	 discrimination	 (Article	 2)	 and	
																																																								
27	UNHCR,	‘Guidelines	on	Protection	of	Refugee	Women’,	July	1991,		
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3310.html>	 accessed	 9	 May	 2012;	 UNHCR,	 ‘Position	 Paper	
Gender-	 Related	 Persecution’,	 1	 January	 2000	 <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3bd3f2b04.html>	
accessed	9	May	2012	
For	a	comprehensive	overview	of	the	evolution	of	gender	within	the	international	refugee	law	context	












guarantees	 the	 right	 to	 equality	 before	 the	 law	 (Article	 26).	 On	 the	 face	 of	 it,	 the	
premise	 of	 this	 argument	 appears	 right.	 It	 is	 true	 that	 one	 may	 infer	 the	 gender-
inclusiveness	of	the	Convention	based	on	its	conceptual	reading	(“in	light	of	its	object	
and	 purpose”)	 additionally	 supported	 by	 human	 rights	 law	 provisions.	 However,	 the	
adequate	addressing	of	gender	in	IRL	and	in	the	context	of	persecution	in	particular,	is	
more	 complex	 than	 inferring	 the	 supporting	 arguments	 for	 gender-sensitive	
interpretation	of	 the	Convention	 from	 the	main	principles	of	PIL	and	 IHRL.	 In	 fact,	 if	






parties	would	 agree	 to	 an	attempt	 to	 amend	 the	Convention	 to	 include	gender	 as	 a	
sixth	 Convention	 ground,	 but	 it	 also	 remains	 doubtful	 whether	 it	 would	 actually	
achieve	 the	 desired	 effect.	 Rather,	 the	 problem	 is	 rooted	 in	 the	 failure	 (if	 not	
ignorance)	of	asylum	decision-making	bodies	to	 implement	a	gender	perspective	into	
the	 refugee	 status	 determination	 procedure.	 This	 includes	 not	 only	 gender-sensitive	
interpretation	 of	 the	 Convention,	 but	 also	 applies	 to	 incorporating	 a	 gender	
perspective	into	procedures	of	status	determination.32	For	example,	understanding	of	
how	 gender	 may	 influence	 the	 way	 in	 which	 women	 describe	 their	 experience	 of	





<http://www.asylumaid.org.uk/publications.php?id=70>	 accessed	 19	 March	 2012;	 Asylum	 Aid,	
‘Unsustainable:	 the	 quality	 of	 initial	 decision-making	 in	 women’s	 asylum	 claims’,	 January	 2011,	
<http://www.asylumaid.org.uk/unsustainable/>	accessed	19	March	2012;	Christel	Querton/	Asylum	Aid,	













the	 international	 level,	mainly	 in	 the	 form	 of	 the	 UNHCR	 Gender	 Guidelines,	 it	 was	
expressed	 in	 purely	 non-legally	 binding	 terms.	 For	 more	 than	 a	 decade,	 gender	
persecution	 has	 been	 recognized	 to	 encompass	 various	 acts,	 e.g.	 rape	 and	 sexual	
violence,	 trafficking,	 transgressing	 social	 mores,	 genital	 mutilation	 and	 domestic	
violence.	Nevertheless,	successful	claims	relating	to	gender-based	persecution	remain	
a	minority.	The	current	legal	status	quo,	combined	with	the	lack	of	a	uniform	approach	





Significant	 changes	 in	 international	 refugee	 law	 followed	 closely	 landmark	




gender-related	 persecution,	 helped	 to	 bring	 to	 the	 attention	 of	 the	 international	




fail	 to	 engage	 a	 convention	 ground	 (especially	 PSG)	 to	 support	 the	 claim.	 Furthermore,	 limited	
awareness	as	to	the	gender	dimension	of	persecution	(e.g.	lack	of	knowledge	about	FGM,	as	reported	by	
Asylum	 Aid	 in	 2011)	 and	 the	 lack	 of	 recognition	 of	 the	 impact	 of	 trauma	 on	 applicant’s	 account	 of	
persecution	lead	to	refusal	of	credibility	of	the	asylum	seeker	and,	in	effect,	refusal	of	asylum.		
For	a	detailed	analysis	of	the	quality	of	initial	decision	making	in	gender-based	asylum	claims	(including	
assessment	 of	 credibility)	 in	 the	 UK	 see:	 Asylum	 Aid,	 ‘Unsustainable:	 the	 quality	 of	 initial	 decision-
making	 in	 women’s	 asylum	 claims’,	 January	 2011	 <http://www.asylumaid.org.uk/unsustainable/>	
accessed	19	March	2012.	
34	To	the	contrary,	Oosterveld	argues	that	in	light	of	the	lack	of	the	ICC	jurisprudence	on	a	crime	against	
humanity	of	gender	persecution,	 it	 is	 the	role	of	 international	 refugee	 law	to	 inform	the	 international	
criminal	 law	 (particularly	 the	 ICC)	 on	 the	 issue	 of	 understanding	 and	 interpretation	 of	 gender-related	
persecution	 (Valerie	 Oosterveld,	 ‘Gender,	 Persecution	 and	 the	 International	 Criminal	 Court:	 Refugee	
Law’s	Relevance	to	the	Crime	Against	Humanity	of	Gender-Based	Persecution’	(2006)	17	Duke	Journal	of	







about	 the	 need	 for	 addressing	 the	 position	 of	 women	 fleeing	 gender-based	
persecution	 in	 armed	 conflict	 by	 the	 IRL.	As	 noted	by	 Storey,	 the	 ICL	 “jurisprudence	
contains	 a	 sophisticated	 tool	 kit	 -	 an	 abundance	 of	 judicial	 insights	 into	 the	
phenomenon	 of	 armed	 conflict	 and	 the	 relevant	 peremptory	 norms	 of	 international	
law	to	be	applied	to	such	situations”.35	Given	the	struggle	of	IRL	to	adequately	address	
situations	 of	 persons	 fleeing	 armed	 conflict,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 gender	 dimension	 of	
persecution,	 the	 jurisprudence	of	 international	 criminal	 courts	 and	 tribunals	 appears	
to	be	a	particularly	useful	and	modern	tool	in	addressing	these	two	problematic	issues.						
There	is	a	close	nexus	between	IRL	and	ICL.36	Not	only	are	the	two	regimes	embedded	






ICTY	 and	 the	 ICTR	 -	 has	 established	 that	 acts	 of	 sexual	 and	 gender-based	 violence	
(especially	rape	and	sexual	enslavement)	may	amount	to	crimes	against	humanity,	war	
crimes	and	genocide.37	Furthermore,	the	Trial	Chamber	in	Akayesu	also	held	that	rape	
may	constitute	a	crime	amounting	to	torture	 -	an	act	 that	 is	absolutely	prohibited	 in	
international	 law,	 prohibition	 of	 which	 is	 established	 as	 a	 jus	 cogens	 norm,	 an	 act	










37 	Prosecutor	 v.	 Akayesu,	 Judgment,	 ICTR-96-4-T,	 2	 September	 1998,	 paras.731-732;	 Prosecutor	 v.	
Kunarac,	Appeals	Judgment,	IT-96-23/IT-96-23/1-A,	12	June	2002,	paras.116-124.	
38	Prosecutor	 v.	 Akayesu,	 Judgement,	 ICTR-96-4-T,	 2	 September	 1998,	 para.687,	 690;	 Prosecutor	 v.	
Furundžija,	Judgment,	IT-95-17/1T,	10	December	1998,	paras.155-157	(re:	torture	as	a	jus	cogens	norm	






meaning	 of	 persecution	 and	 classifies	 it	 as	 a	 crime	 against	 humanity.39	In	 context	 of	
crimes	 against	 humanity,	 the	 Statute	 of	 the	 International	 Criminal	 Court	 (the	 ICC)	
defines	persecution	as	




following	 acts	when	 committed	 as	 part	 of	 a	widespread	 or	 systematic	 attack	
directed	against	any	civilian	population,	with	knowledge	of	the	attack:	
(h)	Persecution	against	any	identifiable	group	or	collectivity	on	political,	racial,	
national,	 ethnic,	 cultural,	 religious,	 gender	 (emphasis	 added)	 as	 defined	 in	
paragraph	3,	or	other	grounds	that	are	universally	recognized	as	impermissible	
under	 international	 law,	 in	 connection	 with	 any	 act	 referred	 to	 in	 this	
paragraph	or	any	crime	within	the	jurisdiction	of	the	Court”.40	
The	 decisions	 of	 international	 criminal	 tribunals	 make	 clear	 not	 only	 that	 acts	 of	
persecution	 can	 be	 performed	 solely	 on	 the	 ground	 of	 the	 victim’s	 gender,	 but	 also	
emphasize	that	gender-related	persecution	often	takes	place	in	the	context	of	armed	
conflict,	 primarily	 through	 acts	 of	 sexual	 violence.	 Although	 the	 ICC	 Statute	 and	 the	
Statutes	of	the	ICTY	and	the	ICTR	do	not	employ	the	language	of	‘armed	conflict’	per	
se,	 they	 explicitly	 state	 the	 condition	 of	 widespread	 or	 systematic	 attack	 against	
civilian	population.	 This	particular	 requirement	 in	 the	 vast	majority	of	 circumstances	
will	 encompass	 the	 situation	 of	 international	 or	 non-international	 armed	 conflict.	
Brought	 together,	 these	 two	 aspects	 suggest	 that	 gender	 is	 in	 fact	 in	 many	
circumstances	the	main	reason	for	persecution	and	should	be	accommodated	as	such	
within	 the	 IRL	 regime.	 Furthermore,	 the	 existence	 of	 armed	 conflict	 significantly	
																																																								




















“3.	 Such	 targeting	 was	 based	 on	 political,	 racial,	 national,	 ethnic,	 cultural,	
religious,	gender	as	defined	 in	article	7,	paragraph	3,	of	 the	Statute,	or	other	








ICC	Statute,	 in	particular	Article	7	 (1)(g),	 shows	that	acts	of	 sexual	and	gender-based	
violence	 which	 occur	 in	 armed	 conflict	 can	 amount	 to	 gender-based	 persecution.	
Furthermore,	 as	 has	 been	 confirmed	 by	 the	 decisions	 of	 international	 criminal	
tribunals,	 such	 acts	 are	 exacerbated	 by	 (if	 not	 inherent	 to)	 the	 events	 of	 armed	
conflicts,	which	are	characterized	by	high	levels	of	 indiscriminate	violence.	Also,	their	
primary	victims	are	women,	who,	given	 the	persecutory	nature	of	 the	acts	of	 sexual	




However,	 the	 statutes	 and	 decisions	 of	 international	 criminal	 tribunals	 cannot	
constitute	 a	 definitive	 framework	 against	 which	 refugee	 law	 should	 be	 assessed.43	
																																																								
41	Prosecutor	v.	Stakić,	Trial	Judgment,	 IT-97-24-T,	31	July	2003,	paras.234-236,	240-241,	244,	791-806,	
826;	 Prosecutor	 v.	 Krstić,	 Trial	 Judgment,	 IT-98-33-T,	 2	 August	 2001,	 paras.616-618;	 Prosecutor	 v.	
Brdanin,	Trial	Judgment,	IT-99-36-T,	1	September	2003,	para.1008;	Prosecutor	v.	Milutinović	et	al.,	Trial	







Some	 commentators	 have	 also	 expressed	 concerns	 about	 the	 transposition	 of	 the	
definition	of	‘persecution’	under	ICL,	which	includes	the	requirement	of	discriminatory	
intent	 and	 that	 the	 crime	 be	 part	 of	 a	 widespread	 or	 systematic	 attack,	 into	 the	
refugee	status	determination	procedure.44	The	fear	is	that	some	decision	makers	may	
use	ICL	as	a	tool	in	limiting	the	protective	scope	of	the	Refugee	Convention	rather	than	
as	 a	 supportive	 tool	 in	 providing	 a	 modern	 and	 dynamic	 interpretation	 of	 the	
Convention.45	The	UNHCR	in	particular	has	recently	expressed	concerns	that	adoption	
of	 an	 ICL	 definition	 of	 persecution,	 inclusive	 of	 the	 requirement	 of	 widespread	 or	
systematic	 attack	 ‘would	 undermine	 the	 international	 protection	 objectives	 of	 the	
1951	Convention	as	this	could	be	construed	as	meaning	that	persons	would	fall	outside	
the	Convention	definition	even	if	they	nonetheless	face	serious	threats	to	their	life	or	
freedoms,	broadly	defined’.46	While	 the	adoption	of	 the	 ICL	definition	of	persecution	
as	 a	 crime	 against	 humanity	 ad	 litteram	 in	 the	 IRL	 context	 may	 indeed	 have	 such	
effect,	 one	 should	 remain	 mindful	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 element	 of	 widespread	 and	
systematic	attack	 is	 required	by	 ICL	 for	 the	purposes	of	prosecuting	persecution	as	a	
crime	against	humanity.	In	the	IRL	context	this	threshold	is	not	relevant	for	purposes	of	





Furthermore,	 instead	 of	 focusing	 on	 differences	 and	 incompatibilities,	 the	 debate	
should	 shift	 towards	debating	how	 ICL	 can	 complement	 IRL	 and	draw	 links	between	
these	 increasingly	specialised	areas	of	public	 international	 law.47	Especially	recent	 ICL	
																																																								
44	Alice	 Edwards,	 Agnes	Hurwitz,	 ‘Introductory	Note	 to	 the	 Arusha	 Conclusions	 on	 Complementarities	
between	 International	Refugee	 Law,	 International	 Criminal	 Law,	 and	 International	Human	Rights	 Law’	
(2011)	23	(4)	International	Journal	of	Refugee	Law	856,	857.		
In	ICL,	the	actus	reus	of	persecution	is	constituted	by	an	underlying	act,	which	must	discriminate	in	fact	
and	 deny	 a	 fundamental	 human	 right	 laid	 down	 in	 international	 law,	 whereas	 a	mens	 rea	 element	
requires	 proof	 of	 discriminatory	 intent	 (Prosecutor	 v.	 Krnojelac,	 Appeals	 Judgment,	 IT-97-25-A,	 17	
September	2003).	
45	Durieux,	supra	20,	166.	








jurisprudence	 could	 offer	 a	 modern	 perspective	 to	 the	 much	 older	 Refugee	
Convention,	 informative	of	 the	 realities	of	 contemporary	armed	conflict	and	gender-
based	persecution	-	an	issue	which,	given	the	time	of	drafting	of	the	Convention,	was	
not	expressly	included.	Furthermore,	the	gender-inclusiveness	and	sensitivity	emerging	
from	 the	 recently	 developed	 (and	 still	 advancing)	 jurisprudence	 of	 international	
criminal	 law	(in	particular	the	ICC	Statute,	the	decisions	of	the	ICTY	and	the	ICTR	and	
the	 recently	 emerging	 jurisprudence	 of	 the	 ICC)	 confirms	 that	 gender-based	
persecution,	 especially	 where	 arising	 as	 a	 result	 of	 armed	 conflict	 or	 its	 immediate	
aftermath,	 is	 an	 issue	 that	 needs	 to	 be	 urgently	 and	 appropriately	 addressed	 in	 the	
international	law	context.	As	such,	ICL	can	be	seen	as	an	increasingly	progressive	(in	its	
gender-sensitive	 dimension)	 international	 legal	 framework	 which,	 through	 its	




of	 the	 past	 20	 years	 of	 jurisprudence),	 they	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 crucial	 in	 terms	 of	




creation.48	One	 example	 of	 such	 challenges	 is	 the	 gender-inclusive	 interpretation	 of	
the	 notion	 of	 persecution	 under	 the	 Refugee	 Convention,	 especially	 when	 gender-





that	 such	 specialized	 law-making	 and	 institution-building	 tends	 to	 take	 place	 in	 relative	 ignorance	 of	
legislative	and	institutional	activities	in	the	adjoining	fields	and	of	the	general	principles	and	practices	of	
international	 law.’,	 International	 Law	 Commission,	 “Fragmentation	 of	 International	 Law:	 Difficulties	
Arising	 from	 the	 Diversification	 and	 Expansion	 of	 International	 Law”,	 Report	 of	 the	 Study	 Group	 of	
International	 Law	 Commission	 finalized	 by	Marti	 Koskenniemi,	 UN	 Doc.	 A/CN.4/L.682,	 13	 April	 2006,	
para.8	<http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_l682.pdf>	accessed	8th	May	2013.	







been	 grossly	 neglected	 in	 public	 international	 law	 until	 the	 end	 of	 20th	 century.	
Therefore,	developments	in	ICL,	especially	those	which	are	gender-related,	should	be	
taken	 into	 account	 in	 constructing	 the	 modern	 interpretation	 of	 the	 Refugee	




In	 recent	 decades,	 there	 has	 been	 a	 proliferation	 of	 non-state	 actors	 on	 the	
international	 scene.	 The	 term	 ‘non-state	 actors’	 encompasses	 a	 diverse	 range	 of	
entities,	 including	militias,	guerrilla	fighters,	religious	groups,	terrorist	groups,	private	
military	contractors,	multinational	corporations,	peacekeeping	forces	and	NGOs.	Their	
activities	 pose	 a	 major	 challenge	 to	 the	 regulation	 of	 their	 behaviour	 under	
international	 law,	which	 traditionally	 regulates	 relations	between	 states.49	Actions	of	
non-state	actors	do	have	an	impact	on	other	individuals	and	holding	non-state	actors	
accountable	 in	 international	 law	 for	 actions	 which	 constitute	 serious	 breaches	 of	
human	rights,	such	as	acts	of	persecution,	remains	the	main	challenge.	In	the	context	










Jan	 Klabbers	 (eds),	 Nordic	 Cosmopolitanism:	 Essays	 in	 International	 Law	 for	 Martti	 Koskenniemi	
(Martinus	Nijhoff	2003)	351-369.	
50	For	 example,	 the	 EU	Qualification	Directive	 recognizes	 non-state	 actors	 of	 protection	 (Article	 7(1)),	
which	 challenges	 the	 traditional	 concept	of	 a	 State	as	 the	 sole	entity	providing	protection	 in	 IRL.	 The	
CJEU	 also	 confirmed	 such	 interpretation	of	Article	 7(1)	 in	Abdulla	 and	Others	 by	 ruling	 that	 actors	 of	
protection	may	 comprise	 international	 organisations	 controlling	 the	 State	or	 a	 substantial	 part	 of	 the	
territory	 of	 the	 State,	 including	 by	 means	 of	 the	 presence	 of	 a	 multinational	 force	 in	 that	 territory’	
(Salahadin	Abdulla	and	Others	v.	Bundesrepublik	Deutschland,	CJEU,	C-175/08;	C-176/08;	C-178/08	&	C-
179/08,	2	March	2010,	para.76.).	However,	O’Sullivan	critiques	this	modern	approach:	Maria	O’Sullivan,	







emanate	 from	 non-state	 actors	 and	 the	 evolving	 nature	 of	 modern	 armed	 conflict,	
which	 is	 now	primarily	of	 internal	 character,	 supports	 this	 dynamic.	Over	 time,	non-
state	actors	have	developed	into	entities,	which	sometimes	hold	significant	power	and	
influence,	 often	 much	 stronger	 than	 the	 State.	 Nykänen	 refers	 to	 this	 modern	
phenomenon	 as	 a	 ‘process	 of	 fragmentation	 of	 powers’,	 where	 “such	 actors	 have	
gained	positions	in	which	they	may	use	and	abuse	regulatory,	financial,	social,	physical	
and	other	forms	of	power	in	various	manners	having	a	sweeping	effect	on	the	lives	of	
individual	 human	 beings”.52	This	 situation	 is	 mirrored	 in	 relations	 and	 behaviours	
present	 both	 during	 armed	 conflicts	 and	 in	 their	 aftermath,	 where	 non-state	 actors	
commit	serious	violations	of	IHL	and	IHRL,	which	may	also	include	acts	of	gender-based	
persecution.	 Accordingly,	 this	 development	 has	 considerable	 implications	 for	 the	





state	 actors,	 as	 opposed	 to	 state	 agents,	 can	 be	 agents	 of	 persecution	 within	 the	
meaning	of	the	Refugee	Convention.	The	Refugee	Convention	does	not	explicitly	state	
who	can	be	the	agent	of	persecution	within	the	meaning	of	Article	1(A)2.	Looking	at	
other,	 more	 recent	 instruments,	 such	 as	 the	 Rome	 Statute	 of	 the	 ICC	 and	 the	 EU	
Qualification	Directive,	one	may	notice	explicit	reference	to	non-state	actors.	To	that	
end,	 one	 may	 argue	 that	 the	 lack	 of	 explicit	 reference	 to	 non-state	 actors	 of	
persecution	 in	 the	 Refugee	 Convention	 means	 that	 it	 does	 not	 cover	 acts	 of	
persecution	 committed	 by	 non-state	 actors.	 However,	 Zimmermann	 notes	 the	
shortcomings	of	such	an	approach	and	rightly	emphasizes	 that	at	 the	time	when	the	
Refugee	 Convention	 was	 created,	 non-state	 actors	 did	 not	 play	 such	 a	 big	 role	 in	
international	 law	 as	 they	 currently	 do.53	Currently	 non-state	 actors,	more	 than	 ever	









practice	 recognises	 that	 persecution	may	 be	 by	 non-state	 actors.	 This	 is	 particularly	
evidenced	in	the	context	of	non-international	armed	conflicts,	where	non-state	actors	
are	 not	 only	 primary	 belligerents,	 but	 also	 entities	 responsible	 for	 committing	
international	 crimes	 and	 persecutory	 acts.	 Therefore,	 the	 Refugee	 Convention,	 as	 a	
living	 instrument,	should	reflect	this	major	modern	development	 in	 its	contemporary	
interpretation	 and	 application.	 In	 order	 for	 the	 Refugee	 Convention	 to	 fulfil	 its	
protection	objectives	and	 to	provide	meaningful	protection	 to	modern	day	 refugees,	
who	 increasingly	often	 suffer	persecution	 from	hands	of	non-state	 actors,	 a	modern	








is	 also	 present	 in	 the	 UNHCR	 Handbook,	 which	 states	 that	 while	 “persecution	 is	
normally	 related	to	action	by	authorities	of	a	country	 (...),	 it	may	also	emanate	 from	
the	sections	of	the	populations	(...)	if	they	are	knowingly	tolerated	by	authorities,	or	if	






While	 there	 is	 a	 general	 trend	 in	 IRL	 to	 recognise	 that	 persecutory	 acts	 can	 be	
attributed	to	non-state	actors,	there	exists	a	lack	of	uniform	and	consistent	approach	












agents	of	 the	 state	 in	 commission	of	persecutory	acts	or	by	 remaining	 indifferent	 to	
the	 occurrence	 of	 persecutory	 acts.	 However,	 under	 this	 interpretation,	 proving	 the	
mere	inability	of	the	state	to	prevent	or	protect	an	individual	from	harms	inflicted	by	
non-state	 actors	 does	not	 suffice	 to	 establish	persecution,	 despite	 a	 genuine	 fear	 of	
suffering	a	serious	harm.	As	such,	the	accountability	view	appears	to	rely	on	the	similar	
premise	 to	 the	principle	of	state	responsibility	 for	wrongful	acts	 in	 international	 law.	
Under	Article	2	of	the	ILC	Draft	Articles	on	Responsibility	of	States	for	 Internationally	
Wrongful	Acts,	in	order	for	state	responsibility	to	be	established,	a	wrongful	act	must	
be	 first	 attributed	 to	 the	 state.56	However,	 despite	 coincidental	 correlation	 between	
the	 accountability	 view	 and	 state	 responsibility,	 it	 is	 not	 suggested	 that	 state	
responsibility	should	form	a	part	of	 the	refugee	definition.	Whilst	state	responsibility	
can	provide	an	informative	perspective	to	the	process	of	establishing	the	existence	of	






complying	 with	 the	 object	 and	 purpose	 of	 the	 Refugee	 Convention.	 According	 to	
Zimmermann,	 the	main	question	 in	 IRL	 is	one	of	whether	 the	applicant	 is	 in	need	of	


















were	 to	 be	 held	 that	 an	 asylum	 seeker	 should	 be	 denied	 needed	 protection	




enabled	 departure	 from	 the	 accountability	 approach	 in	 determination	 of	 cases	




In	 contrast,	 the	 protection	 approach	 assesses	 the	 question	 of	 non-state	 persecution	
through	the	 lens	of	 the	ability	of	a	state	 to	protect	 individuals	 in	 its	 territory	against	




Adan	 v.	 Secretary	 of	 State	 for	 the	 Home	 Department,	 where	 it	 also	 confirmed	 the	







the	 fear	 test,	 but	 not	 the	 protection	 test.	Why	 should	 another	 country	 offer	

























In	addition,	 the	decision	 in	Horvath	opened	the	discussion	about	what	amounts	 to	a	
‘sufficient’	 protection	 by	 the	 state.	 In	Horvath,	 the	 appellant,	 a	 Slovakian	 citizen	 of	
Roma	origin,	was	experiencing	alleged	persecutory	acts	committed	by	non-state	actors	
(groups	 of	 skinheads)	 and	 other	 discriminatory	 treatment	 from	 the	 local	 state	
authorities.	The	Slovakian	police	did	not	offer	protection	 to	Mr	Horvath	 in	situations	
when	he	experienced	persecutory	acts,	but	it	was	proven	that	they	responded	to	other	
instances	of	persecution	directed	at	 citizens	of	Roma	origin.	 Therefore,	on	 the	 facts,	




to	 meet	 the	 standard	 required	 by	 the	 Refugee	 Convention,	 what	 is	 the	 test	 for	
determining	whether	there	is	sufficient	protection	against	persecution	in	the	person's	
country	of	origin?63	It	was	established	that	there	are	two	standards	against	which	the	













which	 makes	 violent	 attacks	 by	 the	 persecutors	 punishable	 and	 a	 reasonable	
willingness	 to	 enforce	 that	 law	on	 the	 part	 of	 the	 law	 enforcement	 agencies’	 in	 the	





Islam	 and	 Shah,	 a	 leading	 UK	 case	 on	 the	 meaning	 of	 a	 particular	 social	 group	
(discussed	 in	 section	 4.1.	 below),	 repetitive	 acts	 of	 domestic	 violence	 against	 two	
Pakistani	 women	 inflicted	 by	 their	 husbands	 were	 recognized	 as	 persecution. 67	
However,	unlike	in	Horvath,	in	Islam	and	Shah	the	lack	of	state	protection	afforded	to	
female	victims	of	domestic	violence	was	held	to	be	sufficient	to	establish	persecution.	
The	 question	 of	 sufficiency	 of	 the	 level	 of	 internal	 protection	 was	 not	 addressed,	
mostly	 because	 of	 the	 undisputable	 fact	 that	 the	 authorities	 in	 Pakistan	 operated	 a	
gender-bias	and	did	not	respond	to	incidents	of	violence	against	women.68		
	
In	 the	 context	 of	 the	 latter,	 Querton	 notes	 the	 important	 role	 of	 country-of-origin	
information	 (COI)	 in	 cases	 of	 non-state	 persecution.69	The	 determination	 of	whether	
the	 state	 provides	 protection	where	 the	 serious	 harm	emanates	 from	private	 actors	
largely	 depends	 on	 COI.70 	This	 may	 have	 particularly	 negative	 impact	 on	 female	
applicants,	 especially	 when	 their	 claims	 are	 involving	 acts	 of	 gender-based	


















information,	Oosterveld	notes,	may	be	difficult	enough	 to	 collect	during	peace	 time,	
but	it	is	extremely	challenging	to	collect	information	on	the	situation	of	women	during	
armed	 conflict	 when	 gender-based	 violence,	 persecutory	 acts	 and	 human	 rights	
violations	are	often	underreported.72	Inaccurate	COI,	along	with	underestimated	data,	
may	 consequently	 lead	 to	 speculative	 judgments	 about	 the	 (non)existence	 of	
persecution,	 which	 may	 invalidate	 the	 claim	 for	 refugee	 status.	 Baillot,	 Cowan	 and	
Munro	 express	 further	 concerns	with	 regard	 to	 over-reliance	 on	 external	 sources	 of	
information	 (such	 as	COI	or	 country	 expert	 reports)	within	 the	 asylum	 system.73	The	
authors	 criticise	 the	 process	 in	 which	 stronger	 reliance	 is	 placed	 upon	 the	 external	
information	 rather	 than	 the	 female	 asylum	 seeker’s	 narrative,	 particularly	 when	
gender-based	 persecution	 is	 involved,	 and	 point	 out	 the	 disempowering	 effect	 such	
process	 can	have	on	 claimants.74	Furthermore,	COI	 is	often	 read	 selectively	by	 those	
involved	in	the	initial	stage	of	the	asylum	determination	procedure,	which	may	result	












73 	Helen	 Baillot,	 Sharon	 Cowan,	 Vanessa	 E.	 Munro,	 ‘Crossing	 borders,	 inhabiting	 spaces:	 The	















The	 ‘sufficient	 protection	 test’,	 established	 in	 Horvath,	 strongly	 focused	 on	 the	
existence	and	operation	of	a	criminal	law	system	in	the	country	of	origin,	may	lead	to	
the	conclusion	that	it	is	possible	for	an	individual,	who	fears	persecution	by	non-state	
actors	 on	 a	 Convention	 ground,	 to	 be	 returned	 to	 their	 country	 because	 the	 state	
attempts	to	operate	a	system	of	protection.	This	might	mean	that	a	female	applicant	
who	 fears	 a	 gender-based	 act	 of	 persecution	 (e.g.	 FGM)	 at	 the	 hands	 of	 non-state	
actors	(e.g.	members	of	a	family	or	a	clan)	could	be	returned	to	her	country	of	origin	in	
situations	 where	 the	 country’s	 criminal	 laws	 prohibit	 such	 conduct.77	In	 practical	
terms,	 this	means	 that	effectively	 it	will	 be	extremely	difficult	 (if	 not	 impossible)	 for	
the	 applicant	 to	 show	 the	 insufficient	 level	 of	 internal	 protection,	 especially	 in	 the	
absence	of	a	discriminatory	policy	of	the	state.	This	may	be	additionally	challenging	to	
prove	 in	cases	where	non-state	persecution	 takes	gender-based	 form,	mostly	due	 to	
the	unavailability	of	sufficient	COI	to	support	the	claim	otherwise.78				
	
Furthermore,	 such	approach	arguably	moves	away	 the	 focus	of	 refugee	 inquiry	 from	
the	 ill-treatment	 of	 the	 applicant,	 which	 is	 likely	 to	 involve	 human	 rights	 violations	
(‘the	subjective	test’),	to	the	notion	of	the	state	agency	 in	the	commission	of	alleged	
acts	 (‘the	 objective	 test’),	 demonstrated	 by	 the	 lack	 of	 sufficient	 internal	 protection	
available	 to	 the	applicant.	As	 such,	 it	marks	a	departure	 from	protecting	 the	asylum	






Convention	 as	 well	 as	 the	 well-established	 principle	 of	 public	 international	 law	 that	 States	 may	 not	
invoke	their	domestic	laws	in	order	to	avoid	their	international	obligations.	Rather,	States	are	obliged	to	
bring	 their	 domestic	 laws	 in	 conformity	 with	 international	 obligations.	 See:	 Hélène	 Lambert,	 ‘The	
Conceptualisation	of	 ‘Persecution’	 by	 the	House	of	 Lords:	Horvath	 v.	 Secretary	 of	 State	 for	 the	Home	
Department’	(2001)	13	(1&2)	International	Journal	of	Refugee	Law	16,	28.	
Macdonald	QC	and	Toal	also	refer	 to	 the	 focus	on	 failure	of	state	protection	 in	non-state	persecution	
cases	 as	 ‘an	 unnecessary	 distraction’:	 Ian	 Macdonald,	 Ronan	 Toal,	Macdonald’s	 Immigration	 Law	 &	
Practice,	7th	ed.,	(Butterworths	2008),	para.12.54.	



















a	 human-rights	 based	 approach	 to	 persecution,	 one	 rejects	 the	 concept	 of	 ability	 of	











treatment	 itself	 combined	with	 the	 lack	of	 effective	protection	 against	 such	harms	 -	
whether	 the	 state	 itself	 persecutes	 or	 not,	 or	 whether	 it	 is	 unable	 to	 prevent	













Fleeing	 armed	 conflict	 and	 seeking	 asylum	 on	 grounds	 of	 gender-based	 persecution	
sets	 a	 major	 challenge	 to	 female	 victims.	 In	 fact,	 it	 appears	 that	 women	 in	 this	
particular	position	confront	an	obstacle	of	having	to	cross	a	‘double	threshold’	(if	not	
double	barrier)	of	evidencing	their	claim.	First,	the	aspect	of	fleeing	armed	conflict	or	
situation	 characterized	 by	 a	 high	 level	 of	 indiscriminate	 violence	 (e.g.	 in	 situation	 of	
civil	war)	is	problematic	due	to	the	general	non-recognition	of	humanitarian	refugees	




included	 as	 an	 autonomous	 ground	 for	 persecution.	 The	UNHCR	 Gender	 Guidelines	
should	 act	 as	 a	 reliable	 tool	 for	 persons	 involved	 in	 refugee	 status	 determination	
procedures	 where	 questions	 of	 gender-related	 aspects	 of	 interpretation	 of	 the	
Convention	 may	 arise.	 Nevertheless,	 the	Guidelines	 have	 their	 practical	 limitations.	
They	may	 provide	 interpretative	 guidance	 and	 encourage	 a	 gender-inclusive	 reading	
and	application	of	the	1951	Convention	but	they	are	not	legally	binding.	Furthermore,	
although	 they	 acknowledge	 gender-based	 persecution	 (in	 a	 soft	 law	 form),	 they	
reaffirm	that	the	adoption	of	a	gender-sensitive	approach	to	the	Convention	does	not	
invalidate	 the	 requirement	 that	 the	 refugee	 claimant	must	 establish	 a	well-founded	
fear	 of	 persecution	 for	 at	 least	 one	 of	 the	 five	 Convention	 reasons.83	In	 effect,	 the	






















the	 numbers	 and	 variety	 of	 asylum	 claims	 considered	 under	 the	 category	 of	 PSG	
increased	over	time.	What	also	became	clear	was	that	the	majority	of	claims	involving	
gender-based	persecution	were	considered	under	this	ground.	In	light	of	the	subject	of	
































The	 protected	 characteristics	 approach	 looks	 at	 whether	 members	 of	 the	 group	 in	
question	 share	 characteristics	 which	 are	 unchangeable	 or	 characteristics	 which	 are	
alterable	 but	 which	 are	 perceived	 to	 be	 fundamental	 to	 human	 dignity	 and	 human	
rights	 and	 therefore	nobody	 should	be	 required	 to	 change	 them.	This	 approach	was	
developed	 in	the	decision	of	the	US	Board	of	 Immigration	Appeals	(BIA)	 in	Re	Acosta	
where	the	BIA	relied	on	the	doctrine	of	ejusdem	generis	in	construing	the	meaning	of	a	
PSG.88	It	noted	that	in	the	light	of	this	rule	of	interpretation,	where	each	of	the	other	
























then	 add	 a	 fifth	 such	 as	 ‘and	 all	 other	 grounds	 that	 are	 frequently	 a	 basis	 for	 persecution’.	 (...)	 The	
suggestion	that	ejusdem	generis	can	play	a	useful	interpretative	role	may	be	based	on	a	slightly	different	








(ii) groups	defined	by	a	 characteristic	 that	 is	 fundamental	 to	human	dignity	 such	
that	a	person	should	not	be	forced	to	relinquish	it;	and		








“the	 collection	 of	 persons	 must	 be	 of	 social	 character,	 that	 is	 to	 say,	 the	
collection	must	be	cognisable	as	a	group	in	the	society	such	that	 its	members	
share	 something	 which	 unites	 them	 and	 sets	 them	 apart	 from	 society	 at	
large”.94		
	






perhaps	 all,	 cases	 on	 external	 perceptions	 of	 the	 group”	 and	 that	 it	 “must	 be	
identifiable	 as	 a	 social	 unit”	 by	 the	 public,	which	 is	 “aware	 of	 the	 characteristics	 or	
attributes	 that	 (...)	 unite	 and	 identify	 the	 group”.95	The	 importance	 of	 the	 public	
perception	element	to	the	determination	of	existence	of	a	PSG	was	later	confirmed	in	




92	UNHCR,	The	 'Ground	with	 the	 Least	 Clarity':	 A	 Comparative	 Study	 of	 Jurisprudential	 Developments	





























a	more	 favourable	approach	 to	determination	of	a	PSG.102	The	social	perception	 test	
can	be	described	as	more	open	and	flexible	due	to	the	lack	of	restrictions	posed	by	the	













members	 of	 his	 family	 had	 been	 murdered	 by	 members	 of	 this	 group	 after	 they	 refused	 to	 pay	 or	
stopped	 payments.	 The	 IAT	 recognized	 that	 the	 status	 of	 being	 a	 prosperous	 private	 landowner	 in	













to	 be	 neither	 unalterable	 or	 fundamental,	 further	 analysis	 should	 be	
undertaken	 to	 determine	 whether	 the	 group	 is	 nonetheless	 perceived	 as	 a	
cognizable	group	in	that	society”.103		
	
Therefore,	 it	 may	 encompass	 groups	 which	 are	 not	 defined	 by	 immutable	
characteristics,	 as	 well	 as	 responding	 better	 to	 the	 changing	 nature	 of	 a	 PSG	 by	
opening	 the	 avenue	 for	 inclusion	of	 new	groups	 that	may	have	emerged	 (or,	 having	
had	 already	 existed,	 became	 to	 be	 persecuted),	 but	 whose	 characteristics	 are	 not	
necessarily	 innate	 or	 unchangeable,	 e.g.	 one’s	 profession.	 Furthermore,	 the	 social	
perception	 approach	 allows	 for	 the	 determination	 of	 a	 PSG	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	
particular	society,	taking	into	account	 its	historical,	cultural	and	religious	specificities.	






in	 one	 country	 but	 not	 in	 others	 or	 which,	 in	 any	 given	 country,	 have	 not	
previously	been	recognized”.104	
	
Despite	 differences	 between	 the	 two	 approaches,	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 groups	
recognized	 as	 PSGs	 under	 the	 social	 perception	 approach	would	 also	 be	 recognized	
using	 protected	 characteristics	 analysis.	 Thus,	 the	 UNHCR	 recommended	 that	 the	
combined	approach	 is	 taken	 in	order	 to	address	any	protection	gaps	 that	may	result	
from	adopting	a	 single	 test	 for	MPSG.	To	 this	end,	 the	UNHCR	 recommends	a	 single	




103 	Secretary	 of	 State	 for	 the	 Home	 Department	 (Respondent)	 v.	 K	 (FC)	 (Appellant),	 Fornah	 (FC)	






“a	 particular	 social	 group	 is	 a	 group	 of	 persons	 who	 share	 a	 common	
characteristic	other	than	their	risk	of	being	persecuted,	or	who	are	perceived	as	





towards	 a	 determination	 of	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 PSG.	 By	 incorporating	 the	 two	
approaches	into	a	single	definition,	it	allows	both	constructions	to	co-exist	in	refugee	










Both	 tests	 have	 been	 applied	 in	 cases	 which	 considered	 whether	 women	 can	
constitute	 a	 PSG	 for	 purposes	 of	 the	 Convention	 definition	 of	 a	 refugee.	 A	 central	
question	in	the	PSG-related	jurisprudence	is	whether	gender	can	be	seen	as	an	innate	
characteristic	 by	 reason	 of	which	women	 are	 persecuted.	 In	 particular,	 the	 cases	 to	
which	the	above	tests	were	applied	dealt	with	women	who	transgressed	social	mores	














who	 suffered	 (or	 are	 at	 risk	 of)	 gender-based	 persecution	 is	 possible	 irrespective	 of	
which	 test	 is	 applied.	Gender	was	 categorised	as	 an	 immutable	 characteristic,	which	





“Women	 in	 any	 society	 are	 a	 distinct	 and	 recognisable	 group;	 and	 their	
distinctive	attributes	and	characteristics	exist	 independently	of	 the	manner	 in	













leading	 case-law	 employing	 gender-inclusive	 application	 of	 a	 PSG	 test	 and	 a	 rather	
clear	 message	 emanating	 from	 the	 UNHCR	 Gender	 Guidelines	 and	 the	 UNHCR	 PSG	


















This	 argument	 however	 is	 generally	 overlooked	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 refugee	
determination	process	and	even	more	often	dismissed	for	mainly	two	reasons.		
	
The	 first	 reason	 is	based	on	what	Baroness	Hale	 rightly	called	 in	Fornah	 ‘a	peculiarly	
cruel	version	of	Catch	22’:	a	difficulty	involved	in	formulating	the	group	in	sufficiently	
narrow	 terms	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	 the	 ‘floodgates’	 concern.111	However,	 an	 attempt	 to	
narrow	the	group	to	include	women	who	may	be	at	risk	of	gender-based	persecution	
in	 or	 as	 a	 result	 of	 events	 taking	 place	 during	 armed	 conflict	 immediately	 raises	
another	concern.	It	has	been	established	that	experience	of	persecution	which	persons	
may	have	in	common	does	not	mean	that	they	constitute	a	PSG.112	In	other	words,	the	
social	 group	must	 exist	 independently	 of	 persecution	 or	 the	 fear	 of	 it,	 although	 the	
common	 experience	 of	 persecution	 may	 be	 an	 indicative	 factor	 in	 recognition	 of	 a	
PSG.113	Consequently,	the	dilemma	remains:			
	




Gender-based	 persecution	 of	 women	 in	 armed	 conflict	 may	 then	 be	 seen	 as	 a	
characteristic,	 which	 ‘unites’	 the	 victims	 and	 therefore	 excludes	 the	 possibility	 of	




of	women	as	a	group,	which	 is	particularly	vulnerable	 in	 situations	of	armed	conflict	
and,	therefore,	a	group	which	should	be	afforded	special	protection	by	IHL.	It	can	also	
be	argued	that	such	a	categorization	can	be	seen	as	rooted	in	women’s	past	common	
experience	 of	 gender-based	 persecution	 in	 armed	 conflict.	 This	 is	 particularly	 true	









‘practice’	 that	 has	 been	 a	 part	 of	 (mis)conduct	 in	 war	 for	millennia;	 a	 (mis)conduct	
which	has	been	victimising	primarily	women	solely	due	to	their	gender.		
	
The	 second	 challenge	 is	 posed	 by	 a	 remarkably	 common	 misperception	 and	




As	 noted	 by	Goodwin-Gill	 and	McAdam,	 “gender	 is	 used	 by	 societies	 to	 organize	 or	
distribute	rights	and	benefits;	where	it	 is	also	used	to	deny	rights	or	 inflict	harm,	the	
identification	 of	 a	 gender-defined	 social	 group	 has	 the	 advantage	 of	 external	
confirmation”.115	Because	 gender	 is	 not	 a	 static	 factor	 and	 gender	 relations	 differ	




As	 argued	 throughout	 this	 chapter,	 understanding	 of	 this	 ‘gender	 dynamic’	 is	
particularly	 relevant	 in	 the	 context	 of	 armed	 conflict,	 when	 women	 are	 especially	
vulnerable	 to	 persecution	 primarily	 due	 to	 their	 gender.	 Furthermore,	 as	 shown	 in	
Shah	 and	 Islam,	 gender	 plays	 a	 major	 role	 behind	 persecution	 of	 women	 and,	 as	
stressed	by	Lord	Steyn	and	Lord	Hutton,	can	indeed	be	a	characteristic	unifying	women	
into	 a	 PSG.	 Nevertheless,	 in	 cases	 where	 the	 sole	 reason	 for	 persecution	 is	 the	
applicant’s	 gender,	 decision-makers	 generally	 continue	 to	 show	 strong	 reluctance	 to	




















In	 2004,	 the	 European	Union	 adopted	 the	 ‘Qualification	Directive’	 (Council	 Directive	
2004/83/EC),	 the	 core	 element	 of	 the	 Common	 European	 Asylum	 System.	 The	
Directive	creates	a	scheme	which	allows	third	country	nationals,	who	do	not	qualify	as	




of	 subsidiary	 protection.	 The	Directive	 has	 been	 already	 acknowledged	 as	 a	 ground-
breaking	step	 in	developing	the	 law	of	refugee	protection	and	has	been	described	as	
“the	most	ambitious	attempt	to	combine	refugee	and	human	rights	law	to	date”.118	It	




Effectively,	 the	 QD	 explicitly	 recognizes	 gender-specific	 acts	 as	 a	 means	 of	
persecution.119	Furthermore,	 the	 Directive	 recognizes	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘serious	 harm’	




third-country	 nationals	 or	 stateless	 persons	 as	 beneficiaries	 of	 international	 protection,	 for	 a	 uniform	
status	for	refugees	or	for	persons	eligible	for	subsidiary	protection,	and	for	the	content	of	the	protection	
granted	(recast),	Official	Journal	of	the	European	Union	2011	L337/9	(20	December	2011).		
118	Hélène	 Lambert,	 ‘The	 EU	 Asylum	 Qualification	 Directive,	 its	 impact	 on	 the	 jurisprudence	 of	 the	
United	 Kingdom	 and	 International	 Law’	 (2006)	 55	 International	 and	 Comparative	 Law	Quarterly	 161,	
162.	





by	 reason	 of	 indiscriminate	 violence	 in	 situations	 of	 international	 or	 internal	 armed	
conflict”.120	As	such,	it	opens	the	possibility	to	seek	international	protection	by	persons	










cannot	 be	 made	 under	 Article	15(2)	 of	 the	 European	 Convention	 for	 the	
Protection	of	Human	Rights	and	Fundamental	Freedoms;	or	





notion	 of	 ‘well-founded	 fear	 of	 persecution’,	 reinstating	 the	 language	 of	 the	 1951	





The	 QD	 addresses	 acts	 of	 a	 persecutory	 character.	 In	 contrast	 to	 the	 international	
system	 of	 refugee	 protection	 outlined	 in	 the	 Refugee	 Convention	 1951,	 the	 QD	
																																																								
120	Article	15(c)	QD:	 ‘Serious	harm	consists	of:	 (…)	(c)	serious	and	individual	threat	to	a	civilian's	 life	or	
person	by	reason	of	indiscriminate	violence	in	situations	of	international	or	internal	armed	conflict.’	
121	UNHCR	Handbook,	supra	18,	para.164:	‘Persons	compelled	to	leave	their	country	of	origin	as	a	result	








1951.	 However,	 the	 UNHCR	 provides	 ‘interpretative	 guidelines’,	 which	 encourage	
reading	 of	 the	 Refugee	 Convention	 in	 a	 gender-sensitive	 manner.124	Although	 their	
adoption	 was	 welcome	 and,	 at	 least	 in	 theory,	 marked	 a	 progression	 towards	 a	





acts	 is	of	particular	 importance,	principally	 in	the	context	of	modern	armed	conflicts,	
which	have	been	characterized	by	an	exceptionally	high	occurrence	of	acts	of	 sexual	
violence.126	The	 great	majority	 of	 victims	 have	 been	women,	 who	were	 deliberately	
targeted	due	to	their	gender,	i.e.	due	to	their	identity	and	status	as	women	within	the	
particular	 society.	 Furthermore,	 the	 addition	 of	 a	 category	 of	 ‘gender-specific	 acts’	
opened	 a	 discussion	 about	 the	 status	 of	 this	 new	 element.	 It	 remains	 uncertain	
whether	 ‘gender-specific	 acts’	 should	 be	 construed	 as	 a	 new	 ground,	 additional	 to	
those	 already	 present	 in	 the	 1951	 Convention.	 Nevertheless,	 at	 the	 very	 least,	 this	
phrase	 could	 be	 understood	 as	 inviting	 a	 gender-sensitive	 interpretation	 and	
application	of	the	Refugee	Convention.		
	
This	 potential	 ambiguity	 leads	 to	 another	 question,	 namely	 that	 of	 the	 relationship	
between	 the	 QD	 and	 international	 law.	 Lambert	 notes	 that,	 especially	 if	 ‘gender-








part	 of	most,	 if	 not	 all,	 historical	 armed	 conflicts.	However,	 it	 is	 largely	 due	 to	 the	 events	 of	modern	
armed	conflicts,	in	particular	war	in	the	Former	Yugoslavia	and	in	Rwanda,	that	sexual	violence	emerged	





in	 relation	 to	 different	 entitlements	 that	 these	 two	 instruments	 warrant	 for	 what	
essentially	may	be	the	same	type	of	persecutory	harm.127		
	
However,	 the	 two	 instruments	 clearly	 differ	 in	 defining	 the	 eligibility	 of	 potential	
beneficiaries	of	asylum.	The	QD	explicitly	takes	a	narrower	view	on	this	 issue:	one	of	
the	 main	 grounds	 of	 eligibility	 is	 a	 requirement	 that	 an	 applicant	 for	 subsidiary	
protection	must	not	qualify	for	refugee	status	within	the	meaning	of	the	1951	Refugee	
Convention.	Merely	by	virtue	of	 this	basic	 introductory	provision,	 it	can	be	seen	that	
the	 preliminary	 characteristics	 of	 attempted	 beneficiaries	 of	 refugee	 protection	 are	
mutually	 exclusive:	 a	 person	 who	 qualifies	 as	 a	 refugee	 may	 not	 benefit	 from	
subsidiary	 protection	 afforded	 under	 the	 Qualification	 Directive	 and	 vice	 versa.128	
Accordingly,	 it	 can	 be	 argued	 that,	 due	 to	 this	 substantive	 difference,	 it	 is	 rather	
understandable	that	the	two	regimes	(albeit	rooted	in	the	same	general	presumption)	
will	not,	in	principle,	guarantee	the	same	level	of	protection.129	Should	they	do	so,	the	










Directive	 is	 rather	 to	 guarantee	 the	minimum	 standards	 (emphasis	 added).	 Recital	 12	QD:	 “The	main	
objective	of	this	Directive	is,	on	the	one	hand,	to	ensure	that	Member	States	apply	common	criteria	for	
the	 identification	of	persons	genuinely	 in	need	of	 international	protection,	and,	on	the	other	hand,	 to	
ensure	that	a	minimum	level	of	benefits	 is	available	for	these	persons	 in	all	Member	States”.	Article	1	
QD	states:	“The	purpose	of	this	Directive	is	to	lay	down	minimum	standards	for	the	qualification	of	third	
country	 nationals	 or	 stateless	 persons	 as	 refugees	 or	 as	 persons	 who	 otherwise	 need	 international	





However,	Lambert	argues,	 the	 two	different	kinds	of	status	of	a	 ‘refugee’	 (i.e.	 the	one	determined	by	
the	 scope	 of	 the	 Refugee	 Convention	 1951	 and	 the	 other	 qualified	 through	 the	 fulfilment	 of	
requirements	 set	 by	 the	 Qualification	 Directive)	 and,	 what	 follows	 from	 this	 distinction,	 different	








created,	 one	 of	 the	 key	 challenges	was	 posed	 by	 divergent	 approaches	 amongst	 EU	





protection	 from	 persecution	 by	 non-state	 actors	 only	 in	 circumstances,	 where	 the	
state	 is	 complicit	 in	 commission	 of	 persecutory	 acts	 by	 non-state	 actors	
(‘accountability	 approach’)	 or	where	 their	 own	 state	 fails	 in	 its	 duty	 to	 provide	 and	
apply	adequate	measures	 to	save	 its	nationals	 from	the	recognised	 threats	or	harms	
(‘protection	view’).	Article	6(c)	of	the	QD	adopts	the	 latter	approach,	which	primarily	





be	 inflicted	by	non-state	actors’.133	Finally,	 this	 is	particularly	 important	development	
from	 the	 perspective	 of	 women	 who	 flee	 gender-based	 persecution,	 as	 very	 often,	
































European	 Convention	 of	 Human	 Rights.	 Paragraph	 (c)	 introduces	 a	 new	 concept	 of	
‘serious	 harm’,	 namely	 one,	 which	 explicitly	 recognizes	 a	 harm	 originating	 from	 the	
situations	of	indiscriminate	violence	in	armed	conflict.		
	





internal	 armed	 conflict,	 which	 broadens	 the	 scope	 of	 prospective	 beneficiaries	 of	









Finally,	 Article	 15(c)	 appears	 to	 require	 proof	 of	 a	 lesser	 degree	 of	 individual	 risk	 in	
order	 for	 an	 applicant	 to	 qualify	 for	 subsidiary	 protection	 than	 that	 required	 under	
Articles	 15(a)	 and	 (b).	 The	 ‘real	 risk’	 standard	 set	 out	 in	 Article	 2(e)	 applied	 to	 the	
meaning	 of	 ‘serious	 harm’	 in	 Article	 15(c),	 effectively	 amounts	 to	 a	 requirement	 of	
proof	 of	 a	 ‘real	 risk	 of	 suffering	 a	 serious	 and	 individual	 threat’	 (emphasis	 added),	
rather	than	a	real	risk	of	suffering	the	actual	 ill-treatment.136	Accordingly,	 it	marks	an	
important	 step	 forward	 in	 the	 system	 of	 refugee	 protection,	 in	 that	 it	 opens	 the	




However,	 Article	 15(c)	 poses	 some	 interpretative	 challenges.	 Two	 important	 issues	





when	 interpreting	 and	 applying	 Article	 15(c),	 one	 cannot	 rely	 upon	 established	
standards	developed	 in	case-law	of	the	ECtHR,	except	with	regard	to	the	right	to	 life	
guaranteed	 by	 Article	 2	 ECHR.	 	 However,	 the	main	 difference	 between	 Article	 15(c)	
and	Articles	15(a)	and	(b),	and	the	crucial	one	 in	the	context	of	current	discussion,	 is	
the	requirement	of	 internal	or	 international	armed	conflict.138	This	element	of	Article	
15(c)	 poses	 significant	 degree	 of	 interpretative	 difficulty,	 as	 different	 standards	 are	
applied	 in	 the	 practice	 of	 member	 states.139	The	 ‘internal’	 aspect	 of	 armed	 conflict	
																																																								
136	This	 approach	 is	 also	 supported	 by	 Hemme	 Battjes,	 European	 Asylum	 Law	 and	 International	 Law	
(2006	Martinus	Nijhoff)	239-240;	for	further	discussion	see	also:	Storey,	supra	136,	33-36.	
137	See	 generally:	 Hélène	 Lambert,	 Theo	 Farrell,	 ‘The	 Changing	 Character	 of	 Armed	 Conflict	 and	 the	














A	 situation	 of	 non-international	 armed	 conflict	 (NIAC)	 is	more	 difficult	 to	 determine	
than	 the	 existence	 of	 an	 international	 armed	 conflict.	 The	 level	 of	 intensity	 of	
indiscriminate	 violence	 must	 reach	 a	 sufficient	 threshold	 in	 order	 for	 internal	
disturbances	or	situations	characterised	by	the	high	degree	of	violence	to	classify	it	as	
an	internal	armed	conflict.	However,	the	definition	of	NIAC	has	evolved	in	the	context	
of	 ICL,	primarily	 in	 the	 case-law	of	 the	 ICTY.	 In	Prosecutor	 v.	Tadić	 (Jurisdiction),	 the	
ICTY	established	that	a	NIAC	“exists	whenever	there	is	a	resort	to	armed	force	between	
States	or	protracted	armed	violence	between	governmental	authorities	and	organized	




• the	 parties	 to	 armed	 conflict	 must	 poses	 a	 minimum	 level	 of	 organisational	
structure.142	
This	definition	has	been	consistently	applied	 since	 the	 judgment	 in	Tadić	 in	 the	case	
law	of	the	ICTY	and	the	ICTR.	That	said,	there	is	no	fixed	definition	of	what	constitutes	
the	minimum	levels	of	 intensity	and	organisation	as	required	by	the	Tadić	definition.	
Rather,	 as	 suggested	 in	Prosecutor	 v.	 Limaj,	 “the	determination	of	 the	 intensity	 of	 a	






141	Prosecutor	 v.	 Tadić,	 Decision	 on	 the	 Defence	 Motion	 for	 Interlocutory	 Appeal	 on	 Jurisdiction,	 2	
October	1995,	para.70.	
142	Prosecutor	 v.	 Tadić,	 Trial	 Judgment,	 IT-94-1-T,	 7	 May	 1997,	 para.562;	 Prosecutor	 v.	 Limaj,	 Trial	
Judgment,	 IT-03-66-T,	 30	 November	 2005,	 para.89;	 International	 Committee	 of	 the	 Red	 Cross	 (ICRC)	
Opinion	Paper,	‘How	is	the	Term	“Armed	Conflict”	Defined	in	International	Humanitarian	Law?’,	March	






However,	 recent	 jurisprudence	 on	 the	 element	 of	 armed	 conflict	 in	 the	 context	 of	
Article	15(c)	does	not	actually	support	the	IHL-	and	ICL-led	approach	to	defining	NIAC.	





flee	 armed	 conflict”	 and	 therefore	 is	 not	 the	 correct	 legal	 framework	 against	which	
Article	15(c)	 claims	 should	be	assessed.144	This	position	was	 further	endorsed	by	 the	
UNHCR	 in	 Annex	 2	 of	 its	 submissions	 in	QD	 &	 AH	 (Iraq),	 where	 the	 UNHCR,	 while	
recognising	 the	 need	 for	 further	 guidance	 on	 the	 necessary	 intensity	 of	 violence,	
argued	that	“a	number	of	features	of	“an	armed	conflict”	 important	under	IHL	are	of	
much	 less	 relevance	 to	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 protection	 offered	 by	 Article	 15(c)	 of	 the	
Qualification	 Directive,	 given	 its	 different	 object	 and	 purpose”.145	Furthermore,	 the	
UNHCR	 “considers	 that	 the	 term	 ‘international	 or	 internal	 armed	 conflict’	 in	 Article	






developed	these	 terms	 in	 first	place.	 It	 is	 therefore	questionable,	Storey	notes,	what	
authority	does	 the	national	 decision	maker	or	 the	UNHCR	or	 even	 the	CJEU	have	 to	
















assessment	 of	 asylum	 claims	 of	 individuals	 fleeing	 situations	 of	 armed	 conflict.	 It	 is	





be	used	 in	 the	context	of	 IRL	as	a	 specialist	and	established	 framework	of	 reference	
when	the	claim	for	international	protection	is	linked	to	the	alleged	persecution	taking	
place	in	the	context	of	armed	conflict.	In	support	of	this	rationale,	Storey	rightly	notes	
that	 “treating	 IHL	 in	 certain	 contexts	 as	 a	 primary	 reference	 point	 and	 as	 a	 starting	
point,	(...)	does	not	mean	treating	it	as	the	only	relevant	body	of	applicable	law	to	be	
applied	 to	 situations	 of	 armed	 conflict	 to	 the	 exclusion	 of	 all	 other	 bodies	 of	
international	 law	such	as	 IHRL”.149	However,	the	approach	facilitating	departure	from	
IHL-inclusive	 interpretation	 of	 the	 key	 terms	 in	 Article	 15(c)	 and	 encouraging	











148	The	 International	 Court	 of	 Justice	 confirmed	 that	 in	 situations	 involving	 armed	 conflict	 IHL	 is	 lex	
specialis:	 Legality	 of	 the	 Threat	 or	 Use	 of	 Nuclear	Weapons,	 Advisory	 Opinion,	 ICJ	 Reports	 1996,	 66;	
Legality	of	 the	Legal	Consequences	of	 the	Construction	of	a	Wall	 in	 the	Occupied	Palestinian	Territory,	







Prior	 to	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 QD	 and	 subsequent	 jurisprudence,	 the	 leading	
British	authority	regarding	refugee	protection	in	armed	conflicts	was	Adan	v.	Secretary	
of	 State	 for	 the	Home	Department.151	The	House	of	 Lords	 in	Adan	 distinguished	 two	
types	 of	 harm:	 harm	 innate	 to	 the	 incidents	 of	 internal	 armed	 conflict	 and	 harm	
involving	 risks	 above	 this	 level.	 It	 was	 held	 that	 in	 order	 for	 the	 applicant	 fleeing	
situations	of	armed	conflict	or	generalised	violence	to	successfully	establish	claim	for	
international	protection,	they	must	show	‘differential	impact’,	i.e.	that	(if	returned)	the	
applicant	 would	 be	 exposed	 to	 the	 risk	 of	 being	 persecuted	 over	 and	 above	 the	
ordinary	 risk	 associated	 with	 warfare.152	In	 other	 words,	 it	 must	 be	 shown	 that	 the	
applicant	is	at	a	higher	risk	of	ill-treatment	than	other	persons	caught	in	situations	of	
armed	 conflict	 or	 generalised	 violence.	 However,	 no	 clear	 guidance	 was	 issued	 in	
relation	 to	 when,	 if	 at	 all,	 the	 ordinary	 events	 of	 civil	 war	 amount	 to	 persecution.	
Furthermore,	the	approach	taken	by	the	UK	House	of	Lords	in	Adan	was	criticised	by	






was	 influenced	 by	 the	 operation	 of	 the	 Article	 15(c)	 of	 the	 Directive.	 However,	 the	
‘exceptionality	 approach’	 based	 on	 applicant	 showing	 an	 individual	 risk	 above	 the	

















Definition	 of	 ‘indiscriminate	 violence’	 established	 in	 KH	 (Article	 15(c)	 Qualification	
Directive)	 Iraq	 CG	 extends	 the	 scope	of	Article	 15(c)	 to	 include	 acts	 of	 violence	 that	
disproportionately	 strike	 the	 civilian	 population	 and	 are	 therefore	 committed	 in	
violation	of	the	main	rules	of	IHL,	in	particular	the	principle	of	distinction.	An	important	
example	 of	 such	 acts	 is	 wartime	 sexual	 violence,	 which	 is	 used	 on	 a	 mass	 scale	 to	
predominantly	 target	 civilian	 women.	 Furthermore,	 such	 acts	 may	 be	 seen	 as	
constituting	gender-based	persecution,	 in	addition	to	amounting	to	a	the	violation	of	
IHL	and	rules	of	 international	criminal	 law.	That	said,	the	UKAIT	held	that	 in	order	to	
establish	 existence	 of	 a	 ‘serious	 harm’	 within	 the	 meaning	 of	 Article	 15(c),	 the	
requirement	of	‘substantial	individual	threat’	cannot	be	separated	from	the	element	of	
‘indiscriminate	violence’.157	To	that	end,	under	KH	construction	of	Article	15(c),	women	
fleeing	armed	conflict	due	 to	 the	 risk	of	being	exposed	 to	gender-based	persecution	





A	 leading	 authority	 on	 the	 issue	 of	 interpretation	 of	 Article	 15(c),	 can	 be	 found	 in	
Elgafaji	v.	Staatssecretaris	van	Justitie.159	The	CJEU	in	Elgafaji	held	that:		
	
“‘individual'	must	 be	 understood	 as	 covering	 harm	 to	 civilians	 irrespective	 of	
their	 identity,	where	 the	 degree	 of	 indiscriminate	 violence	 characterising	 the	
armed	 conflict	 taking	 place	 (...)	 reaches	 such	 a	 high	 level	 that	 substantial	
grounds	are	shown	for	believing	that	a	civilian,	returned	to	the	relevant	country	
or,	as	the	case	may	be,	to	the	relevant	region,	would,	solely	on	account	of	his	


















that	provision	must	be	 subject	 to	a	 coherent	 interpretation	 in	 relation	 to	 the	
other	 two	 situations	 referred	 to	 in	 Article	 15	 of	 the	 Directive	 and	 must,	
therefore,	 be	 interpreted	 by	 close	 reference	 to	 individualisation	 (emphasis	
added).	 In	 that	 regard,	 the	 more	 the	 applicant	 is	 able	 to	 show	 that	 he	 is	
specifically	 affected	 by	 reasons	 of	 factors	 particular	 to	 his	 personal	
circumstances,	 the	 lower	the	 level	of	 indiscriminate	violence	required	for	him	
to	be	eligible	for	subsidiary	protection”.161		
	
The	 ruling	 in	Elgafaji	 employed	 a	 rather	 liberal	 interpretation	of	Article	 15(c),	which	
confirmed	that	a	person	may	be	exposed	to	a	serious	and	 individual	harm	merely	by	
being	present	in	certain	territory.	It	shifted	the	nature	of	the	threat	from	being	purely	
personal	 towards	 a	primarily	 situational	 and	 geographical	 dimension,	 defined	by	 the	
mere	existence	of	high	levels	of	indiscriminate	violence	associated	with	armed	conflict	
taking	 place	 in	 a	 particular	 country	 or	 region.	 As	 such,	 the	 judgment	 marked	 a	
significant	 departure	 from	 the	 test	 established	 by	 the	 UK	 House	 of	 Lords	 in	 Adan,	
which	 required	 the	 applicant	 fleeing	 armed	 conflict	 to	 show	differential	 impact	over	
and	above	the	ordinary	risks	associated	with	conflict.162		
	
Furthermore,	 the	 ruling	 in	 Elgafaji	 introduced	 the	 ‘sliding	 scale’	 approach	 to	 the	
determination	 of	 claims	 involving	 Article	 15(c),	 whereby	 the	 higher	 the	 level	 of	
indiscriminate	 violence,	 the	 lower	 the	 level	 of	 individual	 risk	 of	 harm	 needs	 to	 be	
proved	by	the	applicant.163	Equally,	 this	 reasoning	can	be	applied	to	cases	where	the	
level	 of	 indiscriminate	 violence	 is	 not	 exceptionally	 high,	 but	 the	 claim	 may	
nonetheless	 succeed	 as	 long	 as	 the	 individual	 is	 able	 to	 show	 that	 they	 possess	
individual,	risk-related	characteristic(s).	Following	Elgafaji,	the	applicant	is	not	required	









personal	 circumstances.164 	Rather,	 it	 is	 assessed	 whether	 personal	 risk	 factors	 or	
circumstances	 expose	 an	 applicant	 to	 greater	 risk	 of	 suffering	 serious	 harm	 in	 the	
context	of	indiscriminate	violence.	
	
In	 this	 context,	 given	 the	 prevalence	 of	 gender-based	 violence	 in	 modern	 armed	
conflicts,	one	may	deduce	that	gender	may	amount	to	such	a	characteristic,	especially	
when	the	applicant	is	female.	This	premise	may	be	further	supported	by	the	fact	that	
IHL	 (as	 a	 body	 of	 law	 specifically	 addressing	 situations	 of	 armed	 conflict)	 foresees	
women	as	 specifically	 vulnerable	persons	 in	armed	conflict	 and	 therefore	 in	need	of	
special	protection,	which	is	guaranteed	under	the	Geneva	Convention	IV.	Furthermore,	
modern	 armed	 conflicts	 have	 proven	 that	 women	 and	 girls	 have	 been	 specifically	
targeted	 for	 reasons	 associated	 with	 their	 gender	 and	 subjected	 to	 gender-specific	
forms	of	ill-treatment.	These	acts	not	only	amounted	to	war	crimes,	grave	breaches	of	
the	 Geneva	 Conventions	 1949	 and	 crimes	 against	 humanity	 but	 also,	 arguably,	
constituted	persecutory	acts.		
	
If	 one	was	 to	 consider	 these	 types	of	 gender-based	harms	 in	 context	of	 the	 ‘sliding-
scale’	concept	of	Article	15(c),	it	would	become	evident	that,	irrespective	of	the	place	
on	the	scale,	female	applicants	should	be	able	to	establish	sufficient	grounds	to	avail	
themselves	 of	 protection	 under	 Article	 15(c)	 of	 the	 Directive,	 especially	 when	
persecutory	acts	fall	under	Article	9(2)	of	the	Directive.	Therefore,	 it	can	be	said	that	
Article	 15(c)	 opens	 the	 possibility	 for	 women,	 who	 fear	 or	 have	 been	 subjected	 to	
gender-based	 persecution	 in	 armed	 conflict,	 to	 fulfil	 a	 criterion	 of	 ‘individual	 harm’,	
which	in	turn	may	lead	to	a	successful	claim	under	the	QD.	Furthermore,	Storey	views	














The	 judgment	of	 the	CJEU	 in	Elgafaji	 is	 also	 important	 in	 that	 it	 is	 binding	on	all	 EU	
member	 states.167	However,	 despite	 the	 potential	 impact	 of	 this	 decision	 towards	
overcoming	the	long-existing	limitations	of	the	international	protection	available	under	
the	 Refugee	 Convention,	 the	 legacy	 of	 Elgafaji	 also	 opens	 doors	 to	 interpretative	





While	 the	 QD	 establishes	 a	 progressive	 framework	 under	 which	 claims	 relating	 to	
persecution	 in	 armed	 conflict	 can	 be	 successfully	 considered,	 its	 impact	 on	 other	




is	 also	 likely	 to	 remedy	 the	 core	 shortcoming	 of	 the	 ‘soft	 law’	 UNHCR	 Gender	






166	Protection	gaps	 in	relation	to	claims	 involving	gender-based	persecution	 in	armed	conflict	continue	
to	 exist	where	 an	 applicant	 is	 seeking	 asylum	outside	 the	 EU	 (where	Qualification	Directive	 does	 not	
apply).	This	is	highly	problematic	in	that	applicants	outside	the	EU,	who	do	not	qualify	for	international	












part	of	 this	 chapter,	 the	vast	majority	of	 claims	 related	 to	gender-based	persecution	
tend	 to	be	considered	under	 the	heading	of	PSG.	While	 the	 international	 framework	
uses	the	two	tests	for	determination	of	PSG	(immutable	characteristics	test	and	social	




	(d)	 a	 group	 shall	 be	 considered	 to	 form	 a	 particular	 social	 group	 where	 in	
particular:		
(i) members	 of	 that	 group	 share	 an	 innate	 characteristic,	 or	 a	 common	
background	that	cannot	be	changed,	or	share	a	characteristic	or	belief	
that	 is	 so	 fundamental	 to	 identity	 or	 conscience	 that	 a	 person	 should	
not	be	forced	to	renounce	it,	and	(emphasis	added)	
(ii) that	group	has	a	distinct	 identity	 in	 the	 relevant	country,	because	 it	 is	
perceived	as	being	different	by	the	surrounding	society.170		
	
This	 test	has	been	subsequently	confirmed	 in	many	cases	 involving	determination	of	
PSG	 under	 Article	 10(1)(d)	 of	 the	 Directive,	 in	 particular	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 former	
victims	 of	 trafficking. 171 	However,	 the	 combined	 cumulative	 approach	 to	 the	
interpretation	 of	 PSG	 under	 Article	 10(1)(d)	 is	 highly	 problematic.	 The	 combined	
cumulative	test	departs	from	the	definition	of	a	PSG	adopted	by	the	UNHCR	in	its	PSG	
































10	 (1)(d)	 to	 create	 a	 clear	 test	 based	 on	 two	 alternative	 limbs175,	 so	 that	 subsidiary	








174	For	example,	 in	SB	 (PSG-Protection	Regulations-	Reg	6)	Moldova	CG	 [2008]	UKAIT	00002	 [para.69],	
the	UK	Asylum	and	Immigration	Tribunal	failed	to	apply	the	alternative	reading	of	the	two	limbs	of	PSG	
in	 Article	 10(1)(d)	 QD	 2004	 (as	 established	 in	 Fornah).	 The	 Tribunal	 found	 that:	 ‘It	 would	 also	 be	








be	members	 of	 a	 particular	 social	 group	 in	 one	 country,	 but	 not	 in	 another’	 (paras.71	 and	 72).	 This	






Parliament	and	of	 the	Council	on	minimum	standards	 for	 the	qualification	and	status	of	 third	country	











the	 ‘armed	 conflict’	 element	 of	 claims	 can	 be	 now	 more	 readily	 overcome	 (largely	
thanks	 to	 the	 decision	 in	 Elgafaji),	 the	 ‘gender	 flaw’	 of	 asylum	 claims	 remains.	
Arguably,	 the	main	 impediment	 to	 the	positive	consideration	of	gender-based	claims	
lies	in	the	construction	of	Article	10	(1)(d).	To	some	degree,	these	difficulties	can	also	
be	 attributed	 to	 the	 failed	 opportunity	 to	 explicitly	 include	 gender	 as	 one	 of	 the	
grounds	for	persecution	in	Article	2(c)	of	the	Directive.	However,	as	with	the	Refugee	
Convention,	 such	 inclusion,	 although	 most	 welcome,	 is	 not	 absolutely	 necessary	 to	
successfully	determine	gender-based	claims.177	
		
Rather,	 the	emphasis	 should	 rest	on	 improving	 the	willingness	of	decision-makers	 to	
interpret	 the	 core	 legal	 provisions	 in	 a	 gender-sensitive	manner,	 as	well	 as	 ensuring	
that	 the	 procedures	 involved	 in	 refugee-status	 determination	 take	 into	 account	 the	
specificity	of	women’s	claims	arising	from	their	gender.178	These	two	elements	of	the	
inquiry	 into	 granting	 complementary	 protection	 status	 should	 be	 also	 considered	 in	
the	 context	 of	 recent	 legal	 developments	 on	 the	Council	 of	 Europe	 level:	 the	 ECtHR	
decision	 in	M.S.S.	v.	Belgium	and	Greece	and	the	2011	Council	of	Europe	Convention	







but	 in	 the	 incomplete	 and	 gendered	 interpretation	 of	 refugee	 law,	 the	 failure	 of	 decision-makers	 to	
acknowledge	 and	 reasons	 to	 the	 gendering	 of	 politics	 and	 of	 women’s	 relationship	 to	 the	 state”,	 in:	




179	M.S.S.	 v.	 Belgium	 and	 Greece,	 Application	 No.	 30696/09,	 21	 January	 2011;	 Council	 of	 Europe	








The	 Istanbul	Convention,	which	came	 into	 force	 in	August	2014,	can	be	described	as	
the	“most	far-reaching	international	treaty	to	date	to	address	violence	against	women	
in	a	comprehensive	manner”.180	The	Convention	explicitly	recognizes	violence	against	
women	 as	 a	 violation	 of	 human	 rights	 and	 a	 form	of	 discrimination	 against	women,	
which	encompasses	acts	of	gender-based	violence	committed	against	women	in	public	
and	private	sphere.181	The	Convention	also	lists	various	categories	of	offences	related	
to	 such	 violence,	 e.g.	 FGM,	 stalking,	 sexual	 harassment,	 forced	 marriage,	 domestic	
violence.	The	Convention	also	recognizes	and	addresses	the	problem	of	gender-based	
violence	 in	 the	 context	 of	 migration	 and	 asylum	 (Chapter	 VII).182	Article	 60	 obliges	
states	 to	 recognize	 that	 gender-based	 violence	 amounts	 to	 persecution	 and	 that	 it	
gives	 rise	 to	 an	 entitlement	 to	 subsidiary	 protection	 (Article	 60(1)).	 Parties	 are	 also	
required	 to	 ensure	 gender-sensitive	 interpretation	 of	 the	 1951	 Convention	 (Article	
60(2)	 in	 order	 to	 ensure	 recognition	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 gender-based	 violence	 may	
amount	 to	 persecution	 and	 that	 claims	 involving	 such	 persecution	 are	 properly	
examined.	These	elements	are	crucial	 to	secure	asylum	for	women	suffering	gender-
based	persecution	and	often	decisive	on	the	outcome	of	the	application.	Furthermore,	
Article	 60	 (3)	 obliges	 parties	 to	 the	 Convention	 to	 create	 and	 implement	 gender-
sensitive	 procedures	 (including	 reception	 procedures)	 into	 the	 process	 of	
determination	of	claims	for	international	protection.	These	may	include	very	practical	



















The	 Istanbul	 Convention	 contributes	 to	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 gender-sensitive	
approach	to	determination	of	gender-based	asylum	claims	in	Europe.	Article	60	of	the	
Convention	codifies	some	of	the	existing	provisions	of	the	UNHCR	Gender	Guidelines	
and,	 to	 an	 extent,	 state	 practice,	 especially	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 recognition	 of	 acts	 of	
gender-based	 violence	 as	 constitutive	 of	 persecution.	 The	 Convention	 establishes	
these	elements	as	legal	obligations,	which	are	legally	enforceable	by	the	courts	of	the	
state	 parties	 to	 the	 Convention,	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	 provisions	 of	 the	 ‘soft-law’	
guidelines.	 As	 such,	 application	 of	 Article	 60	 should	 strengthen	 and	 ensure	 the	
application	 of	 the	 gender-sensitive	 reading	 of	 the	 Refugee	 Convention	 in	 systematic	




of	 recognition	 of	 the	 impact	 of	 trauma),	 which	may	 lead	 to	wrongful	 dismissal	 of	 a	




The	 decision	 of	 the	 ECtHR	 in	M.S.S.	 v.	 Belgium	 and	 Greece	 (M.S.S.)	 (although	 not	
concerning	gender-based	persecution	in	armed	conflict)	may	have	a	positive	impact	on	
the	 way	 in	 which	 asylum	 claims	 of	 women	 persecuted	 in	 armed	 conflict	 (or	 in	 its	
																																																								




184	Asylum	Aid	 (2011),	 supra	 32,	 55-58;	 Baillot,	 Cowan	 and	Munro	 note	 that	 cultural	 differences	may	

























constitute	 gross	 violation	 of	 their	 human	 rights.	 Upon	 arrival	 in	 the	 country	 of	
destination,	 they	may	 be	 exposed	 to	 asylum	 procedures	 which	 do	 not	 comply	 with	
recommendations	 of	 the	 UNHCR	 established	 in	 the	 UNHCR	 Gender	 Guidelines.	
Moreover,	 female	 asylum	 seekers	 may	 often	 be	 in	 need	 of	 special	 professional	
assistance,	which	hardly	ever	is	provided.	
	
Taking	 into	 account	 the	 type	 of	 ill-treatment	 associated	with	 persecution,	 it	may	 be	
argued	 that	 victims	of	 gender-based	persecution	experience	 inhuman	and	degrading	
treatment	as	a	part	of	their	persecution,	in	line	of	the	definition	adopted	by	the	court	
in	 M.S.S.	 and	 in	 the	 context	 of	 Article	 3	 ECHR.	 Persecution	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 a	
“premeditated	 (act),	 applied	 for	 hours	 at	 a	 stretch	 and	 causing	 either	 actual	 bodily	
injury	 or	 intense	physical	 or	mental	 suffering”	 and	 therefore	 amounting	 to	 inhuman	
																																																								
185	The	case	concerned	the	expulsion	of	an	Afghan	asylum	seeker	to	Greece	by	the	Belgian	authorities.	







sexual	 violence,	 it	 can	be	 viewed	 as	 degrading	because	 it	 “humiliates	 or	 debases	 an	
individual,	 showing	a	 lack	of	 respect	 for,	or	diminishing,	his	or	her	human	dignity,	or	
arouses	feelings	of	fear,	anguish	or	inferiority	capable	of	breaking	an	individual's	moral	

















female	 asylum	 seekers	 who	 suffered	 gender-based	 or	 gender-specific	 persecution	





Article	 60	 of	 the	 Istanbul	 Convention.	 Finally,	 the	 decision	 in	M.S.S.,	 with	 particular	












While	some	persons	are	 likely	 to	cross	 international	borders	 in	order	 to	seek	asylum	
(i.e.	to	become	a	refugee),	many	more	face	internal	displacement.	Armed	conflict	and	
situations	 of	 generalised	 violence	 as	 well	 as	 human	 rights	 violations	 are	 (next	 to	
environment-related	 displacement)	 the	 key	 reasons	 for	 internal	 displacement.	 The	






Internally	displaced	persons	 (IDPs)	 are	persons	who	are	 forced	 to	 flee	or	 leave	 their	
habitual	 place	 of	 residence	 and	 involuntarily	 move	 within	 the	 borders	 of	 the	 state.	
Unlike	refugees,	IDPs	do	not	cross	international	borders	and,	therefore,	are	not	eligible	
to	 claim	 international	 protection.	 While	 refugees	 can	 benefit	 from	 a	 specific	 legal	
regime	 of	 the	 Refugee	 Convention,	which	 safeguards	 persons	who	 fear	 persecution,	
the	 protection	 of	 IDPs	 is	 not	 governed	 by	 any	 specific,	 international,	 legally	 binding	
instrument.	 Unless	 they	 cross	 international	 borders	 and	 claim	 asylum,	 IDPs	 cannot	
benefit	from	protection	mechanisms	afforded	by	the	1951	Refugee	Convention,	even	if	
they	 experienced	 persecution.	 However,	 irrespective	 of	 the	 differences	 of	 legal	
																																																								
188	IDMC,	 Global	 Overview	 2015:	 	 People	 internally	 displaced	 by	 conflict	 and	 violence,	 May	 2015	
<http://www.internal-displacement.org/publications/2015/global-overview-2015-people-internally-
displaced-by-conflict-and-violence>	accessed	8	November	2015,	7.	
189 	UNHCR,	 2014	 Global	 Trends.	 World	 at	 War,	 18	 June	 2015	 <http://unhcr.org/556725e69.html>	










IDPs	 may	 have	 fled	 for	 similar	 reasons	 as	 refugees,	 they	 remain,	 in	 contrast	 to	
refugees,	under	the	protection	of	their	own	government.	Therefore,	they	are	entitled	
to	 protection	 under	 national	 and	 international	 human	 rights	 law	 and,	when	 internal	
displacement	 occurs	 in	 the	 context	 of	 an	 armed	 conflict,	 under	 international	
humanitarian	 law,	 including	 customary	 international	 humanitarian	 law	 (CIHL).191	This	
may	in	itself	be	problematic,	given	the	context	of	internal	displacement,	which	usually	
occurs	in	post-conflict	situations	or	as	a	result	of	gross	human	rights	violations	within	
the	 country.	 In	 such	 situations,	 the	 state	 is	 likely	 to	 have	 a	weak	 or	 ineffective	 law	









190 	Catherine	 Phuong,	 ‘Internally	 Displaced	 Persons	 and	 Refugees:	 Conceptual	 Differences	 and	
Similarities’	 (2000)	 18(2)	 Netherland	 Quarterly	 of	 Human	 Rights	 215-230;	 Catherine	 Phuong,	 The	
International	Protection	of	Internally	Displaced	Persons	(CUP	2005).	
















women	 and	 girls. 192 	Gender	 can	 be	 one	 of	 the	 core	 underlying	 reasons	 for	
displacement,	with	gender-specific	acts	being	one	of	the	key	causes	of	flight	of	women	
and	 girls.	 Internally	 displaced	 women	 and	 girls	 often	 fall	 victims	 to	 sexual	 violence,	
especially	 in	 the	 context	 of	 inter-ethnic	 or	 inter-religious	 conflict,	 where	 sexual	
violence	 may	 also	 be	 particularly	 used	 as	 a	 method	 of	 ethnic	 cleansing.193	Some	 of	
these	 risks	 continue	even	 in	 IDP	camps,	where	women	and	girls	 are	 sexually	abused	
when	 carrying	 out	 their	 daily	 errands,	 such	 as	 collecting	 water.	 Particular	
vulnerabilities	 of	 internally	 displaced	 women,	 including	 rife	 sexual	 violence	 in	 IDP	
camps,	 risks	 of	 sexual	 exploitation,	 limited	 access	 to	 education,	 food	 and	 health	
services	(including	sexual	and	reproductive	health)	create	a	need	for	construction	and	
implementation	of	the	gender-inclusive	approach	to	the	regulation	of	the	protection	of	
IDPs.194	Furthermore,	 many	 internally	 displaced	 women	 are	 likely	 to	 have	 suffered	
gender-specific	 ill-treatment	 at	 the	 hands	 of	 state	 or	 non-state	 actors,	 which	 may	













Chad,	 12	 April	 2005	 <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/04/12/sexual-violence-and-its-consequences-
among-displaced-persons-darfur-and-chad>	accessed	15	May	2013.	
194	UN	 Human	 Rights	 Council,	 Human	 rights	 of	 internally	 displaced	 persons,	 A/HRC/RES/20/9,	 17	 July	











displaced	 women	 from	 it.195	Furthermore,	 the	 CEDAW	 Committee	 recognized	 the	




The	 Guiding	 Principles	 on	 Internal	 Displacement	 (the	 Guiding	 Principles)	 remain	 the	
only	international	instrument	adopted	specifically	in	response	to	protection	problems	
encountered	 by	 IDPs. 197 	The	 Guiding	 Principles	 cover	 situations	 of	 internal	
displacement	both	during	armed	conflict	and	in	peacetime	and	therefore	incorporate	
relevant	provisions	 from	both	 IHRL	and	 IHL.	Although	they	are	a	soft	 law	 instrument	
and	 therefore	 not	 legally	 binding,	 they	 contain	 a	 comprehensive	 overview	 of	 the	
protection	needs	of	IDPs	and	consolidate	the	existing	norms	and	principles	applicable	
in	situations	of	displacement.	Furthermore,	 the	Guiding	Principles	contain	a	 range	of	
gender-specific	 provisions	 which	 are	 tailored	 to	 provide	 an	 effective	 and	 gender-
sensitive	 response	 to	 the	 particularities	 of	 women’s	 position	 as	 IDPs,	 including	






197	UN	 Commission	 on	 Human	 Rights,	 Internally	 Displaced	 Persons.	 Report	 of	 the	 Representative	 of	
Secretary-General,	Mr.	Francis	M.	Deng,	submitted	pursuant	to	Commission	on	Human	Rights	resolution	
1997/39.	 Guiding	 Principles	 on	 Internal	 Displacement,	 UN	 Doc.	 E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2,	 11	 February	
1998	(hereinafter:	The	Guiding	Principles).	
198	Principles	 11(2)(a)	 and	 (b)	 of	 the	 Guiding	 Principles	 1998	 prohibit	 rape,	 mutilation,	 torture,	 cruel,	
inhuman	or	degrading	treatment	or	punishment,	and	other	outrages	upon	personal	dignity,	such	as	acts	
of	 gender-specific	 violence,	 forced	 prostitution	 and	 any	 form	 of	 indecent	 assault;	 slavery	 or	 any	
contemporary	 form	 of	 slavery,	 such	 as	 sale	 into	 marriage,	 sexual	 exploitation,	 or	 forced	 labour	 of	
children.	
The	Guiding	Principles	also	include	provisions	regarding:	no	discrimination	against	 IDPs	on	the	basis	of	
sex;	 protection	 and	 assistance	 to	 female	 heads	 of	 household	 and	 expectant	mothers	 (Principle	 4);	 in	
cases	other	than	the	emergency	phases	of	a	conflict,	governments	will	try	to	involve	affected	women	in	
the	planning	and	management	of	their	relocation	(Principle	7);	full	participation	of	displaced	women	in	
the	 distribution	 of	 basic	 supplies	 (Principle	 18);	 special	 attention	 to	 the	 health	 needs	 of	 women,	
including	 access	 to	 female	 health	 care	 providers	 and	 services,	 and	 counselling	 for	 victims	 of	 sexual	
abuses	 (Principle	 19);	 equal	 rights	 for	 women	 and	 men	 to	 obtain	 documents	 such	 as	 personal	
identification	 documents,	 birth	 and	 marriage	 certificates,	 in	 their	 own	 names	 (Principle	 20);	 special	
efforts	 to	ensure	 the	 full	and	equal	participation	of	women	and	girls	 in	education	programmes;	Make	










It	 is	the	first	 legally	binding	regional	 instrument	specifically	to	address	the	protection	
needs	and	rights	of	IDPs	in	Africa.	The	Kampala	Convention	introduces	a	framework	of	
protection	 obligations	 of	 states	 and	 other	 actors	 (e.g.	 international	 organizations,	
humanitarian	agencies,	members	of	 armed	groups)	 towards	 IDPs,	 and	 contains	 rules	
aimed	 at	 ensuring	 gender-inclusive	 protection	 of	 women	 in	 situations	 of	 internal	
displacement.201	These	 include	 explicit	 reference	 to	 protection	 of	 women	 and	 girls	
from	 various	 forms	 of	 gender-based	 violence,	 including	 sexual	 violence	 and	 sexual	
exploitation,	 but	 also	 an	 obligation	 of	 states	 to	 provide	 adequate	 medical	 and	
professional	 support	 to	 victims	 of	 gender-based	 violence.202	However,	 while	 these	
developments	 are	 most	 welcome,	 the	 critical	 question	 relates	 to	 the	 availability	 of	








199	Walter	 Kälin,	 ‘The	Guiding	 Principles	 on	 Internal	Displacement	 as	 International	Minimum	Standard	
and	Protection	Tool’	(2005)	24	(3)	Refugee	Survey	Quarterly	27,	33-35.	
200	The	African	Union	 Convention	 for	 the	 Protection	 and	Assistance	 of	 Internally	Displaced	 Persons	 in	
Africa	 2009	 (Kampala	 Convention)	 <http://au.int/en/treaties/african-union-convention-protection-and-
assistance-internally-displaced-persons-africa>	accessed	17	October	2015.	
201	Article	 9(1)(d)	 Kampala	 Convention	 (protection	 from	 SGBV,	 forced	 labour,	 human	 trafficking	 and	
smuggling);	Article	7(5)(f)	Kampala	Convention	 (prohibition	of	engaging	 IDPs,	 in	particular	women	and	
children,	 in	 sexual	 slavery	 and	 trafficking	 in	 persons	 by	 members	 of	 armed	 groups	 during	 armed	
conflict).	
202	Article	 9(2)(d)	 Kampala	 Convention	 (reproductive	 and	 sexual	 health,	 support	 for	 victims	 of	 sexual	
abuses)	See	also:	Lauren	Groth,	 ‘Engendering	Protection:	an	Analysis	of	the	2009	Kampala	Convention	








The	discussion	below	aims	 to	propose	and	discuss	alternative	perspective	 relating	 to	
the	 protection	 of	 conflict-related	 refugees	 and	 IDPs,	 based	 on	 the	 concept	 of	
responsibility	to	protect	(R2P).203	The	practical	application	of	this	concept	arguably	has	




of	 the	 United	 Nations.	 It	 attempts	 to	 analyse	 whether,	 and	 if	 so,	 to	 what	 extent,	
















203	The	discussion	below	 focuses	primarily	on	 the	problem	of	granting	protection	 to	women,	who	 flee	
gender-related	persecution	in	armed	conflict	or	its	aftermath.	It	does	not	exclude	the	fact	that	women	








R2P	was	 founded	 on	 ‘the	 idea	 that	 sovereign	 states	 have	 a	 responsibility	 to	 protect	
their	 own	 citizens	 from	 avoidable	 catastrophe	 –	 such	 as	 mass	 murder,	 rape	 and	
starvation	-	but	when	they	are	unable	or	unwilling	to	do	so,	that	responsibility	must	be	
borne	by	the	broader	community	of	states’.205	The	 ICISS	Report	also	proposed	a	new	
construction	 of	 the	meaning	 of	 responsibility	 to	 protect,	 covering	 not	 only	 reactive	
measures,	 but	 largely	 focusing	 on	 a	 range	of	 preventive	 and	post-conflict	measures,	
not	only	limited	to	military	intervention.206	Stahn	further	notes	the	applicability	of	R2P	
in	 the	 post-conflict	 context,	 suggesting	 that	 it	may	 converge	with	 another	 emerging	
concept	in	international	law:	jus	post	bellum.207		
	
The	 concept	 of	 R2P	 rests	 on	 the	 notion	 of	 the	 responsibility	 of	 states	 to	 protect	
populations	from	genocide,	war	crimes,	ethnic	cleansing	and	crimes	against	humanity.	
Usually	 these	 crimes	 are	 committed	 during	 armed	 conflict,	 whether	 of	 internal	 or	
international	character.208	The	reading	of	elements	of	the	doctrine	within	the	context	
of	 the	 prevalent	 occurrence	 of	 sexual	 and	 gender-based	 violence	 directed	 against	
women	 and	 girls	 in	 armed	 conflict,	 raises	 the	 question	 of	 the	 responsibility	 of	 the	
international	 community	 to	 take	 steps	 to	 prevent	 these	 acts	 from	 happening	 or	 to	
apply	preventive	as	well	as	reactive	measures	aimed	at	protecting	women	from	acts	of	
gender-based	violence	of	 a	persecutory	nature.	 Sexual	 and	gender-based	violence	 in	









actually	 is	a	barrier	 to	 intervention.	The	author	argues	that	 it	was	not	concern	about	sovereignty	that	
prevented	 timely	 intervention	 in	 Bosnia,	 Rwanda,	 Darfur,	 but	 the	 basic	 political	 fact	 that	 no	 state	
















crime	 against	 humanity	 and	 force	 victims	 (or	 persons	 at	 risk)	 of	 persecution	 to	 flee	
their	 place	 of	 origin	 and	 seek	 protection	 elsewhere. 210 	If	 acts	 of	 conflict-related	
gender-based	 violence	 are	 recognized	 to	 be	war	 crimes,	 crimes	 against	 humanity	 or	
genocide,	one	way	of	reacting	to	their	occurrence	(‘responsibility	to	react’)	is	through	










the	 documents	 advocating	 the	 R2P	 doctrine,	 they	 nevertheless	 constitute	measures	
which,	 if	applied	by	states,	 could	 increase	protection	of	persons,	whose	security	and	
lives	would	otherwise	be	in	significant	danger.	This	could,	Feller	notes,	“in	theory	(...)	


















reading	 of	 the	 Refugee	 Convention	 when	 determining	 the	 outcome	 of	 this	 type	 of	
applications	 for	 asylum.	 Unless	 states	 are	 willing	 to	 implement	 gender-sensitive	
procedures	and	develop	a	common	practice	of	interpreting	the	Refugee	Convention	in	
a	gender-inclusive	manner	(i.e.	to	recognize	that	persecution	may	be	attributed	solely	
to	one’s	gender	 rather	 than	one	of	 the	existing	Convention	grounds	and	that	acts	of	







context	 of	 IDPs	 focuses	 on	 fulfilling	 and	 enhancing	 protection	 obligations	 of	 states	
existing	 under	 IHRL	 framework.214	These	 include	 soft-law	 instruments,	 such	 as	 The	
Guiding	Principles,	but	also	states’	human	rights	obligations	under	IHRL.215		
	
In	 the	 absence	 of	 an	 adequate	 international	 and	 legally	 binding	 framework	 of	
protection	of	 IDPs,	the	attention	of	scholars	and	professionals	working	 in	the	field	of	
internal	 displacement	 has	 shifted	 towards	 consideration	 of	 alternative	 mechanisms	
which	 may	 improve	 the	 protection	 of	 IDPs.	 Various	 commentators	 have	 expressed	
proposals	for	improvement	of	global	IDP	protection	through	measures	taken	under	an	
umbrella	of	R2P.216	Mooney	in	particular,	argues	in	favour	of	the	protection	potential	
of	 the	 fusion	 of	 the	 IDPs	 protection	 system	 outlined	 in	 the	 Guiding	 Principles	 with	
																																																								
214	The	 ICISS	 Report	makes	 an	 explicit	 reference	 to	 the	 situation	 of	 refugees	 twice:	 firstly,	 advocating	
acting	under	R2P	in	order	to	prevent	refugee	flows	and	potential	difficulties	of	remedying	such	situation	
(at	5,	70),	and	secondly,	 to	avoid	difficulties	of	 facilitating	the	safe	returns	of	 refugees	 in	post-conflict	
scenarios	(at	42).	
215	Article	 2(1)	 and	 Article	 26	 ICCPR	 (prohibition	 of	 discrimination),	 Article	 7	 ICCPR	 (prohibition	 of	
torture,	 inhuman	or	degrading	treatment	or	punishment),	Articles	9	and	12	ICCPR	(right	to	 liberty	and	





conception	 of	 refugees	 in	 particular	 is	 very	 problematic’:	 Susan	 Harris	 Rimmer,	 ‘Refugees,	 Internally	





R2P.217	In	 advocating	 the	 possibility	 of	 fusion	 of	 the	 two	mechanisms,	 both	Mooney	
and	Harris	Rimmer	point	out	the	common	heritage	of	the	two	concepts.218	The	idea	of	
‘sovereignty	 as	 responsibility’,	 which	 rests	 at	 the	 core	 of	 R2P	 doctrine,	 was	 indeed	
created	 by	 Deng	 and	 Cohen	 as	 a	 foundation	 for	 the	 creation	 of	 The	 Guiding	




IHRL	 obligations.	What,	 then,	 does	 R2P	 have	 to	 offer	 in	 this	 context?	 Arguably,	 the	
‘responsibilities’	 enshrined	 in	 the	 R2P	 doctrine	 are	 framed	 within	 the	 existing	 IHRL	






responsibility	 under	 existing	 international	 law	 vis-à-vis	 the	 people	 on	 their	
territory,	 to	 extend	 protection	 equally	 against	 genocide	 as	 against	 famine,	




R2P	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 framework	 which	 reinforces	 and	 reformulates	 these	 already-
existing	human	rights	obligations	of	the	state,	but	in	no	way	acts	as	a	substitute	for	the	
																																																								
217	Erin	 D.	 Mooney,	 ‘Something	 Old,	 Something	 New,	 Something	 Borrowed…Something	 Blue?	 The	








13(1)	 Journal	 of	 Conflict	&	 Security	 Law	 123-152;	McClean	 argues	 (at	 150)	 that	 “international	 human	









IHRL-based	 obligations.	 R2P	 is	 a	 complementary	 concept	 and	 application	 of	 it	 may	
encourage	 greater	 complementarity	 and	 coordination	 in	 places	 of	 convergence	




The	 problem	 of	 displacement	 worldwide	 is	 mostly	 a	 result	 of	 the	 already	 existing	
failure	to	prevent	human	rights	abuses	-	nonetheless	one	that	requires	reaction	from	
states.	But	states	do	not	have	an	obligation	or	‘responsibility	to	react’	as	such,	at	least	
not	 in	 legally	 defined	 terms.	 State	 parties	 to	 the	 Refugee	 Convention	 are	 under	 an	
obligation	 to	grant	asylum	to	an	applicant	who	seeks	asylum	and	 is	a	 refugee	within	









the	 existing	 protection	 regime	 in	 the	 context	 of	 conflict-related	 displacement,	 it	 is	
crucial	 to	 emphasize	 that	 R2P	 cannot	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 replacement	 for	 the	 Refugee	
Convention	or	any	other	IHRL	instruments	applicable	to	the	protection	of	IDPs.	Rather,	
the	responsibility	to	protect	reinforces	obligations	which	already	exist	in	international	




words,	 it	 is	 a	 concept	 that	 requires	 implementation	 of	 certain	 measures,	
																																																								
222	Carsten	Stahn,	 ‘Responsibility	 to	Protect:	Political	Rhetoric	or	Emerging	Legal	Norm?’	 (2007)	101(1)	
American	 Journal	 of	 International	 Law	 99-120;	 Furthermore,	 Charlesworth	 rightly	 notes	 the	 limited	













of	 the	 IRL	 and	 IDP	 protection	 regime	 will	 not	 have	 to	 be	 urged	 or	 justified	 by	 yet	
another	 human(itarian)	 catastrophe.	 In	 the	 current	 situation,	 R2P	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 a	
mediated	compromise	-	a	mechanism,	which	could	provide	states	with	foundation	and	
encouragement	for	implementation	of	future	gender-related	developments	in	field	of	






scope	 for	 protection	 of	 female	 applicants,	 who	 fear	 gender-based	 persecution	 in	
armed	conflict	and/or	post-conflict	situations.	Although	the	IRL	framework	appears	to	
progress	 gradually	 towards	 a	 gender-inclusive	 approach	 to	 refugee	 determination	
procedures,	 significant	 limitations	 remain.	 These	 limitations	 are	 primarily	 caused	 by	
the	 reluctance	 in	 implementation	 of	 a	 gender-inclusive	 reading	 of	 the	 Refugee	
Convention	 as	 well	 as	 gender-sensitive	 procedures	 into	 the	 refugee	 status	
determination	 process,	 which	 creates	 obstacles	 to	 granting	 asylum	 to	 victims	 of	
gender-based	persecution.	Furthermore,	where	gender	is	an	integral	part	of	the	claim	
for	 international	protection	 (i.e.	where	 the	person	has	been	persecuted	due	 to	 their	
gender	 or	 where	 the	 persecution	 took	 form	 of	 a	 gender-specific	 act)	 the	 decision-
makers	often	fail	to	engage	in	the	gender-inclusive	reading	the	Convention	ground	of	
‘membership	 of	 a	 particular	 social	 group’.	 In	 some	 cases,	 these	 procedural	






followed	by	 return	 of	 the	 applicant	 to	 the	 country	 of	 origin,	where	 exposure	 to	 the	
likely	harm	of	persecution	may	continue	to	exist.		
	
Yet	 another	 difficulty	 in	 determination	 of	 conflict-related	 and	 gender-based	 asylum	
claims	is	posed	by	the	element	of	‘armed	conflict’.	Under	the	traditional	framework	of	
IRL,	 persons	 who	 flee	 situations	 of	 armed	 conflict	 or	 generalised	 violence	 are	 not	
automatically	eligible	for	refugee	status.	In	order	for	such	claims	to	be	successful,	it	is	
essential	 for	 the	 candidate	 to	 prove	 ‘differential	 impact’	 as	 per	 Adan	 v.	 SSHD.	
Persecutory	acts	involving	gender-based	violence,	which	are	committed	in	the	context	
of	 armed	 conflict	 are	 often	 automatically	 categorised	 as	 constituting	 a	 part	 of	
indiscriminate	 violence	 and	 therefore	 not	 falling	 under	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 Refugee	
Convention.	 However,	 the	 development	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 subsidiary	 protection	 has	
shown	 the	potential	of	addressing	protection	gaps	 in	 cases	of	armed	conflict-related	
claims.	 The	 interpretation	 of	 Article	 15(c)	 of	 the	 QD	 has	 arguably	 broadened	 the	
protection	scope	to	include	persons	who	flee	armed	conflict	due	to	the	risk	of	suffering	
serious	 harm,	 therefore	 extending	 the	 protection	 to	 persons	 who	 are	 in	 danger	 of	































The	 creation	 of	 the	 International	 Military	 Tribunal	 at	 Nuremberg	 (IMTN)	 and	 the	
International	Military	Tribunal	for	the	Far	East	(IMTFE)	in	the	aftermath	of	World	War	II	
brought	 the	 first	 successful	 prosecutions	 at	 an	 international	 level	 of	military	 leaders	
guilty	 of	 war	 crimes	 and	 crimes	 against	 humanity. 2 	Since	 then,	 two	 ad-hoc	
international	 criminal	 tribunals,	 the	 International	 Criminal	 Tribunal	 for	 the	 Former	
Yugoslavia	(ICTY)	and	the	International	Criminal	Tribunal	for	Rwanda	(ICTR),	have	been	
created	in	response	to	gross	violations	of	human	rights	and	IHL,	which	were	committed	
during	 the	 war	 in	 the	 Former	 Yugoslavia	 and	 during	 the	 Rwandan	 genocide.3	The	
jurisprudence	of	the	ICTY	and	the	ICTR	set	major	milestones	by	holding	perpetrators	of	
international	 crimes	 criminally	 accountable	 but	 also	 by	 developing	 a	 comprehensive	
																																																								
1	International	 Law	 Commission,	 “Fragmentation	 of	 International	 Law:	 Difficulties	 Arising	 from	 the	
Diversification	 and	 Expansion	 of	 International	 Law”,	 Report	 of	 the	 Study	 Group	 of	 International	 Law	











proliferation	 of	 internationalised	 criminal	 courts,	which	were	 constituted	 either	 as	 a	
part	 of	 UN	 administration	 in	 the	 region	 (Kosovo	 and	 East	 Timor)	 or	 as	 a	 result	 of	 a	
bilateral	 agreement	 between	 the	 state	 and	 the	 UN	 (Special	 Court	 for	 Sierra	 Leone	




end	 in	 the	 near	 future,	 the	 ICC	 will	 become	 the	 main	 international	 court	 for	 the	
prosecution	 of	 international	 crimes	 committed	 both	 during	 armed	 conflict	 and	 in	
peacetime.6		
	
The	 work	 of	 the	 international	 criminal	 courts	 and	 tribunals	 focused	 on	 crimes	
committed	in	context	of	armed	conflicts	of	the	end	of	20th	century	(ICTY,	ICTR)	and	the	
beginning	of	21st	 century	 (SCSL).	One	of	 the	characteristic	 features	of	 these	conflicts	




Whilst	 some	 men	 became	 victims	 of	 acts	 of	 sexual	 violence,	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	
																																																								




v.	 Tadić,	 Decision	 on	 the	 Defence	 Motion	 for	 Interlocutory	 Appeal	 on	 Jurisdiction,	 2	 October	 1995.	
Christopher	 Greeenwood,	 ‘International	 Humanitarian	 Law	 and	 the	 Tadić	 Case’	 (1996)	 7	 European	
Journal	of	International	Law	265;	Colin	Warbrick,	Peter	Rowe,	‘The	International	Criminal	Tribunal:	the	
Decision	of	the	Appeals	Chamber	on	the	Interlocutory	Appeal	on	Jurisdiction	in	the	Tadić	Case’	(1996)	45	
International	 and	 Comparative	 Law	 Quarterly	 691;	 Antonio	 Cassese,	 ‘The	 Legitimacy	 of	 International	




7	Binaifer	Nowrojee,	Shattered	 Lives:	 Sexual	Violence	during	 the	Rwandan	Genocide	and	 its	Aftermath	








armed	conflicts	was	 reflected	 in	 the	 judgments	of	 international	 courts	and	 tribunals.	
Furthermore,	prosecution	of	gender-based	crimes	became	one	of	the	defining	features	
of	 the	 jurisprudence	 of	 the	 ad	 hoc	 tribunals,	 which	 explicitly	 recognized	 and	
prosecuted	gender-based	crimes,	especially	sexual	violence,	at	an	international	level.		
This	 chapter	 critically	 analyses	 and	 evaluates	 the	 approaches	 taken	 by	 selected	
international	 criminal	 courts	 and	 tribunals	 towards	 the	 prosecution	 of	 gender-based	
crimes	committed	against	women	in	armed	conflicts	of	the	past	25	years.	The	case	law,	
which	will	form	the	core	part	of	this	analysis,	originates	from	the	work	of	the	ICTY,	the	
ICTR,	 the	SCSL	and,	 to	an	extent,	 the	 ICC.	The	case	 law	on	gender-based	crimes	was	
originally	conceptualised	and	developed	by	the	judges	at	the	ICTY	and	the	ICTR.	These	





criminal	 court.	 The	 crime	 of	 forced	 marriage,	 which	 has	 been	 conceptualised	 and	
successfully	 prosecuted	 by	 the	 SCSL	 is	 of	 particular	 interest	 in	 the	 context	 of	 this	
chapter.9		
	




8	Prosecutor	 v.	 Tadić,	 Trial	 Judgment,	 IT-94-1-T,	 7	 May	 1997,	 para.206;	 Prosecutor	 v.	 Stakić,	 Trial	
Judgment,	 IT-97-24,	31	 July	2003,	para.241;	Prosecutor	 v.	 Cesić,	 Sentencing	 Judgment,	 IT-95-10/1-S,	 1	
March	 2004,	 paras.13-14;	 Prosecutor	 v.	 Todorovic,	 Sentencing	 Judgment,	 IT-95-9/1-S,	 31	 July	 2011,	
paras.38-40;	Prosecutor	v.	Simić	et	al.,	Trial	Judgment,	IT-95-9-T,	17	October	2003,	para.728;	Situation	in	
Kenya:	 Prosecutor	 v.	 Muthaura	 et	 al	 (Decision	 on	 the	 Confirmation	 of	 Charges	 Pursuant	 to	 Article	
61(7)(a)	and	(b)	of	the	Rome	Statute)	ICC-01/09-02/11	(23	January	2012).	
Sandesh	Sivakumaran,	 ‘Sexual	Violence	Against	Men	 in	Armed	Conflict’	 (2007)	18	European	Journal	of	

























“any	 act	 of	 a	 sexual	 nature	 which	 is	 committed	 on	 a	 person	 under	
circumstances	 which	 are	 coercive.	 Sexual	 violence	 is	 not	 limited	 to	 physical	
invasion	 of	 the	 human	 body	 and	 may	 include	 acts	 which	 do	 not	 involve	
penetration	or	even	physical	contact”.11		












14	Prosecutor	 v.	 Nyiramasuhuko,	 Trial	 Judgment,	 ICTR-98-42-T,	 24	 June	 2011;	 Prosecutor	 v.	 Simone	






criminal	 courts	 and	 tribunals	 enable	 application	 of	 ICL	 to	 situations	 where	 either	 a	
woman	 or	 a	 man	 was	 a	 perpetrator	 or	 a	 victim.15	All	 provisions	 of	 the	 ICC	 statute	
relating	to	sexual	violence	crimes	are	also	worded	in	gender-neutral	terms.16	
The	term	‘gender-based	crimes’	describes	crimes	committed	against	a	person	because	
of	 their	gender.17	Gender-based	violence	may	 take	 the	 form	of	both	sexual	and	non-
sexual	acts,	but	in	the	context	of	ICL,	gender-based	crimes	mostly	involve	an	element	
of	 sexual	 violence.	However,	 some	crimes	of	 sexual	 violence	 can	be	 committed	only	
against	 women	 due	 to	 their	 reproductive	 capacity,	 such	 as	 forced	 pregnancy.	
Furthermore,	the	crime	of	forced	marriage	has	also	been	committed	principally	against	





As	noted	by	Hagay-Frey	a	dichotomy	has	emerged	 in	 international	 law	 in	 relation	 to	
sexual	offences,	exemplified	by	the	distinction	between	sexual	crimes	perpetrated	 in	
the	 context	 of	 inter-group	 conflicts	 based	 on	 group	 identities	 such	 as	 nationality,	
religion,	 race	 or	 ethnicity,	 and	 sexual	 crimes	 perpetrated	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 gender.19	
Whilst	sexual	offences	committed	in	the	context	of	ethnic,	religious,	national	or	racial	
conflict	 have	 been	 successfully	 recognized	 and	 prosecuted	 by	 the	 international	
																																																								
15	Campbell	 notes	 that	 although	 the	 provisions	 of	 ICL	 relating	 to	 sexual	 violence	may	 appear	 gender-
neutral,	they	are	in	fact	embedded	in	gendered	bodies	and	actions.	What	is	sexual	(e.g.	a	particular	act,	
body	 or	 body	 part)	 is	 determined	 by	 the	 notions	 of	 femininity	 and	masculinity.	 As	 such,	 the	 ‘sexual’	
element	 of	 crimes	 of	 sexual	 violence	 is	 always	 already	 gendered.	 Kirsten	 Campbell,	 ‘The	 Gender	 of	
Transitional	 Justice:	 Law,	 Sexual	 Violence	 and	 the	 International	 Criminal	 Tribunal	 for	 the	 Former	
Yugoslavia’	(2007)	1	International	Journal	of	Transitional	Justice	411,	417-420.	
16	That	 said,	 the	 ICC	 failed	 to	 recognize	 the	 sexual	 nature	 of	 some	 crimes	 committed	 against	men.	 In	
Situation	in	Kenya:	Prosecutor	v.	Muthaura	et	al	 (Decision	on	the	Confirmation	of	Charges	Pursuant	to	
Article	61(7)(a)	and	(b)	of	the	Rome	Statute)	ICC-01/09-02/11	(23	January	2012),	the	Pre-Trial	Chamber	






18	Valerie	Oosterveld,	 ‘The	Gender	Jurisprudence	of	the	Special	Court	 for	Sierra	Leone:	Progress	 in	the	
Revolutionary	United	Front	Judgments’	(2011)	44	Cornell	International	Law	Journal	49,	64-68.	





criminal	 courts	 and	 tribunals,	 the	work	 of	 these	 institutions	 so	 far	 has	 only	 partially	
conceptualised	 and	 prosecuted	 sexual	 violence	 as	 a	 gender	 crime.20	In	 order	 to	 be	
effective,	the	prosecution	of	sexual	violence	must	involve	the	recognition	of	it	as	both	
a	 gender	 crime	 and	 a	 crime	 committed	 due	 to	 any	 other	 characteristics	 described	
above.		
	
Therefore,	 for	 purposes	 of	 the	 current	 discussion,	 the	 term	 gender-based	 crimes	 is	
used	in	this	thesis	to	describe	crimes	committed	against	women	during	armed	conflict	
because	of	their	gender.	However,	 it	should	be	noted	that	some	international	crimes	





Sexual	 violence	has	been	used	 in	 the	 vast	majority	of	 armed	conflicts	worldwide	 for	
millennia	and	continues	to	be	used	in	modern	armed	conflicts.21	As	it	was	discussed	in	
detail	in	Chapter	1,	wartime	sexual	violence	has	gone	unpunished	and	for	centuries	has	
been	 accepted	 by	many	 as	 a	 common	 element	 of	 armed	 conflict,	 even	 part	 of	 the	
victor’s	 spoils. 22 	Until	 the	 fourth	 Geneva	 Convention	 was	 adopted	 in	 1949,	 no	
international	 law	 instrument	 explicitly	 prohibited	 rape	 and	 other	 forms	 of	 sexual	
																																																								
20	For	 criticism	of	 the	 approaches	 taken	 toward	 prosecution	 of	 rape	 in	 context	 of	 ethnic	 conflict	 see:	
Doris	 Buss,	 ‘The	 curious	 visibility	 of	wartime	 rape:	 gender	 and	 ethnicity	 in	 international	 criminal	 law’	
(2007)	25	Windsor	Yearbook	of	Access	to	Justice	3.	
21	See	 Chapter	 2	 for	 the	 detailed	 overview	 and	 discussion	 of	 sexual	 violence	 in	 war.	 Sexual	 violence	
continues	to	be	used	in	modern	conflicts.	It	was	used	during	the	Arab	Spring	uprisings	as	well	as	during	
conflict	 in	Syria.	Olga	 Jurasz,	 ‘Women	of	 the	Revolution:	 the	 future	of	women’s	 rights	 in	post-Gaddafi	
Libya’	 in:	 Carlo	 Panara,	 Gary	 Wilson	 (eds),	 The	 Arab	 Spring.	 New	 Patterns	 for	 Democracy	 and	
International	 Law	 (Martinus	 Nijhoff	 2013)	 123,	 133-134	 (describing	 sexual	 violence	 during	 Libyan	












violence	 against	women	 in	 armed	 conflict.23	Thus,	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 legal	 and	 social	
indifference	 towards	 prohibition	 of	 sexual	 violence,	 international	 law	 accountability	
mechanisms	for	committing	gender-based	crimes	in	armed	conflict	were	virtually	non-
existent.24	For	many	years,	this	status	quo	allowed	the	perpetrators	to	go	unpunished,	




ITMN	 and	 the	 IMTFE	 were	 established	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 World	 War	 II,	 enabling	
prosecution	of	the	key	military	 leaders,	who	orchestrated	the	events	of	that	war	and	
were	 responsible	 for	 committing	 war	 crimes,	 crimes	 against	 humanity	 and	 crimes	
against	 peace.	 The	 Charter	 of	 the	 IMTN	 (the	 Nuremberg	 Charter)	 established	
jurisdiction	of	the	IMTN	over	war	crimes,	crimes	against	humanity	and	crimes	against	
peace	 committed	 during	 World	 War	 II.25	However,	 despite	 significant	 evidence	 of	
																																																								
23	Article	27	GC	IV	1949.		
However,	 some	attempts	 to	 systemize	 the	 laws	of	warfare	were	made	by	Grotius	 in	 the	17th	 century:	
“You	may	 read	 in	many	 places	 that	 the	 raping	 of	women	 in	 time	 of	war	 is	 permissible,	 and	 in	many	
others	that	 it	 is	not	permissible.	Those	who	sanction	rape	have	taken	into	account	only	 injury	done	to	
the	person	of	another,	and	have	 judged	that	 it	 is	not	 inconsistent	with	the	 law	of	war	that	everything	









place	 in	 1474,	 against	 Sir	 Peter	 Hagenbach.	 Hagenbach	was	 convicted	 of	 war	 crimes,	 including	 rape,	
committed	under	his	command	by	the	court	of	twenty-eight	judges	drawn	from	the	confederate	entities	




Kelly	 Dawn	 Askin,	 War	 Crimes	 Against	 Women:	 Prosecution	 in	 International	 War	 Crimes	 Tribunals	




25	Charter	of	 the	 International	Military	Tribunal	 for	 the	Trial	of	 the	Major	War	Criminals,	Appended	to	






sexual	 violence	 crimes	 being	 committed	 in	 World	 War	 II	 (by	 both	 enemy	 and	 ally	
forces),	the	Nuremberg	charter	failed	to	explicitly	include	acts	of	sexual	violence	in	any	
of	 the	 categories	 of	 crimes	 prosecuted	 at	 Nuremberg.26	Neither	 rape	 nor	 any	 other	
forms	 of	 sexual	 violence	 were	 prosecuted	 at	 Nuremberg,	 although	 transcripts	 from	
Nuremberg	Trial	 contain	evidence	of	 rape,	 sexual	 torture,	 forced	prostitution,	 forced	
sterilization,	forced	abortion,	pornography,	sexual	mutilation	and	forced	nudity.27				
	
The	 prosecutorial	 inaction	 at	 Nuremberg	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 prosecution	 of	 sexual	
violence	crimes	resulted	in	a	significant	missed	opportunity	in	addressing	these	crimes	















be	 limited	 to,	murder,	 ill-treatment	 or	 deportation	 to	 slave	 labor	 or	 for	 any	 other	 purpose	of	 civilian	
population	 of	 or	 in	 occupied	 territory,	murder	 or	 ill-treatment	 of	 prisoners	 of	war	 or	 persons	 on	 the	
seas,	 killing	of	hostages,	plunder	of	public	or	private	property,	wanton	destruction	of	 cities,	 towns	or	
villages,	or	devastation	not	justified	by	military	necessity;	
(c)	 crimes	 against	 humanity:	 namely,	 murder,	 extermination,	 enslavement,	 deportation,	 and	 other	
inhumane	acts	committed	against	any	civilian	population,	before	or	during	the	war;	or	persecutions	on	
political,	 racial	 or	 religious	 grounds	 in	 execution	 of	 or	 in	 connection	 with	 any	 crime	 within	 the	
jurisdiction	 of	 the	 Tribunal,	 whether	 or	 not	 in	 violation	 of	 the	 domestic	 law	 of	 the	 country	 where	
perpetrated.	
Leaders,	 organizers,	 instigators	 and	 accomplices	 participating	 in	 the	 formulation	 or	 execution	 of	 a	
common	 plan	 or	 conspiracy	 to	 commit	 any	 of	 the	 foregoing	 crimes	 are	 responsible	 for	 all	 acts	
performed	by	any	persons	in	execution	of	such	plan.	
26	The	official	 documents	 from	 the	Nuremberg	 Trial	 are	 available	 in	 this	 42	 volume	work:	Trial	 of	 the	
Major	War	Criminals	Before	the	International	Military	Tribunal,	14	November	1945-	1	October	1946	(42	















the	 ‘Rape	 of	 Nanking’	 in	 1937-1938,	 sexual	 violence	was	 systematically	 used	 by	 the	
Japanese	army	as	a	deliberate	tool	in	punishing,	torturing	and	humiliating	the	civilian	
population.29	It	is	estimated	that	during	the	first	six	weeks	of	the	Japanese	occupation	
of	 Nanking,	 Japanese	 soldiers	 raped	 more	 than	 20	 000	 women	 and	 girls. 30	





Despite	 the	 fact	 that	 rape	 and	 other	 forms	 of	 sexual	 violence	 were	 not	 explicitly	
included	in	the	IMTFE	Charter,	the	visibility	of	sexual	violence	crimes	was	much	greater	
at	IMTFE	than	at	Nuremberg.	The	prevalence	of	sexual	violence	crimes	was	reflected	in	





to	 the	 said	 assurances.	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 inhumane	 treatment	 alleged	 in	

















prisoners	 of	 war	 and	 civilian	 internees	 were	murdered	 beaten,	 tortured	 and	
otherwise	 ill-treated,	 and	 female	 prisoners	 were	 raped	 by	 members	 of	 the	
Japanese	forces.	
5.	 Mistreatment	 of	 the	 sick	 and	 wounded,	 medical	 personnel	 and	 female	
nurses,	contrary	to	Articles	3,	14,	15	and	25	of	the	said	Geneva	Convention	and	





Annex	 to	 the	 said	 Hague	 Convention	 and	 to	 the	 Laws	 and	 Customs	 of	War:	
Large	numbers	of	the	inhabitants	of	such	territories	were	murdered,	tortured,	
raped	 and	 otherwise	 ill-treated,	 arrested	 and	 interned	 without	 justification,	
sent	to	forced	labour,	and	their	property	destroyed	or	confiscated”.32	
The	 IMTFE	 Judgment	 found	 three	 individuals	 (General	Matsui,	Commander	Hata	and	
Foreign	 Minister	 Hirota)	 guilty	 of	 war	 crimes,	 including	 crimes	 of	 sexual	 violence,	
committed	under	 their	authority.	Furthermore,	 the	earlier	 trial	of	General	Yamashita	
at	the	US	Military	Commission	at	Manila,	which	preceded	the	commencement	of	the	
IMTN	 and	 the	 IMTFE	 trials,	 established	 the	 criminal	 command	 responsibility	 of	 the	
accused	 for	 failure	 to	 prevent	war	 crimes	 committed	 under	 his	 command,	 including	





Unlike	 the	 IMTN,	 the	 public	 record	 of	 the	 Tokyo	 trial	 includes	 explicit	 references	 to	






actions	are	widespread	offences,	 and	 there	 is	not	effective	attempt	by	a	 commander	 to	discover	and	
control	 the	 criminal	 acts,	 such	 a	 commander	 may	 be	 held	 responsible,	 eve	 criminally	 liable,	 for	 the	








despite	 the	 lack	 of	 explicit	 reference	 to	 gender	 crimes	 in	 the	 IMTFE	 Charter.	
Nonetheless,	 not	 one	 of	 the	 female	 victims	 was	 called	 to	 give	 evidence	 at	 a	 trial.	
Furthermore,	 the	 IMTFE	 could	 have	 gone	 further	 in	 addressing	 the	 issue	 of	 sexual	
slavery	and	enforced	prostitution	and	establishing	legal	responsibility	of	the	Japanese	
government	for	the	commission	of	these	acts.	As	Chinkin	rightly	notes,	sexual	violence	






Both	 the	 IMTN	 and	 the	 IMTFE	 advanced	 ICL	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 international	 criminal	
liability	 of	military	 leaders	 and	 governmental	 officials	 for	war	 crimes,	 crimes	 against	
humanity	and	crimes	against	peace.	However,	 their	contribution	to	the	development	
of	 jurisprudence	 on	 punishing	 gender	 crimes	 is	 rather	 limited.	 Despite	 the	 well-
recognized	 and	 well-documented	 evidence	 confirming	 the	 prevalence	 of	 sexual	
violence	crimes	during	WW	II,	the	judgments	of	the	IMTN	and	the	IMTFE	do	not	reflect	
the	magnitude	of	these	crimes	nor	the	various	types	of	gender	crimes	that	took	place.	
The	relative	 invisibility	of	gender	crimes	 in	 the	Nuremberg	and	Tokyo	 judgments	can	










rights	NGO	across	Asia	 in	recognition	of	 the	 fact	 that	post-WWII	 trials	have	not	adequately	addressed	








committed	 in	 armed	 conflict.	 Especially	 at	 the	 early	 stages	 of	 the	 development	 of	







ad	hoc	 international	criminal	 tribunals,	 the	 ICTY	and	the	 ICTR.	The	 ICTY	and	the	 ICTR	
Statutes	explicitly	list	rape	as	a	crime	against	humanity	(CAH)	in	Article	5(g)	and	Article	
3(g)	(respectively):		
“The	 International	 Tribunal	 shall	 have	 the	 power	 to	 prosecute	 persons	







“The	 International	 Tribunal	 for	 Rwanda	 shall	 have	 the	 power	 to	 prosecute	
persons	 responsible	 for	 the	 following	 crimes	 when	 committed	 as	 part	 of	 a	




Later	 jurisprudence	 of	 the	 ad	 hoc	 tribunals	 confirmed	 that	 gender	 crimes	 may	









as	 a	means	 of	 destruction	 of	 a	 certain	 national,	 ethnical,	 racial	 or	 religious	 group.39	
Although	 the	 relevant	 articles	 relating	 to	 genocide	 do	 not	 expressly	 include	 rape,	 it	
may	nevertheless	be	genocidal	when	it	has	been	carried	out	as	a	part	of	the	policy	of	
ethnic	 cleansing,	 carried	 out	 on	 a	massive	 and	 systematic	 basis	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	
producing	babies	of	the	ethnic	group	of	the	rapist	or	destroying	the	family	life	of	the	
victims.40	As	such,	 rape	 is	seen	as	amounting	to	a	measure	 ‘causing	serious	bodily	or	




Acts	 of	 sexual	 violence	 also	 constitute	 grave	 breaches	 of	 the	Geneva	 Conventions.43	
Although	 Common	 Article	 3	 of	 the	 Geneva	 Conventions	 does	 not	 explicitly	mention	






of	 International	 Law	 326,	 333;	 Catharine	 MacKinnon,	 ‘Defining	 Rape	 Internationally:	 A	 Comment	 on	
Akayesu’	 (2005)	44	Columbia	 Journal	of	Transnational	 Law	940;	 See	generally:	Usta	Kaitesi,	Genocidal	




Mucić	 et	 al.	 (Čelebići	 Case),	 Trial	 Judgment,	 IT-96-21-T,	 16	November	 1998,	 paras.480-496,	 940-943;	
Prosecutor	v.	Kunarac	et	al.,	Trial	Judgment,	IT-96-23-T	&	IT-96-23/1-T,	22	February	2001,	para.655-656;	
Witnessing	acts	of	sexual	violence	may	also	amount	to	torture:	Prosecutor	v.	Furundžija,	Trial	Judgment,	
IT-95-17/1T,	10	December	1998,	para.267.	However,	 the	 ICC	 in	Bemba	 failed	 to	 conceptualise	 forcing	
family	members	 to	watch	 their	 relatives	being	 raped	as	 torture.	A	 single	 charge	of	 rape	was	pursued	
instead	of	one	rape,	one	torture	charge:	Situation	in	the	Central	African	Republic:	Prosecutor	v.	Bemba	
(Decision	 pursuant	 to	 Article	 61(7)(a)	 and	 (b)	 of	 the	 Rome	 Statute	 on	 the	 Charges	 of	 the	 Prosecutor	
against	Jean-Pierre	Bemba	Gombo)	ICC-01/05-01/08	(15	June	2009),	paras.204-205.	
Prosecutor	 v.	 Kunarac	 et	 al.,	 Trial	 Judgment,	 IT-96-23-T	 &	 IT-96-23/1-T,	 22	 February	 2001,	 para.542	
(sexual	violence	as	enslavement);	Prosecutor	v.	Kvočka	et	al.,	Trial	Judgment,	IT-98-30/1-T,	2	November	
2001,	paras.181-183	(persecution).	
43	This	 norm	 has	 also	 customary	 law	 status:	 Jean-Marie	 Henckaerts,	 Louise	 Doswald-Beck,	Customary	
International	Humanitarian	Law	(Cambridge	University	Press/	ICRC	2005)	(CIHL	Study),	Vol.	I:	Rules,	Rule	
93:	Rape	and	Other	Forms	of	Sexual	Violence		
<http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule93>	 accessed	 2	 December	 2013,	 Vol.	 II:	










government	 of	 Sierra	 Leone,	 pursuant	 to	 UNSCR	 1315	 (2000),	 at	 the	 time	 when	
precedents	 in	 successful	 prosecution	of	 gender	 crimes	have	already	been	 set	by	 the	
ICTY	and	the	ICTR.45		The	SCSL	differs	from	the	ICTY	and	the	ICTR	in	that	it	is	a	hybrid	
court	 and	 the	 first	 ad	 hoc	 tribunal	 based	 on	 a	 treaty	 between	 the	 UN	 and	 a	 UN	
Member	State.46	Consequently,	 the	SCSL	has	mixed	 jurisdiction	over	breaches	of	 IHL,	
war	 crimes,	 and	 crimes	 against	 humanity	 as	 well	 as	 over	 crimes	 punishable	 under	




establishes	 the	 court’s	 jurisdiction	 over	 crimes	 against	 humanity,	 makes	 explicit	
references	not	only	to	rape,	but	includes	other	types	of	gender	crimes,	namely	sexual	
slavery,	 enforced	 prostitution,	 forced	 pregnancy	 and	 any	 other	 form	 of	 sexual	
violence.49	Article	3	of	the	Statute	gives	the	SCSL	jurisdiction	over	serious	violation	of	
Article	3	of	 the	Geneva	Conventions	1949	and	the	Additional	Protocol	 II	1977,	which	







system	 (i.e.	 United	 Nations	 or	 the	 national	 law	 of	 the	 State	 of	 the	 seat).’	 in:	 UNSC,	 Report	 of	 the	
Secretary-	 General	 on	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 Special	 Court	 for	 Sierra	 Leone,	 UN	 Doc.	 S/2000/915,	 4	
October	2000,	para.9;	Alexander	Zahar,	Göran	Sluiter,	International	Criminal	Law:	A	Critical	Introduction	














of	 gender	 crimes	 under	 Article	 2(g)	 set	 the	 basis	 for	 prosecution	 of	 more	 specific	








and	 comprehensive	 listing	 of	 sexual	 and	 gender-based	 crimes	 in	 any	 treaty	 to	 date.	




















hoc	 tribunals	 and	 further	 prosecuted	 as	 crimes	 against	 humanity	 under	 a	 ‘catch-all’	






also	 gives	 explicit	 recognition	 to	 trafficking	 in	 human	 beings,	 especially	 women	 and	































ever	 included	 in	an	 international	 treaty”.60	The	definition	 strongly	bases	 itself	on	 the	
notion	 of	 two	 sexes,	 male	 and	 female,	 a	 biologically	 determined	 binary	 opposition.	
This	 phraseology	 conflicts	 with	 the	 generally	 accepted	 definition	 of	 gender,	 which	
departs	from	this	distinction	and	instead	focuses	on	the	socially	constructed	notions	of	
femininity	 and	 masculinity	 and	 the	 social	 relations	 between	 them,	 which	 are	 also	
culturally	 contingent. 61 	The	 approach	 of	 eliding	 ‘sex’	 with	 ‘gender’	 results	 in	 a	
confusing	definition,	which	has	arguably	a	limiting	scope.	The	current	ICC	definition	of	
gender	puts	 in	question	the	place	of	socio-cultural	analysis	 in	 the	context	of	gender-
specific	provisions	of	the	Statute.	If	one	accepts	the	wrongful	premise	that	sex	equals	
gender	(as	Article	7(3)	may	seem	to	suggest),	then	the	socio-cultural	analysis	of	gender	




arrive	 at	 “insensitive	decisions	 about	 the	protection	or	participation	of	 the	 victim	or	
witness”	or	“will	not	be	able	to	understand	and	evaluate	adequately	the	effects	of	rape	





construction	 of	 gender	 in	 Article	 7(3).63	Accordingly,	 such	 interpretation	 would	 be	
based	on	‘sex’	as	a	foundation	for	a	socially	constructed	definition	of	‘gender’-	a	model	
																																																								
60	Words	 attributed	 to	 Theo	 van	 Bowen.	 Cited	 in:	 Dorean	 M.	 Koenig,	 Kelly	 D.	 Askin,	 ‘International	




and	 men	 and	 ideas	 of	 ‘femininity’	 and	 ‘masculinity’-	 the	 excess	 cultural	 baggage	 associated	 with	
biological	 sex”	 in:	 Hilary	 Charlesworth,	 ‘The	 Feminist	 Methods	 in	 International	 Law’	 (1999)	 93(2)	
American	Journal	of	International	Law	379.	
62	Valerie	 Oosterveld,	 ‘The	 Definition	 of	 “Gender”	 in	 the	 Rome	 Statute	 of	 the	 International	 Criminal	











focus	 on	 socio-cultural	 analysis.	 Furthermore,	 the	 current	 definition	 can	 be	 seen	 as	
restrictive	and	not	encompassing	‘sexual	orientation’	within	the	notion	of	gender	or,	in	
other	words,	does	not	equip	the	ICC	with	tools	to	interpret	and	understand	the	social	




‘gender’	 to	 include	 homosexuality. 65 	Undoubtedly,	 the	 ICC	 Statute	 is	 a	 result	 of	
political	 compromise,	 which	 is	 clearly	 exemplified	 in	 this	 case.	 Unfortunately,	 these	
limitations	result	in	a	narrow	definition	of	gender,	which	is	open	to	misinterpretation.	
Finally,	 the	definition	has	“little	 transformative	edge”	 in	 the	context	of	otherwise	 (at	
least	in	theory)	the	most	gender-sensitive	modern	international	treaty	and	represents	




Article	8	of	 the	 ICC	Statute	codifies	war	crimes	 in	an	extensive	and	detailed	manner.	
The	distinction	is	drawn	between	provisions	applicable	to	international	armed	conflicts	
(Article	 8(2)(a)	 and	 Article	 8(2)(b))	 and	 those	 applicable	 to	 non-international	 armed	
conflict	(Article	8(2)(c)	and	Article	8(2)(e)).		
	
Provisions	 of	 the	 ICC	 Statute	 relating	 to	 grave	 breaches	 of	 Geneva	 Conventions	
(committed	in	international	armed	conflict)	and	serious	violations	of	Article	3	common	
to	 the	 four	 Geneva	 Conventions	 (committed	 in	 non-international	 armed	 conflict)	
reflect	 the	 crimes	 listed	 in	 the	 Geneva	 Conventions	 and	 the	 wording	 used	 in	 these	
instruments.	 As	 such,	 neither	 Article	 8(2)(a)	 nor	 Article	 8(2)(c)	 contain	 explicit	
																																																								
64	Oosterveld,	supra	62,	76.	







reference	 to	 sexual	 violence	 or	 other	 gender	 crimes.	 However,	 Article	 8(2)(b)(xxii),	
relating	 to	 “other	 serious	 violations	 of	 laws	 and	 customs	 applicable	 in	 international	
armed	conflict”,	outlines	a	detailed	 list	of	acts	of	 sexual	violence,	 the	commission	of	
which	may	amount	to	war	crimes:	
“rape,	 sexual	 slavery,	 enforced	 prostitution,	 forced	 pregnancy,	 as	 defined	 in	
article	 7,	 paragraph	 2	 (f)	 enforced	 sterilization,	 or	 any	 other	 form	 of	 sexual	
violence	also	constituting	a	grave	breach	of	the	Geneva	Conventions”.	
In	 addition	 to	 providing	 a	 specific	 list	 of	 acts	 of	 sexual	 violence	 amounting	 to	 war	
crimes,	 Article	 8(2)(b)(xxii)	 recognises	 that	 acts	 of	 sexual	 violence	 also	 constitute	 a	
grave	breach	of	the	Geneva	Conventions.	It	is	also	worth	noting	that	subsection	(xxii)	is	
kept	 distinct	 from	 subsection	 (xxi),	 prohibiting	 “outrages	 upon	 personal	 dignity,	 in	











Genocide	 is	 an	 international	 crime	 under	 Article	 6	 of	 the	 ICC	 Statute.	 Whilst	 this	
provision	does	not	contain	explicit	reference	to	gender	crimes,	the	jurisprudence	of	ad	
hoc	 tribunals	 supports	 the	 interpretation	 that	 acts	 of	 sexual	 violence,	 in	 particular	
rape,	can	have	genocidal	character:	
																																																								
67	Under	 CIHL,	 the	 expressions	 “outrages	 upon	 personal	 dignity”	 and	 “any	 form	 of	 indecent	 assault”	
(stemming	from	the	language	of	Additional	Protocols	I	and	II)	are	interpreted	as	referring	to	any	form	of	
sexual	 violence.	 (CIHL	 Study),	 Vol.	 I:	 Rules,	 Rule	 93:	 Rape	 and	 Other	 Forms	 of	 Sexual	 Violence	 <	
http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule93>	 accessed	 2	 December	 2013,	 Vol.	 II:	
Practice,	 Practice	 relating	 to	 Rule	 93:	 Rape	 and	 Other	 Forms	 of	 Sexual	 Violence	
<http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule93>	accessed	2	December	2013.	





























The	 category	 of	 crimes	 against	 humanity	 has	 been	 extensively	 used	 by	 modern	




century,	 with	 the	 establishment	 of	 ad	 hoc	 tribunals	 and	 their	 progressive	

















In	 order	 for	 a	 criminal	 act	 to	 be	 prosecuted	 as	 a	 crime	 against	 humanity,	 a	 specific	
contextual	 threshold	 must	 be	 met.	 As	 noted	 by	 Cryer	 et	 al.,	 it	 is	 the	 contextual	
threshold	 that	makes	 crimes	 (such	 as	murder,	 rape	 etc.)	which	 otherwise	may	 have	
fallen	exclusively	under	the	national	jurisdiction	of	a	state,	international	crimes,	which	





this	 category	 of	 crime.	 Article	 5	 of	 the	 ICTY	 Statute	 does	 not	 explicitly	 include	 the	
requirement	 of	 “a	 widespread	 or	 systematic	 attack”	 in	 defining	 crimes	 against	
humanity.	Instead,	the	ICTY	Statute	sets	the	contextual	threshold	as	“when	committed	
in	armed	conflict,	whether	international	or	internal	in	character,	and	directed	against	
any	 civilian	 population”.	 However,	 the	 provision	 has	 been	 interpreted	 to	 require	 an	
element	of	“a	widespread	or	systematic	attack”.74	Equally,	the	 ICTR	Statute	broadens	
																																																								
72	“The	 Tribunal	 therefore	 cannot	make	 a	 general	 declaration	 that	 the	 acts	 before	 1939	were	 Crimes	
Against	Humanity	within	 the	meaning	of	 the	Charter,	but	 from	the	beginning	of	 the	War	 in	1939	war	
crimes	were	 committed	on	a	 vast	 scale,	which	were	also	 crimes	against	humanity;	 and	 insofar	 as	 the	
inhumane	 acts	 charged	 in	 the	 Indictment,	 and	 committed	 after	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 war,	 did	 not	




74	The	 ICTY	 in	 Tadić	 interpreted	 this	 provision	 to	 mean	 that	 “acts	 must	 occur	 on	 a	 widespread	 or	
systematic	 basis,	 that	 there	must	 be	 some	 form	of	 a	 governmental,	 organisational	 or	 group	policy	 to	












decision	 marked	 not	 only	 the	 first	 successful	 prosecution	 of	 wartime	 rape	 by	 an	
international	criminal	tribunal,	but	also	set	a	precedent	for	the	still	ongoing	process	of	








the	 work	 of	 the	 ad	 hoc	 tribunals.	 The	 overwhelming	 evidence	 of	 wartime	 sexual	
violence	 being	 committed	 during	 conflicts	 in	 the	 Former	 Yugoslavia	 and	 in	 Rwanda	
directly	 clashed	with	 the	 substantive	 absence	 of	 previous	 experience	 of	 prosecuting	
gender	crimes	in	international	law.	Whilst	the	statutory	provisions	of	the	ICTY	and	the	
ICTR	enabled	charging	 the	accused	with	 rape	and	prosecuting	 it,	 it	became	essential	
that	 the	 tribunals’	 judges	 conceptualize	 rape	 and	 coin	 a	 definition	 of	 this	 crime	 for	
purposes	of	international	criminal	law.				
	
Rape	 was	 first	 defined	 by	 the	 ICTR	 in	 Akayesu	 as	 “a	 physical	 invasion	 of	 a	 sexual	











a	 violation	 of	 one’s	 sexual	 integrity,	 rather	 than	 an	 extensive	 list	 of	 technical	
modalities,	which	is	usually	present	in	definitions	adopted	in	national	jurisdictions.	For	
instance,	 the	 ICTR’s	 definition	 of	 rape	 does	 not	 include	 a	 requirement	 of	 penile	
penetration,	 which	 is	 present	 in	 many	 national	 jurisdictions.78	This	 approach	 of	 the	
ICTR	towards	rape	mirrors	the	approach	represented	in	the	United	Nations	Convention	
Against	 Torture	 and	Other	 Cruel,	 Inhuman	 and	Degrading	 Treatment	 or	 Punishment	
1984,	which	focuses	on	the	concept	of	torture	as	a	type	of	state-sanctioned	violence	
rather	 than	 the	 list	of	 specific	 torturous	acts.79	In	 line	with	 the	conceptual	approach,	
the	Tribunal	also	gave	explicit	recognition	to	the	fact	that	rape	can	take	various	forms,	
including	penetration	by	objects	and/or	use	of	bodily	orifices,	which	are	not	generally	





by	 the	 ICTY	 in	 Furundžija,	 a	 case	 concerning	 multiple	 rapes	 committed	 by	 a	
paramilitary	leader	against	one	woman	during	the	Yugoslav	conflict.81	Rape	was	one	of	
the	methods	 used	 during	 the	 interrogation	 of	 the	 victim	 by	 Furundžija,	 however	 he	
was	 not	 a	 physical	 perpetrator	 himself.	 The	 Trial	 Chamber	 prosecuted	 rape	 as	 a	
violation	of	the	laws	or	customs	of	the	war	under	the	headings	of	torture	(as	inflicting	






whether	physical	or	mental,	 is	 intentionally	 inflicted	on	a	person	 for	 such	purposes	as	obtaining	 from	
him	or	 a	 third	person	 information	or	 a	 confession,	 punishing	him	 for	 an	 act	 he	or	 a	 third	person	has	
committed	or	is	suspected	of	having	committed,	or	intimidating	or	coercing	him	or	a	third	person,	or	for	
any	 reason	 based	 on	 discrimination	 of	 any	 kind,	when	 such	 pain	 or	 suffering	 is	 inflicted	 by	 or	 at	 the	
instigation	of	or	with	the	consent	or	acquiescence	of	a	public	official	or	other	person	acting	in	an	official	
capacity”.		
80	Akayesu,	 para.686:	 "The	 Tribunal	 notes	 that	 while	 rape	 has	 been	 historically	 defined	 in	 national	


















mostly	 reflects	 the	domestic	 approaches	 towards	 rape,	which	 is	 generally	 viewed	as	
non-consensual	intercourse	and	is	defined	through	a	‘checklist’	of	various	elements	of	
the	 crime.	 The	 approach	 in	 Furundžija	 can	 be	 criticized	 for	 departing	 from	 the	
progressive	 approach	 established	 by	 the	 ICTR	 and	 therefore	 having	 limited	
transformative	impact	on	the	prosecution	of	rape	as	a	gender	crime.	Arguably	it	sets	a	
higher	threshold	 for	prosecution	of	 rape,	which	 is	captured	 in	the	 list	of	elements	of	
the	crime	that	need	to	be	fulfilled.	In	particular,	the	requirement	of	“coercion	or	force	
or	 threat	 of	 force”	 is	 problematic.	 It	 suggests	 that	 the	 presence	 of	 force	 or	 threat	
thereof	 is	a	crucial	element	of	rape,	thereby	departing	from	the	concept	of	 ‘coercive	
circumstances’	presented	in	Akayesu.	Finally,	the	approach	taken	in	Furundžija	is	even	
more	 surprising	 given	 that	 three	 weeks	 earlier,	 the	 ICTY	 adopted	 the	 Akayesu	







at	an	even	narrower	definition	of	actus	 reus	of	 rape	 than	one	 in	Furundžija.85	Whilst	
																																																								












“any	 penetration	 of	 the	 victim’s	 vagina	 by	 the	 rapist	with	 his	 genitals	 or	 any	
object	 constitutes	 rape,	 although	 the	 definition	 of	 rape	 (…)	 is	 not	 limited	 to	
such	acts	alone”.86	
	
However,	 the	 ICTY	was	more	successful	 in	 its	attempts	 to	 reconcile	 the	Akayesu	and	
Furundžija	 dichotomy.	 In	Kunarac,	 a	 case	based	exclusively	 on	 the	 charges	 of	 sexual	
violence	against	women,	 the	 ICTY	 took	an	opportunity	 to	clarify	 the	 issue	of	victim’s	
consent,	 which	 was	 a	 challenging	 and	 not	 fully	 articulated	 aspect	 of	 the	 newly	
formulated	definitions	of	 rape	 in	 international	 law.87	Whilst	 the	actus	 reus	of	 rape	 in	
the	Kunarac	definition	was	adopted	verbatim	from	Furundžija,	it	was	the	problematic	
issue	of	consent	that	was	clarified	 in	Kunarac,	 resulting	 in	the	partial	departure	from	
the	 Furundžija	 legacy	 and	much	 needed	 clarification	 of	 the	 definition	 of	 rape	 in	 the	
developing	international	jurisprudence	on	wartime	rape.88					
	
The	 ICC	Statute	followed	the	Furundžija	 -	Kunarac	 interpretation	of	the	actus	reus	of	
rape	 in	 international	 law.	 In	accordance	with	the	 ICC	Elements	of	Crimes	(ICC	EOC)	a	
person	committed	rape	if:		
	
“The	 perpetrator	 invaded	 the	 body	 of	 a	 person	 by	 conduct	 resulting	 in	





and	 engaged	with	 a	 gender-neutral	 approach	 towards	 defining	 rape	 in	 international	
																																																								
86	Ibid.,	para.321.	
87	For	 a	more	 detailed	 discussion	 of	Kunarac,	 see:	 Doris	 Buss,	 ‘Prosecuting	Mass	 Rape:	 Prosecutor	 v.	
Dragoljub	 Kunarac,	 Radomir	 Kovac	 and	 Zoran	 Vukovic’	 (2000)	 10	 Feminist	 Legal	 Studies	 90;	 Patricia	
Sellers,	 ‘Individual(s’)	 Liability	 for	 Collective	 Sexual	 Violence’	 in:	 Karen	 Knop	 (ed),	Gender	 and	Human	
Rights	(Oxford	University	Press	2004).	






law.	 In	 addition,	 the	 ICC	 EOC	 state	 that	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘invasion’	 is	 intended	 to	 be	
broad	enough	to	be	gender-neutral.90	This	allows,	Boon	notes,	the	departure	from	the	










Non-voluntary	 nature	of	 rape	 is	 the	 essence	of	 that	 crime.	 This	 is	 reflected	 in	 penal	
codes	of	many	national	jurisdictions,	which	strongly	emphasize	the	lack	of	consent	of	
the	victim	as	the	crucial	element	of	a	crime.	In	Kunarac,	the	ICTY	considered	‘violation	
of	 sexual	 autonomy’	 as	 the	 common	 denominator	 of	 all	 definitions	 of	 rape,	 which	





(b)	 of	 the	mouth	 of	 the	 victim	 by	 the	 penis	 of	 the	 perpetrator;	 where	 such	
sexual	penetration	occurs	without	the	consent	of	 the	victim.	Consent	 for	 this	
purpose	must	be	consent	given	voluntarily,	as	a	result	of	the	victim’s	free	will,	
assessed	in	the	context	of	the	surrounding	circumstances.	The	mens	rea	is	the	















but	not	as	elements	of	 the	crime	of	 rape	per	 se.94	Furthermore,	 it	was	held	 that	 the	
lack	 of	 consent	 may	 be	 inferred	 from	 the	 circumstances	 in	 which	 the	 crime	 was	
committed,	 resonating	 the	 language	 of	 ‘coercive	 circumstances’	 from	 Akayesu.	
Referring	to	the	example	of	detention	facilities	in	Foča,	where	raped	women	were	held	





established,	 i.e.	 are	 ‘non-consent’	 and	knowledge	 thereof	elements	of	 a	 crime	 to	be	
proven	beyond	reasonable	doubt	by	the	prosecution	(as	per	Kunarac)	or	is	consent	an	
affirmative	 defence	 only	 and	 if	 so	 the	 non-consent	 can	 be	 inferred	 from	 coercive	
circumstances	in	which	the	crime	was	committed	(as	per	Akayesu)?96	Whilst	consent	is	
embedded	in	the	vast	majority	of	national	definitions	of	rape,	it	is	questionable	if	it	is	
necessary	 to	 include	 it	as	an	element	of	a	crime	 for	purposes	of	prosecuting	 rape	 in	
international	law.	Judge	Cassese	warned	in	Prosecutor	v.	Erdemović	against	such	over-
reliance	on	domestic	 definitions	of	 crimes	when	defining	 crimes	 in	 international	 law	
and	 emphasized	 the	 need	 to	 consider	 the	 specificity	 of	 international	 criminal	
proceedings.97	This	 precise	 argument	 was	 reiterated	 in	 Kunarac	 in	 relation	 to	 the	
formulation	of	 the	definition	of	 torture,	with	 the	 Trial	 Chamber	 concluding	 that	 it	 is	
impossible	 to	 transfer	 the	 elements	 of	 torture	 as	 found	 in	 human	 rights	 law	 into	
international	humanitarian	law	without	consideration	of	the	particular	differences	that	
exist	for	these	two	distinct	bodies	of	law.98	By	analogy,	it	should	be	impossible,	if	not	





96	Gacumbitsi,	 Appeal	 Judgment,	 para.153:	 “(…)	Kunarac	 establishes	 that	 non-consent	 and	 knowledge	
thereof	 are	 elements	 of	 rape	 as	 a	 crime	 against	 humanity.	 The	 import	 of	 this	 is	 that	 the	Prosecution	
bears	 the	 burden	 of	 proving	 these	 elements	 beyond	 reasonable	 doubt.	 If	 the	 affirmative	 defence	
approach	were	taken,	the	accused	would	bear,	at	least,	the	burden	of	production,	that	is,	the	burden	to	
introduce	evidence	providing	prima	facie	support	for	the	defence”.	

















as	physical	 and	mental	 integrity,	which	questions	 the	capability	of	 the	victim	 to	give	
genuine	consent.	Thus,	the	existence	of	these	factors	renders	the	victim’s	true	consent	
impossible	 (and,	 arguably,	 irrelevant),	 as	 articulated	 by	 the	 Appeals	 Chamber	 in	
Kunarac,	which	held	that	in	most	cases	charged	as	either	war	crimes	or	crimes	against	
humanity,	 circumstances	 will	 be	 “almost	 universally	 coercive”.100	If	 that	 premise	 is	





shown	 above,	 the	 circumstances	 in	 which	 rapes	 are	 committed	 (as	 crimes	 against	
humanity)	exclude	the	possibility	of	a	real	and	meaningful	consent	on	the	part	of	the	
victim.	Tribunal	judges	reached	the	same	conclusion	in	leading	cases	before	the	ad	hoc	
tribunals	 (e.g.	 Kunarac,	 Furundžija,	 Gacumbitisi	 and	 Krnojelac)	 holding	 that	













In	addition,	Rule	96	of	 the	 ICTY	and	 the	 ICTR	Rules	of	Procedure	and	Evidence	 (RPE)	
supports	 the	argument	 for	omitting	consent	as	an	element	of	 the	crime	and	 instead	
inferring	non-consent	 from	 the	 coercive	 circumstances.102	Under	Rule	 96	of	 the	 ICTY	
RPE,	 the	 victim’s	 consent	 is	 irrelevant	 under	 coercive	 circumstances,	 effectively	
disallowing	 consent	 as	 a	 defence.	 Using	 consent	 as	 an	 affirmative	 defence	 is	 still	
theoretically	 possible,	 although	 it	 would	 appear	 to	 be	 hardly	 possible	 given	 the	










the	 committed	 crime.	Where	 consent	 is	 an	element	of	 a	 crime,	 the	burden	of	proof	
rests	 on	 the	 prosecution	 to	 show	 that	 the	 victim	 did	 not	 consent.	 Establishing	 non-
consent	 involves	 an	 inquiry,	 whereby	 the	 victim	 would	 be	 questioned	 about	 her	
conduct	and	 state	of	mind,	especially	whether	 she	 consented	 to	 the	 sexual	 act.	 This	
may	be	a	particularly	humiliating	and	degrading	experience	 for	 the	 victims	of	 sexual	
violence,	especially	if	the	circumstances	in	which	rape	took	place	can	be	described	as	
coercive	or	where	force	or	coercion	was	used.	However,	the	ICTR	in	Gacumbitsi	took	a	
step	 forward	 in	 recognizing	 that	 the	 prosecution	 can	 prove	 non-consent	 beyond	




102	It	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 the	 first	 version	of	 the	Rule	 96	 excluded	 consent	 as	 a	 defence	 in	 cases	 of	
sexual	violence.	The	current	version	of	 the	Rule	96	was	 revisited	 in	order	 to	balance	 the	 rights	of	 the	









possible.	 (…)	But	 it	 is	not	necessary,	 as	a	 legal	matter,	 for	 the	Prosecution	 to	
introduce	 evidence	 concerning	 the	 words	 or	 conduct	 of	 the	 victim	 or	 the	
victim’s	 relationship	 to	 the	 perpetrator.	 Nor	 need	 it	 introduce	 evidence	 of	
force.	 Rather,	 the	 Trial	 Chamber	 is	 free	 to	 infer	 non-consent	 from	 the	




and	consent	 in	 international	 law.	The	assertion	of	 the	Trial	Chamber	 in	Prosecutor	v.	
Milutinović	 (as	 it	 then	was)	 that	 “the	 apparent	 disparity	 [between	 non-consent	 and	
coercion]	is	of	formal	nature	only”	is	highly	questionable.105		Essentially,	coercion	and	
consent	 are	 separate	 concepts	 focusing	 on	 the	 broader	 notion	 of	 circumstances	
surrounding	commission	of	a	criminal	act,	on	the	one	hand,	and	victim’s	agency	on	the	
other.	Whilst	 it	 is	 argued	 in	 this	 thesis	 that	 the	 coercive	 circumstances	 approach	 is	
more	 adequate	 for	 purposes	 of	 prosecution	 of	 rape	 in	 international	 law,	 some	
commentators	 support	 the	 approach	 prioritizing	 consent	 as	 an	 element	 of	 a	 crime.	
Engle	 in	 particular	 suggests	 that	 focusing	 on	 the	 notion	 of	 coercive	 circumstances	
dilutes	 the	 concept	 of	 consent	 within	 the	 ICTY	 jurisprudence	 and	 therefore	 has	
diminishing	 effect	 on	 women’s	 political	 and	 sexual	 agency	 during	 the	 Yugoslav	
conflict.106	The	 argument	 in	 favour	 of	 prioritising	 non-consent	 is	 also	 advanced	 by	
Boon,	 who	 argues	 that	 such	 an	 approach	 would	 promote	 the	 victim’s	 individual	


















or	 enslavement	 when	 prosecuting	 these	 acts	 as	 crimes	 against	 humanity	 or	 war	




to	prosecuting	rape	as	a	crime	against	humanity	or	war	crime	 in	 ICL.109	The	 fact	 that	
rape	 is	a	sexual	violence	crime	should	not	be	a	factor	 in	 justifying	 implementation	of	
an	 effectively	 higher	 threshold	 for	 prosecution	 of	 rape	 as	 a	 crime	 against	 humanity	
than	the	threshold	applicable	to	other	crimes	against	humanity;	nor	should,	as	O’Byrne	




ICC	 has	 not	 yet	 successfully	 prosecuted	 rape	 under	 the	 Rome	 Statute.111	Therefore,	
one	 can	 only	 speculate	 on	 the	 approach	 taken	 by	 the	 ICC	 judges	 towards	
interpretation	of	elements	of	rape	as	a	crime	against	humanity.	So	far,	the	definition	of	
rape	in	the	ICC	EOC	appears	to	depart	from	the	problematic	notion	of	non-consent	as	
an	element	of	 rape	 and	 this	 element	 is	 not	 included	 in	 the	definition.	However,	 the	












110	Wolfgang	 Schomburg,	 Ines	 Peterson,	 ‘Genuine	 Consent	 to	 Sexual	 Violence	 under	 International	











This	 contention	 is	 supported	 by	 the	 leading	 case	 law	 (Kunarac,	 Gacumbitsi)	 where,	
despite	 the	 language	 of	 non-consent	 being	 used,	 the	 judges	 relied	 wholly	 on	 the	
concept	 of	 coercive	 circumstances	 in	 reaching	 their	 decisions.	 Furthermore,	 the	
application	 of	 the	 coercive	 circumstances	 test	 avoids	 the	 revictimization	 of	 victims	
during	the	trial,	as	they	would	not	be	subjected	to	a	line	of	questioning	regarding	their	
conduct	 when	 the	 act	 was	 committed.	 Despite	 the	 criticism	 surrounding	 the	
application	of	 the	 concept	of	 coercion	 to	 rape	 cases	 in	 international	 law,	 the	 test	of	
coercive	 circumstances	 does	 not	 diminish	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 victim	 is	 an	 autonomous	
person.	 To	 the	 contrary,	 it	merely	 recognizes	 that	 the	 circumstances	may	 impact	on	





It	 is	undisputable	that	 in	the	past	two	decades	rape	became	particularly	 ‘visible’	as	a	
crime,	 both	 in	 international	 law	 and	 on	 the	 international	 scene	 more	 generally.	
Prosecutions	of	 rape	as	 an	 international	 crime,	be	 it	 as	 crime	against	humanity,	war	
crime	 or	 genocide,	 by	 the	 international	 criminal	 courts	 and	 tribunals,	 have	 been	
accompanied	 by	 campaigns	 aiming	 at	 prevention	 of	 rape	 and	 sexual	 violence	 as	
weapons	 of	war.113	Nevertheless,	 it	 remains	 questionable	whether	 rape	 has	 actually	
been	conceptualized	as	a	gender	crime	in	international	law	in	addition	to	establishing	
it	as	a	crime	committed	on	ethnic,	racial,	nationalist	or	religious	grounds.	It	 is	argued	
that	 in	 order	 to	 show	 the	 real	 extent	 of	 rape	 as	 a	 crime	 against	 humanity,	 the	
																																																								
113	These	campaigns	were	both	UN-driven	(e.g.	Stop	Rape	Now)	and	also	conducted	on	a	governmental	
level,	 such	 as	 Prevention	 of	 Sexual	 Violence	 in	 Conflict	 Initiative	 launched	 in	 May	 2012	 by	 William	
Hague,	the	UK	Foreign	Secretary.	








international	 criminal	 courts	 and	 tribunals	 need	 to	 apply	 an	 intersectional	 analysis,	
inclusive	of	gender	as	well	as	other	factors	due	to	which	rape	has	been	committed.114		
	




flawed	approach.	 The	victim’s	ethnicity	often	becomes	 the	predominant	narrative	 in	
conceptualizing	 the	 crime,	 whilst	 gender	 is	 omitted	 from	 the	 analysis.	 To	 a	 great	
extent,	the	Statutes	of	the	Tribunals	 limit	the	scope	for	prosecuting	rape	as	a	gender	
crime	 because	 gender	 is	 not	 included	 as	 a	 discriminatory	 ground	 in	 provisions	 on	
crimes	against	humanity.	This	understandably	constrains	the	ability	of	the	tribunal	to	
explicitly	charge	and	prosecute	rape	as	a	crime	against	humanity	motivated	by	gender	
discrimination.	 Nonetheless,	 the	 Tribunals	 ought	 to	 incorporate	 gender	 into	 the	
broader	 analysis	 of	 the	 crime,	 showing	 that	 it	 is	 in	 fact	 one	 of	 the	 discriminatory	
grounds.	Application	of	the	intersectional	approach	and	making	gender	an	integral	part	
of	 the	 inquiry	 would	 thus	 demonstrate	 that	 the	 victim’s	 gender	 combined	with	 the	
victim’s	ethnicity	are	the	discriminatory	grounds	pursuant	to	which	the	crime	had	been	
committed.	The	 intersectional	approach	which	 focuses	on,	Charlesworth	notes,	 “‘the	
multiple	fluid	structures	of	domination	which	intersect	to	locate	women	differently	at	
particular	 historical	 conjunctures’	 rather	 than	 ‘a	 notion	 of	 universal	 patriarchy	
operating	 in	a	 transhistorical	way	to	subordinate	all	women’”	 is	particularly	useful	 in	
the	 context	 of	 those	 international	 crimes	 which	 involve	 a	 gender	 dimension.115	For	
example,	 Buss	 describes	 the	mass	 rape	 of	women	 in	 Yugoslavia	 as	 an	 example	 of	 a	
phenomenon	 where	 gender,	 sexual	 violence	 and	 nationalism	 were	 intertwined,	
																																																								
114	This	 argument	 is	 also	 supported	 by	 various	 academic	 commentators:	 Rhonda	 Copelon,	 ‘Gender	
Crimes	 as	War	 Crimes:	 Integrating	 Crimes	 against	Women	 into	 International	 Criminal	 Law’	 (2000)	 46	
McGill	Law	Journal	217;	Llezlie	L.	Green,	‘Gender	hate	propaganda	and	sexual	violence	in	the	Rwandan	
genocide:	an	argument	for	interdisciplinarity	in	international	law’	(2002)	33	Columbia	Human	Rights	Law	
Review	 764;	 Doris	 Buss,	 ‘The	 curious	 visibility	 of	 wartime	 rape:	 gender	 and	 ethnicity	 in	 international	
criminal	law’	(2007)	25	Windsor	Yearbook	of	Access	to	Justice	3.	
115	This	section	focuses	on	intersectionality	between	ethnicity	and	gender	in	relation	to	rape	as	a	crime	







The	 shortcomings	of	 the	 current	approach	 to	prosecution	of	 rape	as	a	 crime	against	
humanity	 are	 evidenced	 by	 the	 ICTR	 decision	 in	Gacumbitsi,	 a	 case	 concerning	 the	
defendant’s	responsibility	for	inciting	rapes	of	Tutsi	women	in	his	public	speech	as	well	
as	 his	 individual	 responsibility	 for	 committing	 acts	 of	 murder	 and	 rape.	 One	 of	 the	
victims	was	a	Hutu	woman	married	 to	a	Tutsi	man	 (Witness	TAS)	who	was	 raped	by	
two	Hutu	men.	The	ICTR	was	faced	with	a	dilemma	of	how	to	approach	prosecution	of	
this	crime.	In	order	to	prosecute	it	as	a	crime	against	humanity,	it	needs	to	be	shown	
(apart	 from	 producing	 evidence	 to	 confirm	 the	 act	 of	 rape	 itself)	 that	 the	 rape	 of	









This	 approach	 is	 problematic,	 although	 it	 demonstrates	 an	 attempt	 to	 interpret	 the	
rape	of	Witness	TAS	within	the	broader	context	of	widespread	and	systematic	attack	
during	 Rwandan	 genocide.	 Firstly,	 it	 views	 rape	 of	 Witness	 TAS	 as	 an	 offence	
committed	 against	 her	 husband,	 not	 her	 as	 an	 individual.	 Secondly,	 by	 viewing	 the	
rape	 as	 an	 act	 committed	 against	 a	 particular	 ethnic	 group	 (here	 represented	 by	
Witness	 TAS’	 husband),	 the	 Trial	 Chamber	 ignored	 the	 individual	 aspect	 of	 harm	 as	
well	as	its	gender	dimension.	The	crime	is	effectively	portrayed	only	through	a	lens	of	
ethnicity	 and	 is	 interpreted	 as	 a	 crime	 against	 a	 community.	 Such	 method	
demonstrates	the	limits	of	viewing	rape	through	the	lens	of	ethnicity	only	and	reveals	
a	narrow	understanding	of	sexual	violence	against	women,	especially	in	the	context	of	
ethnic	 conflict.	 Rape	 in	 Gacumbitsi	 is	 undoubtedly	 visible	 as	 a	 crime,	 however	 the	
																																																								






understanding	 of	 the	 offence	 as	 well	 as	 its	 causes	 are	 under-explored	 and	 rather	
narrowly	 constructed.	 Whilst	 the	 ethnic	 dimension	 certainly	 cannot	 be	 ignored,	 it	
should	not	be	the	sole	explanation	of	sexual	violence	in	ethnic	conflict,	or	the	exclusive	
lens	 through	which	 the	 rape	 of	Witness	 TAS	 is	 analysed.	 Buss	 further	 notes	 that	 an	
approach	that	is	overly	focused	on	ethnicity	instead	of	the	intersection	of	ethnicity	and	
gender	 largely	 ignores	 the	 pre-conflict	 patterns	 and	 practices	 of	 inequality,	 which	
enabled	this	particular	form	of	abuse	in	the	first	place.118		
	
The	 decision	 in	Gacumbitsi	 stands	 in	 strong	 contrast	 to	 the	 decision	 of	 the	 ICTY	 in	
Krstić,	 a	 case	 concerning	 the	 execution	 of	 approximately	 seven	 to	 eight	 thousand	
Bosnian	 Muslim	 men	 in	 Srebrenica.	 The	 Trial	 Chamber	 engaged	 in	 intersectional	
analysis	 of	 gender	 and	 ethnicity	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 Srebrenica	 genocide	 and	 gave	
explicit	 recognition	 to	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 Srebrenica	 massacre	 on	 Bosnian	 Muslim	
women.	 By	 recognizing	 that	 Bosnian	 Muslims	 of	 Eastern	 Bosnia	 were	 a	 patriarchal	
society,	the	Tribunal	held	that:		
	
“[f]or	 Bosnian	 Muslim	 women	 it	 is	 essential	 to	 have	 a	 clear	 marital	 status,	




showed	 the	 impact	 of	 mass	 murder	 of	 Bosnian	 Muslim	 men	 on	 Bosnian	 Muslim	
women	although	 they	were	not	direct	victims	of	 the	crime.	The	 ICTY	 referred	 to	 the	




on	 survival	 of	 a	 traditionally	 patriarchal	 society”.120	However,	 the	 ICTY’s	 decision,	
whilst	 praised	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 received	 criticism	 for	 portraying	 Bosnian	 Muslim	
















conflict,	where	 gender	 and	 other	 factors	 such	 as	 race,	 ethnicity	 or	 religion	 intersect	
and	 produce	 a	 particular	 type	 of	 violence.	 However,	 as	 evidenced	 by	 Krstić,	 the	
intersectional	 approach	 needs	 to	 be	 informed	 by	 the	 inquiry-based	 approach	 of	 the	
courts	 rather	 than,	 (which	 has	 been	 the	 case	 so	 far)	 the	 preconceived	 and	 often	
stereotypical	ideas	about	a	particular	society	or	group.	Gender	is	not	a	static	factor	and	
it	 is	 capable	 of	 evolving	 together	 with	 the	 changes	 in	 society.	 Thus,	 the	 broader	
context	of	modern	societal	relations	needs	to	be	taken	into	account	in	order	to	avoid	






acts	 amounting	 to	 crimes	 listed	 under	 other	 headings	 of	 crimes	 against	 humanity.	
These	include	torture,	enslavement,	persecution	and	other	inhumane	acts.	Successful	
prosecution	of	acts	of	 sexual	violence	under	 these	headings	was	a	 significant	 step	 in	














which,	under	certain	circumstances,	may	amount	 to	a	CAH.	Article	7(1)(h)	of	 the	 ICC	









Enslavement	 is	 categorized	 as	 a	 CAH	 in	 the	 statutes	 of	 the	 IMTN	 (Article	 6(c)),	 the	
IMTFE	 Charter	 (Article	 5(c)),	 the	 ICTY	 (Article	 5(c)),	 the	 ICTR	 (Article	 3(c)),	 the	 SCSL	
(Article	 2(c))	 and	 the	 ICC	 (Article	 7(1)(c)).	 In	 addition,	 the	 SCSL	 Statute	 and	 the	 ICC	









“the	 control	 of	 someone’s	 movement,	 control	 of	 physical	 environment,	
psychological	control,	measures	taken	to	prevent	or	deter	escape,	force,	threat	
of	 force	 or	 coercion,	 duration,	 assertion	 of	 exclusivity,	 subjection	 to	 cruel	
treatment	and	abuse,	control	of	sexuality	and	forced	labour”.125		
	
The	Trial	Chamber	held	 that	acts	of	 rape	committed	by	 the	accused	amount	 to	both	
rape	 and	 enslavement	 under	 Article	 3	 of	 the	 ICTY	 Statute.	 By	 recognizing	 that	 the	
																																																								
123	This	point	was	articulated	by	the	ICTR	Trial	Chamber	in	Prosecutor	v.	Semanza,	Trial	Judgment,	ICTR-








accused	 “forced	 their	 captives	 to	 endure	 rape	 as	 an	 especially	 odious	 form	 of	 their	
domestic	 servitude”,	 the	 Appeals	 Chamber	 in	Kunarac	 further	 upheld	 that	 rape	 and	
enslavement,	 although	 based	 (in	 the	 factual	 circumstances	 in	Kunarac)	 on	 the	 same	
act,	are	two	distinct	offences.126	Although	the	decision	 in	Kunarac	did	not	 invoke	the	
language	of	‘sexual	slavery’	per	se,	the	ICTY	conceptually	recognized	that	acts	of	sexual	
violence	 may	 in	 certain	 circumstances	 amount	 to	 enslavement.	 As	 such,	 Kunarac	
marked	 a	 significant	 development	 in	 the	 jurisprudence	 of	 the	 international	 criminal	
tribunals	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 crime	 of	 sexual	 slavery.	 It	 also	 departed	 from	 the	











(i) The	Accused	 exercised	 any	 or	 all	 the	 powers	 attaching	 to	 the	 right	 of	





(iii) The	Accused	 intended	 to	exercise	 the	act	of	 sexual	 slavery	or	acted	 in	
the	reasonable	knowledge	that	this	was	likely	to	occur.128				
	
The	SCSL	adopted	the	 list	of	 indicia	 for	enslavement	from	Kunarac.	Furthermore,	the	




‘Evaluating	 the	 Special	 Court	 for	 Sierra	 Leone’s	Gender	 Jurisprudence’	 in:	 Charles	 Chernor	 Jalloh,	The	






need	 not	 be	 physically	 confined	 -	 to	 the	 contrary,	 they	may	 remain	 in	 the	 captor’s	
control	because	they	have	nowhere	else	to	go	and	fear	for	their	lives.129		






Torture	 figures	as	a	crime	against	humanity	 in	Article	5(f)	of	 the	 ICTY	Statute,	Article	







“(…)	 the	 term	 "torture"	 means	 any	 act	 by	 which	 severe	 pain	 or	 suffering,	




reason	 based	 on	 discrimination	 of	 any	 kind,	 when	 such	 pain	 or	 suffering	 is	
inflicted	 by	 or	 at	 the	 instigation	 of	 or	with	 the	 consent	 or	 acquiescence	 of	 a	
public	official	or	other	person	acting	in	an	official	capacity”.131		
	
Nonetheless,	 the	 Trial	 Chamber	was	 of	 the	 view	 that	 the	 human	 rights	 definition	 of	
torture	needed	to	be	adjusted	to	reflect	the	contextual	circumstances	in	which	torture	
																																																								
129	Prosecutor	 v.	 Brima	 et	 al.,	 Trial	 Judgment,	 SCSL-04-16-T,	 20	 June	 2007;	Prosecutor	 v.	 Brima	 et	 al.,	
Appeal	 Judgment,	SCSL-04-16-A,	22	February	2008,	para.709;	Prosecutor	v.	 Sesay,	Kallon,	Gbao	 (RUF),	
Judgment,	SCSL-04-15-T,	2	March	2009,	para.161;	Prosecutor	v.	Taylor,	Judgment,	SCSL-03-01-T,	18	May	
2012,	para.420.	











requirement	 present	 in	 the	 CAT	 definition,	 namely	 the	 requirement	 that	 an	 act	 of	
torture	 is	 perpetrated	 by	 a	 person	 acting	 in	 official	 capacity.132	Therefore,	 the	 Trial	
Chamber	 held	 that	 the	 elements	 of	 torture	 under	 IHL,	 which	 reflect	 customary	
international	law	are:		
	







Kunarac	marked	 the	 first	 successful	 conviction	 by	 the	 international	 criminal	 tribunal	
for	acts	of	 sexual	violence	amounting	 to	 torture	as	a	CAH.	The	accused	Kunarac	and	
Vukovic	were	 found	guilty	of	 torture	as	a	crime	against	humanity	 (and	also	as	a	war	
crime)	for	committing	acts	of	sexualized	torture	on	Muslim	women	and	girls.	The	Trial	
Chamber	 viewed	 rapes	 as	 acts	 resulting	 in	 severe	 mental	 and	 physical	 pain	 and	
suffering	for	the	victims	and	therefore	amounting	to	torture.134	The	ICTY	Trial	Chamber	
held	 that	women	and	girls	were	chosen	 to	be	 raped	because	 they	were	Muslim	and	
female,	 which	 constituted	 a	 prohibited	 ground	 (discrimination)	 for	 purposes	 of	 the	
torture	 definition.135	The	 accused	 intentionally	 committed	 rape	 as	 torture	 with	 this	
particular	discriminatory	intention	in	mind.		
	
The	 ICTR	 followed	 Kunarac	 in	 Prosecutor	 v.	 Semanza	 by	 cumulatively	 charging	 and	
prosecuting	rape	under	Articles	3(f)	(torture)	and	3(g)	(rape)	of	the	ICTR	Statute.136	The	
ICTR	Trial	Chamber	found	the	accused	guilty	of	 inciting	a	crowd	to	rape	Tutsi	women	























committing	 “crimes	 against	 humanity	 by	 inflicting	 severe	 physical	 or	mental	 pain	 or	
suffering	 through	 acts	 of	 rape	 or	 other	 forms	 of	 sexual	 violence,	 upon	 civilian	men,	
women	and	children	in	the	Central	African	Republic,	in	violation	of	Articles	7(1)(f)	and	
25(3)(a)	or	28(a)	or	28(b)	of	 the	Rome	Statute”	 in	addition	to	 the	count	of	 rape	as	a	
CAH.140	The	 inclusion	of	 two	separate	but	 related	charges	was	 supported	by	 the	 fact	
that	 victims	were	 raped	 in	 front	of	 their	 family	members.141	Therefore,	 the	pain	and	
suffering	was	experienced	by	 those	who	were	 raped	 in	 front	of	 family	members	but	
also	by	those	who	were	forced	to	watch	their	family	members	being	raped.	However,	
the	 Pre-Trial	 Chamber	 II	 refused	 to	 confirm	 the	 separate	 count	 of	 torture	 as	 a	 CAH,	
arguing	that	the	act	of	torture	was	“fully	subsumed	by	the	count	of	rape”.142		
The	approach	presented	by	the	ICC	in	this	decision	is	highly	problematic.	The	reasoning	
of	Pre-Trial	Chamber	 II	 (or	rather	the	 lack	of	 it)	 regarding	the	opinion	that	the	act	of	
torture	is	subsumed	in	the	charge	of	rape	is	questionable.	It	remains	unclear	how	the	
material	 elements	 of	 the	 crime	 of	 torture,	which	was	 inflicted	 on	 persons	 forced	 to	
watch	their	family	members	being	raped,	could	be	subsumed	under	a	single	charge	of	
rape	as	a	crime	against	humanity.	Unfortunately,	the	decision	of	the	Pre-Trial	Chamber	




















basic	 number	 of	 prohibited	 grounds	 of	 persecution,	 which	 include	 political,	 racial,	
religious	and,	in	the	case	of	SCSL	only,	ethnic	grounds.	The	ICC	Statute	offers	by	far	the	
broadest	 list	 of	 persecutory	 grounds.	 Article	 7(1)(h)	 defines	 persecution	 as	 an	 act	
committed		
	
“against	 any	 identifiable	 group	 or	 collectivity	 on	 political,	 racial,	 national,	
ethnic,	 cultural,	 religious,	gender	as	defined	 in	paragraph	3,	or	other	grounds	








The	 ICTY	has	particularly	 rich	 jurisprudence	on	 the	 issue	of	 persecution	 as	 a	CAH.145	
The	ICTY	Appeals	Chamber	in	Prosecutor	v.	Krnojelac	defined	persecution	as		
“an	act	or	omission	which	discriminates	 in	 fact	and	which:	denies	or	 infringes	
upon	 a	 fundamental	 right	 laid	 down	 in	 international	 customary	or	 treaty	 law	
(the	 actus	 reus);	 and	 was	 carried	 out	 deliberately	 with	 the	 intention	 to	
																																																								
143	Article	5(h)	ICTY	Statute,	Article	3(h)	ICTR	Statute,	Article	2(h)	SCSL	Statute,	Article	7(1)(h)	ICC	Statute.		









discriminate	on	one	of	 the	 listed	grounds,	 specifically	 race,	 religion	or	politics	
(the	mens	rea)”.146		
In	the	interpretation	of	the	ad	hoc	tribunals,	the	acts	or	omissions	which	underlie	the	
crime	 of	 persecution	 do	 not	 need	 to	 constitute	 a	 crime	 in	 international	 law,	 but	
nonetheless	must	be	of	the	same	level	of	gravity	as	the	crimes	listed	in	the	ICTY	or	ICTR	
statutes.	 In	 contrast,	 the	 ICC	 Statute	 additionally	 requires	 a	 connection	 between	
persecution	 and	 either	 one	 of	 the	 acts	 listed	 in	 Article	 7(1)	 or	 any	 crime	within	 the	
jurisdiction	 of	 the	 Court.	 Cryer	 et	 al	 question	 the	 customary	 law	 status	 of	 this	
definition	 by	 pointing	 out	 that	 such	 requirement	 is	 absent	 in	 the	 Tribunals’	
jurisprudence. 147 	Furthermore,	 as	 noted	 by	 the	 ICTY	 Trial	 Chamber	 in	 Kupreškić,	
“although	the	Statute	of	the	ICC	may	be	 indicative	of	the	opinio	 juris	of	many	states,	
Article	 7(1)(h)	 is	 not	 consonant	 with	 customary	 international	 law”.148	However,	 in	
practical	terms,	it	 is	highly	likely	that	acts	of	persecution	will	normally	be	linked	to	at	
least	 one	 of	 the	 acts	 recognized	 as	 criminal	 under	 the	 ICC	 Statute	 or	 otherwise	
forbidden	in	international	law.	Thus	far,	the	international	criminal	tribunals	recognized	




The	 ICTY	and	 the	 ICTR	have	successfully	prosecuted	acts	of	 sexual	and	gender-based	
violence	committed	against	women	as	well	as	against	men,	as	persecution.150	In	Stakić	
and	 Brdanin,	 the	 ICTY	 Trial	 Chamber	 held	 that	 rapes	 committed	 against	 women	 of	
Bosnian	Muslim	or	Bosnian	Croat	origin	were	discriminatory	 in	nature	and	 therefore	
amounted	 to	 persecution.151 	The	 ICTR	 also	 found	 rapes	 committed	 against	 Tutsi	
																																																								















women	 at	 Kigali	 roadblocks	 and	 in	 two	 religious	 buildings	 as	 amounting	 to	
persecution.152	However,	rape	is	not	the	only	act	of	sexual	and	gender-based	violence	
to	be	recognized	as	persecutory	in	nature.	In	Brdanin,	the	ICTY	recognized	that	acts	of	
sexual	 nature	might	 also	 amount	 to	 persecution,	 e.g.	 forcing	 detainees	 to	 have	 sex	
with	each	other	or	 forcing	a	Bosnian	Muslim	woman	 to	undress	 in	 front	of	 cheering	
Bosnian	 Serb	 policemen. 153 	Furthermore,	 the	 ICTR	 acknowledged	 that	 gendered	
language	may	 also	 be	 a	 contributing	 factor	 to	 a	 criminal	 act	 of	 persecution.	 To	 that	





More	 recently,	 the	 ICTY	 Appeals	 Chamber	 in	 Prosecutor	 v.	 Šainović	 et	 al	 and	 in	
Prosecutor	 v.	 Dordević	 found	 (reversing	 the	 acquittals	 by	 the	 Trial	 Chamber)	 the	
members	 of	 the	 Serbian	 leadership	 guilty	 of	 acts	 of	 persecution	 by	 sexual	 assaults	
committed	 by	 their	 troops	 during	 the	 ethnic	 cleansing	 in	 Kosovo	 in	 1999.155	In	 both	
cases,	the	ICTY	Appeals	Chamber	found	the	accused	guilty	on	the	basis	of	the	doctrine	
of	 joint	criminal	enterprise.	By	 finding	 that	sexual	assaults	amounted	to	persecution,	
the	 ICTY	Appeals	 Chamber	 in	Šainović	and	 in	Dordević	 considered	 sexual	 violence	 in	
the	 broader	 context	 of	 systematic	 campaign	 of	 terror	 and	 violence,	 similarly	 to	 the	
type	 of	 consideration	 normally	 given	 to	 any	 other	 violent	 acts.156	As	 such,	 the	 ICTY	



















towards	 the	 prosecution	 of	 acts	 of	 gender-based	 persecution	 as	 crimes	 against	
humanity.	 Whilst	 at	 present	 there	 is	 no	 further	 case	 law	 (other	 than	 the	 arrest	
warrants	mentioned	above)	which	would	illustrate	the	ICC	approach	to	gender-based	
persecution,	 other	 decisions	 of	 the	 ICC	 prompt	 concerns	 about	 the	 prospects	 of	
successful	 prosecution	 of	 this	 newly	 codified	 international	 crime.	 One	 of	 the	 key	
concerns	is	the	demonstrative	reluctance	of	the	ICC	to	cumulatively	charge	offences	of	




a	 single	 charge	 of	 rape,	 illustrates	 this	 point.	 Oosterveld	 shares	 these	 concerns	 and	
rightly	 notes	 that	 “if	 not	 remedied,	 the	 associated	 harms	 resulting	 from	 the	 various	
gender-related	charges	will	not	be	fully	captured	in	the	trial	 judgment”.160		This	point	
raises	significant	issues	for	the	future	prospects	of	achieving	gender	justice	at	the	ICC.	
The	diversity	of	harms	 suffered	by	 the	victims	of	 crimes	of	 sexual	 and	gender-based	
violence	 should	 be	 adequately	 reflected	 in	 the	 charges	 placed	 before	 the	 court	 and	
then	prosecuted	 at	 trial	 stage.	 The	 accuracy	 of	 charging	 and	prosecuting	 sexual	 and	
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this	 term.	Should	 the	 ICC	prosecute	acts	of	gender-based	persecution,	 it	will	have	to	
revisit	 and	 clarify	 the	 scope	of	 the	 term	under	 the	 ICC	Statute.	Given	 the	difficulties	
surrounding	the	definition	of	gender	at	the	ICC,	it	remains	uncertain	whether	the	ICC	




crime	 of	 persecution,	 it	 is	 crucial	 that	 the	 ICC	 Prosecutor	 and	 the	 ICC	 judges	 give	
recognition	 to	 all	 discriminatory	 grounds	 for	 persecution	 which	 were	 engaged	 in	
committing	a	particular	act.	The	prevalence	of	acknowledging	other	grounds	(such	as	
race	 or	 ethnicity)	 over	 gender	 has	 been	 highlighted	 by	 Buss,	 who	 noted	 that	 such	
approach	effectively	maneuvers	the	complexity	of	sexual	violence	and	inequality	out	of	
the	decisions	of	 international	 criminal	 tribunals.162	Therefore,	 in	cases	of	persecution	
based	 on	 multiple	 grounds	 including	 gender,	 there	 exists	 a	 possibility	 that	 the	













“[T]he	 crime	 of	 inhumane	 acts	 functions	 as	 residual	 category	 for	 serious	 charges	 which	 are	 not	






for	 acts	 that	do	not	 fulfill	 the	 threshold	of	 rape	as	 a	 crime	against	humanity.	 This	 is	
particularly	 the	 case	 in	 relation	 to	 acts	 of	 sexual	 violence	 which	 do	 not	 involve	
penetration	 or	 sexual	 contact,	 but	 are	 nonetheless	 considered	 as	 sexual	 in	 their	
nature,	such	as	forced	nudity	or	sexual	mutilation.164	The	category	of	‘other	inhumane	
acts’	 is	 also	 included	 in	 Article	 7(1)(k)	 of	 the	 ICC	 Statute.	 However,	 the	 ICC	 Statute,	
which	 contains	much	more	 detailed	 provisions	 regarding	 sexual	 violence	 as	 a	 crime	
against	humanity,	additionally	includes	specific	reference	to	‘any	other	form	of	sexual	




On	a	normative	 level,	 the	category	of	 ‘other	 inhumane	acts’	 remains	 largely	open	 to	
judicial	 interpretation,	 with	 “each	 case	 being	 examined	 on	 its	 merits”.165	The	 broad	
construction	 of	 ‘other	 inhumane	 acts’	 allows	 the	 courts	 to	 have	 flexibility	 in	
adjudication	of	crimes	against	humanity	and	gives	recognition	to	the	evolving	nature	of	
crimes	 against	 humanity.	 In	 particular,	 it	 enables	 the	 courts	 to	 punish	 various	 acts	
amounting	 to	 crimes	 against	 humanity,	 which	 were	 not	 envisaged	 at	 the	 time	 of	
drafting	 the	 provisions	 on	 crimes	 against	 humanity.	 In	 fact,	 the	 inclusion	 of	 ‘open-
ended’	provisions	in	modern	treaties	is	not	unusual	and	can	be	observed	for	instance	
in	Article	7(1)(g)	of	the	ICC	Statute	(‘any	other	form	of	sexual	violence	of	comparable	
gravity’)	 and	 in	 the	 definition	 of	 trafficking	 in	 human	 beings	 in	 Article	 3(a)	 of	 the	
Protocol	to	prevent,	suppress	and	punish	trafficking	in	persons,	especially	women	and	
children,	 supplementing	 the	 United	 Nations	 Convention	 on	 Transnational	 Organized	
Crime	 2000.	 That	 said,	 the	 wide	 scope	 of	 the	 provision,	 whilst	 beneficial	 from	 the	
perspective	 of	 allowing	 a	 certain	 degree	 of	 flexibility	 with	 respect	 to	 charging	 and	
prosecuting	crimes	not	thought	of	at	the	time	of	the	drafting	of	a	given	treaty,	causes	
concerns	 as	 to	 whether	 there	 is	 a	 sufficient	 level	 of	 specificity	 of	 the	 crime	 for	
																																																								


















Therefore,	 a	 crime	 against	 humanity	 of	 ‘other	 inhumane	 acts’	 needs	 to	 satisfy	 the	
threshold	requirements	for	crimes	against	humanity,	both	in	relation	to	the	actus	reus	
element	 (an	 act	must	 form	 a	 part	 of	 a	widespread	 or	 systematic	 attack	 against	 the	
civilian	population)	 and	 the	mens	 rea	 element	 (the	perpetrator	had	 the	 intention	 to	
commit	 the	 offence	 and	 had	 knowledge	 of	 its	 role	 as	 a	 part	 of	 an	 ongoing	 attack	
against	 civilian	 population)	 as	 well	 as	 being	 of	 equivalent	 seriousness	 as	 other	 acts	
explicitly	 listed	 in	 the	 crimes	 against	 humanity	 provisions.	 Furthermore,	 the	 broad	
interpretation	of	‘other	inhumane	acts’	initially	raised	concerns	regarding	the	violation	
of	 the	 nullum	 crimen	 sine	 lege	 principle	 in	 that	 ‘other	 inhumane	 acts’	 have	 been	
defined	in	international	law	ex	post	facto.	However,	this	issue	has	been	resolved	by	the	
ad	hoc	 tribunals,	which	held	 that	 ‘other	 inhumane	acts’	provisions	conform	with	 the	
principle	 nullum	 crimen	 sine	 lege	 as	 they	 proscribe	 conduct	 prohibited	 under	















inhumane	 acts’	 to	 a	 range	 of	 acts	 of	 sexual	 violence	 other	 than	 rape,	 which	 would	
otherwise	 fail	 to	 be	 prosecuted	 as	 crimes	 against	 humanity.	 The	 ICTR	 prosecuted	
forced	 nudity	 in	 Akayesu,	 where	 the	 accused	 was	 held	 criminally	 responsible	 for	
forcing	 several	 female	 victims	 to	undress	 in	 front	of	 the	bureau	 communal,	 perform	
physical	 exercise	 naked	 and	 marching	 naked. 170 	Furthermore	 the	 Trial	 Chamber	
reiterated	that	these	acts	amounted	to	sexual	violence,	although	they	did	not	involve	
penetration	or	sexual	contact.171	In	Kupreškić,	the	ICTY	prosecuted	forced	prostitution	












of	 the	 international	 criminal	 courts,	 the	 SCSL.	 The	 SCSL	 considered	 forced	marriage	
committed	during	the	civil	war	 in	Sierra	Leone	in	the	AFRC,	RUF	and	in	Taylor.175	The	
AFRC	 Appeals	 Judgment	 marked	 the	 first	 time	 in	 history	 where	 an	 international	
criminal	 court	 or	 tribunal	 held	 that	 forced	 marriage	 amounts	 to	 a	 crime	 against	
																																																								
170	Akayesu,	 Trial	 Judgment,	 para.697.	 Forced	 nudity	was	 also	 alleged	 as	 a	 crime	 against	 humanity	 of	
‘other	inhumane	acts’	in	Prosecutor	v.	Nyiramasuhuko.	However,	it	was	noted	by	the	ICTR	Trial	Chamber	
that	the	Prosecution	failed	to	include	these	charges	in	the	indictment	or	produce	sufficient	evidence	to	
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Forced	 marriage	 became	 a	 recognized	 phenomenon	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 Sierra	
Leonean	war.	Forced	marriage	was	not	a	feature	of	conflicts	which	were	subject	to	the	
jurisdiction	of	the	international	criminal	tribunals	created	in	the	20th	century,	such	as	
the	 IMTN,	the	 IMTFE,	 the	 ICTY	or	 the	 ICTR.	During	the	conflict	 in	Sierra	Leone,	many	
girls	and	women	were	abducted	and	forced	to	become	‘bush	wives’	(or	‘rebel	wives’).	
They	 were	 forcefully	 ‘married’	 to	 the	 rebels	 and	 forced	 to	 live	 with	 them	 as	 their	
‘wives’.	 Their	 duties	 as	 a	 ‘wife’	 involved	 taking	 care	of	 and	 carrying	 their	 husband’s’	
belongings,	 cooking,	 cleaning,	doing	 laundry,	 taking	care	of	 the	household	as	well	as	
satisfying	 the	 husband’s	 sexual	 needs	 on	 demand.176	As	 a	 result	 of	 sexual	 relations	
with	men,	many	women	became	pregnant	and	gave	birth	to	children	fathered	by	their	
‘husbands’.	 Some	women	 also	 suffered	 physical	 injuries,	miscarriages	 and	 long-term	
damage	to	their	sexual	health	resulting	from	forced	sexual	intercourse.	The	impact	of	
forced	 marriage	 on	 victims	 continued	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 war.	 Many	 women	 were	
forced	to	live	with	the	continuing	stigma	of	being	‘bush	wives’,	which	not	only	caused	
mental	 trauma	 but	 also	 was	 the	 primary	 reason	 why	 some	 women	 faced	 real	
difficulties	reintegrating	into	their	communities	or	even	families.177		
	
The	 treatment	 of	 forced	 marriage	 by	 the	 SCSL	 remains	 highly	 controversial,	 in	
particular	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 categorization	 of	 forced	marriage	 under	Article	 2	 of	 the	
SCSL	 Statute.	 The	distinctiveness	of	 forced	marriage,	which	was	exemplified	both	by	
the	character	of	a	crime	and	by	its	significant	role	in	the	context	of	the	Sierra	Leonean	
conflict,	may	partly	 explain	why	 there	 existed	no	prohibition	of	 such	 conduct	within	
the	ICL.	The	defence	argued	that	forced	marriage	should	not	be	categorized	as	‘other	
inhumane	act’	due	to	 it	 falling	short	of	satisfying	the	gravity	 threshold	 for	 the	 ‘other	











marriage	 is	 subsumed	 under	 the	 category	 of	 sexual	 slavery	 as	 a	 crime	 against	
humanity,	pursuant	to	Article	2(g)	of	the	SCSL	Statute.178	Based	on	examination	of	the	
evidence	submitted	by	the	Prosecution,	the	majority	of	 judges	viewed	the	presented	
evidence	of	 forced	marriage	as	 satisfying	elements	of	 the	 crime	of	 sexual	 slavery.	 In	
the	Trial	Chamber’s	view,	the	nature	of	acts	involved	in	forced	marriage	was	primarily	








forced	 marriage,	 it	 also	 demonstrated	 other	 aspects	 of	 the	 crime.	 For	 instance,	 in	
addition	to	performing	household	duties,	the	‘wives’	were	expected	to	pledge	loyalty	
to	their	‘husbands’.	This	suggested	the	relationship	of	exclusivity,	which	was	confirmed	
by	 several	 witnesses	 in	 their	 testimonies.180	A	 breach	 of	 this	 exclusive	 relationship	
could	 lead	 to	 severe	 consequences,	 including	 death.181	The	 Dissenting	 Opinion	 of	
Justice	Doherty	 supported	 the	more	 conceptual	 view	of	 forced	marriage	 and	 placed	
emphasis	 on	 the	 element	 of	 forced	 conjugal	 relationship,	 which	 may	 (but	 not	
necessarily	has	to)	involve	physical	or	sexual	violence.182	Justice	Doherty’s	definition	of	
forced	marriage	acknowledged	the	 long-lasting	and	diverse	effect	of	 the	crime	on	 its	

































satisfied	 chapeau	 requirements	 for	 crimes	 against	 humanity. 185 	Nonetheless,	 the	
Appeals	 Chamber	 declined	 to	 enter	 fresh	 (and	 cumulative)	 convictions	 against	 the	
accused.	 It	 based	 its	 decision	 on	 the	 view	 that	 society’s	 disapproval	 of	 the	 forceful	
abduction	and	use	of	women	and	girls	as	conjugal	partners	as	a	part	of	a	widespread	
or	systematic	attack	on	civilian	population	is	adequately	reflected	by	recognizing	that	
such	 conduct	 as	 criminal	 and	 that	 it	 constitutes	 an	 ‘other	 inhumane	 act’	 capable	 of	





Chamber	 relied	 on	 a	 distinction	 between	 the	 practice	 of	 arranged	 marriages	 in	










Sebutinde	 and	 Justice	 Doherty. 188 	Arranged	 marriages	 are	 a	 popular	 practice	 in	
customary	 law	 in	Sierra	 Leone,	which	was	 confirmed	by	 the	 testimony	of	 the	Expert	
Witness	for	the	Prosecution,	Mrs.	Bangura	and	the	Expert	Witness	for	the	Defence,	Dr.	
Thorsen. 189 	According	 to	 the	 evidence	 provided	 by	 the	 Expert	 Witness	 for	 the	
Prosecution,	in	arranged	marriages,	the	consent	of	the	bride’s	family	(very	often	of	the	
male	representatives)	is	essential	in	order	for	marriage	to	be	concluded.	Furthermore,	





However,	 whilst	 it	 is	 true	 that	 forced	 marriage	 does	 not	 involve	 consent	 from	 the	
‘bride’	 or	 her	 family	 nor	 concludes	 in	 a	 formal	 ceremony,	 this	 reliance	 on	 such	
reasoning,	 and	 the	 largely	 linguistic	 distinction	 between	 ‘arranged’	 and	 ‘forced’	
marriage,	 is	 highly	 problematic.	 Arranged	marriages	 in	 Sierra	 Leone	 (and	 elsewhere)	
are	in	violation	of	human	rights	obligations	enshrined	in	the	key	international	human	
rights	treaties,	in	particular	Article	16	CEDAW	and	Article	23	ICCPR.190	Furthermore,	in	




‘arranged’	 and	 ‘forced’	 marriages,	 the	 Appeals	 Chamber	 appears	 to	 have	 neglected	
highly	problematic	aspects	of	peacetime	forced	marriages.		
	
The	 SCSL	 returned	 to	 the	 question	 of	 characterization	 of	 forced	marriage	 in	 Taylor.	
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the	 sexual	 aspect	of	 the	 crime	and	 the	 forced	 labour	element.	Accordingly,	 the	Trial	




CAH.193	Whilst	 this	 step	 certainly	 marks	 an	 attempt	 to	 reconcile	 the	 problem	 of	
appropriate	 characterization	 of	 forced	 marriage,	 it	 nonetheless	 fails	 to	 capture	 this	




in	 Taylor	 (the	 final	 case	 prosecuted	 before	 the	 SCSL)	 failed	 to	 build	 on	 previous	




Judgment,	 some	 commentators	 have	 questioned	 the	 legality	 of	 the	 decision. 194	
Goodfellow	in	particular	maintains	that	the	classification	of	forced	marriage	as	‘other	
inhumane	act’	 by	 the	 SCSL	Appeals	Chamber	offended	 the	principle	of	 legality,	 non-
retroactivity	and	the	requirement	of	specificity	in	international	criminal	law.195	The	key	
error	 of	 the	 SCSL	 Appeals	 Chamber	 was,	 Goodfellow	 argues,	 the	 absence	 of	
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forced	 marriage	 in	 Sierra	 Leone	 supports	 the	 view	 that	 forced	 marriage	 fulfills	 the	
criteria	of	crimes	against	humanity	of	‘other	inhumane	acts’.	The	ICTY	Trial	Chamber	in	
Kupreškić	formulated	a	human	rights-based	definition	of	‘other	inhumane	acts’	which,	









1981	 and	 the	 Maputo	 Protocol. 197 	Furthermore,	 forced	 marriage	 could	 also	 be	
interpreted	 to	 amount	 to	 inhuman	 or	 degrading	 treatment	 or	 to	 servitude	 and	 is	




conceptualized	 as	 a	 form	of	 enslavement,	 rather	 than	other	 inhumane	act	 or	 sexual	
slavery	 as	 charged	 by	 the	 Prosecution	 in	 the	 AFRC	 case.	 The	 vast	 majority	 of	 the	
commentary	on	the	prosecution	of	forced	marriage	by	the	SCSL	confines	the	debate	to	
these	 two	 categories	 of	 crimes	 only,	 whereas	 a	 more	 thorough	 examination	 of	 the	
phenomenon	 of	 forced	 marriage	 as	 enslavement	 may	 appear	 to	 capture	 rather	
adequately	 the	 distinctive	 nature	 of	 this	 crime.199	One	 of	 the	 key	 criticisms	 of	 the	
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categorization	 of	 forced	 marriage	 as	 sexual	 slavery	 (as	 per	 the	 Trial	 Chamber’s	
judgment	in	AFRC)	is	that	it	ignores	the	non-sexual	aspects	of	the	crime,	such	as	forced	







compulsory	 labour	 or	 service,	 often	 without	 remuneration	 and	 often,	 though	 not	
necessarily,	 involving	 physical	 hardship;	 sex;	 prostitution;	 and	 human	 trafficking”.200	
Furthermore,	 the	 Trial	 Chamber	 listed	 factors	 which	 should	 be	 taken	 into	 account	
when	 determining	 whether	 enslavement	 was	 committed,	 such	 as	 “control	 of	
someone’s	 movement,	 control	 of	 physical	 environment,	 psychological	 control,	
measures	 taken	 to	 prevent	 or	 deter	 escape,	 force,	 threat	 of	 force	 or	 coercion,	
duration,	assertion	of	 exclusivity,	subjection	 to	 cruel	 treatment	 and	abuse,	control	 of	
sexuality	and	forced	 labour”.201	A	close	examination	of	 the	nature	of	 forced	marriage	
allows	 one	 to	 conclude	 that	 all	 of	 the	 above	 factors	 are	 indeed	 enshrined	 in	 this	
criminal	act.	What	is	more,	viewing	forced	marriage	through	the	lens	of	the	definition	
of	 enslavement	 from	 Kunarac	 allows	 to	 capture	 all	 factors	 and	 acts	 involved	 in	
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under	 different	 enumerated	 acts-	 forced	 marriage,	 other	 inhumane	 acts,	 sexual	
slavery,	 or	 outrages	 upon	 personal	 dignity	 while	 omitting	 the	 non-sexual	 acts	 of	
ownership,	the	circumstances	of	slave	trading,	and	forgoing	allegations	of	enslavement	
and	 slavery,	 is	 legally	unsatisfactory”.202	Therefore,	 categorization	of	 forced	marriage	
as	enslavement	would	have	enabled	capturing	the	complexity	and	multifaceted	nature	






Statute	 contains	 a	 list	 of	 specific	 offences	 of	 a	 sexual	 and	 gender-based	 nature	 in	
Article	 7(1)(g).	 This	 is	 the	 broadest	 treaty	 provision	 listing	 sexual	 and	 gender-based	
crimes	 to	 date.	 Furthermore,	 Article	 7(1)(g)	 in	 itself	 contains	 a	 residual	 category	 of	
‘other	 forms	 of	 sexual	 violence’,	 which	 may	 be	 particularly	 utilized	 in	 charging	 and	
prosecuting	acts	otherwise	not	captured	within	the	scope	of	this	provision.	In	addition	
to	 the	 chapeau	 requirements	 for	 CAH,	 the	 ICC	 EOC	 requires	 that	 the	 crime	 against	
humanity	of	sexual	violence	consists	of	the	following	elements:		
1) The	 perpetrator	 committed	 an	 act	 of	 a	 sexual	 nature	 against	 one	 or	
more	persons	or	caused	such	person	or	persons	to	engage	in	an	act	of	a	
sexual	nature	by	 force,	or	by	 threat	of	 force	or	 coercion,	 such	as	 that	
caused	by	fear	of	violence,	duress,	detention,	psychological	oppression	
or	abuse	of	power,	against	such	person	or	persons	or	another	person,	or	
by	 taking	 advantage	 of	 a	 coercive	 environment	 or	 such	 person’s	 or	
persons’	incapacity	to	give	genuine	consent.		
2) Such	 conduct	 was	 of	 a	 gravity	 comparable	 to	 the	 other	 offences	 in	
article	7,	paragraph	1	(g),	of	the	Statute.		









Given	 this	 unique	 aspect	 of	 the	 ICC	 Statute,	 it	may	be	 argued	 that	 the	 specificity	 of	
Article	 7(1)(g)	 may	 in	 practical	 terms	mean	 that	 gender-based	 crimes	 will	 rarely	 be	
charged	 and	 prosecuted	 under	 the	 residual	 category	 of	 ‘other	 inhumane	 acts’.	 The	
inclusion	of	 the	open-ended	category	of	 ‘any	other	acts	of	 sexual	violence’	 in	Article	
7(1)(g)	 effectively	 allows	 the	 ICC	 to	 prosecute	 acts	 of	 sexual	 violence	which	 are	 not	
explicitly	 included	 in	 that	 Article	 without	 the	 need	 to	 resort	 to	 the	 more	 general	
category	of	‘other	inhumane	acts’.				However,	the	decision	of	the	Pre-Trial	Chamber	II	
in	Prosecutor	v.	Muthaura	et	al.	questions,	however	astoundingly,	this	hypothesis.203	In	
the	 decision	 on	 the	 confirmation	 of	 charges,	 the	 Pre-Trial	 Chamber	 II	 refused	 to	
consider	acts	of	 forcible	circumcision	and	(in	some	cases)	penile	amputation	 inflicted	






inherently	 a	 question	 of	 fact”.205	What	 is	 more,	 the	 judges	 viewed	 these	 acts	 as	
“motivated	 by	 ethnic	 prejudice	 and	 intended	 to	 demonstrate	 cultural	 superiority	 of	
one	tribe	over	the	other”	and	not	as	a	crime	of	sexual	and	gender-based	nature.206	In	
reaching	this	finding,	the	Pre-Trial	Chamber	II	appeared	to	be	ignorant	of	the	argument	




The	decision	of	Pre-Trial	Chamber	 II	puts	 in	question	 the	gender	 strategy	of	 the	 ICC.	
The	misconceptualisation	of	the	sexual	aspect	of	the	crime	of	forcible	circumcision	and	
penile	amputation	as	well	as	disregard	for	the	gender	dimension	of	the	crime,	prompts	












to	 listing	diverse	gender	crimes,	 the	decision	 in	Muthaura	displayed	a	 rather	 limiting	
and	 alarming	 approach	 of	 the	 judges	 towards	 crimes	 of	 a	 sexual	 and	 gender-based	
nature,	 setting	 an	 unfortunate	 precedent	 for	 the	 future	 practice	 of	 charging	 and	
prosecuting	 gender	 crimes	 at	 the	 ICC.	 Finally,	 whilst	Muthaura	 concerned	 acts	 of	
sexual	 violence	 directed	 against	men,	 the	 bizarre	 finding	 of	 the	 Pre-Trial	 Chamber	 II	
begs	 the	 question	 of	 whether	 similar	 acts	 directed	 against	 women	 would	 also	 be	
interpreted	 by	 the	 ICC	 in	 the	 same	manner.	 Theoretically,	 the	 reasoning	 of	 the	 Pre-
Trial	Chamber	II,	if	followed,	may	lead	to	an	erratic	but	analogous	conclusion	that	acts	






Bemba	provides	another	 illustration	of	 the	problematic	approach	of	 the	 ICC	 towards	
the	category	of	‘other	forms	of	sexual	violence’	under	Article	7(1)(g)	of	the	ICC	Statute.	
The	Pre-Trial	 Chamber	 III	 in	Bemba	 refused	 to	 characterise	 the	 acts	 of	 forced	public	
undressing	of	women	as	‘other	forms	of	sexual	violence’	because,	in	the	judges’	view,	
these	 acts	 “do	 not	 constitute	 forms	 of	 sexual	 violence	 of	 comparable	 gravity	 to	 the	
other	crimes	set	forth	in	article	7(1)(g)	of	the	Statute”.208	The	approach	of	the	Pre-Trial	
Chamber	 III	 stands	 in	 contradiction	 to	 the	 jurisprudence	 of	 the	 ad	 hoc	 tribunals,	 in	
particular	 the	 judgment	 of	 the	 ICTR	 in	 Akayesu.	 In	 1998,	 the	 ICTR	 successfully	
prosecuted	forced	nudity	as	an	international	crime	of	sexual	violence	in	Akayesu.	The	
ICTR	 considered	 forced	 public	 nudity	 as	 sexual	 violence,	 defined	 by	 the	 Tribunal	 as	
“any	act	of	a	sexual	nature	which	is	committed	on	a	person	under	circumstances	which	
are	coercive”.209	Whilst	the	decisions	of	the	ad	hoc	tribunals	do	not	bind	the	ICC,	it	is	
nonetheless	 surprising	 that	 the	 Pre-Trial	 Chamber	 III	 departed	 from	 the	 approach	
																																																								




















breach	 of	 Geneva	 Convention	 or	 as	 a	 violation	 of	 Common	 Article	 3)	 and	 its	
subsequent	prosecution	at	an	international	criminal	tribunal.210		The	Appeals	Chamber	
also	found	that	for	purposes	of	applying	IHL	“an	armed	conflict	exists	whenever	there	
is	 a	 resort	 to	 armed	 force	 between	 States	 or	 protracted	 armed	 violence	 between	
governmental	authorities	and	organized	armed	groups	or	between	such	groups	within	
a	 State”.211	Furthermore,	 for	 an	offence	 to	be	 a	war	 crime,	 the	 criminal	 act	must	be	
closely	related	to	hostilities.212	However,	as	emphasized	by	the	ICTY	Appeals	Chamber	
in	Kunarac,	“(t)he	armed	conflict	need	not	have	been	causal	to	the	commission	of	the	





grave	 breaches	 of	 the	Geneva	Conventions	 1949	under	Article	 2	 of	 the	 ICTY	 Statute	
(applicable	to	offences	committed	in	international	armed	conflict	only)	or	as	violations	
																																																								








of	 laws	or	customs	of	war	under	Article	3	of	 the	 ICTY	Statute	 (applicable	to	offences	
committed	in	both	international	and	non-international	armed	conflict).214	In	relation	to	
the	 latter	 category,	 the	 ICTY	 often	 relied	 on	 Common	 Article	 3	 to	 the	 Geneva	
Conventions	 1949.	 In	 many	 cases,	 acts	 of	 sexual	 violence	 (in	 particular	 rape)	
committed	against	women	were	charged	and	prosecuted	as	torture	under	Article	2(b)	
of	 the	 ICTY	Statute	or	under	Common	Article	3(1)(a)	 (“violence	to	 life	and	person,	 in	
particular	(…)	torture”).	In	Čelebići,	the	ICTY	recognized	rape	as	a	form	of	torture,	as	a	
grave	breach	of	the	GC	1949	and	as	a	violation	of	the	laws	and	customs	of	war.215	The	
ICTY	 found	 one	 of	 the	 accused	 (Delić)	 guilty	 of	 committing	 acts	 of	 torture	 through	
multiple	 rapes	 of	 the	 victim,	Ms.	 Ćećez,	 causing	 the	 victim	 severe	mental	 pain	 and	
suffering.216	The	Trial	Chamber	observed	that	rapes	were	committed	on	Ms.	Ćećez	 in	
order	 to	obtain	 information	about	her	husband’s	whereabouts,	but	also	because	she	
was	 a	woman.	 As	 such,	 these	 acts	 represented	 a	 form	 of	 discrimination,	which	 is	 a	
prohibited	purpose	for	the	offence	of	torture	under	international	law.217	This	approach	
was	 later	 confirmed	 in	Kvočka	 et	 al.,	where	 the	 Trial	 Chamber	 stated	 that	 “raping	 a	
person	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 sex	 or	 gender	 is	 a	 prohibited	 purpose	 for	 the	 offence	 of	









Prosecutor	 v.	 Kunarac	 et	 al.,	 Trial	 Judgment,	 IT-96-23-T	&	 IT-96-23/1-T,	 22	 February	 2001,	 paras.630-
687,	 782;	 Čelebići	 Case,	 Trial	 Judgment,	 IT-96-21-T,	 16	 November	 1998,	 para.941-943;	 Prosecutor	 v.	
Furundžija,	Trial	Judgment,	 IT-95-17/1T,	10	December	1998,	paras.264-266,	275	(Furundžija	was	found	
guilty	 of	 torture	 (Count	 13)	 and	 aiding	 and	 abetting	 outrages	 upon	 personal	 dignity,	 including	 rape	
(Count	14),	as	violations	of	laws	or	customs	of	war	under	Article	3	ICTY	Statute);	Prosecutor	v.	Kvočka	et	
al.,	Trial	Judgment,	IT-98-30/1-T,	2	November	2001,	para.560;	Prosecutor	v.	Bralo,	Sentencing	Judgment,	






Kunarac	 et	 al.,	 Trial	 Judgment,	 IT-96-23-T	 &	 IT-96-23/1-T,	 22	 February	 2001,	 para.654;	 Prosecutor	 v.	





to	a	violation	of	the	 laws	or	customs	of	war.219	Furthermore,	 in	Kunarac,	 the	tribunal	
convicted	 one	 of	 the	 accused	 men	 (Kovač)	 of	 committing	 outrages	 upon	 personal	












(including	 rapes,	 forced	 marriages	 and	 sexual	 slavery)	 were	 committed.	 The	 Trial	
Chamber	in	RUF	confirmed	that	sexual	violence	is	used	“as	a	tactic	of	war	to	humiliate,	
dominate	 and	 instil	 fear	 in	 victims,	 their	 families	 and	 communities	 during	 armed	
conflict”	 and	 that	 in	 this	 case	 specifically,	 acts	 of	 sexual	 violence	 were	 committed	
“against	 the	 civilian	 population	 in	 an	 atmosphere	 in	which	 violence,	 oppression	 and	
lawlessness	 prevailed”. 222 	Whilst	 the	 ad	 hoc	 tribunals	 previously	 emphasized	 the	
deliberate	 use	 of	 sexual	 violence	 as	 a	weapon	 of	war,	 the	 SCSL	made	 a	 clearer	 link	
between	 such	 characterization	 of	 conflict-related	 sexual	 violence	 and	 the	 crime	 of	






221 	Prosecutor	 v.	 Sesay,	 Kallon,	 Gbao	 (RUF),	 Judgment,	 SCSL-04-15-T,	 2	 March	 2009,	 para.1352;	
confirmed	 on	 appeal:	 Prosecutor	 v.	 Sesay,	 Kallon,	 Gbao	 (RUF),	 Appeals	 Judgment,	 SCSL-04-15-A,	 26	
October	2009,	para.990.	
For	 discussion	 of	 the	 prosecution	 of	 terrorism	 as	 a	 war	 crime	 by	 the	 SCSL	 see:	 Roberta	 Arnold	 ‘The	
Judicial	Contribution	of	the	Special	Court	for	Sierra	Leone	to	the	Prosecution	of	Terrorism’	in:	in	Charles	
Chernor	 Jalloh,	The	 Sierra	 Leone	 Special	 Court	 and	 its	 Legacy.	 The	 Impact	 for	Africa	and	 International	






to	 the	 combat	 strategy	 and	 ideology	 adopted	 by	 the	 RUF	 forces.	 Furthermore,	 the	
effects	of	the	campaign	involving	sexual	violence	on	the	broader	society	were	stressed,	
especially	 the	destructive	 effects	 of	 these	 acts	 on	 the	 victim	herself	 but	 also	 on	her	
immediate	 family,	as	well	as	her	prospects	of	 family	and	community	 life.	The	acts	of	
terrorism	 perpetrated	 through	 acts	 of	 sexual	 violence	 had	 an	 overarching	 goal	 of	
tearing	apart	communities	not	only	by	means	of	inflicting	physical	and	mental	pain	on	




The	 SCSL	 followed	 the	 same	 approach	 in	Taylor,	where	 the	 Trial	 Chamber	 held	 that	
sexual	 violence	 amounted	 to	 acts	 of	 terrorism	 and	 it	 was	 “deliberately	 aimed	 at	
destroying	 the	 traditional	 family	 nucleus,	 thus	 undermining	 the	 cultural	 values	 and	
relationships	which	held	society	together”.224	Furthermore	the	Taylor	judgment	echoes	
the	view	expressed	by	the	Trial	Chamber	 in	RUF	 in	 that	 it	 found	that	sexual	violence	





to	 prosecuting	 gender-based	 crimes	 at	 an	 international	 level,	 which	 advances	 the	
previous	jurisprudence	of	the	ad	hoc	tribunals	on	gender-based	crimes.	By	prosecuting	
sexual	 violence	 as	 acts	 of	 terrorism,	 the	 SCSL	 showed	 that	 these	 violent	 acts	 of	 a	
gender-based	nature	are	not	merely	 ‘spoils	of	 the	war’	or	 incidental	acts,	but	 rather	
constitute	 an	 integral	 part	 of	 a	 strategy	 deliberately	 aimed	 at	 terrorizing	 the	 civilian	
population.	 Furthermore,	when	considering	gender-based	crimes	as	 constitutive	acts	
of	 terrorism,	 the	 court	 focused	 on	 various	 types	 of	 such	 crimes,	 including	 sexual	
slavery	and	forced	marriage	as	well	as	rape,	providing	a	more	profound	understanding	









underscores	 the	 importance	 of	 viewing	 gender	 crimes	 not	 only	 within	 their	 own	
categories	 but	 also	 as	 constituent	 elements	 of	 other	 international	 crimes. 226	
Nonetheless,	the	progressive	approach	demonstrated	by	the	SCSL	in	Taylor	and	in	RUF	
clashes	 with	 the	 view	 of	 the	 Trial	 Chamber	 in	 the	 AFRC	 case,	 which	 rather	 timidly	
observed	that	acts	of	sexual	violence,	for	instance	sexual	slavery,	were	committed	by	




The	 ICC	 Statute	 contains	 extensive	 provisions	 on	 war	 crimes	 committed	 in	
international	 and	 non-international	 armed	 conflicts.	 As	 a	 modern	 treaty,	 the	 ICC	
Statute	 explicitly	 recognises	 crimes	 of	 sexual	 violence	 as	war	 crimes,	which	marks	 a	
change	 from	 the	 language	 originally	 used	 in	 the	 Geneva	 Conventions	 1949	 and	 in	
Additional	 Protocols	 I	 and	 II.	 Whilst	 the	 language	 used	 in	 the	 provisions	 on	 grave	
breaches	of	the	GCs	1949	(Article	8(2(a))	and	on	serious	violations	of	Common	Article	3	
(Article	 8(2)(c))	mirror	 the	 language	 used	 in	 the	 GCs	 1949,	 various	 crimes	 of	 sexual	
violence	 are	 recognized	 as	 violations	 of	 the	 laws	 and	 customs	 applicable	 in	 armed	
conflicts.	Both	Article	8(2)(b)(xxii)	and	Article	8(2)(e)(vi)	incorporate	an	extensive	list	of	
acts	 of	 sexual	 violence,	 including	 rape,	 sexual	 slavery,	 enforced	 prostitution,	 forced	
pregnancy,	as	defined	in	article	7(2)(f)	of	the	ICC	Statute,	enforced	sterilization,	or	any	
other	 form	 of	 sexual	 violence	 also	 constituting	 a	 grave	 breach	 of	 the	 Geneva	
Conventions	 or	 a	 serious	 violation	 of	 article	 3	 common	 to	 the	 four	 Geneva	








to	 Article	 61(7)(a)	 and	 (b)	 of	 the	 Rome	 Statute	 on	 the	 Charges	 of	 the	 Prosecutor	 Against	 Bosco	
Ntaganda),	ICC-01/04-02/06	(9	June	2014)	(Counts	5,	6,	8,	9);	Situation	in	the	Democratic	Republic	of	the	













The	 first	 judgment	 of	 the	 ICC	 in	 Prosecutor	 v.	 Lubanga	 resulted	 in	 a	 rather	
disappointing	 outcome	 in	 relation	 to	 prosecution	 of	 gender-based	 war	 crimes.230	
Despite	 being	 based	 on	 a	 single	 count	 of	 the	war	 crime	 of	 ‘conscripting	 or	 enlisting	




was	 particularly	 astonishing	 given	 the	 overwhelming	 amount	 of	 evidence	 from	
international	 organizations	 and	 NGOs	 working	 in	 the	 DRC,	 which	 confirmed	 the	
common	nature	of	sexual	violence	in	general	as	well	as	directed	against	child	soldiers,	
in	 particular	 girls. 231 	Furthermore,	 during	 the	 trial,	 at	 least	 15	 of	 the	 first	 25	
prosecution	witnesses	(including	two	expert	witnesses)	provided	testimony	of	gender-
based	 crimes,	 in	 particular	 rape	 and	 sexual	 slavery.232	The	 failure	 of	 the	 OTP	 to	







to	 Article	 61(7)(a)	 and	 (b)	 of	 the	 Rome	 Statute	 on	 the	 Charges	 of	 the	 Prosecutor	 Against	 Bosco	




231	Amnesty	 International,	 Democratic	 Republic	 of	 Congo:	 Children	 at	 War	 (8	 September	 2003),	 8-9	












its	 opening	 and	 closing	 submissions,	 it	 has	 not	 requested	 any	 relevant	
amendment	 to	 the	 charges.	 (...)	Not	only	did	 the	prosecution	 fail	 to	 apply	 to	
include	 rape	 and	 sexual	 enslavement	 at	 the	 relevant	 procedural	 stages,	 in	
essence	it	opposed	this	step”.233	
The	 flaw	 in	 investigating	 and	 charging	 acts	of	 sexual	 violence	 committed	against	 girl	
soldiers	 in	Lubanga	 resulted	 in	creating	a	 rather	 limited	picture	of	 the	 real	extent	of	
the	 crime	 of	 the	 recruitment	 and	 use	 of	 child	 soldiers.	 Although	 the	 Trial	 Chamber	
briefly	acknowledged	 the	multiplicity	of	 roles	played	by	child	 soldiers	 in	general,	 the	
gender-based	 aspect	 of	 child	 soldiering	 and	 the	 occurrence	 of	 gender-based	 crimes	





girls	 and	 their	 illegal	 recruitment	 is	 often	 intended	 for	 that	 purpose	 (…).	 It	 is	
discriminatory	 to	 exclude	 sexual	 violence	 which	 shows	 a	 clear	 gender	
differential	impact	from	being	a	bodyguard	or	porter	which	is	mainly	a	task	give	
to	young	boys”.234		
Furthermore,	 the	 judgment	 in	Lubanga	exposed	two	key	critical	 issues	related	to	girl	
soldiers.	 Firstly,	 the	 question	 arises	 as	 to	 what	 it	 means	 to	 ‘actively	 participate	 in	
hostilities’	 for	 purposes	 of	 prosecuting	 acts	 under	 Article	 8(2)(e)(vii).	 The	 phrase	 ‘to	
actively	 participate	 in	 hostilities’	 is	 the	 essential	 element	 of	 the	 crime	 under	 Article	
8(2)(e)(vii)	of	the	ICC	Statute.	It	draws	on	one	of	the	key	principles	of	IHL,	namely	the	
principles	 of	 distinction	 between	 civilians	 who	 are	 afforded	 protection	 and	 persons	
who	 directly	 participate	 in	 hostilities	 who	 no	 longer	 benefit	 from	 the	 same	 level	 of	
protection	 as	 civilians. 235 	Therefore,	 from	 the	 IHL	 perspective,	 the	 narrower	 the	






235	There	 exists	 a	 difference	 between	 the	 legal	 terms	 used	 in	 this	 context.	 The	 IHL	 language	 uses	 the	





that	 can	 be	 afforded	 to	 the	 person	 (i.e.	 they	 cannot	 be	 construed	 as	 legitimate	
targets).	The	meaning	of	 ‘active	participation	 in	hostilities’	 is	crucial	 in	the	context	of	
addressing	harms	suffered	by	girl	soldiers.	For	example,	if	‘direct	participation’	was	to	
be	understood	as	active	participation	in	combat	only,	girl	soldiers	who	did	not	perform	
combat	 roles	 could	 be	 viewed	 as	 civilians.	 However,	 from	 the	 ICL	 perspective,	 the	
meaning	of	‘active	participation	in	hostilities’	has	been	given	a	broader	interpretation	
and	 has	 been	 shown	 to	 encompass	 a	 myriad	 of	 roles,	 by	 far	 not	 limited	 to	 active	
combat	only.	The	ICC	confirmed	that		
“The	 extent	 of	 the	 potential	 danger	 faced	 by	 a	 child	 soldier	 will	 often	 be	
unrelated	 to	 the	 precise	 nature	 of	 the	 role	 he	 or	 she	 is	 given.	 Those	 who	
participate	actively	in	hostilities	include	a	wide	range	of	individuals,	from	those	
on	the	front	line	(who	participate	directly)	through	to	the	boys	or	girls	who	are	
involved	 in	 a	 myriad	 of	 roles	 that	 support	 the	 combatants.	 All	 of	 these	
activities,	which	cover	either	direct	or	indirect	participation,	have	an	underlying	
common	 feature:	 the	 child	 concerned	 is,	 at	 the	very	 least,	 a	potential	 target.	
The	decisive	factor,	therefore,	in	deciding	if	an	“indirect”	role	is	to	be	treated	as	
active	participation	in	hostilities	is	whether	the	support	provided	by	the	child	to	






to	 encompass	 the	 variety	 of	 roles	 performed	 by	 girl	 soldiers	 and	 to	 capture	 the	
complexity	 of	 their	 involvement	 in	 hostilities.	 Sexual	 violence	 committed	 against	 girl	
soldiers	 should	 be	 viewed	 as	 an	 inherent	 element	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘using	 to	
participate	 in	 hostilities’	 as	 in	 fact	many	 girls	 are	 recruited	 to	 armed	 groups	 for	 the	
purpose	of	sexual	exploitation,	amongst	performing	other	roles.	Applying	the	formula	
articulated	 by	 the	 ICC	 Trial	 Chamber	 (child’s	 support	 and	 the	 level	 of	 consequential	
risk),	 sexual	 violence	 should	 fall	 under	 the	 threshold	 of	 ‘active	 participation	 in	
hostilities’,	reflecting	the	constant	risk	of	becoming	victims	to	sexual	violence	to	which	
girls	are	exposed	by	being	associated	with	a	particular	armed	group.	Nonetheless,	such	







hostilities	 through	 their	 experience	 of	 sexual	 exploitation	 as	well	 as	 other	 roles	 and	
therefore	 are	 excluded	 from	 the	 IHL	 protection	 afforded	 to	 civilians.	 This	 has	
implications	 for	 charging	 and	 prosecuting	 perpetrators	 of	 such	 acts,	 as	 illustrated	 in	
Lubanga.		
	
The	decision	 in	Lubanga	 prompts	an	 inquiry	 into	 the	way	 in	which	 (if	 at	 all)	 gender-
based	crimes	committed	against	girl	soldiers	can	be	charged	and	prosecuted	under	the	
ICC	 Statute.	 Whilst	 the	 broad	 understanding	 of	 ‘active	 participation	 in	 hostilities’	
provides	a	true	reflection	of	 the	complexity	of	 the	crime	and	the	variety	of	 the	roles	
involved,	it	also	has	implications	for	the	prosecution	of	crimes	committed	against	girl	
soldiers.	Viewing	girl	 soldiers	as	active	participants	 in	hostilities	means	 that	 they	are	
not	eligible	for	protection	attributed	to	civilians	under	the	rules	of	 IHL.	Based	on	this	
distinction,	 gender-based	 crimes	 committed	 against	 girl	 soldiers	 could	 not	 be	
prosecuted	 as	 war	 crimes	 given	 that	 they	 were	 committed	 by	 the	members	 of	 the	
same	 armed	 group	 that	 the	 girl	 soldiers	 were	 a	 part	 of.	 These	 clashing	 approaches	
between	IHL	and	ICL	put	girl	soldiers	 in	a	catch-22	situation:	the	IHL	approach	would	
result	 in	 maximising	 their	 protection	 as	 civilians,	 whilst	 ignoring	 the	 gender-based	
aspect	 of	 the	 crime	 of	 recruitment	 and	 use	 of	 children	 to	 actively	 participate	 in	
hostilities.	 In	 contrast,	 the	 ICL	 approach	 captures	 the	 true	 extent	 of	 the	 crime,	
including	 its	 gender	 dimension,	 at	 the	 price	 of	 compromising	 prosecution	 of	 these	
gender-based	crimes	as	war	crimes.	 If	 the	overarching	aim	 is	 to	maximise	protection	
given	to	girls	recruited	and	used	by	armed	groups,	then	the	IHL	approach	of	employing	
a	restrictive,	combat-focused	definition	of	 ‘participating	 in	hostilities’	 is	favourable.	 It	
will	 therefore	view	girl	 soldiers	who	are	subjected	 to	sexual	violence	by	members	of	
the	 same	 armed	 group	 as	 civilians	 rather	 than	 as	 persons	 actively	 participating	 in	
hostilities.	 However,	 if	 the	 objective	 is	 to	 demonstrate	 that	 child	 soldiers,	 especially	
girls,	fulfil	a	variety	of	roles	(some	of	which	do	not	involve	active	combat	per	se)	which	
further	 the	 combat	 aims	 of	 the	 armed	 group,	 the	 ICL	 approach	 appears	 to	 be	more	
adequate.	This	approach	treats	girl	soldiers	as	‘actively	participating	in	hostilities’	even	
where	they	do	not	engage	in	direct	combat,	including	being	sexually	exploited	by	the	





participate	 in	 hostilities,	 although	 sexual	 violence	 is	 not	 an	 element	 of	 the	 legal	
definition	of	this	crime	under	the	ICC	Statute.	Nonetheless,	the	ICC’s	interpretation	of	
‘active	participation	 in	hostilities’	 restricts	 the	prosecution	of	 sexual	 violence	against	
girl	 soldiers	 as	 a	 war	 crime	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 i)	 girls	 are	 viewed	 as	 ‘actively	








Statute.237	Such	 categorisation	 of	 charges	 enables	 the	 court,	 at	 least	 in	 theory,	 to	
escape	the	Lubanga	fallacy.	Charging	Ntaganda	with	rape	and	sexual	slavery	as	CAH	(in	
addition	 to	 charging	 these	 acts	 as	 war	 crimes)	 makes	 it	 possible	 to	 prosecute	 the	
accused	for	perpetrating	these	acts	against	child	soldiers	without	obliging	the	court	to	





the	precedential	 judgment	 in	Akayesu,	where	 the	 ICTR	prosecuted	rape	as	genocide,	
the	tribunal	has	successfully	prosecuted	rape	and	sexual	violence	as	constituent	acts	of	
genocide	 in	Gacumbitsi,	Muhimana,	Bagosora	 et	 al.,	Karemera	 et	 al.239	The	 ICC	 also	
has	 jurisdiction	 over	 the	 crime	 of	 genocide,	 but	 no	 person	 has	 been	 convicted	 of	
																																																								
237	Situation	in	the	Democratic	Republic	of	the	Congo:	Prosecutor	v.	Bosco	Ntaganda	(Decision	Pursuant	
to	 Article	 61(7)(a)	 and	 (b)	 of	 the	 Rome	 Statute	 on	 the	 Charges	 of	 the	 Prosecutor	 Against	 Bosco	
Ntaganda)	ICC-01/04-02/06	(9	June	2014).	
238	See	generally:	Usta	Kaitesi,	Genocidal	Gender	and	Sexual	Violence.	The	legacy	of	the	ICTR,	Rwanda’s	
ordinary	courts	and	gacaca	courts	 (Intersentia	2014).	At	 the	 ICTY,	 the	charges	of	genocide	 in	Karadzic	
and	Mladic	are	based	(in	part)	on	acts	of	sexual	violence.	
239	Prosecutor	v.	Gacumbitsi,	Trial	Judgement,	ICTR-2001-64-T,	17	June	2004,	paras.292-293;	Prosecutor	
v.	 Muhimana,	 Judgment	 and	 Sentence,	 ICTR-95-1B,	 28	 April	 2005,	 paras.513	 and	 517;	 Prosecutor	 v.	











satisfy	 the	 dolus	 specialis	 of	 genocide,	 i.e.	 that	 the	 acts	 are	 “committed	 with	 the	
specific	intent	to	destroy,	in	whole	or	in	part,	a	particular	group,	targeted	as	such”.241	
In	approaching	the	 issues	of	dolus	specialis	 in	Akayesu,	 the	Trial	Chamber	recognized	
that	 “intent	 is	 a	 mental	 factor	 which	 is	 difficult,	 even	 impossible,	 to	 determine”.242	
Therefore,	the	Trial	Chamber	held,	it	is		
“possible	 to	 deduce	 the	 genocidal	 intent	 inherent	 in	 a	 particular	 act	 charged	
from	 the	 general	 context	 of	 the	 perpetration	 of	 other	 culpable	 acts	
systematically	 directed	 against	 that	 same	 group	 (…)	 such	 as	 the	 scale	 of	
atrocities	 committed,	 their	 general	 nature,	 in	 a	 region	 or	 a	 country,	 or	
furthermore,	 the	 fact	 of	 deliberately	 and	 systematically	 targeting	 victims	 on	
account	 of	 their	 membership	 of	 a	 particular	 group,	 while	 excluding	 the	
members	of	other	groups”.243		
In	prosecuting	acts	of	genocide	involving	sexual	and	gender-based	violence,	one	of	two	
categories	 is	 relied	 on:	 the	 acts	 are	 either	 interpreted	 as	 ‘causing	 serious	 bodily	 or	
mental	 harm	 to	 the	 members	 of	 the	 group’	 or	 viewed	 as	 ‘amounting	 to	 measures	
intended	to	prevent	births	within	the	group’	such	as	sexual	mutilation,	the	practice	of	
sterilization,	 forced	 birth	 control,	 separation	 of	 the	 sexes	 and	 prohibition	 of	





Situation	 in	 Darfur,	 Sudan:	 Prosecutor	 v.	 Omar	 Hassan	 Ahmad	 Al	 Bashir	 (“Omar	 Al	 Bashir”),	 Second	
Warrant	of	Arrest	for	Omar	Hassan	Ahmed	Al	Bashir,	ICC-02/05-01/09	(12	July	2010)	6-8;	at	p.6,	the	Pre-










rape	 or	 forced	 impregnation	 in	 the	 context	 of	 inter-ethnic	 conflict.246	The	 tribunals	
clarified	that	rape	resulting	in	forced	impregnation	of	a	woman	of	ethnicity	other	than	
the	perpetrator	which	results	in	birth	of	a	child	who	will	not	belong	to	the	same	ethnic	
group	 as	 the	 mother	 constitutes	 a	 measure	 intended	 to	 prevent	 births	 within	 the	




in	Akayesu	was	particularly	 important	given	that	rape	 is	not	 included	as	a	prohibited	
act	in	the	Genocide	Convention	1948,	nor	is	gender	viewed	as	a	protected	group	under	
this	 international	 instrument.	 The	 Trial	 Chamber	 in	 Akayesu	 also	 framed	 sexual	
violence	as	an	 integral	part	of	 the	deliberate	process	of	 targeting	and	destruction	of	
the	 Tutsi	 group	 as	 a	 whole	 rather	 than	 as	 opportunistic	 crimes,	 which	 put	 sexual	
violence	on	a	par	with	other	potentially	genocidal	acts,	such	as	murder.		
	
Importantly,	 the	 jurisprudence	 of	 the	 ICTR	 contributed	 to	 the	 conceptualisation	 of	
sexual	 and	 gender-based	 violence	 as	 a	 mental	 harm	 under	 the	 scope	 of	 statutory	
provisions	on	genocide.	The	decision	in	Akayesu	emphasized	the	destructive	effect	of	
genocidal	 rape	 on	 the	 victim.	 The	 Trial	 Chamber	 noted	 that	 in	 addition	 to	 physical	
harm,	the	experience	of	being	raped	constitutes	a	mental	harm	and	may	 lead	to	the	
victim’s	 refusal	 to	 procreate	 in	 the	 future.249	Furthermore,	 when	 considering	 the	
genocidal	 killing	 of	 over	 7000	 Bosnian	 Muslim	 men	 in	 Srebrenica,	 the	 ICTY	 Trial	
Chamber	 in	 Blagojević	 focused	 not	 only	 on	 the	 lasting	 effects	 of	 the	 psychological	















Chamber	 viewed	 these	 experiences	 as	 satisfying	 the	 requisite	 threshold	 of	 Article	
4(2)(b)	 of	 the	 ICTY	 Statute.	 Interestingly,	 the	 ICTR	 Trial	 Chamber	 in	 Prosecutor	 v.	
Rukundo	 focused	 exclusively	 on	 the	 mental	 harm	 caused	 to	 the	 victim	 of	 sexual	
assault.	 The	 Trial	 Chamber	 held	 that	 the	 sexual	 assault	 perpetrated	 by	 a	 clergy	
member	 on	 a	 young	 girl	 constituted	 genocide	 based	 only	 on	 the	 finding	 that	 she	
suffered	 mental	 harm	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 attack.	 Adopting	 the	 definition	 of	 sexual	
violence	 formulated	 in	 Akayesu,	 the	 Trial	 Chamber	 emphasized	 the	 contextual	
circumstances	in	which	the	sexual	assault	happened.251	Nonetheless,	the	conviction	of	
Rukundo	was	overturned	on	appeal	as	 the	 ICTR	Appeals	Chamber	 reasoned	 that	 the	
finding	regarding	the	requisite	genocidal	 intent	at	 the	time	of	 the	sexual	assault	was	
not	 supported	 by	 the	 evidence. 252 	However,	 the	 Appeals	 Chamber	 did	 not	 find	
erroneous	the	earlier	finding	of	sexual	assault	as	amounting	to	a	serious	mental	harm.	
Judge	 Pocar	 (dissenting)	 criticised	 the	 approach	 of	 the	 majority	 in	 Rukundo	 for	
unreasonably	viewing	the	single	act	of	sexual	assault	as	“‘qualitatively’	different	from	
other	 killings	 or	 serious	 bodily	 injury	 for	 which	 the	 accused	 has	 been	 held	
responsible”.253		
Judge	 Pocar’s	 point	 captures	 the	 problematic	 aspect	 of	 prosecuting	 acts	 of	 sexual	
violence	as	genocide,	namely	the	often	present	judicial	tendency	to	view	these	crimes	
as	 falling	 outside	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 particular	 category	 of	 prosecuted	 international	
crime	 (here:	 genocide).	 Despite	 the	 evident	 advances	 in	 international	 criminal	
																																																																																																																																																																		
from	 their	 loved	 and	 forcibly	 transferred,	 and	 the	 terrible	 consequences	 that	 this	 had	 on	 their	 life,	
reaches	the	threshold	of	serious	mental	harm	under	Article	4(2)(b)	of	the	Statute”.	
251	The	Prosecutor	v.	Rukundo,	ICTR-01-70,	Judgment,	27	February	2009,	para.388:		
“The	Chamber	acknowledges	 that	 it	has	not	had	 the	benefit	of	 any	direct	evidence	on	Witness	CCH’s	
mental	 state,	 following	 the	 sexual	 assault,	 apart	 from	 her	 testimony	 that	 she	 could	 not	 tell	 anyone	
about	 the	 incident.	 The	 Chamber,	 however,	 recalls	 that	 it	 may	 draw	 inferences	 from	 the	 evidence	
presented.	 The	 Chamber	 finds	 it	 necessary	 to	 look	 beyond	 the	 sexual	 act	 in	 question	 and	 finds	 it	
particularly	important	to	consider	the	highly	charged,	oppressive	and	other	circumstances	surrounding	















jurisprudence	 towards	 recognition	 of	 genocidal	 acts	 of	 sexual	 violence,	 such	 an	
approach	(if	maintained)	may	lead	to	taking	a	step	back	from	the	progressive	character	





International	 criminal	 prosecutions	 of	 gender-based	 crimes	 have	 come	 a	 long	 way	
since	 international	 criminal	 trials	at	 IMTN	and	 IMTFE.	 In	 less	 than	20	years	 since	 the	
landmark	 decisions	 in	 Tadić,	 Akayesu,	 Furundžija	 and	 Kunarac,	 the	 gender	 crimes	
jurisprudence	 of	 the	 ad	 hoc	 tribunals	 and	 the	 SCSL	 has	 developed	 at	 a	 fast	 pace,	
developing	 the	normative	scope	of	 the	 ICL	 framework	and	establishing	definitions	of	
international	crimes	(e.g.	rape	in	Akayesu).			
	
The	 decisions	 of	 international	 criminal	 courts	 and	 tribunals	 also	 advanced	 the	
positioning	of	gender-based	crimes	within	 the	 ICL	 framework	and	 in	 the	discipline	of	
international	 law	in	general.	The	decisions	set	legal	 landmarks	by	prosecuting	various	










the	SCSL,	 the	 ICC	 is	 the	only	permanent	 international	 criminal	 court	with	 jurisdiction	
over	international	gender-based	crimes.	The	substantive	provisions	of	the	ICC	Statute	





crimes	 and	 CAH)	 and	 gender-based	 persecution	 as	 a	 CAH.	 Despite	 that,	 the	 ICC	
Prosecutor	 has	 charged	 but	 not	 yet	 successfully	 prosecuted	 gender-based	 crimes.	




























tribunals	 are	 a	 significant	 step	 in	 pursuing	 international	 gender	 justice	 for	 conflict-
related	 gender-based	 crimes.	 As	 discussed	 in	 chapter	 4,	 gender-based	 crimes	 have	
been	successfully	prosecuted	at	 the	 international	 level	as	war	crimes,	 crimes	against	
humanity	and	genocide.	In	this	respect,	prosecutions	of	gender-based	crimes	by	ad	hoc	
tribunals	 and	 the	 SCSL	 were	 instrumental	 in	 marking	 a	 significant	 shift	 from	 the	
Nuremberg	 legacy,	where	 gender-based	 crimes	 committed	during	 the	 Second	World	
War	were	effectively	 left	unaccounted	for.	 In	contrast,	 the	modern	framework	of	 ICL	
takes	 account	 of	 gender-based	 crimes,	 which	 is	 primarily	 demonstrated	 in	 the	
provisions	of	the	ICC	Statute	listing	a	broad	array	of	gender-based	crimes	as	well	as	a	
number	of	successful	international	prosecutions	of	such	crimes.1	However,	the	analysis	
of	 international	 case-law	 concerning	 gender-based	 crimes	 reveals	 some	 of	 the	
obstacles	 and	 challenges	 embedded	 in	 the	 international	 criminal	 process	 of	 seeking	
accountability	 for	 conflict-related	 gender-based	 crimes	 within	 the	 ICL	 framework.	
These	 challenges	 are	 primarily	 related	 to	 the	 procedural	 aspects	 of	 investigating,	
indicting	 and	 prosecuting	 persons	 responsible	 for	 committing	 gender-based	 crimes.	
The	weaknesses	exposed	in	relation	to	the	investigation	and	documentation	of	gender-
based	 crimes	 have	 proven	 to	 have	 an	 instrumental	 effect	 on	 the	 later	 stages	 of	 the	
process,	 including	 confirmation	 of	 charges,	 prosecution	 at	 the	 trial	 stage	 and	
sentencing.	 They	 have	 also	 had	 a	 significant	 impact	 on	 the	 decisions	 on	 award	 of	













prosecution	 of	 conflict-related	 gender-based	 crimes	 by	 the	 international	 courts	 and	
tribunals.	 Drawing	 on	 the	 experience	 of	 prosecuting	 gender-based	 crimes	 by	 the	 ad	
hoc	tribunals	and	the	SCSL,	the	discussion	will	focus	predominantly	on	the	ICC	and	the	
ways	in	which	the	ICC	can	tackle	the	enduring	challenges	embedded	in	the	process	of	
prosecuting	 gender-based	 crimes.	 The	 discussion	 presented	 in	 this	 chapter	 also	
engages	with	 two	main	modes	 of	 prosecuting,	 and	 establishing	 liability	 for,	 gender-
based	crimes,	namely	cumulative	charging	and	joint	criminal	enterprise	 liability	(JCE).	





The	 early	 prosecutions	 of	 gender-based	 crimes	 before	 the	 ad	 hoc	 tribunals	 met	
obstacles	related	both	to	substantive	and	procedural	law.	As	the	tribunals	were	setting	
precedent	 in	 the	 prosecution	 of	 sexual	 and	 gender-based	 violence,	 they	were	 faced	
with	the	challenge	of	defining	some	of	the	crimes	for	the	first	time	in	international	law.	
Unlike	the	ICC	Statute	and	the	ICC	Elements	of	Crimes,	the	statutes	of	the	ICTY	and	the	
ICTR	 do	 not	 contain	 statutory	 definitions	 of	 gender-based	 crimes.	 Furthermore,	
although	the	ICTY	and	the	ICTR	prosecuted	a	number	of	acts	of	sexual	violence,	their	
statutes	listed	expressly	only	rape	as	a	crime	against	humanity	and,	additionally,	in	the	
case	 of	 the	 ICTR,	 enforced	 prostitution	 as	 a	 violation	 of	 Common	 Article	 3	 to	 the	











criminal	 court	 and	 is	 arguably	 much	 better	 equipped	 to	 prosecute	 gender-based	
crimes	 than	 the	 ad	 hoc	 tribunals.	 At	 the	 very	 least,	 the	 ICC	 Statute	 gives	 the	 ICC	
Prosecutor	a	solid	basis	for	charging	and	prosecuting	a	variety	of	gender-based	crimes.	
Although	the	ICC	is	not	bound	by	the	precedents	set	by	other	international	courts	and	
tribunals,	 it	 can	 nonetheless	 draw	 on	 the	 experience	 of	 prosecuting	 gender-based	
crimes	by	the	ICTY,	the	ICTR	and	the	SCSL.	Furthermore,	the	ICC	can	benefit	from	the	
changes	 in	 political	 attitudes	 towards	 sexual	 and	 gender-based	 violence	 in	 conflict.	
Over	 the	 past	 two	 decades,	 the	 topic	 of	 conflict-related	 sexual	 violence	 has	 gained	
prominence	not	only	in	international	law	but	also	in	international	politics.		
	
The	 positioning	 of	 sexual	 and	 gender-based	 crimes	 within	 the	 international	 context	
shifted	from	being	a	discrete,	rarely	mentioned	topic	to	the	forefront	of	international	
debates	 and	 political	 involvement	 in	 addressing	 this	 problem.	 For	 instance,	 in	 May	
2012	 the	 then	UK	Foreign	Secretary,	William	Hague,	 launched	 the	Preventing	Sexual	
Violence	 in	 Conflict	 Initiative	 (PSVI),	 which	 aimed	 at	 addressing	 the	 problem	 of	
impunity	for	crimes	of	sexual	violence	committed	in	armed	conflict.4	The	efforts	of	the	
PSVI	 campaign	 resulted	 in	 the	 adoption	 of	 the	 Declaration	 of	 Commitment	 to	 End	
Sexual	 Violence	 in	 Conflict	 during	 the	 G8	 Foreign	 Ministers	 Meeting,	 which	 was	
endorsed	by	over	 two	 thirds	of	 the	United	Nations	member	 states.5	Furthermore,	 in	
June	2014,	 the	UK	hosted	a	Global	Summit	 to	End	Sexual	Violence	 in	Conflict,	which	
was	the	largest	meeting	of	state	and	non-state	delegates	thus	far	addressing	the	topic	
of	 fighting	 conflict-related	 sexual	 violence.6	These	unprecedented	events	 go	 to	 show	
that	 conflict-related	 sexual	 violence	 is	 no	 longer	 an	 isolated	 issue,	 but	 one	 that	 is	
becoming	 incorporated	 into	 international	 and	 foreign	 policy	 agendas.	 Whilst	 the	
																																																								
4	Foreign	and	Commonwealth	Office,	Preventing	Sexual	Violence	in	Conflict	Initiative,	











increased	 attention	 to	 this	 problem	does	not	 guarantee	 the	 immediate	 reduction	of	
acts	 of	 sexual	 violence	 committed	 in	 modern	 conflicts	 nor	 an	 increase	 in	 their	
prosecutions,	 it	may	nonetheless	 be	 hoped	 that	 it	may	have	 a	 positive	 influence	on	
domestic	laws	as	well	as	strengthen	states’	cooperation	with	the	ICC.		
	
Despite	 the	 noticeable	 changes	 in	 political	 attitudes	 towards	 conflict-related	 sexual	
violence	 and	 the	 advances	 in	 ICL	 related	 to	 seeking	 accountability	 for	 gender-based	
crimes,	 obstacles	 to	 prosecuting	 gender-based	 crimes	 remain.	 Zawati	 perceives	 the	
“abstractness	and	lack	of	accurate	description	of	gender-based	crimes	in	the	statutory	
laws	 of	 the	 international	 criminal	 tribunals	 and	 courts”	 as	 a	 major	 obstacle	 to	 the	
prosecution	of	gender-based	crimes	at	an	 international	 level	and	suggests	that	“rape	
and	 other	 forms	 of	 sexual	 violence	 should	 be	 prosecuted	 separately	 as	 crimes	 in	
themselves,	 not	 as	 a	 subsection	 of	war	 crimes	 or	 crimes	 against	 humanity”.7	In	 this	
somewhat	problematic	premise,	Zawati	appears	to	ignore	the	practical	and	procedural	
aspects	 of	 such	 a	 proposal	 or	 the	 feasibility	 of	 introducing	 a	 separate	 category	 of	
international	crimes	within	international	criminal	law,	namely	an	individual	category	of	




suggests,	 forging	 a	 new	 treaty	 under	 Chapter	 VII	 of	 the	 UN	 Charter,	 would	make	 a	
substantive	 difference	 to	 the	 way	 in	 which	 such	 crimes	 are	 currently	 addressed	 by	
international	 criminal	 courts	 and	 tribunals.	 Undoubtedly,	 a	 new	 treaty	 addressing	
gender-based	crimes	only	would	be	an	interesting	addition	to	the	current	international	
legal	 landscape.	 But	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 it	 remains	 unclear	 as	 to	 which	 body	 would	
enforce	provisions	of	such	a	treaty	and	how,	if	at	all,	would	they	relate	to	the	existing	
provisions	on	gender-based	crimes	in	the	ICC	Statute.	Finally,	what	measures	would	be	
introduced	 in	 such	 a	 treaty	 to	 overcome	 the	 procedural	 obstacles	 associated	 with	
international	criminal	trials?		
																																																								






crimes	 lies	not	 in	the	alleged	statutory	or	definitional	shortcomings	(which	to	a	 large	
extent	 have	 been	 remedied	 by	 the	 ICC	 Statute	 and	 relevant	 ICL	 jurisprudence),	 but	
rather	 in	 the	procedural	aspect	of	 this	process.8	These	particular	enduring	difficulties	
have	been	highlighted	by	a	number	of	 commentators,	 but	 also	 identified	by	 the	 ICC	




standard	of	 fairness	and	due	process”.10	In	an	attempt	 to	close	 the	 impunity	gap	 for	
gender-based	 crimes	 within	 the	 ICL	 framework,	 it	 is	 essential	 that	 cases	 involving	
gender-based	 crimes	 meet	 this	 threshold.	 Strengthening	 of	 the	 procedural	 law	 in	
relation	to	investigation	and	prosecution	of	gender-based	crimes	is	therefore	crucial	in	
order	 to	 improve	 the	 process	 of	 bringing	 justice	 to	 victims	 of	 gender-based	 crimes	





it	 could	 not	 be	 proven	 that	 the	 crimes	 had	 happened	 in	 the	 first	 place,	 or	 that	 the	 accused	 was	
involved”.	 Kai	 Ambos,	 ‘Thematic	 Investigations	 and	 Prosecution	 of	 International	 Sex	 Crimes:	 Some	
Critical	Comments	from	a	Theoretical	and	Comparative	Perspective’	in	Morten	Bergsmo	(ed),	Thematic	
Prosecution	 of	 International	 Sex	 Crimes	 (Torkel	 Opsahl	 Academic	 EPublisher	 2012)	 292;	 ICTR,	 ‘Best	
Practices	 Manual	 for	 the	 Investigation	 and	 Prosecution	 of	 Sexual	 Violence	 Crimes	 in	 Post-Conflict	
Regions’	 (30	 January	 2014)	 <http://unictr.unmict.org/en/documents/best-practices-manuals-and-
conference-reports>	accessed	17	March	2015,	sections	III	and	IV.		
9	The	 procedural	 and	 evidentiary	 difficulties	 associated	 with	 prosecution	 of	 gender-based	 crimes	 are	
explored	in	sections	3	and	4	of	this	chapter.		





Crimes	 (Torkel	 Opsahl	 Academic	 EPublisher	 2012);	 Niamh	 Hayes,	 ‘Sisyphus	Wept:	 Prosecuting	 Sexual	
Violence	 at	 the	 International	 Criminal	 Court’	 in:	 William	 Schabas,	 Yvonne	 McDermott,	 Niamh	 Hayes	
(eds),	 The	 Ashgate	 Companion	 to	 International	 Criminal	 Law:	 Critical	 Perspectives	 (Ashgate	 2013);	
Susana	 SáCouto,	 Katherine	 Cleary,	 “The	 importance	 of	 effective	 investigation	 of	 sexual	 and	 gender-









To	 that	 end,	 this	 chapter	will	 focus	 on	 the	 procedural	 aspects	 of	 prosecuting	 sexual	
and	gender-based	crimes	at	the	ICC.	The	analysis	will	draw	on	the	experience	of	the	ad	
hoc	 international	 criminal	 tribunals	 and	 the	 SCSL	 in	 this	 field	 as	 well	 as	 the	 ICC’s	
practice	 to	 date	 in	 relation	 to	 prosecuting	 sexual	 and	 gender-based	 crimes.	 The	
challenges	 associated	 with	 this	 process	 form	 the	 starting	 point	 for	 the	 discussion,	
which	also	aims	to	provide	proposals	for	improvement	of	the	procedures	employed	by	
the	 ICC	 in	 relation	 to	 investigation,	 charging	 and	 prosecution	 of	 sexual	 and	 gender-
based	 crimes.	 Nonetheless,	 it	 must	 be	 recognized	 that	 prosecution	 of	 sexual	 and	
gender-based	crimes	at	 international	 criminal	 courts	and	 tribunals	provides	only	one	





Responsibility	 for	 criminal	 investigation	 lies	 with	 the	 Prosecutor	 at	 the	 ad	 hoc	
tribunals,	 the	 SCSL,	 and	 the	 ICC.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 the	 ICC,	 the	 duty	 of	 carrying	 out	 an	
effective	 investigation	 and	 prosecution	 of	 crimes	 is	 placed	 upon	 the	 Prosecutor.11	
Furthermore,	 Regulation	 34	 of	 the	 Regulations	 of	 the	 ICC	 Office	 of	 the	 Prosecutor	
states	that	when	developing	a	case	hypothesis,	the	joint	investigation	team	should	aim	
to	 select	 incidents	 which	 reflect	 the	 most	 serious	 crimes	 and	 the	 main	 types	 of	
victimization,	 including	 sexual	 and	 gender-based	 violence. 12 	The	 key	 aim	 of	 the	
investigation	 is	 to	 collect	 evidence	 regarding	 particular	 international	 crimes	 which	
arise	 in	 relation	 to	 a	 specific	 situation	 or	 specific	 accused	 and	 to	 interpret	 it.13	The	
collected	evidence	is	crucial	in	proving	a	case	against	the	defendant	and	in	securing	a	
																																																								















evidence	needs	 to	be	 interpreted	and	evaluated	against	 the	elements	of	a	particular	
offence	(e.g.	rape)	as	well	as	against	the	common	elements	required	for	the	particular	
category	 of	 international	 crime	 (e.g.	 CAH,	 war	 crime	 or	 genocide).	 As	 such,	 the	
investigation	phase	 is	 of	 paramount	 importance	 in	 ensuring	 that	 the	Prosecutor	 can	




The	 investigation	 of	 international	 crimes	 comes	with	 a	 plethora	 of	 challenges	which	
equally	apply	to	investigations	of	any	domestic	crimes,	whether	of	sexual	and	gender-
based	 nature	 or	 not.	 Firstly,	 there	 are	 significant	 differences	 between	 international	
criminal	investigations	and	investigations	carried	out	in	a	domestic	setting.	These	two	
types	 of	 investigations	 differ	 in	 their	 focus,	 subject	 matter,	 and	 share	 considerably	
different	experiences	in	relation	to	the	accessibility	of	information.		
	
International	 investigations	 are	 strongly	 focused	 on	 establishing	 the	 socio-political	
context	in	which	particular	criminal	acts	were	committed.	The	contextual	perspective	
is	 crucial	 in	 order	 to	 adequately	 categorize	 a	 specific	 criminal	 act	 within	 the	 ICL	
framework.	For	instance,	depending	on	the	circumstances	in	which	it	was	committed,	
rape	can	be	charged	and	prosecuted	as	a	war	crime	and/or	a	crime	against	humanity	
and/or	 genocide.	 Furthermore,	 the	 scale	 on	 which	 international	 crimes	 have	 been	
committed	means	that	the	investigators	are	likely	to	face	a	multiplicity	of	perpetrators,	
victims	and	witnesses,	whose	numbers	are	 incomparably	higher	than	those	arising	 in	
domestic	 investigations.	 As	 it	 is	 practically	 impossible	 to	 ascertain	 all	 of	 the	
perpetrators,	victims	and	witnesses,	the	investigations	often	need	to	be	focused	either	
according	 to	 a	 geographic	 region	 where	 crimes	 were	 allegedly	 committed	 (e.g.	
genocidal	campaign	in	the	Butare	province	in	Rwanda),	the	group	of	defendants	or	the	






The	 subject	matter	 of	 the	 international	 investigation	 also	 stands	 in	 contrast	with	 its	
domestic	 counterpart.	 Whilst	 domestic	 investigators	 may	 undoubtedly	 encounter	
examples	 of	 gruesome	 and	 violent	 crimes,	 including	 instances	 of	 violent	 organized	
crime,	 the	 subject	 matter	 of	 international	 crimes	 and	 the	 factual	 circumstances	 in	
which	 they	 have	 been	 committed	 vary	 from	 those	 attributable	 to	 domestic	 crimes.	
International	crimes	are	usually	committed	in	the	context	of	mass	atrocities	motivated	
by	 political	 reasons.	 They	 are	 usually	 committed	 against	 a	 particular	 population	 or	
group	that	is	targeted	and	these	acts	may	be	perpetrated	by	either	State	or	non-state	
actors.	 In	 fact,	 the	 involvement	 of	 State	 agents	 in	 the	 commission	 of	 international	
crimes	 may	 significantly	 limit	 the	 political	 will	 to	 investigate	 and	 prosecute	 such	
crimes,	 making	 the	 investigation	 by	 the	 international	 team	 additionally	 difficult.	
Importantly,	the	absence	of	an	international	police	force	and	the	limited	resources	of	
the	 international	prosecutors	mean	 that	 the	Prosecutor’s	progress	 in	 investigation	 is	
largely	dependant	upon	the	cooperation	and	financial	support	from	States	and	other	
entities,	such	as	international	organizations	and	NGOs.15	Whilst	domestic	prosecutions	




criminal	 law	 take	 place	 shortly	 after	 an	 armed	 conflict	 or	 situation	 of	 alleged	mass	
violation	of	human	rights	came	to	an	end.	The	post-conflict	context	brings	out	some	of	
the	 practical	 difficulties	 in	 carrying	 out	 such	 investigations,	 such	 as	 the	 security	








15	On	 the	 role	 of	 human	 rights	 professionals	 in	 investigation:	 Morten	 Bergsmo,	 William	 H.	 Wiley,	
“Human	 Rights	 Professionals	 and	 the	 Criminal	 Investigation	 and	 Prosecution	 of	 Core	 International	











violence	 is	underreported,	especially	when	 it	happens	 in	armed	conflict.17	Moreover,	
conflict-related	gender-based	crimes	are	often	committed	together	with	other	crimes,	
such	as	murder.	The	killing	of	the	victim	of	sexual	violence	automatically	eliminates	the	







investigation	 into	 international	 criminal	 law	 violations”.19	This	 approach,	 which	 has	









17	UNSC,	 Conflict-related	 sexual	 violence.	 Report	 of	 the	 Secretary-General,	 UN	 Doc.	 S/2015/203,	 23	
March	2015,	para.5,	noting	that	“sexual	violence	during	and	in	the	wake	of	armed	conflict	continues	to	
be	 dramatically	 underreported	 because	 of	 the	 risks,	 threats	 and	 trauma	 faced	 by	 those	 who	 come	
forward”.				
18	Kai	 Ambos,	 ‘Thematic	 Investigations	 and	 Prosecution	 of	 International	 Sex	 Crimes:	 Some	 Critical	
Comments	 from	 a	 Theoretical	 and	 Comparative	 Perspective’	 in:	 Morten	 Bergsmo	 (ed),	 Thematic	
Prosecution	of	International	Sex	Crimes	(Torkel	Opsahl	Academic	EPublisher	2012)	297.	
19	Maxine	 Marcus,	 ‘Investigation	 of	 crimes	 of	 sexual	 and	 gender-based	 violence	 under	 international	





It	 is	 therefore	 essential	 that	 investigative	 teams	 are	 adequately	 trained	 to	 approach	
and	 interview	 the	 victims	 of	 gender-based	 crimes	 and	 that	 evidence	 is	 competently	
collected	and	documented.	The	prosecutorial	strategy	also	has	a	great	 impact	on	the	
way	 in	 which	 investigations	 into	 gender-based	 crimes	 are	 conducted.	 As	 argued	 by	
Nowrojee,	“different	prosecution	strategies	will	require	different	evidentiary	standards	
and	 investigative	 approaches.	Without	 a	 unified	 prosecution	 strategy	 on	 the	 sexual	
violence	 charges,	 different	 teams	 will	 pursue	 different,	 and	 perhaps	 even	
contradictory,	 approaches”.20	Therefore,	 it	 vital	 that	 the	 prosecutorial	 strategy	 takes	
account	 of	 gender-based	 crimes	 from	 the	 very	 outset,	 even	 before	 any	 decision	 is	
made	to	initiate	investigation	in	any	country.21	The	question	of	the	ability	of	a	state	to	
prosecute	conflict-related	sexual	and	gender-based	violence	should	form	a	part	of	the	
initial	 inquiry	 carried	 out	 by	 the	 Prosecution	 into	 the	 particular	 situation	 (i.e.	 at	 the	
‘situation	 stage’),	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 obligation	 placed	 on	 the	 ICC	 Prosecutor	
under	Article	54(1)(b)	of	the	ICC	Statute.	The	initial	inquiry	ought	to	examine	whether	
national	 institutions	are	capable	of	 carrying	out	 the	 investigation	and	prosecution	of	
gender-based	 crimes	 and,	 if	 so,	whether	 they	 actually	 carry	 out	 proceedings	 against	





other	 crimes	 such	 as	 murder	 or	 torture,	 or	 even	 the	 lack	 of	 political	 will	 to	 do	 so.	







22	According	to	the	Amnesty	 International	 report	 from	2008,	“(…)	despite	extensive	documentation	by	
women’s	 groups,	 non-governmental	 organisations	 and	 NATO	 of	 rape	 and	 other	 crimes	 of	 sexual	
violence	committed	on	a	 large	scale	during	the	conflict	 in	Kosovo	(…)	 it	appears	that	there	had,	up	to	
April	 2007	been	only	 one	 indictment	 including	 a	 charge	 of	 rape	or	 sexual	 violence	 as	 a	war	 crime	or	











The	 commitment	 to	 the	 incorporation	 of	 a	 gender	 perspective	 into	 all	 stages	 of	
prosecuting	 gender-based	 crimes,	 including	 the	 early	 phase,	 is	 also	 reflected	 in	 the	
2014	ICC	Policy	Paper	on	Sexual	and	Gender-Based	Crimes,	in	which	the	ICC	Prosecutor	
commits	 to	examining	 the	existence	of	genuine	and	relevant	national	proceedings	 in	
relation	 to	 sexual	 and	 gender-based	 crimes	 and	 assessing	 whether	 they	 relate	 to	
potential	 cases	 being	 examined	 by	 the	 OTP.24	The	 Policy	 Paper	 also	 recognizes	 the	
existence	 of	 possible	 barriers	 to	 genuine	 criminal	 proceedings,	 which	 will	 be	
considered	 by	 the	 OTP	 during	 the	 complementarity	 assessment,	 including	
“discriminatory	 attitudes	 and	 gender	 stereotypes	 in	 substantive	 law,	 and/or	





The	 collection	 of	 evidence	 related	 to	 gender-based	 crimes	may	 be	 impeded	 by	 the	
reluctance	 of	 some	 victims	 to	 give	 an	 account	 of	 acts	 of	 sexual	 and	 gender-based	
violence	 committed	 against	 them. 26 	This	 may	 be	 caused	 by	 a	 variety	 of	 factors	
																																																								
23	Susana	SáCouto,	Katherine	Cleary,	 “The	 importance	of	effective	 investigation	of	 sexual	 and	gender-
based	 crimes	 at	 the	 International	 Criminal	 Court”	 (2009)	 17	 American	 University	 Journal	 of	 Gender,	
Social	Policy	and	Law	337,	344-345.	
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for	 their	 physical	 safety	 and	 security.	 Various	 societies,	 cultures	 and	 religions	 attach	
stigma	 to	 the	 victims	 of	 sexual	 and	 gender-based	 violence,	 which	 may	 result	 in	
exclusion	of	such	persons	from	their	immediate	family	and	broader	community,	having	
a	 profound	 impact	 on	 the	 victim’s	 future	 life.27	As	 described	 by	 the	 ICTY,	 witnesses	
“face	 various	 social,	 psychological	 and	 sometimes	 even	 physical	 impediments	 to	
coming	forward	and	testifying.	Some	of	the	potential	witnesses	feel	that	their	security	
may	be	 jeopardised	should	 they	come	 to	 testify.	 In	addition,	 identifying	oneself	as	a	
victim	 of	 sexual	 violence	 may	 lead	 to	 stigmatisation	 within	 one’s	 society,	 making	
return	 to	normal	 life	even	more	difficult”.28	Whilst	 the	apprehension	associated	with	
testifying	applies	 to	all	victims	of	crime,	 testifying	about	gender-based	crimes	carries	
particular	 challenges	not	only	due	 to	 the	 social	 stigma	attached	 to	 these	 crimes	but	
also	 because	 of	 the	 possible	 risk	 of	 revictimisation	 during	 testimony.	 It	 is	 therefore	
crucial	 to	 consistently	 ensure	 the	 physical	 and	 psychological	 safety	 and	 security	 of	
victims	and	witnesses	who	provide	evidence	of	gender-based	crimes	 in	 international	
trials.	 However,	 where	 witnesses	 are	 based	 in	 their	 own	 countries,	 this	 task	 is	
particularly	 challenging.	 The	 ICC	 Statute	 contains	 procedural	 measures	 aimed	 at	
protecting	 victims	 and	 witnesses	 which	 may	 include	 a	 hearing	 in	 closed	 session	 or	
proceedings	 in	 camera.	 Under	 Article	 68(1),	 the	 Court	 “shall	 take	 appropriate	
measures	 to	 protect	 the	 safety,	 physical	 and	 psychological	 well-being,	 dignity	 and	
privacy	 of	 victims	 and	 witnesses”,	 especially	 in	 cases	 involving	 sexual	 and	 gender-
based	violence.29	Under	ICC	RPE,	the	Court	may	also	order	protective	measures	(Rule	
87)	 and/or	 special	measures	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 traumatised	 victim	 or	witness	 or	 the	
victim	of	sexual	violence	(Rule	88).	The	ICC	Victims	and	Witnesses	Unit	may	also	advise	
the	 Prosecutor	 and	 the	 Court	 on	 appropriate	 protective	 measures,	 security	
arrangements,	 counselling	 and	 assistance.30	Whilst	 the	 decisions	 and	 practice	 of	 the	
																																																								



















of	 the	 interviewer.32 	Nowrojee	 stresses	 the	 need	 to	 incorporate	 gender-sensitive	
interviewing	 methodology	 when	 collecting	 evidence	 about	 gender-based	 crimes.	
Regarding	 the	 ICTR,	 Nowrojee	 points	 out	 major	 weaknesses	 in	 the	 investigation	
process,	 such	 as	 investigators’	 lack	 of	 skills	 on	 how	 to	 effectively	 pursue	 evidence	




In	 culturally	 sensitive	 environments,	 the	 need	 for	 an	 investigator’s	 ‘informed	
preparation’	is	of	paramount	importance.34	The	investigator’s	knowledge	of	the	nature	
of	the	conflict	as	well	as	understanding	of	the	culture,	customs	and	traditions	within	a	




not	 be	 an	 evasive	 technique	 but	 rather	 a	 show	 of	 respect,	 similarly	 to	 the	 greeting	
involving	 shaking	 hands	 being	 possibly	 perceived	 in	 some	 contexts	 as	 highly	
inappropriate.	 The	 understanding	 of	 customary	 views	 on	 sexuality	 as	 well	 as	
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relevant	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 language	 used	 by	 the	 victim	 to	 describe	 her	 experiences.	
Some	 victims	 may	 not	 expressly	 refer	 to	 acts	 of	 sexual	 and	 gender-based	 violence	
using	words	such	as	‘rape’	or	‘sexual	assault’.	Instead,	they	may	speak	of	experiencing	
these	acts	of	violence	using	euphemistic	phrases	(“he	lay	with	me”	or	“he	disrespected	
me”)	or	may	choose	to	speak	of	 these	events	 in	 the	 third	person,	avoiding	revealing	
their	personal	victimhood.36	Additionally,	an	 investigator	needs	to	understand,	Hayes	
notes,	“that	not	everything	they	or	the	interviewee	say	will	have	direct	word-for-word	




acts	 of	 sexual	 violence	 not	 directly,	 but	 in	 the	 context	 of	 other	 crimes	 being	
committed.	 In	 the	Akayesu	 trial	at	 the	 ICTR,	 the	witness	who	was	called	to	 testify	at	
the	 early	 stage	 of	 the	 trial	 about	 the	 murder	 of	 most	 members	 of	 her	 family	
spontaneously	 mentioned	 that	 her	 six	 year	 old	 daughter	 had	 been	 raped.38	When	
further	questioned	by	 the	members	of	 the	 ICTR,	 including	 Judge	Navanethem	Pillay,	
Witness	J	testified	that	other	girls	had	been	raped	in	Akayesu’s	bureau	communal.	The	
example	 of	 the	 spontaneous	 testimony	 of	 Witness	 J	 in	 Akayesu	 revealed	 that	 the	
witness	had	not	been	questioned	about	occurrences	of	sexual	violence	crimes	 in	 the	
Taba	commune	during	her	interviews.	It	also	stresses	the	need	to	pay	close	attention	
to	 the	 victim’s	 testimony	 at	 the	 interview	 stage,	 especially	 in	 relation	 to	 identifying	
possible	information	about	gender-based	crimes.			
																																																								
36	Ibid.,	 422;	 ICTR,	 ‘Best	 Practices	 Manual	 for	 the	 Investigation	 and	 Prosecution	 of	 Sexual	 Violence	
Crimes	in	Post-Conflict	Regions’,	supra	8,	para.173.		





and	glossaries	 in	order	 to	 familiarise	 themselves	with	 the	appropriate	and	accurate	 terms	 to	describe	
acts	 of	 sexual	 violence	 and	 parts	 of	 the	 body”.	 ICC-OTP,	 Policy	 Paper	 on	 Sexual	 and	 Gender-Based	







Due	 to	 the	 nature	 of	 gender-based	 crimes,	 the	 victims	may	hesitate	 to	 speak	 about	
their	experiences	with	a	male	investigator.	However,	this	is	not	to	say	that	men	should	
not	be	involved	in	the	investigation	of	gender-based	crimes.	Rather,	the	focus	ought	to	
be	 placed	 on	 the	 consistent	 and	 high	 standard	 of	 expertise	 in	 investigating	 gender-
based	crimes,	regardless	of	the	gender	of	the	team	member.	As	Sellers	rightly	notes,	
“investigations	 could	 field	 all	 male	 team	members,	 or	 all	 female	 team	members	 or	
mixed-gendered	 teams	 depending	 on	 what	 configuration	 would	 be	 more	 likely	 to	





to	 adapt	 to	 the	 local	 customary	 greetings,	 learning	 a	 few	 words	 of	 greeting	 in	 the	
language	 of	 the	 witness	 and	 therefore	 showing	 respect	 to	 the	 witness,	 their	




The	 decision	 to	 bring	 charges	 before	 an	 international	 court	 or	 tribunal	 lies	 at	 the	
discretion	of	the	Prosecutor.	It	 is	up	to	the	Prosecutor	to	determine	and	characterize	
the	charges	and	to	 include	the	relevant	ones	 in	the	 indictment.42	Over	the	years,	the	
Prosecutors	of	international	criminal	courts	and	tribunals	have	been	criticised	for	their	
selectiveness	and,	at	times,	a	demonstrable	lack	of	political	will	 in	charging	crimes	of	
sexual	 and	 gender-based	 violence.	 Despite	 indisputable	 advances	 made	 by	 the	
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cent	 of	 indictments	 in	 1999–2000	 to	 35	 per	 cent	 in	 2001–02,	 since	 Carla	 Del	 Ponte	
assumed	the	office	of	the	ICTR	Prosecutor.43	By	Del	Ponte’s	final	year,	none	of	the	new	
indictments	contained	rape	charges.	In	addition,	a	number	of	cases	(most	notably	the	





A	number	of	 factors	have	a	 significant	bearing	on	which	 charges	are	brought	by	 the	
Prosecutor.	 Firstly,	 international	 criminal	 courts	 and	 tribunals	 are	 designed	 to	 focus	
their	prosecutions	on	the	most	serious	international	crimes	or	on	crimes	committed	by	
high-level	 defendants.	 In	 this	 context,	 the	 gravity	 of	 gender-based	 crimes	 has	 often	
been	 downplayed	 by	 an	 incorrect,	 although	 fairly	 common,	 view	 that	 sexual	 and	
gender-based	violence	is	not	of	equal	gravity	to	other	international	crimes.	Moreover,	
the	false	perception	that	crimes	of	sexual	and	gender-based	violence	are	more	difficult	
to	prosecute	 than	other	 international	 crimes	 can	be	 seen	 as	 an	 additional	 hurdle	 to	
including	charges	of	such	crimes	in	the	indictment.46	The	institutional	attitude	towards	
charging	gender-based	crimes	changed	significantly	at	the	ICC,	where	the	vast	majority	
of	 the	 defendants	 in	 cases	 brought	 before	 the	 Court	 have	 been	 charged	 with	 such	
offences.	However,	where	charges	of	gender-based	crimes	proceed	 to	 trial,	 they	are	
still	 subjected	 to	what	 Hayes	 describes	 as	 “the	most	 intractable	 problem	 facing	 the	
ICC,	 and	 the	 one	 which	 appears	 to	 affect	 prosecutions	 for	 sexual	 violence	 to	 an	
																																																								
43	Binaifer	Nowrojee,	‘“Your	Justice	is	Too	Slow”	Will	the	ICTR	Fail	Rwanda’s	Rape	Victims?’	(November	
2005)	 United	 Nations	 Research	 Institute	 for	 Social	 Development,	 Occasional	 Paper	 No.10,	 10	
<http://www.unrisd.org/publications/opgp10>	accessed	17	March	2015.	









inordinate	 extent”,	 namely	 the	 quality	 and	 sufficiency	 of	 prosecution	 evidence	
supporting	these	charges.47		
	
Secondly,	 in	 order	 to	 charge	 and	 prosecute	 high-level	 commanders	 and	 leaders	 for	
gender-based	 crimes,	 the	 link	 needs	 to	 be	 established	 between	 the	 acts	 of	 sexual	
violence	and	the	accused.	It	needs	to	be	shown	that	the	accused	either	committed	or	
instigated	 the	acts	 themselves	 (individual	 criminal	 responsibility)	or	 that	 the	accused	
exercised	 superior	 responsibility	 over	 the	 direct	 perpetrator	 of	 the	 alleged	 offence	
(superior	 responsibility	 doctrine).	 In	 the	 context	 of	 the	 latter,	 it	 needs	 to	 be	
demonstrated	that	 the	perpetrator	 (i.e.	subordinate)	was	under	the	effective	control	
of	 the	 accused	 and	 that	 the	 accused	 knew,	 or	 should	 have	 known,	 that	 his	
subordinates	were	committing	or	were	about	to	commit	international	crimes	yet	failed	
to	take	all	necessary	and	reasonable	measures	to	prevent	or	repress	the	commission	
of	 such	 crimes. 48 	Given	 that	 the	 need	 for	 such	 a	 link	 applies	 equally	 to	 other	
international	crimes,	whenever	the	doctrine	of	superior	responsibility	 is	 invoked	as	a	
mode	 of	 liability.	 To	 that	 end,	 at	 least	 in	 principle,	 gender-based	 crimes	 are	 equally	
affected	by	 the	scope	of	 this	principle	as	any	other	 international	crimes.	The	case	of	
Charles	 Taylor,	 the	 former	 president	 of	 Liberia,	 is	 illustrative	 in	 this	 respect	 and	














49	Valerie	Oosterveld,	 ‘Gender	 and	 the	 Charles	 Taylor	 Case	 before	 the	 Special	 Court	 for	 Sierra	 Leone’	
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sexual	 and	 gender-based	 violence	 and	 therefore	 “as	 early	 as	 August	 1997,	 the	
Accused,	as	President	of	Liberia	and	a	member	of	the	ECOWAS	Committee	of	Five,	was	
informed	 in	 detail	 of	 the	 crimes	 committed	 by	 the	 AFRC/RUF	 members	 during	 the	
Junta	 period,	 including	 murder,	 abduction	 of	 civilians	 including	 children,	 rape,	
amputation	and	 looting.	He	would	 therefore	have	been	aware	of	 the	 likelihood	 that	
the	AFRC/RUF	would	commit	similar	crimes	in	the	future”.50	Given	Taylor’s	knowledge,	
providing	 and	 facilitating	 arms	 and	 ammunition	 to	 the	 RUF	 and	 AFRC	 constituted	
practical	 assistance	 in	 committing	 international	 crimes	 (including	 sexual	 slavery	 and	
rape),	 therefore	 amounting	 to	 aiding	 and	 abetting	 the	 commission	 of	 the	 crimes	
outlined	in	the	indictment.51		
	
In	 contrast,	 looking	 at	 the	 experience	 of	 the	 ICTR,	 Van	 Schaack	 comments	 on	 the	
difficulties	 encountered	 by	 the	 prosecution	 in	 Akayesu,	 where	 the	 prosecutor	 was	
initially	 unable	 to	 charge	Akayesu	with	 crimes	of	 sexual	 violence	 committed	 in	 Taba	
commune	 (where	 Akayesu	was	 a	bourgmestre),	 despite	 the	 knowledge	 of	 such	 acts	
being	perpetrated.52	This	was	due	to	the	lack	of	evidence	supporting	the	existence	of	
the	superior-subordinate	relationship	between	Akayesu	and	the	perpetrators	of	sexual	
violence.	 Coincidentally,	 the	 prosecution	 was	 able	 to	 amend	 the	 indictment	 and	
succeed	in	prosecuting	Akayesu	with	regard	to	charges	of	sexual	violence	thanks	to	the	
spontaneous	testimony	of	one	of	the	witnesses	during	the	trial.	Another	case	before	
the	 ICTR,	 Prosecutor	 v.	 Muvunyi,	 also	 faced	 similar	 problems.53 	However,	 as	 the	
experience	 from	the	 ICTY	and	the	 ICTR	goes	 to	show,	prosecuting	acts	of	 sexual	and	









53 	Prosecutor	 v.	 Muvunyi,	 Trial	 Judgment	 and	 Sentence,	 ICTR-2000-55A-T,	 12	 September	 2006,	
paras.400-409;	para.409:	“The	Chamber	fully	understands	the	unique	circumstances	of	rape	victims	and	
sympathises	with	them.	However,	in	light	of	the	very	specific	nature	of	the	rape	charge	contained	in	the	







Joint	 criminal	 enterprise	 (JCE)	 is	 a	 mode	 of	 liability	 for	 international	 crimes.	 After	
World	War	 II,	 the	 Charters	 of	 the	 IMTN	 and	 of	 the	 IMTFE	 provided	 that	 those	who	
participated	in	“a	common	plan	or	conspiracy	to	commit	any	of	the	foregoing	crimes	
are	responsible	for	all	acts	performed	by	any	person	in	execution	of	such	plan”.54	The	
doctrine	 of	 JCE	 has	 been	 further	 developed	 and	 applied	 by	 modern	 international	
criminal	courts	and	tribunals	and,	according	to	Cassese	et	al.,	it	is	to	be	regarded	as	a	
norm	 of	 customary	 international	 criminal	 law.55	The	 ICTY	 Appeals	 Chamber	 in	 Tadić	
confirmed	that	JCE	is	a	part	of	customary	ICL	and	outlined	three	forms	of	JCE:		
a) JCE	 I,	where	all	participants	 in	 the	common	design	possess	 the	same	criminal	
intent	to	commit	a	crime;		
b) JCE	II	(so	called	‘concentration	camp’	cases)	is	a	variant	of	JCE	I	which	requires	
that	 a	 criminal	 plan	 involves	 ill-treatment	 taking	 place	 in	 an	 institutionalised	
setting,	e.g.	detention	camp;		
c) JCE	 III,	 where	 the	 criminal	 act	 falls	 outside	 the	 ‘common	 purpose’	 but	 is	
nonetheless	 a	 foreseeable	 consequence	 of	 the	 common	 plan’s	
implementation.56		





reason	 to	 treat	 it	 any	 differently	 in	 cases	 involving	 sexual	 violence.57	In	 order	 to	
prosecute	 any	 crime	using	 JCE	 liability,	 it	 needs	 to	be	 shown	 that	 there	exists	 a	 link	
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55	Antonio	 Cassese,	Mary	De	Ming	 Fan,	 Vanessa	 Thalmann,	 Salvatore	 Zappala,	 ‘Amicus	 curiae	 brief	 of	











between	 the	high-level	 accused	person	 and	 the	 committed	 crimes,	 even	 though	 the	
accused	may	have	been	physically	removed	from	them.	In	that	respect,	the	nature	of	
the	crime	is	irrelevant,	allowing	for	the	prosecution	of	sexual	violence	in	the	same	way	
as	 other	 crimes.	 The	 ICTY	 has	 successfully	 relied	 on	 JCE	 in	 the	 prosecution	 of	 cases	
involving	 sexual	 violence.58	The	mode	of	 liability	 applied	 in	 such	 cases	was	 generally	
involving	JCE	III	(i.e.	where	sexual	violence	was	a	natural	and	foreseeable	consequence	
of	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 common	 plan),	 but	 JCE	 I	 liability	 was	 nonetheless	
successfully	 invoked	in	Stakić.59	Stakić	was	convicted	of	persecution	(as	a	CAH)	based	
on	rapes	and	sexual	assaults	(amongst	other	criminal	acts),	which	formed	a	part	of	a	
JCE	 to	 ethnically	 cleanse	 the	 Prijedor	 region	 by	 deporting	 and	 persecuting	 Bosnian	













58 	Michelle	 Jarvis,	 Elena	 Martin	 Salgado	 ‘Future	 Challenges	 to	 Prosecuting	 Sexual	 Violence	 Under	
International	 Law:	 Insights	 from	 ICTY	 Practice’	 in:	 Anne-Marie	 de	 Brouwer,	 Charlotte	 Ku,	 Renée	
Römkens	 and	 Larissa	 van	 den	 Herik,	 Sexual	 Violence	 as	 an	 International	 Crime:	 Interdisciplinary	
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59	Prosecutor	v.	Stakić,	Trial	Judgment,	IT-97-24-T,	31	July	2003,	paras.234-236,	240-241,	244,	757,	791-
806,	 826;	Prosecutor	 v.	 Stakić,	 Appeal	 Judgment,	 IT-97-24-A,	 22	March	 2006,	 paras.73,	 84-85,	 92-98,	
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September	 2006,	 convicting	 Krajišnik	 of	 persecution	 based	 on,	 amongst	 other	 things,	 sexual	 violence	













ii. The	 existence	 of	 a	 common	 plan,	 design	 or	 purpose	 which	 amounts	 to	 or	
involves	the	commission	of	a	crime	provided	for	in	the	Statute.		
iii. Participation	 of	 the	 accused	 in	 the	 common	 design	 involving	 perpetration	 of	
one	of	the	crimes	provided	for	in	the	Statute.62		
In	 Prosecutor	 v.	 Kvočka	 et	 al.,	 the	 ICTY	 Trial	 Chamber	 convicted	 the	 accused	 of	
committing	 acts	 of	 persecution	 (involving	 rape	 and	 sexual	 assault)	 in	 the	 Omarska	
camp	in	Prijedor.	Considering	the	question	of	foreseeability	of	acts	of	sexual	violence	
in	 the	 detention	 camp	 in	Omarska	 by	 the	 defendants,	 the	 Trial	 Chamber	 concluded	




“any	 crimes	 that	 were	 natural	 or	 foreseeable	 consequences	 of	 the	 joint	
criminal	 enterprise	 of	 the	 Omarska	 camp,	 including	 sexual	 violence,	 can	 be	
attributable	 to	participants	 in	 the	criminal	enterprise	 if	 committed	during	 the	
time	 he	 participated	 in	 the	 enterprise.	 In	 Omarska	 camp,	 approximately	 36	
women	were	held	in	detention,	guarded	by	men	with	weapons	who	were	often	
drunk,	violent,	and	physically	and	mentally	abusive	and	who	were	allowed	 to	
act	 with	 virtual	 impunity.	 Indeed,	 it	 would	 be	 unrealistic	 and	 contrary	 to	 all	
rational	 logic	 to	 expect	 that	 none	 of	 the	women	 held	 in	 Omarska,	 placed	 in	
circumstances	 rendering	 them	 especially	 vulnerable,	 would	 be	 subjected	 to	
rape	or	other	forms	of	sexual	violence”.63			
	
Similarly,	 in	Krstić,	 the	 ICTY	Trial	Chamber	 reasoned	 that	 sexual	 violence	was	not	an	
agreed	part	of	the	defendants’	common	purpose	to	forcibly	transfer	Bosnian	Muslims	










members	 of	 the	 UN	 to	 provide	 protection”	 were	 indicative	 of	 the	 foreseeability	 of	
sexual	violence.64		
	







Appeals	 Chamber	 provided	 an	 important	 clarification	 on	 the	 standard	 for	 JCE	 III	
liability,	confirming	that	it	is	one	of	possibility,	not	probability.	Therefore,	it	corrected	






the	 Tutsi	 population	 in	 Rwanda	 in	 1994,	 but	 instead	 amounted	 to	 a	 natural	 and	
foreseeable	consequence	of	the	joint	criminal	enterprise	of	the	accused	in	the	form	of	
a	 campaign	 to	 exterminate	 the	 Tutsis.68		 The	 accused	 were	 proven	 to	 have	 had	
sufficient	 knowledge	 about	 rapes	 and	 sexual	 assaults	 taking	 place	 as	 a	 part	 of	 the	
policy	 to	 destroy	 the	 Tutsi	 population,	 primarily	 because	 of	 their	 professional	
positions.	Despite	that,	 they	decided	to	continue	taking	part	 in	 JCE	and	took	the	risk	
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that	 these	 crimes	 would	 continue	 to	 be	 committed.69	Importantly,	 the	 ICTR	 also	










of	 the	 JCE	 III	 doctrine	 attracted	 significant	 criticism.71	The	 ICTY	 was	 criticised	 for	
“inventing	 JCE	 III	 out	 of	 a	 thin	 air	 in	 Tadić”,	 whilst	 the	 doctrine	 itself	 was	 said	 to	
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as	well	 as	 their	 professional	 standing	would	 suggest	 that	 the	 consequences	 of	 their	
actions	were	more	readily	foreseeable	to	them	than	to	an	ordinary	person.		
	
When	 it	 comes	 to	 acts	 of	 sexual	 violence,	 it	 is	 expected	 that	 such	 public	 figures,	
especially	military	 strategists	and	 leaders,	would	have	been	aware	of	 the	political	 as	
well	 as	 strategic	 dimensions	 of	 the	 use	 of	 sexual	 violence	 in	 conflicts	 as	well	 as	 the	
historical	 record	 of	 such	 practices.	 In	 this	 context,	 it	 is	 worth	 noting	 the	 dissenting	
opinion	of	Judge	Chowhan	in	Milutinović	et	al.	who,	in	relation	to	the	ethnic	cleansing	
campaign	 in	Kosovo,	 considered	 the	nature	of	 the	conflict	 in	question	as	well	as	 the	
past	 history	 of	 conflicts	 in	 the	 region	 as	 factors	 contributing	 to	 “prudence	 and	 [a]	
common	 sense”	 conclusion	 that	 “sexual	 assaults,	 like	 murders,	 were	 certainly	
foreseeable	 realities”.73	To	 suggest	 otherwise	 would	 be	 not	 only	 naïve,	 but	 would	
further	 perpetuate	 one	 of	 the	 key	 reasons	 why	 the	 high	 level	 leaders	 and	 senior	
officials	have	long	managed	to	evade	criminal	accountability	for	conflict-related	sexual	
violence.	It	is	also	difficult	to	ignore	the	importance	of	causation	in	the	context	of	JCE	
III.	 After	 all,	 the	 ‘consequential	 crime’	 is	 made	 possible	 by	 the	 existence	 and	
implementation	of	the	 ‘common	plan’	of	JCE.	Under	the	JCE	 III	doctrine,	the	accused	
need	 not	 directly	 commit	 the	 ‘consequential	 crime’;	 the	 requirement	 is	 that	 the	





The	 application	 of	 JCE	 III	 exposes	 the	 complex	 nature	 of	 the	 perpetration	 of	
international	 crimes.	 It	 forces	 the	 law	 to	 look	 beyond	 the	 direct	 perpetrators	 of	
international	 crimes	 and	 command	 responsibility.	 As	 such,	 it	 offers	 a	more	 rounded	
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74	According	to	the	 ICTY	Appeals	Chamber	 in	Tadić,	 the	standard	required	 is	 to	show	that	the	accused	
took	the	risk	willingly,	“more	than	negligence	is	required”	(IT-94-1-A,	15	July	1999,	para.220);	Mohamed	










position	 to	 stop	 or	 prevent	 international	 crimes	 from	 occurring,	 especially	 if	 they	
receive	 information	about	certain	crimes	 taking	place.	For	 instance,	 in	Šainović	et	al.	























Violence	 as	 an	 International	 Crime:	 Interdisciplinary	 Approaches	 (Intersentia	 2013)	 134-135;	Michelle	
Jarvis,	Elena	Martin	Salgado	‘Future	Challenges	to	Prosecuting	Sexual	Violence	Under	International	Law:	
Insights	from	ICTY	Practice’	 in:	Anne-Marie	de	Brouwer,	Charlotte	Ku,	Renée	Römkens	and	Larissa	van	
den	 Herik,	 Sexual	 Violence	 as	 an	 International	 Crime:	 Interdisciplinary	 Approaches	 (Intersentia	 2013)	
106-110.	






the	 successful	 execution	 of	 other	 criminal	 acts,	 such	 as	 ethnic	 cleansing,	 forcible	
transfers	 or	 forced	 detention.	 From	 the	 perspective	 of	 seeking	 accountability	 for	
conflict-related	 sexual	 violence,	 JCE	 III	 can	 therefore	 be	 seen	 as	 an	 important	








group	 of	 persons	 acting	with	 a	 common	 purpose.	 Such	 contribution	 shall	 be	
intentional	and	shall	either:	
(i) Be	made	with	the	aim	of	furthering	the	criminal	activity	or	criminal	






of	 recklessness	which	 is	 central	 to	 JCE	 III.	 As	 clarified	 by	 the	 Pre-Trial	 Chamber	 I	 in	
Mbarushimana,	 contributions	 of	 the	 alleged	 perpetrator	 need	 to	 be	 ‘significant’	 but	
not	‘essential’,	with	the	major	factor	(amongst	four	others)	being	“the	role	the	suspect	















group,	was	 charged	 under	 Article	 25(3)(d)	with	 a	 number	 of	 criminal	 acts,	 including	
rape	and	sexual	 slavery,	allegedly	 committed	 in	 the	context	of	 the	attack	on	Bogoro	
village	 in	 eastern	 DRC	 in	 February	 2003.83	In	 March	 2014,	 Katanga	 was	 ultimately	





worrying	 approach	 towards	 viewing	 gender-based	 crimes	 in	 the	 context	 of	 Article	
25(3)(d).	The	court	did	not	view	acts	of	rape	and	sexual	slavery	as	constituting	a	part	of	
the	 ‘common	 purpose’	 of	 the	 attack	 on	 civilian	 population	 in	 Bogoro.85	Given	 the	
ethnic	background	of	 the	conflict,	 it	 is	even	more	astounding	that	 the	Trial	Chamber	
failed	 to	 make	 a	 connection	 with	 the	 large	 body	 of	 jurisprudence	 from	 ad	 hoc	
tribunals,	 which	 emphasizes	 the	 role	 of	 sexual	 violence	 in	 inter-ethnic	 conflict.	
Furthermore,	 this	 finding	 stands	 in	 sharp	 contrast	 with	 the	 approach	 demonstrated	
towards	property-oriented	crimes	(destruction	of	property,	pillage)	and	murder,	which	
were	held	to	constitute	a	part	of	the	‘common	purpose’,	therefore	forming	a	ground	




in	Bogoro.	 It	was	considered	that	 transporting,	 storing	and	distributing	weapons	and	
ammunition	demonstrated	planning,	intent	and	preparation	for	the	attack	and	proved	
																																																								
82 	Situation	 in	 the	 Democratic	 Republic	 of	 the	 Congo:	 Prosecutor	 v.	 Germain	 Katanga	 (Judgment	
pursuant	to	article	74	of	the	Statute),	Trial	Chamber	II,	ICC-01/04-01/7-3436,	7	March	2014.	
83 	Bogoro	 village	 was	 inhabited	 predominantly	 by	 persons	 of	 Hema	 ethnicity.	 The	 militia	 group	
commanded	by	Katanga	was	in	conflict	with	Hema	militia	group,	which	was	based	on	the	ethic	rivalry.	
Situation	in	the	Democratic	Republic	of	the	Congo:	Prosecutor	v.	Germain	Katanga	(Judgment	pursuant	








Katanga’s	 contribution	 to	 the	 common	 purpose.87	Nonetheless	 the	 judges	 failed	 to	
make	 the	 connection	 between	 the	 act	 of	 amassing	 large	 amounts	 of	 arms	 and	 the	
subsequent	 occurrence	 of	 sexual	 violence.	 This	 inconsistent	 interpretation	 begs	 the	
question	of	what	would	be	considered	an	equivalent	‘significant	contribution’	for	rape	
or	 sexual	 slavery?	 In	 the	 absence	 of	 the	 ICC	 elaboration	 on	 this	 particular	 issue,	 it	
remains	 questionable	 why	 Trial	 Chamber	 II	 was	 not	 convinced	 beyond	 reasonable	
doubt	that	the	supply	of	arms	by	Katanga	facilitated	the	commission	of	acts	of	sexual	
and	 gender-based	 violence	 by	 the	 militia.	 Finally,	 the	 conclusion	 reached	 by	 Trial	
Chamber	 II	 is	 even	more	 astounding	 given	 that	 the	 link	 between	 acts	 of	 sexual	 and	
gender-based	 violence	 and	 arms	 is	 explicitly	 recognized	 in	 Article	 7(4)	 of	 the	 Arms	
Trade	Treaty	2013	as	well	as	by	the	UN	Human	Rights	Council.88		
	
The	 apparent	 shortcomings	 of	 the	 Katanga	 decision	 illustrate	 that	 gender-based	
crimes	 continue	 to	be	 treated	differently	 to	other	 crimes	within	 the	 ICC	 jurisdiction.	
The	 reasoning	 of	 Trial	 Chamber	 II	 confirms	 that	 there	 exists	 the	 on-going	 double-
standard	 in	 the	approach	of	 international	 courts	 towards	 the	prosecution	of	gender-
based	 crimes.	 Such	practice	 is	 reflected	 in	 the	alarmingly	 common	practice	whereby	
the	 courts	 appear	 to	 require	 a	 higher	 standard	 of	 proof	 to	 satisfy	 the	 threshold	 of	
reasonable	doubt	in	cases	involving	sexual	and	gender-based	violence,	despite	the	lack	
of	 the	 substantive	 requirement	 that	 would	 justify	 the	 need	 for	 such	 an	 approach.	
Finally,	 the	 trial	 of	 gender-based	 crimes	 under	 Article	 25(3)(d)	 in	 Katanga	 sets	 an	
alarming	 precedent	 for	 the	 future	 prosecution	 of	 such	 crimes	 before	 the	 ICC.89	
However,	 the	 ICC	 OTP	 Policy	 on	 Sexual	 and	 Gender-Based	 Crimes	 recognizes	 that,	

















crimes,	 “evidence	 such	 as	 pattern	 of	 prior	 or	 subsequent	 conduct	 or	 specific	 notice	
may	 be	 adduced	 to	 prove	 awareness	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	 accused	 that	 such	 crimes	
would	occur	in	ordinary	course	of	events”.90	Nonetheless,	thus	far	the	ICC	appears	to	





Cumulative	 charging	 became	 a	 common	 practice	 in	 the	 ad	 hoc	 tribunals	 and	 at	 the	
SCSL,	particularly	when	prosecuting	gender-based	crimes.91	It	was	also	accepted	by	the	
IMTN	and	the	 IMTFE.	The	key	principle	behind	cumulative	charging	 is	 that	 it	enables	
the	 prosecution	 of	 different	 crimes	 based	 on	 the	 same	 course	 of	 conduct	 of	 the	
accused.	 The	 rationale	 behind	 this	 principle	 is	 that,	 especially	 in	 the	 context	 of	
international	 crimes,	 crimes	 may	 overlap	 leading	 to	 the	 same	 act	 being	 possibly	
concurrently	 considered	 a	war	 crime,	 crime	 against	 humanity	 and	 genocide.	 In	 such	
situations,	the	distinction	between	the	categories	of	crimes	under	which	the	particular	
criminal	 act	 is	 charged	 depends	 on	 the	 circumstances	 and	 context	 in	 which	 it	 was	
committed.		
	
The	 ad	 hoc	 tribunals	 have	 long	 accepted	 cumulative	 charging	 and	many	 individuals	




91	With	 an	exception	of	Kayishema	&	Ruzindana	 in	which	 the	 ICTR	 ruled	 against	 cumulative	 charging:	
Prosecutor	v.	Kayishema	&	Ruzindana,	Judgment	and	Sentence,	ICTR-95-1,	21	May	1999,	paras.625-650.	
92	Prosecutor	v.	Akayesu,	Trial	 Judgment,	 ICTR-96-4-T,	2	September	1998,	paras.468-470;	Prosecutor	v.	
Rutaganda,	 Judgment	 and	 Sentence,	 ICTR-96-3-T,	 6	 December	 1999,	 paras.115-119;	 Prosecutor	 v.	
Musema,	 Judgment	 and	 Sentence,	 ICTR-96-13-T,	 27	 January	 2000,	 paras.269-299;	 Čelebići,	 Appeal	
Judgment,	 IT-96-21-A,	20	February	2001,	paras.397-400;	Prosecutor	v.	 Jelisić,	Appeal	 Judgment,	 IT-95-
10-A,	 5	 July	 2011,	 paras.82-83;	 Prosecutor	 v.	 Krstić,	 Appeal	 Judgment,	 IT-98-33-A,	 19	 April	 2004,	
paras.219-227	(overturning	Trial	Chamber’s	decision	and	allowing	cumulative	charging).	
Atilla	Bogdan,	‘Cumulative	charges,	convictions	and	sentencing	at	the	ad	hoc	international	tribunals	for	
the	 Former	 Yugoslavia	 and	 Rwanda’	 (2002)	 3(1)	 Melbourne	 Journal	 of	 International	 Law	 1-32;	





“Cumulative	 charging	 is	 to	 be	 allowed	 in	 light	 of	 the	 fact	 that,	 prior	 to	 the	
presentation	of	all	of	the	evidence,	it	is	not	possible	to	determine	to	a	certainty	
which	 of	 the	 charges	 brought	 against	 an	 accused	 will	 be	 proven.	 The	 Trial	












distinct	 element	 not	 contained	 in	 the	 other.	 An	 element	 is	 materially	 distinct	 from	









In	 the	 past,	 the	 ad	 hoc	 tribunals	 and	 the	 SCSL	 successfully	 convicted	 individuals	
accused	 of	 gender-based	 crimes	 based	 on	 cumulative	 charges.	 Cumulative	 charging	
not	only	enabled	the	full	extent	of	these	crimes	to	be	captured	and	the	true	extent	of	
the	criminal	conduct	of	the	accused	but	also	permitted	the	prosecution	of	these	crimes	
















Taylor	 allowed	 cumulative	 convictions	 for	 crimes	 against	 humanity	 of	 both	 sexual	







However,	 the	 approach	 towards	 cumulative	 charging	 of	 gender-based	 crimes	
presented	by	 the	 ICTY,	 the	 ICTR	 and	 the	 SCSL	 appears	 to	 stand	 in	 contrast	with	 the	
approach	demonstrated	thus	far	by	the	ICC.99	Whilst	the	ICC	Statute	does	not	contain	
provisions	 which	 explicitly	 address	 cumulative	 charging,	 references	 to	 such	 practice	
are	made	 in	 the	 ICC	EOC	as	well	 as	 in	 the	 recent	OTP	Policy	on	 Sexual	 and	Gender-
Based	Crimes.	The	 introduction	 to	 the	 ICC	EOC	states	 the	principle	 that	“a	particular	
conduct	 may	 constitute	 one	 or	 more	 crimes”.100	The	 ICC	 Prosecutor	 also	 confirmed	
that	 “the	 Office	 will	 bring	 charges	 for	 sexual	 and	 gender-based	 crimes	 explicitly	 as	
crimes	per	se,	in	addition	to	charging	these	acts	as	forms	of	other	violence	within	the	
Court’s	subject-matter	jurisdiction,	where	the	material	elements	are	met,	e.g.	charging	
rape	 as	 torture,	 persecution,	 and	 genocide”	 and	 that	 “(t)he	Office	will	 seek	 to	bring	
cumulative	charges	in	order	to	reflect	the	severity	and	multi-faceted	character	of	these	
																																																								

















gender-based	 crimes	 ultimately	 relies	 on	 the	 approach	of	 the	 ICC	 Pre-Trial	 Chamber	
towards	such	practice.	In	Bemba,	the	Pre-Trial	Chamber	refused	to	confirm	cumulative	
charges	 of	 rape,	 torture	 and	 outrages	 upon	 personal	 dignity.	 In	 rejecting	 charges	 of	
torture	 as	 a	 CAH	 and	 outrages	 upon	 personal	 dignity	 as	 a	 war	 crime,	 the	 Pre-Trial	
Chamber	 argued	 that	 these	 acts	 are	 fully	 subsumed	 under	 the	 count	 of	 rape	 as	 a	
CAH. 102 	The	 Pre-Trial	 Chamber	 also	 justified	 its	 decision	 on	 the	 basis	 that	
“prosecutorial	 practice	 of	 cumulative	 charging	 is	 detrimental	 to	 the	 rights	 of	 the	
Defence	 since	 it	 places	 an	 undue	 burden	 on	 the	 Defence”.103	Further	 grounding	 its	
decision,	 the	 Pre-Trial	 Chamber	 reasoned	 that	 “as	 a	 matter	 of	 fairness	 and	
expeditiousness	 of	 the	 proceedings,	 only	 distinct	 crimes	 may	 justify	 a	 cumulative	
charging	 approach	 and,	 ultimately,	 be	 confirmed	 as	 charges,”	 and	 that	 this	 is	 “only	
possible	if	each	statutory	provision	allegedly	breached	in	relation	to	one	and	the	same	
conduct	 requires	 at	 least	 one	 additional	 material	 element	 not	 contained	 in	 the	
other”.104	With	regard	to	the	 latter	criterion,	originating	from	the	Čelebići	test,	 it	can	
be	 argued	 that	 the	 Pre-Trial	 Chamber	 misapplied	 this	 test	 in	 Bemba.	 The	 material	
elements	of	each	of	the	offences	originally	charged	in	the	indictment	are	different.	The	
elements	of	rape	and	torture	are	distinctive	and	do	not	overlap:	a	physical	invasion	of	





01/05-01/08	 (15	 June	 2009),	 paras.204-205	 (torture),	 310	 (outrages	 upon	 personal	 dignity);	 Laurie	
Green,	 ‘First-Class	 Crimes,	 Second-Class	 Justice:	 Cumulative	 Charges	 for	 Gender-Based	 Crimes	 at	 the	
International	Criminal	Court’	(2011)	11	International	Criminal	Law	Review	529-541,	Kai	Ambos,	‘Critical	














et	 al.,	 “a	 questionable	 application	 of	 the	 [Čelebići]	 test”.107	In	 particular,	 the	 Bemba	
decision	 stands	 in	 contrast	with	 the	 successful	 application	 of	 this	 test	 to	 cumulative	
charges	 in	Ruto	 and	 in	Al-Bashir.108	Since	 the	 decision	 in	Bemba,	 the	 ICC	 confirmed	






Obtaining	 reliable	 evidence	 is	 crucial	 when	 prosecuting	 international	 crimes.	 The	
importance	of	this	 is	especially	prominent	 in	the	prosecution	of	gender-based	crimes	
where	victims	and	witnesses,	due	to	a	number	of	factors,	may	be	particularly	hesitant	
to	 testify	 about	 their	 experiences.	 Furthermore,	 an	 additional	 challenge	 is	 posed	 by	
the	 apparent	 tendency	 amongst	 international	 criminal	 courts	 to	 require	 higher	
evidentiary	standards	in	cases	involving	gender-based	crimes.	Whilst	this	is	not	a	legal	
or	 procedural	 requirement,	 the	 manner	 in	 which	 evidence	 is	 considered	 effectively	
																																																								
105	ICC	EOC,	Article	7(1)(f)	[torture]	and	Article	7(1)(g)-1(1)	[rape];	This	argument	is	also	posed	by	Laurie	





108	Situation	 in	 the	 Republic	 of	 Kenya:	 Prosecutor	 v.	William	 Samoei	 Ruto,	 Henry	 Kiprono	 Kosgey	 and	
Joshua	Arap	Sang	 (Decision	on	the	Confirmation	of	Charges	pursuant	to	Article	61(7)(a)	and	(b)	of	the	
Rome	Statute)	ICC-01/09-01/11	(23	January	2012)	paras.279-281;	Situation	in	Darfur,	Sudan:	Prosecutor	
v.	 Omar	 Hassan	 Ahmad	 Al	 Bashir	 (“Omar	 Al	 Bashir”)	 (Decision	 on	 the	 Prosecutor’s	 Application	 for	 a	
Warrant	of	Arrest	against	Omar	Hassan	Ahmad	Al	Bashir),	ICC-02/05-01/09-3	(4	March	2009)	paras.95-
96	 (accepting	 counts	 of	 extermination	 and	 murder	 as	 crimes	 against	 humanity	 based	 on	 the	 same	
conduct).	
109	Situation	in	the	Democratic	Republic	of	the	Congo:	Prosecutor	v.	Bosco	Ntaganda	(Decision	Pursuant	
to	 Article	 61(7)(a)	 and	 (b)	 of	 the	 Rome	 Statute	 on	 the	 Charges	 of	 the	 Prosecutor	 Against	 Bosco	





imposes	 a	 higher	 evidentiary	 threshold. 110 	This	 tendency	 has	 therefore	 practical	
implications	 in	 determining	 the	 ultimate	 success	 of	 the	 case	 and	 emphasizes	 the	
importance	of	not	only	collecting	reliable	evidence	but	also	its	persuasive	presentation	
in	court.	Finally,	the	existing	direct	and	indirect	gender-based	discrimination	amongst	
investigators,	 prosecutors	 and	 judges	 often	 leads	 to	 an	 insufficient	 recognition	 of	
gender-related	 dimensions	 within	 the	 evidence	 and,	 as	 Inder	 notes,	 too	 few	




All	 international	 criminal	 courts	 and	 tribunals	 have	 adopted	 Rules	 of	 Procedure	 and	
Evidence	 which	 contain	 provisions	 relating	 to	 evidence	 in	 cases	 involving	 sexual	
violence.	Rule	96	of	 the	 ICTY	RPE	 is	 considered	 the	key	 contribution	 to	ensuring	 the	
effective	 prosecution	 of	 sexual	 violence	 at	 the	 ad	 hoc	 tribunals.	 Rule	 96,	 which	 is	
reflected	 in	 the	 ICTR	 RPE,	 SCSL	 RPE	 and	 ICC	 RPE,	 established	 that	 in	 cases	 involving	
sexual	violence	no	corroboration	of	 the	victim’s	 testimony	 is	 required.112	It	 therefore	
gives	 recognition	 to	 the	 contextual	 reality	 in	 which	 sexual	 violence	 takes	 place	 in	
conflict,	 where	 no	 witnesses	 are	 present	 or	 where	 the	 only	 witnesses	 were	
collaborating	 with	 the	 perpetrator.	 Most	 importantly,	 Rule	 96(ii)	 restricts	 the	
circumstances	 in	which	 consent	may	 be	 used	 as	 a	 defence	 in	 cases	 involving	 sexual	
violence.	 It	accepts	that	non-consent	may	be	automatically	 inferred	 in	circumstances	
where	the	victim	“has	been	subjected	to	or	threatened	with	or	has	had	reason	to	fear	
violence,	 duress,	 detention	 or	 psychological	 oppression”	 or	 where	 the	 victim	
“reasonably	believed	that	if	the	victim	did	not	submit,	another	might	be	so	subjected,	
threatened	or	put	in	fear”.113	This	principle	has	been	further	confirmed	and	applied	by	
the	 ad	 hoc	 tribunals,	most	 notably	 in	Akayesu,	 Kunarac	 and	Gacumbitsi,	 where	 the	
																																																								
110	Marcus,	supra	19,	212;	Susana	SáCouto,	Katherine	Cleary,	“The	importance	of	effective	investigation	










circumstances’	 in	 rape	 cases.114	Rule	 96(iv)	 also	 requires	 that	 past	 sexual	 conduct	 of	
the	victim	shall	not	form	a	part	of	the	evidence.115	Additional	protection	to	witnesses	
was	 provided	 by	 Rule	 96	 (iii)	 which	 requires	 that	 “before	 evidence	 of	 the	 victim’s	
consent	 is	 admitted,	 the	 accused	 shall	 satisfy	 the	 Trial	 Chamber	 in	 camera	 (session	
closed	to	public)	that	the	evidence	is	relevant	and	credible”.116	This	regulation	ensures	
that	the	cases	involving	sexual	violence,	especially	rape,	proceed	only	if	there	is	a	valid	
basis	 for	 it,	 thereby	 protecting	 the	 witness	 form	 being	 unnecessarily	 exposed	 to	




that	 it	 is	 dependent	 on	 the	 presentation	 of	 the	 obtained	 evidence	 in	 court.	 This	
requires	adherence	to	the	rules	of	procedure	and	evidence	of	a	given	court	as	well	as	a	
striking	of	the	balance	between	the	rights	of	the	accused	and	protection	of	the	victims	












114	Prosecutor	 v.	 Akayesu,	 Trial	 Judgment,	 ICTR-96-4-T,	 2	 September	 1998,	 para.688;	 Prosecutor	 v.	











to	 investigators,	 the	 courts	 may	 not	 always	 be	 persuaded	 by	 the	 strength	 of	 the	
evidence	 adduced	 by	 summary	witnesses.	 For	 instance,	 the	 ICC	 Pre-Trial	 Chamber	 I	
warned	in	Gbagbo	that	the	Chamber	may	choose	to	decline	to	confirm	allegations	that	
are	 supported	 only	 by	 anonymous	 or	 summary	 witness	 statements.119	The	 Pre-Trial	
Chamber	 I	 also	 forewarned	 about	 the	 use	 of	 NGO	 reports	 and	 press	 articles	 as	






The	 ICTY	 recognized	 the	 specific	 needs	 of	 victims	 and	witnesses	 of	 rape	 and	 sexual	
assault	in	the	first	case	heard	before	the	tribunal.	The	Trial	Chamber	in	Tadić	captured	
some	of	the	key	challenges	of	testifying	about	sexual	violence	when	it	emphasized	that	
“rape	 and	 sexual	 assault	 often	 have	 particularly	 devastating	 consequences	which,	 in	
certain	 instances,	 may	 have	 a	 permanent	 detrimental	 impact	 on	 the	 victim.	 (…)	
testifying	 about	 the	 event	 is	 often	 difficult,	 particularly	 in	 public,	 and	 can	 result	 in	
rejection	by	the	victim’s	family	and	community.	 In	addition,	traditional	court	practice	










Chamber	 strongly	 relied	 on	 contemporary	 documentary	 evidence	 from	 the	 reports	 of	 international	
organisations	and	NGOs	on	crimes	committed	in	Sierra	Leone	as	well	as	media	coverage	of	these	crimes.	
On	the	basis	of	such	evidence,	the	Trial	Chamber	found	beyond	reasonable	doubt	hat	Taylor	was	aware	








Due	 to	 the	 nature	 of	 international	 crimes,	 extraordinarily	 high	 reliance	 on	 evidence	
adduced	 by	 the	 victims	 and	witnesses,	 as	well	 as	 the	 public	 and	 global	 outreach	 of	
international	 criminal	 courts,	 the	 system	 of	 international	 criminal	 justice	 had	 to	
develop	measures	to	protect	victims	and	witnesses	who	decided	to	testify	against	the	
accused.	 The	 Rules	 of	 Procedure	 and	 Evidence	 of	 the	 ICC,	 the	 SCSL	 and	 the	 ad	 hoc	




In	 addition	 to	 the	 core	 provisions	 regarding	 the	 need	 to	 ensure	 the	 safety	 of	 the	
victims/	witnesses	and	to	exercise	care,	key	 importance	is	attached	to	protecting	the	
identity	of	the	victim/	witness.	This	issue	is	particularly	significant	when	the	trial	takes	
place	during	 armed	 conflict	 or	 in	 its	 immediate	 aftermath,	where	 victims/	witnesses	
and	 their	 families	 often	 find	 themselves	 facing	 real	 threats	 to	 their	 lives	 or	 being	
harassed,	 intimidated	 or	 threatened	 if	 it	 is	 found	 out	 that	 they	 will	 give	 evidence	
against	the	accused	or	their	supporters.123	At	the	same	time,	non-disclosure	of	witness	
identity	 is	 a	 key	 example	 of	 the	 tension	 between	 rights	 of	 the	 accused	 and	 the	
protection	of	the	victim/	witness.124		
	
In	 Tadić,	 the	 ICTY	 allowed	 the	 use	 of	 anonymous	 witness	 (i.e.	 the	 witness	 whose	
identity	 is	 unknown	 to	 both	 parties),	 which	 attracted	 wide	 questioning,	 particularly	
from	 the	 due	 process	 perspective.125	This	 conflict	 further	 highlights	 what	 Chinkin	
excellently	 described	 as,	 “the	 argument	 that	 human	 rights	 standards	 have	 been	




123	The	 impact	 of	 disclosure	 of	 victim’s	 identity	 on	 their	 safety	 is	 outlined	 by	 the	 ICTR:	 ICTR,	 ‘Best	
Practices	 Manual	 for	 the	 Investigation	 and	 Prosecution	 of	 Sexual	 Violence	 Crimes	 in	 Post-Conflict	
Regions’,	 supra	 8,	 paras.179-180;	 ICC-OTP,	 Policy	 Paper	 on	 Sexual	 and	 Gender-Based	 Crimes	 (June	
2014),	supra	29,	para.65.		
124	Rule	69	ICTY	RPE;	Rule	69	ICTR	RPE;	Rule	69	SCSL	RPE,	Rule	81(4)	ICC	RPE.	
125	Monroe	 Leigh,	 ‘The	 Yugoslav	 Tribunal:	 Anonymity	 Is	 Inconsistent	 with	 Due	 Process’	 (1996)	 90	
American	 Journal	 of	 International	 Law	 235;	 Olivia	 Swaak-Goldman,	 ‘The	 ICTY	 and	 the	 Right	 to	 a	 Fair	
Trial:	 A	 Critique	 of	 the	 Critics’	 (1997)	 10	 Leiden	 Journal	 of	 International	 Law	 215;	 Natasha	 Affolder,	





fundamental	 guarantees	 required	 by	 individuals”.126	However,	 the	 Tribunal	 did	 not	
afford	blanket	anonymity	to	all	victims/	witnesses	and	indicated	careful	guidelines	on	
the	determination	of	 anonymous	 status	 of	 the	 victim/	witness.127	The	 Trial	 Chamber	
focused	 particularly	 on	 the	 security	 concerns	 of	 the	 victim	 and	 emphasized	 the	 fact	
that	 the	Tribunal	 itself	 is	not	 in	a	position	 to	offer	protection	 to	witnesses	 following	
their	 testimony.128	Arguably,	 by	 acting	within	 these	 constraints	 the	 ICTY,	 contrary	 to	
the	overwhelming	criticism,	managed	to	actually	adhere	to	the	commitments	set	out	





The	 approach	 taken	 in	Tadić	 is	 only	 partially	 reflected	 in	 Rule	 81(4)	 of	 the	 ICC	 RPE,	
which	allows	for	witness	anonymity	to	be	invoked	(following	a	successful	request),	but	
only	 in	the	period	 leading	up	to	the	trial.129	Nonetheless,	 ICC	RPE	built	on	the	RPE	of	
the	 ad	 hoc	 tribunals	 to	 provide	 a	 number	 of	 other	 rules	 aimed	 at	 the	 protection	 of	
victims	and	witnesses.	In	order	to	avoid	retraumatisation	of	the	victim/	witness,	Rule	
68	 of	 the	 ICC	 RPE	 allows	 the	 presentation	 of	 a	 witness	 statement	 in	 the	 form	 of	 a	
previously	 recorded	statement,	 in	audio,	video	or	 transcript	 form.130	Alternatively,	as	
an	exception	to	the	principle	of	public	hearings,	Rule	67	of	the	ICC	RPE	allows	the	use	
of	 audio	 or	 video-link	 technology	 to	 provide	 live	 testimony	 without	 requiring	 the	





and	 Witnesses,	 10	 August	 1995,	 IT-94-1-T,	 para.77:	 “Initially,	 the	 Trial	 Chamber	 must	 consider	 the	
factors	that	apply	to	all	witnesses.	First,	with	respect	to	the	objective	aspect	of	the	criterion	that	there	
must	 be	 real	 fear	 for	 the	 safety	 of	 the	 witness,	 it	 is	 generally	 sufficient	 for	 a	 court	 to	 find	 that	 the	
ruthless	character	of	an	alleged	crime	justifies	such	fear	of	the	accused	and	his	accomplices.	The	alleged	
crimes	 are,	 without	 doubt,	 of	 a	 nature	 that	 warrants	 such	 a	 finding.	 Secondly,	 the	 Prosecutor	 has	
sufficiently	 demonstrated	 the	 importance	 of	 the	witnesses	 to	 prove	 the	 counts	 of	 the	 indictment	 to	












witness.	These	 include,	but	are	not	 limited	to,	 the	use	of	pseudonyms,	redacting	the	
name	of	a	person	and	any	identifying	information	from	public	records,	image	or	voice	
alteration	 and	 use	 of	 electronic	 means	 to	 provide	 testimony	 of	 the	 victim/	 witness	
before	 the	 court. 131 	Finally,	 the	 Chamber	 is	 obliged	 to	 control	 the	 manner	 of	
questioning	in	order	to	avoid	any	harassment	or	intimidation	of	victims/	witnesses.132		
	
Overall,	 building	on	 the	experience	of	 the	ad	hoc	 tribunals,	 the	 ICC	 Statute	 and	RPE	
take	 a	 strongly	 victim-focused	 approach,	 which	 is	 nonetheless	 balanced	 with	
protecting	 the	 rights	 of	 the	 accused.	 Given	 the	 heinous	 nature	 of	 the	 crimes		
prosecuted	 before	 the	 ICC	 as	 well	 as	 their	 contextual	 aspect,	 the	 victim-focused	
approach	 is	 particularly	 needed	 to	 support	 and	 protect	 victims	 and	 witnesses	 who	
decide	to	testify.	From	the	perspective	of	victims	of	sexual	and	gender-based	crimes,	
the	existence	of	 these	measures	 is	 of	paramount	 importance	and	may	be	a	decisive	
factor	 in	 their	 decision	 whether	 to	 testify	 or	 not.	 Furthermore,	 it	 ought	 to	 be	
recognized	that	the	interests	of	victims/	witnesses	as	well	as	their	needs	may	vary	and	
a	 certain	 level	 of	 flexibility	 in	 providing	 adequate	 support	 and	 protection	 may	 be	
required.	Nonetheless,	the	substantive	and	procedural	rules	merely	set	out	the	agreed	
standards.	 In	 order	 to	 provide	 meaningful	 protection	 to	 its	 intended	 beneficiaries,	




The	 achievement	 of	 international	 justice	 for	 conflict-related	 gender-based	 crimes	
depends	 not	 only	 on	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 set	 of	 adequate	 substantive	 and	 procedural	
laws,	 but	 also	 on	 the	 gender	 awareness	 and	 attitudes	 of	 those	 working	 within	 the	
international	 criminal	 justice	 system.	 The	 institutional	 culture	 within	 international	








apparent	 that	 there	 exist	 significant	 gender	 biases	 amongst	 persons	 working	 at	 all	
structural	 levels	 of	 international	 criminal	 courts.	 Richard	 Goldstone,	 the	 first	 ICTY	
Prosecutor,	recollects	his	astonishment	with	the	level	of	gender	bias	within	the	office	





Gender	 biases	 have	 been	 often	 reflected	 in	 the	 attitudes	 of	 staff	 towards	 the	
investigation	and	prosecution	of	 gender-based	 crimes,	 e.g.	 ‘I’ve	 got	 ten	dead	bodies	





to	 be	 abbreviated”	 and	 who	 often	 found	 herself	 “tutoring	 [my]	 male	 colleagues	 of	
what	 it	means	 to	a	woman	 to	be	 raped	 (…)	You	have	 to	be	 insistent	 that	 this	was	a	




during	trials	of	gender-based	crimes,	both	by	defence	 lawyers	and	the	 judges.	As	 for	
the	 latter,	 judges	may	actively	demonstrate	their	bias	through	their	words	or	actions	
but	 also	by	omitting	 to	 intervene,	 for	 example	 to	 stop	harassment	of	 the	 victim.	An	
																																																								
133	Richard	Goldstone,	 ‘Prosecuting	Rape	 as	 a	War	 Crime’	 (2002)	 34	Case	Western	Reserve	 Journal	 of	
International	Law	277,	280,	resulting	in	the	successful	appointment	of	Patricia	Viseur-Sellers	as	a	Gender	
Advisor	to	the	ICTY.	















could	 not	 have	 raped	 her	 because	 she	 had	 not	 taken	 a	 bath	 in	 a	 few	 days	 and	 she	
smelled.	All	three	judges	on	the	bench	reacted	to	this	with	laughter.137	Following	this	
outrageous	behaviour,	no	apology	was	ever	 issued	 to	 the	victim.	Other	more	 recent	
examples	of	gender	bias	at	the	ICC	include	the	deliberations	of	the	Pre-Trial	Chamber	II	
regarding	the	(non)sexual	nature	of	crimes	alleged	in	Muthaura,	the	majority	decision	




The	 existence	 of	 demonstrable	 gender	 biases	within	 the	 institutions	 of	 international	
criminal	 justice	 amounts	 to	 structural	 discrimination	 and	 constitutes	 a	 significant	
obstacle	 to	 the	 successful	 investigation	and	prosecution	of	 gender-based	crimes	and	
putting	 an	 end	 to	 impunity	 for	 such	 crimes. 139 	The	 institutional	 gender	 biases	
contradict	 the	principle	of	non-discrimination,	which	 is	 embedded	 in	Article	21(3)	of	
the	 ICC	Statute	and	 is	also	a	key	principle	 in	 International	Human	Rights	 Law	 (IHRL).	
Article	21(3)	 requires	 that	 the	 ICC	applies	 and	 interprets	 the	 law	 in	accordance	with	
IHRL	 and	 without	 adverse	 distinction	 based	 on	 gender	 (amongst	 other	 grounds).140	
Hence,	 the	application	of	 the	principle	of	non-discrimination	 in	 the	pre-trial	and	trial	
stages	of	 cases	 involving	gender-based	crimes	 is	of	paramount	 importance.	Not	only	
																																																								




to	 Article	 61(7)(a)	 and	 (b)	 of	 the	 Rome	 Statute)	 ICC-01/09-02/11	 (23	 January	 2012),	 paras.265-266;	
Situation	in	the	Democratic	Republic	of	the	Congo:	Prosecutor	v.	Thomas	Lubanga	Dyilo	(Judgment),	ICC-
01/04-01/06	(14	March	2012),	para.896;	Situation	in	the	Central	African	Republic:	Prosecutor	v.	Bemba	
(Decision	 pursuant	 to	 Article	 61(7)(a)	 and	 (b)	 of	 the	 Rome	 Statute	 on	 the	 Charges	 of	 the	 Prosecutor	
against	Jean-Pierre	Bemba	Gombo)	ICC-01/05-01/08	(15	June	2009),	paras.204-205.	
139	For	a	critique	of	the	ICC	from	a	feminist	institutionalist	framework	perspective,	see:	Louise	Chappell,	








also,	 on	 a	 normative	 level,	 it	 contributes	 to	 the	 development	 of	 gender	 inclusive	
international	criminal	jurisprudence.	Furthermore,	its	application	ensures	that	victims	
of	gender-based	crimes	are	not	discriminated	against	during	the	proceedings,	both	in	
relation	 to	 the	 procedural	 rules	 and	 in	 matters	 concerning	 substantive	 law.	 For	
instance,	 regarding	 the	 latter,	 Judge	Odio	 Benito	 noted	 in	 her	Dissenting	Opinion	 in	
Lubanga	the	discriminatory	nature	of	excluding	sexual	violence	from	the	scope	of	the	




as	 incorporating	 a	 broad	 range	 of	 sexual	 violence	 offences	 into	 article	 7(1)(g),	
development	of	gender-sensitive	provisions	within	 the	 ICC	RPE	and	 the	appointment	




ensuring	 greater	 gender	 sensitivity	 at	 the	 ICC	 should	 be	 commended,	 the	 mere	
codification	 of	 gender-sensitive	 rules	 and	 regulations	 is	 not	 sufficient.	 In	 order	 to	
achieve	 meaningful	 gender	 justice	 at	 the	 ICC,	 a	 close	 monitoring	 and	 scrutiny	 is	
required	 both	 from	 inside	 the	 court	 and	 by	 external	 actors	 (such	 as	 NGOs,	 the	
















criminal	 justice.144	It	 would	 be	 unscrupulous	 to	 ignore	 the	 fact	 that	 in	 many	 cases	
involving	 gender-based	 crimes,	 especially	 in	 the	 early	 days	 of	 international	 criminal	
tribunals,	the	presence	and	expertise	of	female	judges	made	a	substantive	difference.	
Female	 judges	 have	 been	 responsible	 for	 some	 key	 substantive	 and	 procedural	
developments	 in	 international	 criminal	 justice,	particularly	with	 reference	 to	gender-
based	crimes.		
	
The	 primary	 example	 of	 this	 is	Akayesu,	 where	 Judge	 Navanethem	 Pillay	 requested		
amendment	to	the	charges	following	a	testimony	about	sexual	violence	by	one	of	the	
victims.	 This	 intervention	 ultimately	 resulted	 in	 the	 first	 international	 criminal	
prosecution	of	rape	as	well	as	formulation	of	the	definition	of	rape	in	international	law	





the	 charges	 under	 Rule	 50	 of	 the	 ICTY	 RPE.145	More	 recently,	 Judge	 Odio	 Benito’s	
Dissenting	Opinion	in	Lubanga	marked	an	important	development	in	the	recognition	of	
sexual	 violence	 as	 an	 element	 of	 the	 crime	 of	 enlistment,	 conscription	 and	 use	 of	




to	 the	 laws	 at	 the	 time	when	 the	 case	was	 originally	 heard.	 Rosemary	 Hunter,	 Clare	McGlynn,	 Erika	
Rackley	 (eds),	 Feminist	 Judgments:	 From	 Theory	 to	 Practice	 (Hart	 2010);	 Heather	 Douglas,	 Francesca	
Bartlett,	Trish	Luker,	Rosemary	Hunter	(eds),	Australian	Feminist	Judgments:	Righting	and	Rewriting	Law	
(Hart	2014).	
Feminist	 International	 Judgments	 Project	 is	 currently	 organised	 in	 the	 UK	 by	 Dr	 Troy	 Lavers	 and	 Dr	
Loveday	 Hodson	 (forthcoming:	 2016).	 The	 project	 includes	 feminist	 international	 judgments	 in	 cases	
involving	gender-based	crimes:	Prosecutor	v.	Lubanga	and	the	AFRC	case.		
On	 the	 topic	 of	 gender	 and	 judging	 in	 international	 criminal	 law	 context	 see:	Nienke	Grossman,	 ‘Sex	
Representation	 on	 the	 Bench	 and	 the	 Legitimacy	 of	 International	 Criminal	 Courts’	 (2011)	 11	
International	Criminal	 Law	Review	643-653;	Patricia	M.	Wald,	 ‘Women	on	 International	Courts:	 Some	
Lessons	Learned’	(2011)	11	International	Criminal	Law	Review	401-408.	For	a	critical	overview	of	women	
in	 judiciary	 see:	Sally	 J.	Kenney,	Gender	and	 Justice.	Why	Women	 in	 the	 Judiciary	Really	Matter	 (2013	
Routledge).	












consideration	 of	 the	 gender	 dimension	 of	 crimes,	 it	 does	 not	 necessarily	 guarantee	
such	 outcome.	 Nowrojee	 notes	 the	 dramatic	 and	 consistent	 drop	 in	 the	 number	 of	
new	 indictments	 including	 charges	of	 sexual	 violence	 since	Carla	Del	Ponte	assumed	
the	 office	 of	 the	 ICTR	 Prosecutor	 in	 September	 1999.	 Concerns	 have	 also	 been	
expressed	 about	 the	 legacy	 of	 the	 current	 ICC	 Prosecutor,	 Fatou	 Bensouda.	 Whilst	
Bensouda	 expressed	 a	 strong	 commitment	 to	 bringing	 in	 new	 indictments	 and	






the	 SCSL	have	enabled	progressive	 steps	 in	 the	 international	 prosecution	of	 gender-
based	crimes.	These	notable	advances	in	international	criminal	law	(which	have	been	
discussed	at	 length	 in	Chapter	4),	whilst	praised	on	the	one	hand,	have	also	raised	a	
fundamental	 question	 of	 the	 provision	 of	 gender	 justice	 for	 victims	 of	 sexual	 and	
gender-based	 violence,	 whose	 cases	 have	 not	 been	 heard	 before	 international	
tribunals.	The	 limited	capacity	of	the	 ICTY,	the	 ICTR	and	the	SCSL	as	well	as	the	time	
limits	 for	 their	 operation	 meant	 that	 from	 the	 very	 time	 these	 organs	 were	
established,	 only	 selected	 cases	 could	 be	 investigated	 and	 tried	 before	 these	
international	 courts.	 The	 aim	 of	 the	 ad	 hoc	 tribunals	 and	 the	 SCSL	 was	 to	 hold	
accountable	the	individuals	most	responsible	for	committing	international	crimes	and,	
as	 a	 result,	 the	 remaining	 cases	 were	 left	 subject	 to	 prosecution	 by	 the	 domestic	
courts.	As	such,	the	rules	of	international	criminal	courts	and	tribunals	instantly	limited	






The	normative	and	operational	 limitations	of	 international	criminal	 tribunals	and	 the	
ICC	 reiterate	 the	 primary	 obligation	 of	 states	 to	 establish	 accountability	 for	
international	 crimes	 through	 national	 judicial	 systems.	 Although	 domestic	
prosecutions	 of	 conflict-related	 gender-based	 crimes	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 atrocities	
generally	 come	 with	 significant	 challenges,	 national	 courts	 have	 undertaken	 (with	
varied	levels	of	success)	prosecution	of	such	crimes.	The	War	Crimes	Chamber	of	the	
Court	of	Bosnia	 and	Herzegovina	 (WCC),	 a	 specialised	branch	of	 the	Court	of	Bosnia	
and	Herzegovina	created	in	2003,	convicted	33	defendants	on	sexual	violence	charges	
between	2005	and	2013.147	The	WCC	successfully	prosecuted	rape,	sexual	slavery	and	
enslavement,	 gender-based	persecution	 (as	a	CAH)	and	 sexual	 violence	as	 torture	at	
the	domestic	level.148	Likewise,	acts	of	sexual	violence	committed	during	the	Rwandan	
genocide	 were	 prosecuted	 in	 ordinary	 Rwandan	 national	 courts	 before	 being	
transferred	to	gacaca	courts	in	2008.	However,	Kaitesi	notes	the	problematic	aspects	
of	 these	 prosecutions,	 reflected	 in	 inconsistent	 categorisation	 of	 sexual	 violence	
(between	first	and	third	category	offences,	with	the	latter	attracting	only	 light	prison	
sentences)	 as	 well	 as	 a	 large	 number	 of	 acquittals.149	Prosecution	 of	 gender-based	
crimes	is	also	a	priority	for	the	mobile	gender	courts	in	the	Democratic	Republic	of	the	
Congo	 (DRC).150	The	 mobile	 gender	 courts	 are	 a	 response	 of	 the	 Congolese	 judicial	
system	 to	 the	 problem	 of	 enabling	 access	 by	 victims	 to	 courts	 across	 the	 country,	
which	 in	 some	 cases	 may	 require	 a	 week-long	 journey.	 Sexual	 violence	 has	 been	
widespread	 during	 the	 conflict	 in	 the	 Eastern	 DRC,	 which	 has	 one	 of	 the	 highest	
incidences	 of	 such	 acts	 in	 the	 world,	 and	 bringing	 justice	 to	 the	 victims,	 especially	




and	 Challenges.	 An	 analysis	 of	 criminal	 proceedings	 before	 the	 Court	 of	 Bosnia	 and	 Herzegovina	














military	 court	 convicted	 four	 senior	 army	 officers	 and	 five	 lower	 rank	 soldiers	 of	
committing	a	mass	rape	attack	in	the	village	of	Fizi,	therefore	showing	that	prosecution	




The	 ICC	was	 founded	on	and	operates	on	 the	principle	of	complementarity,	which	 is	
enshrined	 in	 Article	 17	 of	 the	 ICC	 Statute.152 	This	 means	 that	 the	 ICC	 will	 only	
investigate	and	prosecute	international	crimes	where	a	state	is	unable	or	unwilling	to	
carry	 out	 such	 proceedings	 within	 the	 domestic	 jurisdiction.	 Therefore,	 the	 ICC	
operates	as	the	court	of	last	resort,	with	the	primary	duty	to	investigate	and	prosecute	
international	 crimes	 under	 the	 ICC	 Statute	 resting	 on	 the	 state	 parties	 to	 the	 ICC	
Statute.	 In	principle,	 this	 includes	 the	 investigation	and	prosecution	of	gender-based	
crimes	 in	a	domestic	 context.	 The	obligation	of	 states	 to	prevent	and	punish	acts	of	
sexual	 and	 gender-based	 violence	 is	 also	 supported	 by	 UN	 Security	 Council	
Resolutions,	which	form	a	part	of	Women,	Peace	and	Security	Agenda	(WPS	Agenda).	
For	instance,	UN	Security	Council	Resolution	1325		
“Emphasizes	 the	 responsibility	of	 all	 States	 to	put	 an	end	 to	 impunity	 and	 to	
prosecute	 those	 responsible	 for	 genocide,	 crimes	 against	 humanity,	 and	war	
crimes	including	those	relating	to	sexual	and	other	violence	against	women	and	
girls,	 and	 in	 this	 regard	 stresses	 the	 need	 to	 exclude	 these	 crimes,	 where	
feasible	from	amnesty	provisions”.153				
																																																								
151	Alison	Cole,	 ‘Making	the	perpetrators	of	mass	sexual	violence	pay:	 International	 justice	 for	gender-
related	 crimes’	 (Openspace,	 6	 March	 2012)	 <http://www.osisa.org/openspace/global/making-
perpetrators-mass-sexual-violence-pay-alison-cole>	 accessed	 15	 July	 2015;	 Kelly	 D.	 Askin,	 ‘Fizi	 Diary:	
Mobile	 Court	 Tries	 Landmark	 Rape	 Case’	 (Open	 Society	 Foundation,	 17	 February	 2011)	
<http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/fizi-diary-mobile-court-tries-landmark-rape-case>	
accessed	15	July	2015.	




primary	 responsibility	 of	 states	 to	 fight	 impunity	 for	 international	 gender-based	 crimes:	 UN	 Security	





Nonetheless,	 it	 remains	 questionable	 whether	 the	 overall	 positive	 assessment	 of	 a	
state’s	general	willingness	and	ability	to	prosecute	international	crimes	is	a	guarantee	
that	 gender-based	 crimes	 will	 be	 adequately	 investigated	 and	 prosecuted	
domestically,	 particularly	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 conflict.	 The	 capacity	 of	 the	 domestic	
legal	 systems	 to	 prosecute	 gender-based	 crimes	 in	 line	 with	 the	 principle	 of	
complementarity	heavily	depends	on	the	existence	of	adequate	and	gender-sensitive	
substantive	laws	as	well	as	procedural	rules.	Ní	Aoláin	shows	that	whilst	many	parties	
to	 the	 Rome	 Statute	 have	 general	 criminal	 laws	 dealing	 with	 sexual	 offences,	 their	
level	 of	 sophistication	 and	 detail	 varies	 significantly.154	Also,	 even	 where	 legislation	







(or	 lack	 thereof)	of	 conflict-related	gender-based	crimes	before	 the	domestic	 courts.	
Indeed,	 concerns	 have	 been	 expressed	 by	 various	 commentators	with	 regard	 to	 the	
rights	of	 the	accused	 in	 the	domestic	proceedings,	particularly	over	 the	due	process	
rights	and	fairness	of	the	proceedings.157	Likewise,	similar	concerns	exist	with	regard	to	
the	 treatment	 of	 gender-based	 crimes	 and	 real	 prospects	 of	 their	 effective	 and	 fair	
prosecution.	Unfortunately,	 the	 extensive	 and	 gender-sensitive	 provisions	 of	 the	 ICC	
statute	 related	 to	 gender-based	 crimes	 do	 not	 find	 reflection	 in	 complementarity	
																																																																																																																																																																		
2009)	 UN	 Doc.	 S/RES/1889,	 para.3;	 UN	 Security	 Council	 Resolution	 2106	 (24	 June	 2013)	 UN	 Doc.	
S/RES/2106,	 para.2;	 UN	 Security	 Council	 Resolution	 2122	 (18	 October	 2013)	 UN	 Doc.	 S/RES/2122,	
para.12.	
154	Fionnuala	 Ní	 Aoláin,	 ‘Gendered	 Harms	 and	 their	 Interface	 with	 International	 Criminal	 Law’	 (2014)	
16(4)	International	Feminist	Journal	of	Politics	622,	Appendix	I.	
155	Nicola	Westmarland,	 Geetanjali	 Gangoli	 (eds),	 International	 Approaches	 to	 Rape	 (The	 Policy	 Press	
2011)	8.	





on	 National	 Due	 Process’	 (2006)	 17	 Criminal	 Law	 Forum	 255;	 Enrique	 Rojo,	 ‘The	 Role	 of	 Fair	 Trial	






domestic	 level.158	This	 in	turn	creates	a	potential	 impunity	gap	whereby	perpetrators	
of	 gender-based	 crimes	 may	 go	 unpunished	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 complementarity	
assessment	may	indicate	general	willingness	and	ability	of	the	state	to	prosecute	other	
types	 of	 crimes,	 such	 as	 murder	 or	 torture. 159 	Therefore,	 it	 is	 necessary	 that	
preliminary	investigations	carried	out	by	the	ICC	Prosecutor	include	the	assessment	of	
factors,	 which	 may	 impede	 genuine	 investigation	 and	 prosecution	 of	 gender-based	
crimes	 by	 domestic	 courts.	 These	 factors	may	 include	 (although	 are	 not	 limited	 to)	
gender	 stereotypes	 embedded	 in	 domestic	 substantive	 laws	 and	 procedural	 rules;	




Equally,	 from	a	 long-term	perspective,	 efforts	 should	 be	made	by	 parties	 to	 the	 ICC	
Statute	 to	amend	 their	national	 laws	and	 rules	of	procedure	 to	 reflect	 standards	 set	





158	This	 argument	 is	 also	 advanced	 by	 Chappell	 et	 al.	 with	 regard	 to	 ICC	 preliminary	 examinations	 of	




women’s	 groups,	 non-governmental	 organisations	 and	 NATO	 of	 rape	 and	 other	 crimes	 of	 sexual	
violence	committed	on	a	 large	scale	during	the	conflict	 in	Kosovo	(…)	 it	appears	that	there	had,	up	to	
April	 2007	been	only	 one	 indictment	 including	 a	 charge	of	 rape	or	 sexual	 violence	 as	 a	war	 crime	or	





Paper	 on	 Sexual	 and	 Gender-Based	 Crimes	 (June	 2014),	 para.41	 <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-Policy-Paper-on-Sexual-and-Gender-Based-Crimes--June-2014.pdf>	accessed	17	
March	2015.	






The	 pursuit	 of	 justice	 for	 conflict-related	 gender-based	 crimes	 continues	 to	 face	
obstacles	both	at	 the	 international	 and	domestic	 levels.	 The	observation	of	 the	 ICTY	
Trial	 Chamber	 in	 Kupreskic	 that	 “we	 have	 had	 to	 shoulder	 the	 heavy	 burden	 of	
establishing	incredible	facts	by	means	of	credible	evidence”	remains	true.162	Although	
notable	 advances	 have	 been	made	 since	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 ICTY	 in	 the	mid-90’s	 in	
relation	 to	 developing	 gender	 jurisprudence	 as	 well	 as	 creating	 a	 gender-sensitive	
system	of	procedural	rules,	international	prosecution	of	gender-based	crimes	is	not	to	
be	taken	for	granted.	Undoubtedly,	the	substantive	 law	and	 jurisprudence	applicable	
to	gender-based	crimes	has	grown	and	developed	 immensely	over	 the	course	of	 the	
past	 25	 years,	 with	 the	 ICC	 statute	 codifying	 the	 substantive	 part	 of	 this	 practice.	








increase	 the	 likelihood	 of	 obtaining	 ‘good	 and	 reliable’	 evidence	 to	 support	
prosecution	 of	 conflict-related	 gender-based	 crimes,	 both	 in	 international	 and	
domestic	context.	The	International	Protocol	on	the	Documentation	and	Investigation	
of	 Sexual	 Violence	 in	 Conflict,	 launched	 in	 June	 2014	 by	 the	 UK	 Foreign	 &	
Commonwealth	 Office,	 is	 a	 good	 example	 of	 an	 initiative	 that	 seeks	 to	 provide	 the	
means	to	realise	such	aim.163	When	considered	from	an	 international	criminal	 justice	













An	 effective	 and	 gender-sensitive	 prosecutorial	 strategy	 is	 central	 to	 securing	
successful	convictions	for	conflict-related	sexual	and	gender-based	violence.	After	all,	
















The	 right	 of	 victims	 of	 international	 crimes	 and	 gross	 human	 rights	 violations	 to	 an	
effective	 remedy	 has	 been	 long	 recognized	 in	 international	 treaty	 law,	 international	
case-law	and	 in	soft	 law	 instruments.1	More	recently,	 the	 ICC	Statute	 laid	ground	for	
the	 award	 of	 reparations	 in	 international	 criminal	 law.	 Although	 the	 right	 to	
reparations	is	recognized	in	international	law,	the	gender	dimension	of	reparations	for	
conflict-related	harms	has	only	fairly	recently	emerged	as	a	topic	of	academic	inquiry	
in	 international	 law.2	For	 instance,	 the	 issue	of	 reparations	 for	 victims	of	 sexual	 and	




the	 process	 of	 transition	 from	 conflict	 to	 peace	 and	 securing	 post-conflict	 justice.	
Gender-sensitive	 reparations	 for	women	who	are	victims	of	 international	crimes	and	
gross	 violations	 of	 human	 rights	 are	 an	 integral	 part	 of	 these	 processes	 and	 an	
important	element	 in	addressing	 the	 long-term	 impact	of	armed	conflict	on	women.	
Thus	far,	international	law’s	efforts	to	address	the	long-term	impact	of	armed	conflict	
on	 women	 focused	 predominantly	 on	 attempting	 to	 close	 the	 impunity	 gap	 for	
																																																								
1	Discussed	in	detail	in	section	4	below.		
2	Ruth	 Rubio-Marín	 (ed),	What	 Happened	 to	 the	Women?	Gender	 and	 Reparations	 for	 Human	 Rights	
Violations	 (New	 York:	 Social	 Sciences	 Research	 Council	 2006);	 Ruth	 Rubio-Marín	 (ed),	 The	 Gender	 of	
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Commissioner	on	Human	Rights,	 ‘A	Guidance	Note	of	 the	Secretary	General:	Reparations	 for	Conflict-
Related	 Sexual	 Violence’	 (June	 2014)	 <http://www.unwomen.org/en/docs/2014/6/reparations-for-
conflict-related-sexual-violence>	accessed	17	July	2015.	
3	Yuma	Totani,‘Legal	Responses	to	World	War	II	Sexual	Violence:	the	Japanese	Experience’	 in	Elizabeth	






related	 gender-based	 crimes	 (discussed	 in	 chapters	 4	 and	 5)	 have	 provided	 an	
important	 but	 somewhat	 limited	 avenue	 of	 redress	 for	 the	 victims.	 Whilst	
international	 criminal	 tribunals	 delivered	 symbolic	 justice	 by,	 in	most	 cases,	 holding	
the	key	perpetrators	of	gender-based	crimes	to	account,	they	did	not	have	the	powers	
or	 jurisdiction	 to	award	reparations	 for	 the	victims.4	The	 jurisdictional	and	 functional	
distinction	 between	 civil	 and	 criminal	 courts	 meant	 that	 in	 order	 to	 obtain	 further	
redress	 for	 harm	 suffered,	 the	 victims	 needed	 to	 resort	 to	 national	 courts	 to	 claim	
compensation.5	This	 process	 brought	 about	 inherent	 challenges	 illustrated	 by	 the	
shortcomings	 in	 domestic	 legislation,	 different	 rules	 on	 the	 recognition	 of	 victims	





This	 chapter	 looks	 at	 the	 right	 to	 reparation	 in	 international	 law	 through	 a	 gender	






discussed.	 Finally,	 the	 chapter	 assesses	 the	 prospect	 of	 developing	 gender-sensitive	



















law.	 There	 has	 been	 relatively	 little	 engagement	 with	 theorising	 harm	 in	 the	 legal	
context,	exploring	its	elements	and	determining	its	scope.	In	the	context	of	inter-state	
reparations,	 the	 International	 Law	 Commission	 Draft	 Articles	 on	 Responsibility	 of	
States	 for	 Internationally	Wrongful	Acts	2001	(ILC	Draft	Articles)	adopt	a	 language	of	
‘damage’	 and	 ‘injury’	 to	 determine	 the	 extent	 of	 harm	 and	 to	 assess	 the	 state’s	
responsibility	for	repairing	that	harm.8	Article	31(1)	of	the	(ILC	Draft	Articles)	places	an	
obligation	 on	 all	 states	 to	 “make	 full	 reparation	 for	 the	 injury	 caused	 by	 the	
internationally	 wrongful	 act”.9	The	 provision	 further	 states	 that	 “injury	 includes	 any	
damage,	whether	material	 or	moral,	 caused	by	 the	 internationally	wrongful	 act	 of	 a	
State”.	However,	although	injury	may	include	damage,	 it	does	not	necessarily	consist	
of	 it.	 In	 other	 words,	 injury,	 which	 results	 from	 an	 infringement	 of	 rights	 or	 legally	
protected	interest,	does	not	have	to	result	in	the	material	or	other	damage	in	order	to	
invoke	 the	 international	 responsibility	 of	 a	 state	 to	 repair	 that	 injury.10	As	 such,	 the	




suffered	 by	 individuals,	 two	 key	 issues	 arise.	 Firstly,	 there	 is	 a	 question	 of	 whether	
international	law	imposes	an	obligation	on	states	to	provide	reparations	to	individuals	
																																																								
7	UN	 Basic	 Principles	 and	 Guidelines	 on	 the	 Right	 to	 a	 Remedy	 and	 Reparation	 for	 Victims	 of	 Gross	
Violations	of	International	Human	Rights	Law	and	Serious	Violations	of	International	Humanitarian	Law,	
UN	 Doc.	 A/RES/60/147,	 adopted	 by	 the	 General	 Assembly	 on	 16	 December	 2005	 (hereinafter:	 2005	
Basic	Principles).	
8	International	 Law	Commission,	Draft	Articles	on	Responsibility	of	 States	 for	 Internationally	Wrongful	











individuals	 as	 subjects	 of	 international	 law.	 Although	 the	 positivist	 view	 of	
international	law	definitively	excludes	individuals	as	subjects	of	international	law,	post-
1945	 developments	 forced	 a	 gradual	 alteration	 of	 this	 traditional	 position.	 The	
adoption	 of	 the	 Nuremberg	 Charter,	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 IHRL	 framework	 as	well	 as	
adoption	of	 the	 four	Geneva	Conventions	of	 1949	 confirmed	 that	 individuals	 can	be	
beneficiaries	of	 rights	as	well	as	bearers	of	some	responsibilities,	 including	 individual	
criminal	 responsibility	 for	 international	 crimes	 under	 ICL.	 The	 latter	 principle	 was	
further	reflected	in	UNSC	Resolutions	827	(1993)	and	955	(1994)	establishing	the	ICTY	
and	 the	 ICTR	 (respectively)	 and	 in	 Article	 25	 of	 the	 Rome	 Statute	 of	 the	 ICC.	
Furthermore,	 the	 ICJ	 confirmed	 in	 the	 LaGrand	 Case	 that	 international	 law	 treaties	
may	create	individual	rights,	which	may	be	invoked	before	international	courts.11	The	
ICJ	 therefore	 reversed	 the	 traditional	 position	 expressed	 by	 the	 PCIJ	 in	 its	 Advisory	
Opinion	 concerning	Jurisdiction	 of	 the	 Courts	 of	 Danzig,	which	 stated	 that	 a	 treaty	
between	 Germany	 and	 Poland,	 “being	 an	 international	 agreement,	 cannot	 as	 such	
create	direct	rights	and	obligations	for	private	individuals”.12	Individuals	have	become	
accepted	 as	 subjects	 of	 international	 law	 or	 rather,	 in	 Higgins’	 view,	 participants	 in	









the	 Polish	 Service,	 against	 the	 Polish	 Railways	Administration),	 Advisory	Opinion,	 (1928)	 PCIJ	 Series	 B	
No.15,	17.	






treaties,	 including	 the	 key	 regional	 human	 rights	 treaties	 such	 as	 the	 European	
Convention	of	Human	Rights	(ECHR)	and	American	Charter	of	Human	Rights.14	The	UN	
Human	 Rights	 Committee	 considers	 the	 right	 to	 an	 effective	 remedy	 to	 be	 non-
derogable,	 even	 in	 states	 of	 emergency,	 and	 has	 established	 a	 clear	 link	 between	
reparations	 and	 the	 obligation	 of	 states	 to	 provide	 an	 effective	 remedy.15	As	 such,	
under	 IHRL,	 there	 exists	 a	 right	 of	 individuals	 to	 obtain	 a	 remedy	 for	 human	 rights	





to	 the	 responsibility	 of	 states	 to	 provide	 reparation	 to	 individuals	 and	which	would	
define	the	elements	of	harm	in	that	context.	By	analogy	to	the	ILC	Draft	Articles,	the	
international	 law	understanding	of	harms	suffered	by	individuals	can	be	defined	with	
reference	 to	obligations	of	 states	 vis-à-vis	 individuals	which	 are	 enshrined	 in	human	
rights	treaties.	
A	human	rights-based	understanding	of	‘harm’	should	be	twofold;	within	this	approach	
harm	 can	 be	 viewed	 as	 comprising	 two	 elements:	 firstly,	 the	 breach	 of	 the	 state’s	
obligations	 towards	 an	 individual	 established	 under	 international	 law	 and	 secondly,	
negative	 consequences	 /	 impact	 arising	 from	 that	 breach.	 The	 latter	 should	 include	
losses	of	both	a	pecuniary	and	non-pecuniary	nature.		
	





regarding	 the	 right	 to	 remedy	 or	 reparations	 for	 violations	 of	 rights	 enshrined	 in	 the	 Charter.	 Article	
21(2)	 of	 the	 ACHPR	 explicitly	 mentions	 compensation	 only	 in	 cases	 involving	 spoliation	 of	 natural	
resources:	“In	case	of	spoliation	the	dispossessed	people	shall	have	the	right	to	the	lawful	recovery	of	its	
property	as	well	as	to	an	adequate	compensation”.	
15	UN	 Human	 Rights	 Committee,	 General	 Comment	 No.29:	 States	 of	 Emergency	 (Article	 4)	 U.N.	 Doc.	















to	 their	 gender.	 However,	 the	 term	 encompasses	 harms	 which	 can	 be	 experienced	
only	 by	 women,	 such	 as	 forced	 pregnancy	 or	 harms	 associated	 with	 the	 female	
reproductive	system.17	Secondly,	whilst	 some	gendered	harms	may	not	be	 limited	 to	
women	 in	 a	biological	 sense,	 but	 are	more	 likely	 to	be	experienced	by	women	 than	
men	or	which	affect	women	disproportionately.	In	addition,	it	ought	to	be	noted	that	a	
particular	 violation	may	 be	 differently	 experienced	 by	 a	woman	 than	 by	 a	man	 and	
imply	different	types	of	harm.18		
	
Feminist	 legal	 scholars	 have	 long	 recognized	 that	 law,	 both	 at	 domestic	 and	 at	
international	 level,	has	demonstrated	a	 limited	engagement	with	fully	addressing	the	
needs	 and	 experiences	 of	 women.19	The	 shortcomings	 in	 legal	 responses	 to	 female	






17	Joanne	 Conaghan,	 ‘Gendered	 Harms	 and	 the	 Law	 of	 Tort:	 Remedying	 (Sexual)	 Harassment’	 (1996)	
16(3)	Oxford	Journal	of	Legal	Studies	407,	407-408.	
18	Ruth	Rubio-Marín,	‘The	Gender	of	Reparations	in	Transitional	Societies’	in:	Ruth	Rubio-Marín	(ed),	The	
Gender	 of	 Reparations.	 Unsettling	 Sexual	 Hierarchies	While	 Redressing	Human	 Rights	 Violations	 (CUP	
2009)	97-99.	






and	 male	 assumptions,	 which	 largely	 marginalised	 experiences	 of	 women	 and	
effectively	excluded	them	from	shaping	the	international	legal	framework.20		
	
Over	 the	 past	 three	 decades,	 international	 law	 has	 started	 to	 recognize	 the	 wide	
spectrum	 of	 the	 impact	 of	 armed	 conflict	 on	women	 as	well	 as	 the	 urgent	 need	 to	
address	 this	 matter. 21 	Generally,	 efforts	 to	 address	 this	 problem	 focused	
predominantly	 on	 strengthening	 protection	 from	 sexual	 and	 gender-based	 violence	
and,	 to	 a	 large	 extent,	 prosecution	 of	 gender-based	 crimes.	 However,	 the	 issue	 of	
remedying	gender-specific	violations	through	reparations	has	remained	marginalised.	
Despite	 some	notable	 advances	 in	 fighting	 impunity	 for	wartime	 sexual	 and	 gender-
based	 violence,	 international	 law	 only	 relatively	 recently	 started	 to	 engage	with	 the	
notion	 of	 gendered	 harms	 sustained	 during	 armed	 conflict,	 doing	 so	 predominantly	
through	 the	 lens	 of	 international	 criminal	 law.	 Nonetheless,	 the	 understanding	 of	
gendered	harms	which	arises	 from	the	 jurisprudence	of	 international	 criminal	 courts	
and	 tribunals	 demonstrates	 a	 somewhat	 narrow	 conceptualisation	 of	 such	 harms	
sustained	 by	 women	 during	 armed	 conflict,	 often	 reliant	 on	 essentialist	 notions	 of	
female	 victimhood.22	The	 treatment	 of	 forced	 marriage	 as	 a	 sex-only	 crime,	 to	 the	
exclusion	 of	 its	 non-sexual	 aspect,	 or	 the	 flawed	 approach	 towards	 prosecution	 of	
crimes	committed	against	girl	soldiers	are	illustrative	in	that	respect.23		
	
The	 provision	 of	 gender-sensitive	 and	 adequate	 reparations	 for	 women	 in	 the	
aftermath	of	conflict	relies	heavily	on	a	gender-inclusive	understanding	of	the	nature	
and	 wide	 spectrum	 of	 gendered	 harms.	 Therefore,	 a	 greater	 understanding	 of	
gendered	harms	is	required	in	order	to	provide	a	basis	for	developing	a	comprehensive	




22	Several	 authors	 criticise	 the	 essentialist	 approach	 in	 international	 law:	 Christine	 Chinkin,	 Hilary	
Charlesworth,	 The	 boundaries	 of	 international	 law.	 A	 feminist	 analysis	 (Manchester	 University	 Press	
2000)	52-56;	Mark	A.	Drumbl,	 ‘“She	makes	me	ashamed	to	be	a	woman”:	The	Genocide	Conviction	of	
Pauline	Nyiramasuhuko’	(2012-2013)	34	Michigan	Journal	of	International	Law	559,	581-590.		
23	For	 a	 detailed	 discussion	 of	 these	 issues	 see:	 Chapter	 4,	 sections	 3.1.2.5.	 (forced	 marriage)	 and	
3.2.2.1.	(crimes	committed	against	girl	soldiers).		














Gendered	 harms	 occur	 as	 a	 result	 of	 social	 relations.	 Therefore,	 they	 need	 to	 be	
assessed	and	understood	in	the	broader	social	context	and	with	a	broad	understanding	
of	the	possible	types	of	harms.25	Such	an	approach	to	gendered	harms	may	avoid	the	
risk	 of	 producing	 an	 essentialist	 picture	 of	 a	 female	 victim	 who	 suffers	 only	 sexual	
harms,	leaving	out	a	range	of	other	egregious	violations	to	which	women	are	subjected	
during	 conflict.26	Gendered	harms	are	 inherently	 interlinked	with	 the	 gender-specific	
impact	of	armed	conflict	on	women,	which	often	involves,	but	is	certainly	not	limited	
to,	sexual	violence.	As	discussed	in	chapter	2,	acts	of	sexual	and	gender-based	violence	
have	 profound	 long-term	 impacts	 on	 women’s	 post-conflict	 lives	 as	 well	 as	 their	
physical	 and	 mental	 health.	 Although	 the	 severe	 impact	 of	 conflict-related	 sexual	
violence	is	generally	recognized	in	 international	 law,	particularly	through	IHL	and	ICL,	
violations	of	women’s	 reproductive	 rights	 (e.g.	 loss	of	 reproductive	capacity)	are	not	
typically	 included	 or	 conceptualised	 as	 distinct	 violations	 of	 human	 rights.27	Instead,	
reparation	 programmes	 tend	 to	 focus	 on	 remedying	 harms	 arising	 from	 violation	 of	






Gender	 of	 Reparations.	 Unsettling	 Sexual	 Hierarchies	While	 Redressing	Human	 Rights	 Violations	 (CUP	
2009)	 80;	 Fionnuala	Ní	Aoláin,	 ‘Exploring	 a	 Feminist	 Theory	of	Harm	 in	 the	Context	of	Conflicted	and	
Post-Conflict	Societies’	(2009-2010)	35	Queen’s	Law	Journal	219,	233-234.	
27	Ruth	Rubio-Marín,	‘The	Gender	of	Reparations	in	Transitional	Societies’	in:	Ruth	Rubio-Marín	(ed),	The	




Whilst	 international	 law	 (especially	 IHL	 and	 ICL)	 focuses	 largely	 on	 sexual	 violence,	
women’s	experiences	of	conflict	 include	harms	of	a	non-sexual	nature,	such	as	PTSD,	
forced	labour,	loss	of	housing,	forced	displacement	and	violations	of	economic,	social	
and	 cultural	 rights.28	Sankey	 further	 emphasizes	 a	 range	 of	 socio-economic	 forms	 of	
violence	experienced	by	women	which	deprive	them	of	the	basic	subsistence	resulting	
in	 subsistence	harms.29	Despite	 their	grave	 impact,	 subsistence	harms	 in	 the	 form	of	
forced	 displacement,	 attacks	 on	 homes,	 livelihoods	 and	 basic	 resources,	 have	 been	
largely	marginalised	in	international	law.	The	treatment	of	such	harms	in	international	
law	 has	 been	 reduced	 to	 viewing	 them	 through	 the	 lens	 of	 their	 material	 impact,	
without	focusing	on	the	physical,	psychological,	social	as	well	as	the	gendered	aspect	
of	the	harms.	Although	some	subsistence	harms	have	been	recognized	by	the	ICTY	and	











As	 was	 demonstrated	 in	 Chapter	 2,	 gendered	 harms	 sustained	 by	 women	 during	
armed	 conflict	 have	 significant	 implications	 primarily	 for	 the	 harmed	 individual	 but	
also	 for	 the	broader	community.	This	 in	 turn	creates	what	 some	scholars	 refer	 to	as	
																																																								




29	Diana	 Sankey,	 ‘Gendered	 Experiences	 of	 Subsistence	 Harms:	 A	 Possible	 Contribution	 to	 Feminist	
Discourse	on	Gendered	Harm?’(2015)	24(1)	Social	&	Legal	Studies	25-45.	





‘communities	of	harm’,	 composed	of	persons	emotionally	 tied	 to	 the	 victims	or	 in	 a	
relationship	of	co-dependency	with	them.31	
	
Generally,	 international	 law	 does	 not	 recognise	 such	 communities.	 It	 focuses	
exclusively	on	the	injured	individuals	whose	victimhood	forms	the	basis	for	the	right	to	
receive	 reparations.	 More	 recent	 soft	 law	 developments,	 such	 as	 the	 2005	 Basic	
Principles	 and	 the	 2014	 UNSG’s	 Guidance	 Note	 depart	 from	 such	 understanding	 of	
victimhood	and	broaden	the	definitional	scope	of	the	term	‘victim’	to	include	“family	







The	 key	 purpose	 of	 reparations,	 albeit	 often	 practically	 impossible,	 is	 to	 restore	 the	
order	which	was	disturbed	by	 the	 violation,	 to	 ‘undo’	 the	wrong	and	 to	 remedy	 the	






in	 International	 Law’	 (2000)	 12	 Yale	 Journal	 of	 Law	 and	 Feminism	 43-84;	 Ruth	 Rubio-Marín,	 Clara	
Sandoval,	Catalina	Díaz,	‘Repairing	Family	Members:	Gross	Human	Rights	Violations	and	Communities	of	
Harm’	 in	 Ruth	 Rubio-Marín	 (ed),	 The	 Gender	 of	 Reparations.	 Unsettling	 Sexual	 Hierarchies	 While	
Redressing	Human	Rights	Violations	(CUP	2009)	215-290.	














of	 an	 engagement	 involves	 an	 obligation	 to	 make	 reparation	 in	 an	 adequate	 form.	
Reparation	 therefore	 is	 the	 indispensable	 complement	 of	 a	 failure	 to	 apply	 a	









International	 Court	 of	 Justice	 (ICJ)	 in	 several	 cases,	 including	Gabčikovo-Nagymaros	
Project	 Case,	DRC	 v	 Uganda,	 The	 Genocide	 Case	 and	 Ahmadou	 Sadio	 Diallo	 Case.36	
However,	 the	 ICJ	 (and,	previously,	 the	PCIJ)	 focuses	predominantly	on	the	traditional	
understanding	 of	 an	 obligation	 to	 make	 reparation	 as	 an	 interstate	 remedy	 for	
violations	 of	 international	 law	 and	 breaches	 of	 state	 responsibility.	 Therefore,	
traditionally,	 the	 beneficiaries	 of	 reparations	 in	 general	 international	 law	 are	 states,	
not	 individuals.37	The	 obligation	 of	 states	 to	 make	 reparations	 for	 internationally	
wrongful	 acts	 is	 also	 articulated	 in	 Article	 31	 of	 the	 International	 Law	 Commission	








82,	 para.259;	 Application	 of	 the	 Convention	 on	 the	 Prevention	 and	 Punishment	 of	 the	 Crime	 of	
Genocide	 (Bosnia	 and	 Herzegovina	 v	 Serbia	 and	 Montenegro)	 ICJ	 Reports	 2007,	 26	 February	 2007,	
p.232-233;	 Case	 Concerning	 Ahmadou	 Sadio	 Diallo	 (Republic	 of	 Guinea	 v	 Democratic	 Republic	 of	 the	
Congo),	Judgment,	ICJ	Reports	2010,	639,	para.161.	
37	This	approach	is	illustrated	in	the	Civilian	War	Claimants	Association	Ltd	v.	The	King	[1932]	AC	14.	The	
case	 concerned	 a	 question	 whether	 Article	 232	 of	 the	 Versailles	 Treaty	 obliging	 Germany	 to	 “make	
compensation	 for	all	damage	done	 to	 the	civilian	population	of	 the	Allied	and	Associated	Powers	and	
their	 property”	 conferred	 a	 right	 to	 compensation	 upon	 individual	 persons	 concerned.	 The	 House	 of	







Nonetheless,	 there	 has	 been	 a	 gradual	 shift	 towards	 including	 natural	 and	 legal	
persons	as	direct	beneficiaries	of	reparations.	This	shift	was	particularly	due	to	the	rise	
in	 recognition	of	 the	 importance	of	human	 rights	and	 its	 impact	on	 the	evolution	of	
other	branches	of	 international	 law,	especially	with	regard	to	recognition	of	rights	of	
individuals	 in	 international	 law.39	The	 official	 commentary	 to	 Article	 33	 of	 the	 ILC	
Articles	views	individuals	as	direct	beneficiaries	of	reparations.	It	acknowledges	that		
“(…)	 a	 State’s	 responsibility	 for	 the	 breach	 of	 an	 obligation	 under	 a	 treaty	
concerning	 the	 protection	 of	 human	 rights	 may	 exist	 towards	 all	 the	 other	
parties	to	the	treaty,	but	the	individuals	concerned	should	be	regarded	as	the	





to	 “compensate,	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 applicable	 rules	 of	 international	 law,	 all	
natural	or	legal	persons	having	suffered	any	form	of	material	damage	as	a	result	of	the	






categories	 are	 also	 reflected	 in	 the	 1985	General	 Assembly	 Declaration	 of	 the	 Basic	
Principles	 of	 Justice	 for	 Victims	 of	 Crime	 and	 Abuse	 of	 Power	 and	 in	 the	 ILC	 Draft	
Articles	 which	 additionally	 include	 satisfaction	 (Article	 37)	 amongst	 the	 types	 of	
																																																																																																																																																																		





Acts.	General	Commentary,	Yearbook	of	 the	 International	Law	Commission	 (2001)	vol.	 II,	Part	Two,	91	
(Article	33,	para.3)	(hereinafter	ILC	Draft	Articles,	General	Commentary).	





a	 limited	 effect	 in	 cases	 involving	 armed	 conflict,	 especially	 where	 gender-based	
crimes	 are	 concerned.	 The	 irreversible	 nature	 of	 gendered	 harms	 (particularly	 their	
reproductive	aspect)	as	well	as	the	level	of	both	physical	and	mental	pain	and	suffering	





the	 need	 to	 incorporate	 gender-sensitive	 reparations	 into	 the	 existing	 legal	





2106	 stresses	 the	 importance	 of	 “supporting	 survivors	 in	 accessing	 justice	 and	
reparations”.44	UNSCR	 2122	 further	 recalls	 the	 right	 to	 reparations	 for	 violations	 of	
individual	 harms,	 especially	 in	 relation	 to	 international	 crimes	 committed	 against	





perspective.	 The	WPS	 resolutions	 brought	 the	 topic	 of	 reparations	 for	 gender-based	
violence	 into	 the	 realm	 of	 the	 UN	 Security	 Council	 and	 framed	 it	 in	 the	 context	 of	
international	 peace	 and	 security.	As	 such,	 it	 not	only	 emphasized	 the	 importance	of	
																																																								
42	UNGA	Resolution	40/34,	Declaration	of	the	Basic	Principles	of	Justice	for	Victims	of	Crime	and	Abuse	
of	 Power,	 UN	 Doc.	 A/RES/40/34,	 29	 November	 1985,	 Annex,	 paras.8-13;	 Article	 34	 (restitution)	 and	
Article	36	(compensation)	ILC	Draft	Articles.	
43	It	is	further	argued	in	this	thesis	that	restoring	the	system	existing	before	the	violations	took	place	is	
an	 inadequate	 form	 of	 reparation	 for	 gender-based	 harms	 sustained	 in	 armed	 conflict	 as	 it	 likely	 to	
reinforce	the	system	of	inequality	and	structural	discrimination	existing	before	the	conflict	(for	further	
discussion	see	section	5.1.1.	below).		





full	 and	 effective	 reparations	 for	 conflict-related	 sexual	 violence	 as	 an	 essential	
component	of	a	durable	peace,	but	also	paved	the	way	for	other	developments	at	the	
UN	 level,	 such	 as	 the	 UN	 Secretary-General’s	 Guidance	 Note	 on	 Reparations	 for	
Conflict-Related	 Sexual	 Violence	 (June	 2014).46	Finally,	 the	 UNSCRs	 1888	 and	 2106	









A	Party	 to	 the	 conflict	which	violates	 the	provisions	of	 the	Conventions	or	of	
this	Protocol	shall,	if	the	case	demands,	be	liable	to	pay	compensation.	It	shall	
be	 responsible	 for	 all	 acts	 committed	 by	 persons	 forming	 part	 of	 its	 armed	
forces.47	
This	 legal	 principle	 is	 also	 reflected	 in	 customary	 IHL	 (CIHL),	 whereby	 “a	 State	
responsible	 for	 violations	 of	 international	 humanitarian	 law	 is	 required	 to	make	 full	
reparation	 for	 the	 loss	 or	 injury	 caused”.48	Despite	 the	 absence	 of	 corresponding	




However,	 the	 IHL	 provisions	 regarding	 reparation	 for	 violations	 of	 IHL	 are	 not	
uncircumscribed.	 Firstly,	 Article	 91	 of	 AP	 I	 employs	 a	 narrow	 focus	 on	 remedies,	
																																																								











nature	 of	 compensation	 and	 hence	 does	 not	 directly	 refer	 to	 individuals	 as	
beneficiaries	of	such	remedy.	Accordingly,	IHL	does	not	foresee	avenues	of	redress	for	
individuals	who	have	 suffered	 violations	 of	 IHL.	However,	 some	 commentators	 have	
argued	 in	 favour	 of	 reading	 of	 this	 provision	 as	 inclusive	 of	 individuals.	 Kalshoven	
justifies	 such	 an	 interpretation	 with	 reference	 to	 the	 records	 of	 the	 Second	 Hague	
Peace	 Conference	 1907	 during	 which	 the	 text	 of	 this	 provision	 was	 adopted. 49	
Kalshoven’s	argument	that	the	parties	to	the	conference	intended	to	lay	down	a	rule	














Furthermore,	 the	 operation	 of	 the	 rules	 on	 compensation	 for	 violations	 of	 IHL	 is	
additionally	challenged	by	the	typology	of	modern	armed	conflicts,	which	are	primarily	
																																																								
49	Frits	 Kalshoven,	 ‘State	 Responsibility	 for	Warlike	 Acts	 of	 the	Armed	 Forces’	 (1991)	 40	 International	
and	Comparative	Law	Quarterly	827,	830-832.	
50	Christopher	Greenwood,	‘International	Humanitarian	Law	(Laws	of	War)’	 in:	Frits	Kalshoven	(ed)	The	
Centennial	 of	 the	 First	 International	 Peace	 Conference	 (Kluwer	 Law	 International	 2000)	 250;	 Liesbeth	
Zegveld,	 ‘Remedies	 for	Victims	of	Violations	of	 International	Humanitarian	 Law’	 (2003)	Vol.85	No.851	
International	Review	of	the	Red	Cross	497,	506.	
51 	Yves	 Sandoz,	 Christophe	 Swiniarski,	 Bruno	 Zimmermann	 (eds),	 Commentary	 on	 the	 Additional	
Protocols	of	8	 June	1977	 to	 the	Geneva	Conventions	of	12	August	1949	 (ICRC,	Martinus	Nijhoff	1987)	







non-international	 in	 nature	 and	 usually	 waged	 by	 non-state	 actors.	 Article	 3	 of	 the	
Hague	Convention	 IV	as	well	 as	Article	91	of	AP	 I	 focus	exclusively	on	obligations	of	
states	to	pay.	Whilst	there	exist	a	few	examples	of	state	practice	and	United	Nations	
practice	 supporting	 the	 recognition	 of	 an	 obligation	 of	 armed	 opposition	 groups	 to	
provide	 reparations	 for	 violations	 of	 IHL,	 the	 extent	 of	 such	 obligations	 remains	
unclear.53	Moreover,	even	 if	such	an	obligation	was	recognized,	the	determination	of	
such	 claims	 remains	 questionable,	 particularly	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 judicial	 body	
mandated	with	addressing	violations	of	IHL.		
	
Finally,	 the	 question	 arises	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 actual	 ability	 of	 individuals	 to	 enforce	
their	rights	to	receive	reparations	for	violations	of	IHL	before	domestic	courts.	Zegveld	
rightly	 notes	 that	 “primary	 rights	 in	 IHL	 do	 not	 necessarily	 translate	 into	 secondary	
rights	as	a	consequence	of	 their	breach”,	 forcing	victims	 to	 rely	on	CIHL	or	domestic	
















55	Sharon	Weill,	 The	 Role	 of	 National	 Courts	 in	 Applying	 International	 Humanitarian	 Law	 (OUP	 2014)	
168-169;	 Jean-Marie	 Henckaerts,	 Louise	 Doswald-Beck,	 Customary	 International	 Humanitarian	 Law	







to	 sexual	 violence,	 IHL	 continues	 to	 offer	 very	 limited	 avenues	 of	 redress	 for	 such	





The	 key	 modern	 developments	 in	 relation	 to	 reparations	 in	 international	 law	 have	
been	 advanced	 through	 IHRL,	 both	 in	 hard	 law	 and	 soft	 law	 form.	 In	 2005,	 the	 UN	
General	Assembly	adopted	the	most	comprehensive	set	of	guidelines	on	reparations	to	
date.57	Two	 years	 later,	 the	 Nairobi	 Declaration	 on	 Women’s	 and	 Girls’	 Rights	 to	 a	
Remedy	and	Reparation	was	developed	by	a	coalition	of	civil	society	organizations	 in	




The	 Basic	 Principles	 and	 Guidelines	 on	 the	 Right	 to	 a	 Remedy	 and	 Reparation	 for	
Victims	of	Gross	Violations	of	 International	Human	Rights	Law	and	Serious	Violations	
of	International	Humanitarian	Law	(The	Basic	Principles)	do	not	create	legally	binding	





norms”. 59 	According	 to	 the	 Basic	 Principles,	 victims,	 defined	 as	 “persons	 who	
																																																								
57	UN	 Basic	 Principles	 and	 Guidelines	 on	 the	 Right	 to	 a	 Remedy	 and	 Reparation	 for	 Victims	 of	 Gross	
Violations	of	International	Human	Rights	Law	and	Serious	Violations	of	International	Humanitarian	Law,	
UN	 Doc.	 A/RES/60/147,	 adopted	 by	 the	 General	 Assembly	 on	 16	 December	 2005	 (hereinafter:	 2005	
Basic	Principles).	






individually	 or	 collectively	 suffered	 harm,	 including	 physical	 or	 mental	 injury,	
emotional	 suffering,	 economic	 loss	 or	 substantial	 impairment	 of	 their	 fundamental	
rights,	 through	 acts	 or	 omissions	 that	 constitute	 gross	 violations	 of	 international	
human	rights	law,	or	serious	violations	of	international	humanitarian	law”,	are	entitled	
to	 five	 key	 types	of	 reparation:	 compensation,	 restitution,	 rehabilitation,	 satisfaction	
and	guarantees	of	non-repetition.60	The	category	of	victims	is	also	expanded	to	include	




established	 thus	 far	 in	 general	 international	 law	 and	 IHL,	 which	 focus	 only	 on	










entities	 as	 providers	 of	 reparations	 indicates	 further	 departure	 from	 the	 traditional	
approach	to	reparations	 in	general	 international	 law,	but	also	poses	some	normative	




62	This	 dynamic	 is	 illustrated	 in	 the	 case-law	 of	 international	 criminal	 tribunals	 as	 well	 as	 the	 ICC,	
primarily	 with	 regard	 to	 international	 crimes	 involving	 sexual	 and	 gender-based	 violence.	 On	 many	
occasions,	family	members	were	forced	to	witness	the	victim	being	raped	or	sexually	assaulted,	which	in	
some	 cases	 heard	 before	 the	 tribunals	 was	 prosecuted	 as	 torture	 (Prosecutor	 v.	 Furundžija,	 Trial	
Judgment,	IT-95-17/1T,	10	December	1998,	para.267).		
However,	 in	contrast,	 the	 ICC	 in	Bemba	 failed	to	conceptualise	 forcing	family	members	to	watch	their	
relatives	being	raped	as	torture.	A	single	charge	of	rape	was	pursued	instead	of	one	rape,	one	torture	
charge:	 Situation	 in	 the	 Central	 African	 Republic:	 Prosecutor	 v.	 Bemba	 (Decision	 pursuant	 to	 Article	






that	 the	 legal	person	 in	question	 is	 liable	 for	 serious	violation	of	human	 rights.	Thus	
far,	 the	normative	boundaries	of	 IHRL,	which	attribute	 the	primary	 responsibility	 for	
protecting	human	rights	to	states,	have	precluded	human	rights	courts	from	breaking	
new	ground	with	regard	to	establishing	direct,	horizontal	liability	of	individuals	under	
IHRL. 64 	However,	 regional	 human	 rights	 courts	 have	 recognized	 and	 successfully	
adjudicated	 cases	 supporting	 the	 liability	 of	 states	 in	 human	 rights	 law	 for	 acts	
committed	 by	 non-state	 actors,	 including	 acts	 of	 violence	 against	 women.65	In	 such	
cases,	the	ultimate	responsibility	for	the	violation	(at	a	supranational	level)	is	found	to	
lie	with	 the	 state	 for	 its	 failure	 in	 fulfilling	due	diligence	obligations	and	not	directly	











The	 ECtHR	 also	 reaffirmed	 states’	 positive	 obligations	 towards	 victims	 of	 trafficking	 in	 human	 beings	
arising	under	Article	4	of	the	ECHR	in	Rantsev:	Rantsev	v.	Cyprus	and	Russia,	Application	No.25965/04,	
Judgment,	7	 January	2010;	 see	also:	Ryszard	Piotrowicz,	 ‘States’	Obligations	under	Human	Rights	 Law	
towards	Victims	of	Trafficking	 in	Human	Beings:	Positive	Developments	 in	Positive	Obligations’	 (2012)	
24(2)	International	Journal	of	Refugee	Law	181-201.	
65	Velásquez	 Rodríguez	 v.	 Honduras,	 IACtHR,	 Judgment	 (Merits),	 29	 July	 1988,	 Ser.C,	 No.7,	 paras.172-
177;	 González	 et	 al.	 (“Cotton	 Field”)	 v.	 Mexico,	 IACtHR,	 Judgment	 (Preliminary	 Objection,	 Merits,	
Reparations	and	Costs),	16	November	2009,	Ser.C,	No.205,	paras.280-286;	Opuz	v.	Turkey,	Application	
No.33401/02,	 Judgment,	 9	 June	 2009;	 UN	 Commission	 on	 Human	 Rights,	 Report	 of	 the	 Special	
Rapporteur	on	violence	against	women,	its	causes	and	consequences,	Yakin	Ertürk,	on	the	Due	Diligence	
Standard	as	a	Tool	for	the	Elimination	of	Violence	Against	Women,	UN	Doc.	E/CN.4/2006/61,	20	January	
2006;	 UN	 Human	 Rights	 Council,	 Report	 of	 the	 Special	 Rapporteur	 on	 Violence	 against	 Women,	 its	




(CUP	 2011)	 166-168;	 Andrew	 Byrnes,	 Eleanor	 Bath,	 ‘Violence	 against	Women,	 the	 Obligation	 of	 Due	
Diligence	 and	 the	 Optional	 Protocol	 to	 the	 Convention	 on	 Elimination	 of	 All	 Forms	 of	 Discrimination	
against	Women	 -	 Recent	Developments’	 (2008)	 8(3)	Human	Rights	 Law	Review	517-533;	 Ruth	 Rubio-
Marín,	 Clara	 Sandoval,	 ‘Engendering	 the	 Reparations	 Jurisprudence	 of	 the	 Inter-American	 Court	 of	
Human	Rights:	The	Promise	of	the	Cotton	Field	Judgment’	(2011)	33	Human	Rights	Quarterly	1062-1091;	








Similarly	 to	 general	 international	 law	 and	 IHL,	 the	 IHRL	 framework	 relevant	 to	
reparations	 developed	 largely	 without	 taking	 account	 of	 gender-based	 harms	 or	
violations	 suffered	 by	 women	 in	 particular.	 Generally,	 human	 rights	 treaty	 law	
establishes	the	right	to	an	effective	remedy,	which	was	first	articulated	in	Article	8	of	
the	UDHR	and	 is	enshrined	 in	key	 international	and	regional	human	rights	 treaties.66	
The	right	to	reparations	under	IHRL	can	be	interpreted	to	derive	from	these	provisions.	
Arguably,	the	notion	of	an	‘effective	remedy’,	if	 it	 is	to	be	genuinely	effective,	should	
not	be	 limited	 to	 the	 court	proceedings	only,	but	additionally	encompass	a	 range	of	
practical	means	of	 redress,	 including	pecuniary	 remedies.	The	only	UN	human	 rights	
treaty	 which	 currently	 provides	 a	 comprehensive	 definition	 of	 reparations	 is	 the	
International	Convention	for	Protection	of	All	Persons	from	Enforced	Disappearances	
2006	(CED).67	Articles	24(4)	and	(5)	of	the	CED	mirror	the	forms	of	reparations	outlined	
in	 the	 2005	 Basic	 Principles	 and	 include	 compensation,	 restitution,	 rehabilitation,	
satisfaction	and	guarantees	of	non-repetition.68	As	such,	the	CED	is	the	first	UN	human	
rights	 treaty	 to	 formulate	 in	a	 legally	binding	 form	the	 right	of	 individuals	 to	 receive	
reparations.	 Nevertheless,	 none	 of	 the	 UN	 human	 rights	 treaties	 establishes	 the	
specific	right	to	reparations	for	acts	of	violence	against	women.	CEDAW,	which	is	often	
referred	 to	as	 the	Women’s	Convention,	 contains	provisions	 stipulating	 the	 rights	of	
women	to	non-discrimination	in	multiple	areas,	including	equality	before	the	law,	but	
it	 does	 not	 explicitly	 provide	 for	 women’s	 rights	 to	 remedies,	 reparations	 or	
compensation.69			
																																																								











The	 right	 of	 women	 to	 receive	 reparations	 for	 acts	 of	 violence	 perpetrated	 against	
them	has	been	recognised	at	a	regional	treaty	level.	The	Inter-American	Convention	on	
the	Prevention,	Punishment	and	Eradication	of	Violence	Against	Women	1994	(Belém	
do	Pará	Convention)	 requires	 states	parties	 to	ensure	effective	access	 to	 restitution,	
reparations	 or	 other	 effective	 remedies	 for	 women	 subjected	 to	 violence.70	Parties	
must	establish	the	necessary	administrative	and	legislative	mechanisms	to	give	effect	
to	 this	 obligation,	 and	 must	 make	 women	 aware	 of	 their	 legal	 rights	 and	 existing	
remedies	 for	 violence	 against	 women.71	Equivalent	 provisions	 are	 included	 in	 the	
Protocol	to	the	African	Charter	on	Human	and	Peoples’	Rights	on	the	Rights	of	Women	








to	 an	 extent,	 regional	 human	 rights	 courts.	 The	 treaty	 bodies	 have	 repeatedly	
reiterated	the	existence	of	the	right	to	reparations	in	IHRL	as	well	as	both	procedural	
and	substantive	obligations	of	states	in	this	regard.73	The	Human	Rights	Committee	has	
reaffirmed	 the	 obligation	 of	 parties	 to	 the	 ICCPR	 to	 provide	 reparations	 to	 persons	
whose	 rights	 under	 the	 Covenant	 have	 been	 violated,	 and	 has	 emphasized	 that	
“without	 reparation	 to	 individuals	 (…)	 the	obligation	 to	provide	an	effective	 remedy,	
which	 is	 central	 to	 the	 efficacy	 of	 article	 2,	 paragraph	 3,	 is	 not	 discharged”. 74	














Recommendation	No.19	 that	obligations	under	 the	Convention	 include	 the	provision	
of	 effective	 complaints	 procedures	 and	 remedies,	 including	 compensation. 75 	The	
Committee	also	clarified	in	General	Recommendation	No.28	that	the	scope	of	states’	
obligations	 under	 Article	 2(b)	 of	 CEDAW	 includes	 provision	 of	 monetary	 and	 non-




violence	 against	 women	 committed	 in	 armed	 conflict.	 Although	 the	 continued	
applicability	of	 IHRL	 in	situations	of	armed	conflict	 is	generally	accepted,	 the	CEDAW	
Committee	is	thus	far	the	only	UN	treaty	body	to	have	commented	on	reparations	for	
harms	sustained	by	women	during	armed	conflict.77	It	is	also	the	only	UN	human	rights	
treaty	 body	 to	 have	 given	 detailed	 consideration	 to	 gender-sensitive	 reparations	 for	
harms	 sustained	 both	 in	 armed	 conflict	 and	 in	 post-conflict	 situations.	 The	 CEDAW	
Committee	has	commented	in	General	Recommendation	No.30	on	the	right	of	women	
to	 prompt,	 adequate	 and	 effective	 reparations	 for	 violations	 of	 rights	 under	 the	
CEDAW	 suffered	 during	 armed	 conflict.78	Importantly,	 the	 Committee	 stressed	 the	
obligation	 of	 parties	 to	 CEDAW	 not	 only	 to	 provide	 reparations	 which	 are	 gender-
sensitive	 and	 responsive	 to	 women’s	 needs	 but	 also	 emphasized	 the	 need	 for	
transformative	 reparation	 measures	 which	 would	 “seek	 to	 transform	 the	 structural	
inequalities	which	 led	to	violations	of	women’s	rights”.79	By	requiring	state	parties	to	
take	 practical	 steps	 to	 combat	 structural	 inequalities,	 the	 Committee	 addressed	 the	
paramount	 issue	 regarding	 reparations	 for	 conflict-related	 gender-based	 harms,	
namely	 the	 necessity	 to	 design	 reparations	which	would	 also	 prevent	 the	 violations	
from	 recurring	 in	 the	 future.	 The	 necessity	 of	 transformative	 reparations	 in	 cases	
involving	VAW	was	emphasized	earlier	by	 the	 Inter-American	Court	of	Human	Rights	
																																																								
75	CEDAW,	 General	 Recommendation	 No.19	 on	 Violence	 Against	 Women,	 UN	 Doc.	 A/47/38,	 1992,	
para.24.	
76	CEDAW,	General	Recommendation	No.	28	on	the	Core	Obligations	of	States	Parties	under	Article	2	of	














must	 be	 designed	 to	 change	 this	 situation,	 so	 that	 their	 effect	 is	 not	 only	 of	
restitution,	 but	 also	 of	 rectification.	 In	 this	 regard,	 re-establishment	 of	 the	
same	structural	context	of	violence	and	discrimination	is	not	acceptable”.80	
Moreover,	 by	 emphasizing	 the	 applicability	 of	 state	 obligations	 under	 Article	 5(a)	




post-conflict	 situations.	 To	 that	 end,	 it	 also	 emphasized	 the	 importance	 of	 states	
fulfilling	obligations	under	Article	 5(a)	with	 a	 view	 to	providing	 gender-sensitive	 and	
adequate	 reparations. 81 	Secondly,	 the	 CEDAW	 Committee	 sought	 to	 remedy	 the	
existing	pattern	of	looking	at	reparations	through	the	lens	of	restitution,	which	in	the	
case	 of	 violence	 against	 women	 merely	 reinstates	 the	 system	 of	 inequalities	 that	
enabled	 the	 gender-based	 violations	 in	 the	 first	 place.	 Furthermore,	 the	 Committee	
emphasized	 the	 need	 for	 reparations	 to	 be	made	 with	 respect	 to	 not	 only	 gender-
based	violence	but	also	 violations	of	women’s	economic,	 social	 and	 cultural	 rights.82	
Finally,	 the	 Committee	 noted	 that	 women’s	 active	 participation	 is	 crucial	 to	 the	




80 	González	 et	 al.	 (“Cotton	 Field”)	 v.	 Mexico,	 IACtHR,	 Judgment	 (Preliminary	 Objection,	 Merits,	
Reparations	and	Costs),	16	November	2009,	Ser.C,	No.205,	para.450.		
81	CEDAW	Committee	 also	 confirmed	 that	 states	 are	 required	 to	make	 “changes	 to	 relevant	 laws	and	
practices”	 as	 a	 part	 of	 an	 obligation	 to	 provide	 an	 appropriate	 remedy	under	Article	 2(b)	 of	 CEDAW.	
CEDAW,	General	Recommendation	No.	28	on	the	Core	Obligations	of	States	Parties	under	Article	2	of	







The	 ICC	 Statute	 established	 a	 unique	 mechanism	 which	 allows	 the	 victims	 of	
international	 crimes	 subject	 to	 ICC	 jurisdiction	 to	 submit	 claims	 to	 the	 court	 for	
reparations.84	The	ICC	is	the	first	international	criminal	court	to	provide	such	a	system;	
as	the	international	criminal	courts	and	tribunals	preceding	 it	 lacked	jurisdiction	with	
regard	 to	 reparations	 for	 harms	 arising	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 commission	 of	
international	 crimes.85	The	 court	 has	 jurisdiction	 only	 in	 relation	 to	 individuals	 who	
have	 allegedly	 committed	 international	 crimes;	 not	 states.	 Accordingly,	 the	 ICC	
reparations	 system	 does	 not	 take	 account	 of	 state	 responsibility	 for	 international	
crimes	 or	 gross	 violations	 of	 human	 rights	 and	 humanitarian	 law,	 even	 in	 situations	








injury	 suffered	 by	 the	 victim.87	On	 the	 basis	 of	 this	 assessment,	 the	 Court	 can	 then	














On	the	topic	of	domestic	 implementation	of	the	provisions	of	the	 ICC	Statute	and	the	 ICC	orders	with	









victims	 of	 international	 crimes.89	Although	 the	 provisions	 refer	 to	 three	 types	 of	
reparations,	the	Court	may	award	other	remedies,	as	per	Rule	91(1)(f)	of	the	ICC	RPE.	
The	Court	 can	order	 reparations	either	directly	 against	 the	 convicted	person	 (Article	
75(2))	 or	 through	 the	 Trust	 Fund	 for	 Victims	 (TFV)	 (Article	 79(2)).	 The	 TFV	 was	











physical,	 psychological	 and	 material	 support	 to	 the	 victims,	 their	 families	 and	
communities	 through	assistance	programmes.	However,	 unlike	with	 reparations,	 the	
‘assistance	mandate’	 of	 the	 TFV	 is	 not	 linked	 to	 the	 conviction	 of	 the	 accused	 and	





laid	 down	 certain	 principles	 regarding	 their	 award	 in	 Prosecutor	 v.	 Lubanga.	 The	






Prosecutor	 v.	 Thomas	 Lubanga	 Dyilo	 (Judgment	 on	 the	 appeals	 against	 the	 “Decision	 establishing	
principles	 and	 procedures	 to	 be	 applied	 to	 reparations”	 of	 7	 August	 2012	 with	 AMENDED	 order	 for	




Statute,	 reversed	 the	 earlier	 decision	 of	 the	 ICC	 Trial	 Chamber	 with	 regard	 to	
reparations	and	clarified	several	crucial	concepts.		
	
The	 Appeals	 Chamber	 emphasized	 that	 the	 obligation	 to	 repair	 is	 directly	 linked	 to	
individual	 criminal	 responsibility	 under	 the	 ICC	 Statute	 and,	 as	 such,	 lies	 with	 the	
convicted	person.93	In	this	context,	destitution	of	the	accused	was	rendered	irrelevant	
and	 more	 emphasis	 was	 placed	 on	 the	 notion	 of	 the	 attribution	 of	 guilt	 and	
responsibility	(both	for	the	criminal	acts	and	consequences	of	them)	to	the	convicted	
person.94	This	 approach	 reversed	 the	 position	 of	 the	 Trial	 Chamber	 which	 failed	 to	
make	 awards	 of	 reparations	 directly	 against	 Lubanga,	 based	 on	 his	 indigence.	 The	
Appeals	Chamber	reasoned	that	 indigence	is	not	an	obstacle	to	award	of	reparations	
against	the	convicted	person	and	that,	based	on	the	principle	of	accountability,	the	ICC	
needs	 to	make	 a	 reparations	order	 against	 the	 convicted	person	even	 if	 reparations	
are	 ordered	 through	 a	 TFV.95	However,	 whilst	 the	 presented	 reasoning	 is	 correct	 in	
principle,	 its	 practical	 aspect	 is	 highly	 questionable.	 The	 alleged	 indigence	 of	 the	
individual	will	 inherently	have	an	 impact	on	 reparations	 for	 individuals	who	suffered	
harms	as	a	 result	of	 international	crimes	committed	by	 the	convicted	person.	Whilst	




the	 determination	 of	 individual	 criminal	 responsibility	 under	 ICL.	 The	 ‘liability	 to	
remedy	harm’	requires	the	establishment	of	a	causal	link	between	the	criminal	act	and	
the	harm	based	on	‘but	for’	test	and	the	‘proximate	cause’	standard.96	Furthermore,	in	
contrast	 to	 criminal	 proceedings,	 the	 causality	 does	 not	 have	 to	 be	 proven	 beyond	












Nonetheless,	 the	 Appeals	 Judgment	 also	 raises	 some	 concerns	 regarding	 the	 ICC’s	
approach	 towards	 reparations.	 Stahn	notes	 that	 the	Order	 for	 Reparations	 issued	 in	
the	 Lubanga	 case	 appears	 to	 prioritise	 accountability	 over	 other	 societal	 concerns,	
such	 as	 security,	 well-being	 or	 deterrence	 measures	 preventing	 the	 violations	 from	
recurring	 in	the	future.98	Whilst	this	approach	 is	reflective	of	the	general	priorities	of	
any	 criminal	 court,	 it	 raises	 the	 issue	 of	 suitability	 of	 such	 an	 approach	 in	 the	 post-
conflict	 context.	Arguably,	 the	exclusive	 focus	on	criminal	accountability	of	 the	high-
level	convicted	person	as	a	key	determinative	 factor	 for	award	of	 reparations	moves	
away	from	remedying	other	effects	of	armed	conflict	which	must	be	addressed	in	the	
process	of	transition	from	conflict	to	peace.	In	particular,	 it	may	lead	to	prioritisation	
of	 victims	 of	 prosecuted	 and	 convicted	 crimes	 to	 the	 detriment	 (if	 not	 exclusion)	 of	
victimhood	 of	 other	 persons	 who	 have	 suffered	 harms	 resulting	 from	 international	
crimes	which	may	have	not	been	prosecuted	at	the	ICC	or,	if	prosecuted,	no	conviction	
was	secured.	For	instance,	victims	of	sexual	and	gender-based	violence	and	victims	of	








re-stigmatisation	of	 former	child	 soldiers	within	 their	 communities”.100	However,	 this	
shortcoming	is	also	attributed	to	flaws	in	the	earlier	stages	of	the	case,	principally	the	
type	 and	 number	 of	 charges	 in	 the	 indictment	 linking	 back	 to	 the	 weaknesses	 in	
















A	 similar	 difficulty	 arose	 in	 relation	 to	 reparations	 for	 victims	 of	 sexual	 and	 gender-
based	 violence	 in	 Lubanga.	 Although	 the	 first	 decision	 on	 reparations	 included	
provision	of	reparation	for	such	victims,	the	Appeals	Chamber	reversed	that	finding.	It	
was	 held	 that	 harms	 arising	 from	 sexual	 and	 gender-based	 violence	 suffered	 by	 the	
victims	 were	 not	 linked	 to	 the	 crimes	 of	 which	 Lubanga	 was	 convicted	 (i.e.	 the	
enlistment,	conscription	and	use	of	child	soldiers	under	Article	8(2)(e)(vi)	and	 (vii)	of	
the	ICC	Statute).	Therefore,	in	the	Appeals	Chamber’s	view,	Lubanga	could	not	be	held	
liable	 for	 reparations	 in	 respect	 of	 these	 harms.	 The	 decision	 further	 illustrates	 the	
importance	of	adequate	and	detailed	charging	of	gender-based	crimes	at	the	pre-trial	




The	 negative	 impact	 of	 the	 questionable	 finding	 of	 the	 Trial	 Chamber	 in	 Lubanga	
establishing	that	acts	of	sexual	and	gender-based	violence	are	not	a	part	of	the	crime	
of	enlistment,	conscription	and	use	of	child	soldiers	to	participate	actively	in	hostilities	
is	 particularly	 demonstrable	 in	 this	 context.102	Such	 interpretation	 effectively	 led	 to	
exclusion	 of	 victims,	 predominantly	 girls,	 who	 suffered	 harm	 resulting	 from	 sexual	
violence	committed	 in	 the	context,	or	as	a	 result,	of	 recruitment	and/or	use	of	child	
soldiers	 from	benefitting	 from	 reparations	 ordered	 against	 Lubanga.	 Such	 a	 result	 is	
particularly	worrying	given	the	commitment	of	the	ICC	to	the	principle	of	equality	and	




102	Decision	 of	 the	 ICC	 Trial	 Chamber	 in	 Lubanga	 regarding	 the	 issue	 of	 whether	 sexual	 and	 gender-








provide	 effective	 remedies	 for	 the	 victims	 whilst	 promoting	 a	 more	 inclusive	 and	
participatory	 approach.104	Nonetheless,	 the	 early	 practice	 of	 the	 ICC	 with	 regard	 to	
reparations	 raises	 questions	 regarding	 the	 appropriateness	 and	 effectiveness	 of	 the	
established	 regime.	 Several	 commentators	 have	 also	 raised	 doubts	 regarding	 the	











possibility	 of	 seeking	 reparations,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 lack	 of	 understanding	 of	 practical	




104	Situation	 in	 the	 Democratic	 Republic	 of	 the	 Congo:	 Prosecutor	 v.	 Thomas	 Lubanga	 Dyilo	 (Decision	












Despite	 these	 limitations,	 the	 ICC	 faces	 potentially	 large	 numbers	 of	 victims	 seeking	
reparations.107	This	 immediately	 raises	a	question	about	 the	effectiveness	of	 such	an	
approach.	 If	 the	 overarching	 aim	 of	 the	 post-conflict	 reparations	 is	 to	 remedy	 the	
harms	 suffered	 by	 individuals	 in	 armed	 conflict	 and	 to	 assist	 in	 the	 process	 of	
transformation	 from	conflict	 to	peace,	 then	 the	 ICC	 regime	provides	a	 rather	 limited	
scope	 for	 achieving	 these	 objectives.	 A	 large	 number	 of	 claimants	 raises	 questions	
about	the	financial	aspects	of	awarding	reparations.	Thus	far,	the	ICC	has	had	to	rely	
on	 the	 funds	 of	 the	 TFV	 to	 finance	 reparations	 for	 victims	 of	 crimes	 perpetrated	 by	
Lubanga,	as	he	was	found	to	be	destitute,	thereby	precluding	the	TFV	from	seizing	any	
assets.	Furthermore,	as	Moffett	notes,	even	where	the	defendant’s	assets	are	seized	
(as	 in	Bemba),	 the	 final	 award	 to	 the	 victims	 is	 likely	 to	be	 far	 less	 than	 reparations	
ordered	 by	 regional	 human	 rights	 courts,	 including	 rehabilitations	 and	 measures	 of	
satisfaction.108	The	strong	reliance	of	the	ICC	reparations	mechanism	on	the	TFV	is	also	
questionable.	Given	 that	 the	 TFV	 relies	 on	 voluntary	 donations	 from	 wealthier	
countries,	 the	 Trust	 Fund	 hardly	 offers	 a	 sustainable	 source	 of	 finance	 for	 future	
reparations.	 Schabas	 also	 doubts	 the	 utility	 of	 providing	 funds	 for	 the	 humanitarian	




Finally,	 the	 ICC	 practice	 with	 respect	 to	 gender-inclusive	 reparations	 is	 yet	 to	 be	
observed.	 In	 principle,	 the	 ICC	 reparations	 system	 recognizes	 the	 need	 for	 gender-
sensitive	 reparations,	 which	 applies	 equally	 to	 cases	 involving	 gender-based	 crimes	
and	those	that	do	not.	The	reparations	system	is	additionally	supported	by	the	general	
principles	 enshrined	 in	 the	 ICC	 Statute	 which	 prohibit	 gender	 discrimination	 and	
envisage	 special	 attention	 to	 the	 needs	 of	 victims	 of	 sexual	 and	 gender-based	
																																																								
107	For	 instance,	 in	 the	 Bemba	 case,	 there	 are	 4452	 victims.	 Prosecutor	 v.	 Bemba	 (Public	 redacted	










violence.110	However,	 flaws	 in	 the	 earlier	 procedural	 stages	 of	 a	 case	 may	 lead	 to	
gender-based	 crimes	 not	 being	 included	 in	 the	 conviction,	 therefore	 significantly	
limiting	the	eligibility	of	victims	to	claim	reparations.	Also,	there	is	no	clarification	on	
what	gender-inclusivity	actually	means	when	it	comes	to	implementation	of	reparation	
orders.	 The	Order	 for	Reparations	 in	Lubanga	merely	 states	 that	 a	 “gender-inclusive	
approach	 should	 guide	 the	design	of	 the	principles	 and	procedures	 to	be	 applied	 to	
reparations”	 with	 a	 view	 to	 attaining	 gender	 parity	 in	 reparations,	 but	 does	 not	
elaborate	further	on	practical	means	through	which	these	goals	are	to	be	achieved.111	






reparations	 programmes,	 or	 even	 the	 lack	 of	 such	 programmes	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	
violent	 conflicts,	 effectively	 prevent	 women	 who	 have	 suffered	 violations	 of	 their	





Basic	 Guidelines,	 also	 failed	 to	 include	 a	 gender	 perspective.	 In	 2014,	 the	 UN	
Secretary-General	 issued	a	Guidance	Note	on	Reparations	 for	Conflict-Related	Sexual	
Violence,	 which	 (though	 not	 binding)	 provided	 “guidance	 for	 United	 Nations	
engagement	 in	 the	 area	 of	 reparations	 for	 victims	 of	 conflict-related	 sexual	




111	Situation	 in	 the	Democratic	Republic	 of	 the	Congo:	Prosecutor	 v.	 Thomas	 Lubanga	Dyilo	 (Order	 for	
Reparations),	ICC-01/04-01/06-3129-AnxA	(3	March	2015),	para.18.	





demonstrates	 a	 more	 elaborate	 attempt	 to	 address	 the	 matter	 of	 reparations	 for	
conflict-related	sexual	violence	in	a	more	comprehensive	manner,	also	recognizing	the	
need	to	tailor	the	reparations	to	the	specific	needs	of	survivors	of	sexual	and	gender-
based	 violence.	 Nonetheless,	 the	 Guidance	 Note	 focuses	 on	 one	 particular	 type	 of	
gendered	 harm,	 namely	 conflict-related	 sexual	 violence,	 rather	 than	 the	 wider	





Reparations	 in	 international	 law	 come	 in	 many	 forms.114	The	 2005	 Basic	 Principles	
establishes	 a	 framework	 of	 five	 key	 types	 of	 reparations:	 restitution,	 compensation,	
satisfaction,	 rehabilitation	 and	 guarantees	 of	 non-repetition. 115 	This	 instrument	
remains	 the	 most	 comprehensive	 to	 date	 which,	 whilst	 lacking	 a	 clear	 gender	
perspective,	 provides	 the	 most	 coherent	 set	 of	 rules	 governing	 reparations	 for	
violations	of	IHRL	and	IHL.	The	following	sections	explore	the	issue	of	reparations	for	





international	 law,	as	outlined	 in	 the	Chorzów	Factory	Case.116	Although	 restitution	 in	
international	law	developed	as	an	inter-state	remedy,	it	is	now	accepted	as	a	form	of	
reparation	 benefiting	 individuals	 who	 are	 victims	 of	 violations	 of	 IHRL	 and	 IHL	 and	





115	The	 term	 ‘guarantees	of	 non-repetition’	 is	 commonly	used	 in	 international	 instruments	 addressing	
reparations.	 However,	 the	 term	 is	 somewhat	 problematic,	 as	 one	 can	 never	 really	 guarantee	 non-
repetition	of	violations.		













substantial	 reliance	 of	 general	 international	 law	 (and,	 to	 an	 extent,	 IHRL)	 on	





women’s	 rights	 resulting	 in	 gendered	 harms.	 Application	 of	 restitution	 in	 the	 post-








Although	 restitution	 has	 a	 limited	 facility	 for	 remedying	 sexual	 harms,	 it	 may	
nonetheless	be	used	 to	 counteract	 some	of	 the	harms	 suffered	as	a	 result	of	 sexual	
violence.	 Ní	 Aoláin	 et	 al.	 note	 that	 in	 many	 societies	 culture	 plays	 a	 crucial	 role	 in	
determining	 the	 true	 extent	 of	 gendered	 harms;	 for	 instance	 the	 loss	 of	 ‘social	
position’	within	the	community	due	to	being	ostracised	as	a	victim	of	sexual	violence.	
A	gender-sensitive	approach	to	restitution	in	such	cases	requires	not	only	a	culturally-





suffered	 by	 the	 victim	 and	 the	 loss	 of	 social	 status	 of	 the	 victim.	 In	 such	 instances,	
gender-sensitive	 forms	of	restitution	would	entail	 taking	proactive	yet	complex	steps	
to	reinstate	the	social	position	of	the	victim	status	quo	ante.	This	comes	nonetheless	
with	 significant	practical	 challenges,	which	would	 require	 long-term	efforts	 aimed	at	
promoting	social	and	attitudinal	change	towards	victims	of	gendered	harms.	However,	
such	 efforts	 fall	 outside	 the	 normative	 and	 operational	 scope	 of	 international	 legal	
framework.		
	
Restitution	 can	 be	 effectively	 applied	 as	 a	mode	of	 reparation	 for	 other,	 non-sexual	
harms	sustained	by	women	in	armed	conflict,	such	as	the	loss	of	land	and/or	property.	
For	 this	 purpose,	 a	 broad	 understanding	 of	 property	 should	 be	 employed,	 including	
housing,	 land,	 tangible	property,	 livestock	and	any	other	 forms	of	property	on	which	
women’s	 livelihoods	 are	 dependent.	 The	 return	 of	 property	 plays	 a	 key	 role	 in	
women’s	 rebuilding	 of	 their	 everyday	 lives	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 conflict.	 It	 is	 directly	
linked	 to	 women’s	 economic	 and	 social	 rights,	 in	 particular	 the	 right	 to	 adequate	
housing	 and	 adequate	 food. 118 	Furthermore,	 women’s	 property	 rights	 are	
interconnected	with	their	security	(including	food	security),	health	and	livelihoods,	all	
of	 which	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 in	 a	 particularly	 fragile	 condition	 as	 a	 result	 of	 conflict.119	
Limited	 employment	 options	 and	 general	 economic	 hardship	 resulting	 from	 violent	
conflict	contribute	to	an	increase	in	economic	vulnerability	of	women,	especially	those	
who	lack	family	or	community	support	or	are	single	heads	of	households.120	Therefore,	
the	 strategic	 importance	 as	 well	 as	 the	 transformative	 potential	 of	 ensuring	 the	
prompt	 and	 complete	 restitution	 of	 property	 to	 women	 should	 not	 be	
underestimated.	For	instance,	the	return	of	land	and	tools	or	livestock	to	rural	women	






the	right	 to	an	adequate	standard	of	 living,	and	on	the	right	 to	non-discrimination	 in	 this	context,	UN	
Doc.	 A/HRC/19/53,	 26	 December	 2011,	 para.2;	 Diana	 Sankey,	 ‘Towards	 Recognition	 of	 Subsistence	






However,	 property	 restitution	 may	 prove	 challenging	 in	 countries	 where	 gender	
discrimination	 in	 property	 ownership	 exists.	 The	 limited	 or	 non-existent	 rights	 of	
women	to	hold	property	in	some	systems	may	be	an	obstacle	to	effective	restitution	of	






particularly	 precarious	 position.	 Reclaiming	 the	 property,	 often	 after	 a	 significant	
period	 of	 absence	 caused	 by	 the	 events	 of	 armed	 conflict	 is	 not	 only	 paved	 with	
practical	 challenges	 (e.g.	 proving	 ownership	 in	 the	 likely	 absence	 of	 documents,	
getting	access	to	the	property	or	evicting	the	illegal	tenants)	but	also,	as	illustrated	by	
Blečić	v.	Croatia,	may	not	result	in	securing	the	ownership	and	occupancy	rights.123	The	




the	context	of	property	 restitution	 for	 refugees	and	 IDPs,	especially	 through	gender-
sensitive	reparation	programmes,	policies	and	practices.125	The	significance	of	land	and	




122	Leslie	 Kurshan,	 ‘Rethinking	 property	 rights	 as	 human	 rights:	 acquiring	 equal	 property	 rights	 for	
women	using	 international	 human	 rights	 treaties’	 (2000)	 8(2)	American	University	 Journal	 of	Gender,	
Social	 Policy	 and	 the	 Law	 353,	 361;	 Sharanya	 Sai	 Mohan,	 ‘The	 Battle	 After	 the	 War:	 Gender	
Discrimination	 in	 Property	 Rights	 and	 Post-Conflict	 Property	 Restitution’	 (2011)	 36	 Yale	 Journal	 of	
International	Law	461,	464,	480-483	(describing	customary	law	in	Rwanda).	
123	Blečić	v.	Croatia,	Application	No.	59532/00,	Judgment,	8	March	2006.	











and	 policies	 addressing	 the	 disadvantages	 faced	 by	 many	 women	 in	 relation	 to	
claiming	their	inheritance	rights	or	rights	to	land	in	the	aftermath	of	conflict.126	Finally,	
the	 reform	 of	 land	 and	 property	 laws	 with	 a	 view	 of	 eradicating	 gender-bias	 and	
gender	 discrimination	 entrenched	 in	 existing	 laws	may	 in	 itself	 constitute	 a	 form	 of	
transformative	 reparation,	 which	 not	 only	 ensures	 the	 effective	 remedy	 to	 the	





arising	 from	violations	of	 states’	obligations	under	 IHRL	and/or	 IHL.128	Compensation	
can	be	provided	 in	respect	of	various	harms,	 including	moral	and	material	aspects	of	
sustained	harms,	 loss	of	opportunities,	 loss	of	earnings	or	costs	of	required	legal	and	







consequential	 losses,	 e.g.	 the	 loss	 of	 reproductive	 capacity,	 loss	 of	 support,	 loss	 of	
pecuniary	 opportunity	 or	 loss	 of	 economic	 capacity.	 This	 is	 particularly	 important	 in	
the	 context	 of	 awarding	 compensation	 for	 gendered	 harms,	 the	 effects	 of	 which	
severely	 impact	 on	 the	 future	 of	 the	 victims	 both	 in	 the	 short-	 and	 longer	 term.	 As	





Catherine	 O’Rourke,	 Aisling	 Swaine,	 ‘Transforming	 Reparations	 for	 Conflict-Related	 Sexual	 Violence:	
Principles	 and	 Practice’	 (2015)	 28	 Harvard	 Human	 Rights	 Journal	 97,	 120;	 UN	Human	 Rights	 Council,	
Report	 of	 the	 Special	 Rapporteur	 on	 adequate	 housing	 as	 a	 component	 of	 the	 right	 to	 an	 adequate	












Although	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 put	 an	 exact	 compensatory	 value	 on	 physical	 and	 mental	
injures	 suffered	 as	 a	 result	 of	 sexual	 violence,	 it	 is	 nonetheless	 possible	 to	 be	more	




children	 conceived	 as	 a	 result	 of	 rape.130	Furthermore,	 the	 cultural	 dimension	 of	
economic	 harms	 should	 not	 be	 ignored.	 In	 societies	 where	 the	 social	 status	 of	 a	
woman	 is	adversely	affected	as	a	 result	of	her	being	a	victim	of	 sexual	violence,	 the	
compensation	award	should	take	account	of	this.	For	instance,	where	a	female	victim	
is	ostracised	or	deemed	to	be	of	‘unmarriageable	status’,	the	economically	assessable	
damages	 consequential	 to	 this	 type	 of	 harm,	 such	 as	 the	 loss	 of	 support,	 should	 be	
taken	into	account.	Regional	human	rights	courts	have	recognized	the	loss	of	support	
as	a	ground	for	award	of	reparations	in	situations	where	typically	the	death	of	a	victim	
resulted	 in	 such	 loss	 (financial	or	otherwise)	 to	 the	victim’s	 family	or	dependants.131	
Whilst	in	some	circumstances	the	loss	of	support	may	be	attributed	to	the	death	of	a	
spouse	or	another	family	member	upon	whom	the	woman	is	economically	dependent	
(e.g.	 forced	 single	 motherhood	 due	 to	 spouse/	 partner	 having	 disappeared	 or	 died	
during	 armed	 conflict),	 it	 is	 argued	 that	 a	 broader	 understanding	 of	 the	 category	 of	
‘loss	 of	 support’	 is	 needed.	 It	 ought	 to	 be	 recognized	 that	 in	 context	 of	 gendered	
																																																								
130	Sara	 L.	 Zeigler,	 Gregory	 Gilbert	 Gunderson,	 ‘The	 Gendered	 Dimension	 of	 Conflict’s	 Aftermath:	 A	
Victim-Centered	Approach	to	Compensation’	(2006)	20(2)	Ethics	&	International	Affairs	171,	184;	Ruth	
Rubio-Marín,	 ‘The	 Gender	 of	 Reparations	 in	 Transitional	 Societies’	 in:	 Ruth	 Rubio-Marín	 (ed),	 The	
Gender	 of	 Reparations.	 Unsettling	 Sexual	 Hierarchies	While	 Redressing	Human	 Rights	 Violations	 (CUP	
2009)	108.		
131	Aktaş	v.	Turkey,	Application	No.24351/94,	 Judgment,	24	April	2003,	para.359-361;	Çakici	 v.	Turkey,	
Application	 No.23657/94,	 Judgment,	 8	 July	 1999,	 paras.127,	 130;	 Gül	 v.	 Turkey,	 Application	 No.	










take	 account	 of	 the	 generally	 disadvantageous	 economic	 position	 of	 women	 as	 a	
group,	 which	 becomes	 particularly	 aggravated	 during	 armed	 conflict	 and	 in	 its	
aftermath.132	Many	women	work	in	low-paid	jobs	or	do	not	receive	payment	for	their	
work,	 e.g.	 they	work	 at	 home	 or	 on	 family	 land.133	The	 quantification	 of	 the	 loss	 of	
income	which	ignores	women’s	non-monetary	contributions	is	therefore	likely	to	lead	
to	 a	 low	 compensatory	 award	 (if	 at	 all),	 deepening	 the	 already	 disadvantageous	
position	of	 the	 victims.	 Furthermore,	 the	 impact	 of	 gendered	harms	may	 also	 affect	
the	victim’s	access	to	the	same	opportunities	she	would	have	had	if	the	violation	had	
not	 occurred,	 which,	 where	 applicable,	 should	 be	 reflected	 in	 the	 compensation	








132	Ruth	Rubio-Marín,	 ‘The	Gender	 of	 Reparations	 in	 Transitional	 Societies’	 in:	 Ruth	Rubio-Marín	 (ed),	
The	 Gender	 of	 Reparations.	 Unsettling	 Sexual	 Hierarchies	 While	 Redressing	 Human	 Rights	 Violations	
(CUP	2009)	103.	
133	UNSG	Guidance	Note,	17.	
134	UNSG	Guidance	Note	 (page	 17)	makes	 a	 reference	 to	 the	 impact	 of	 sexual	 violence	 on	 the	 future	
income	of	the	victim,	e.g.	limited	opportunities	due	to	being	stigmatized	as	a	victim	of	sexual	violence.			
In	Loayza	Tamayo	v.	Peru,	the	IACtHR	invented	a	concept	of	proyecto	de	vida	(life	plan),	which	seeks	to	





into	 economic	 terms”	 (Loayza	 Tamayo	 v.	 Peru,	 IACtHR,	 Judgment	 (Reparations),	 27	 November	 1998,	
Ser.C,	No.42,	para.153).	
135	Ruth	Rubio-Marín,	 ‘The	Gender	 of	 Reparations	 in	 Transitional	 Societies’	 in:	 Ruth	Rubio-Marín	 (ed),	







In	 situations	 where	 scarce	 resources	 are	 contrasted	with	 a	 large	 number	 of	 victims	
claiming	compensation,	the	individual	awards	may	be	very	limited.	Likewise,	McCarthy	
points	towards	the	potential	tension	between	quantum	of	compensation	available	to	
victims	 seeking	 reparations	 through	 regional	human	 rights	 courts	or	 through	 the	 ICC	




need	 to	 be	 addressed.	 In	 order	 for	 compensation	 to	 be	 effective,	 it	 needs	 to	 be	
ensured	 that	 victims	 of	 gendered	 harms	 are	 aware	 of	 how	 to	 access	 this	 form	 of	
reparation	 as	 well	 as	 have	 means	 to	 benefit	 from	 it.	 Matters	 of	 illiteracy,	 lack	 of	
documentation,	mobility	or	the	lack	of	a	personal	bank	account	may	stand	in	the	way	
of	many	women	 receiving	 reparations	 for	 sustained	gendered	harms.	 Therefore,	 the	
design	 of	 reparation	 programmes	 should	 address	 these	 obstacles	 with	 a	 view	 to	






such,	 it	 is	envisaged	that	a	gender-sensitive	approach	to	rehabilitation	would	 involve	
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139 	UNSG	 Guidance	 Note	 suggests	 that	 “compensation	 could,	 for	 example,	 take	 the	 form	 of	












injuries	 to	 both	 physical	 and	 mental	 health	 may	 require	 immediate	 attention.	
However,	the	timely	and	adequate	provision	of	such	services	is	often	overlooked.	For	





In	 addition,	 the	 UN	 Secretary-General	 notes	 that	 rehabilitation	 in	 cases	 involving	
victims	 of	 conflict-related	 sexual	 violence	 should	 not	 be	 limited	 to	medical	 services	
only	and	should	also	be	extended	 to	other	persons	 (such	as	 family	members)	with	a	
view	of	maximising	 the	 probability	 of	 all	 victims’	 recovery.142	Ní	 Aoláin	 et	 al.	 further	
suggest	 that	 rehabilitation	measures	may	 also	 include	broader	 victim-empowerment	
strategies,	such	as	formal	and	informal	education.143	Arguably,	rehabilitation	measures	
should	 be	 inclusive	 of	 vocational	 rehabilitation,	 especially	 where	 the	 impact	 of	
gendered	harms	forces	the	victim	to	change	profession	or	precludes	her	continuing	the	
work	 she	 did	 prior	 to	 the	 violation	 occurring.	 Vocational	 rehabilitation	may	 include	
provision	of	 free	 information	about	employment	opportunities	but	also	 free	 training	









Shelton	 adopts	 a	 broader	 definition	 of	 rehabilitation	 as	 “the	 process	 of	 restoring	 the	 individual’s	 full	









Measures	 of	 satisfaction	 focus	 primarily	 on	 due	 recognition	 of	 the	 victims	 and	 are	
achieved	mostly	through	a	range	of	symbolic	reparations.144	These	may	include	public	
apologies,	 commemorations	 and	 tributes	 to	 victims,	 official	 and/or	 judicial	
declarations	restoring	the	reputation	and	dignity	of	victims	and	truth	seeking.145		
	
The	public	 recognition	of	gendered	harms	 is	one	of	 the	essential	 features	of	gender-
sensitive	measures	of	satisfaction.	It	is	important	that	in	the	aftermath	of	conflict,	the	
complete	range	of	harms	suffered	by	individuals	is	declared,	therefore	acknowledging	
the	 victims	 of	 gendered	 harms	 and	 types	 of	 violations	 that	 they	 suffered.	 However,	
where	 the	 state	 is	 responsible	 for	 the	 violations,	 such	 recognition	 should	 be	
accompanied	 by	 public	 apology	 and	 public	 admission	 of	 state	 responsibility	 for	
gendered	harms	suffered	as	a	result	of	state	failure	in	protecting	human	rights	of	the	
victims.	 The	 example	 of	 comfort	 women	 illustrates	 well	 the	 importance	 of	 public	
apologies	and	admission	of	state	responsibility	to	the	victims	of	gendered	harms.	After	
many	 decades	 since	 the	 violations	 were	 committed,	 the	 surviving	 former	 comfort	
women	have	not	 yet	 received	a	public	 apology	 from	 Japan	 for	 violations	which	 they	
suffered	 at	 the	 hands	 of	 Japanese	 military.146	Although	 in	 December	 2015	 Japan	







on	 Human	 Rights:	 UNHRC,	 Concluding	 observations	 on	 the	 sixth	 periodic	 report	 of	 Japan	 (20	 August	
2014)	UN	Doc.	CCPR/C/JPN/CO/6,	para.14	(considering	that	the	situation	reflects	ongoing	violations	of	
the	 victims’	 human	 rights	 as	well	 as	 a	 lack	 of	 effective	 remedies	 available	 to	 them	as	 victims	of	 past	
human	 rights	 violations);	 CEDAW,	 Concluding	 Observations:	 Japan	 (7	 August	 2009)	 UN	 Doc.	
CEDAW/C/JPN/CO/6,	 paras.37-38	 (Recommending	 that	 the	 State	 party	 urgently	 endeavour	 to	 find	 a	
lasting	solution	for	the	situation	of	“comfort	women”	which	would	include	the	compensation	of	victims,	
the	prosecution	of	perpetrators	and	the	education	of	the	public	about	these	crimes.);	UN	Office	of	the	
High	 Commissioner	 on	 Human	 Rights,	 ‘Japan’s	 approach	 to	 the	 issue	 of	 “comfort	 women”	 causing	
further	violations	of	victims’	human	rights	-	Pillay’	(6	August	2014)		
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14920&LangID=E>	 accessed	








during	 the	 Second	 World	 War	 and	 committed	 to	 payment	 of	 £5.6	 million	 in	
reparations,	 similar	 steps	 have	 not	 been	 taken	 by	 Japan	 with	 respect	 to	 comfort	
women	originating	 from	other	 countries,	 such	 as	 the	 Philippines,	 Taiwan,	 China	 and	
Indonesia.147	In	 contrast,	 the	 Truth	 and	 Reconciliation	 Commission	 in	 Sierra	 Leone	
demonstrated	 good	 practice	 in	 relation	 to	 awarding	 gender-sensitive	 satisfaction	
measures.	 The	Truth	and	Reconciliation	Commission	 recommended	 that	as	a	part	of	
symbolic	 reparations,	 the	 president	 of	 Sierra	 Leone	 publicly	 acknowledge	 the	 harm	
suffered	 by	 women	 and	 girls	 during	 the	 Sierra	 Leonean	 civil	 war	 and	 that	 he	 offer	
unequivocal	 public	 apology	 to	 the	 victims	 on	 behalf	 of	 preceding	 governments	 of	
Sierra	Leone.148		
	
However,	 processes	 of	 memorialisation	 of	 victims	 of	 gendered	 harms	 are	 still	
susceptible	to	denial.	For	instance,	a	proposal	to	install	a	plaque	commemorating	rape	
victims	in	Foča	on	the	facade	of	a	building	where	women	were	raped	and	tortured	was	
rejected.149	Furthermore,	 gender-sensitive	measures	of	 satisfaction	 require	efforts	 to	
avoid	 reinforcement	 of	 stereotypes	 in	 favour	 of	 essentialist	 visions	 of	 female	
victimhood.	Processes	of	memorialisation	often	focus	on	male	victims	of	conflict	or	on	
commemoration	 of	 male	 combatants,	 ignoring	 the	 active	 role	 of	 many	 women	 in	
waging	 armed	 conflict.	 In	 such	 processes,	women	 are	 usually	 portrayed	 (if	 at	 all)	 as	
victims	 of	 crimes	 against	 their	 ‘honour’	 or	 ‘chastity’,	 therefore	 reinforcing	 the	








(New	 York:	 Social	 Sciences	 Research	 Council	 2006)	 268-269;	 Sierra	 Leone	 Truth	 and	 Reconciliation	







Guarantees	 of	 non-repetition	 encompass	 a	 variety	 of	 measures,	 including	 effective	
civilian	 control	 over	 military	 and	 security	 forces,	 human	 rights	 and	 IHL	 education,	
strengthening	of	the	rule	of	law	and	judiciary,	review	and	reform	of	laws	contributing	
to	 violations	 of	 IHRL	 and	 IHL.150	The	 key	 aim	of	 these	measures	 is	 to	 prevent	 future	
violations	of	human	 rights	or	 IHL.	However,	mere	assurances	by	 the	State	promising	
non-repetition	 of	 human	 rights	 violations	 resulting	 in	 harms	of	 gendered	 nature	 are	
not	 sufficient.	 Rather,	 positive	 steps	 are	 required	 to	 ensure	 the	 elimination	 of	 the	
structural	 discrimination	which	 enabled	 these	 violations.	 For	 instance,	 a	 part	 of	 the	
measures	 outlined	 in	 paragraph	 23(h)	 of	 the	 2005	 Basic	 Principles	 can	 be	 aimed	 at	
repealing	 discriminatory	 domestic	 laws	 and	 introducing	 legal	 reforms	 based	 on	 the	
principle	 of	 equality	 and	 non-discrimination.	 Furthermore,	 steps	 should	 be	 taken	 to	







reparation	 funds	 for	 fulfilment	 of	 guarantees	 of	 non-repetition	 can	 be	 dedicated	 to	





Whilst	 each	 type	 of	 reparations	 has	 its	 own	 form	 and	 method	 of	 delivery,	 some	








Many	 of	 the	 debates	 about	 post-conflict	 reparations	 raise	 the	 distinction	 between	
individual	and	collective	reparations	as	well	as	the	appropriateness	of	these	modes	of	
reparations	in	relation	to	gendered	harms	arising	from	gross	violations	of	IHRL	and/or	




detrimental	 impact	 on	 their	 families	 and	 communities.	 In	 that	 context,	 collective	
reparations,	which	 aim	at	 supporting	not	 exclusively	 the	primary	 victim	but	 also	 the	
broader	community,	may	appear	as	an	appropriate	mode	of	reparations.	Arguably,	the	
collective	nature	of	these	reparations	makes	them	better	tailored	to	remedy	the	social	
effects	 of	 gendered	 harms,	 for	 instance	 by	 supporting	 community	 programmes,	
ensuring	 provision	 of	 education	 and/or	 vocational	 courses	 or	 reintegration	 of	 the	
former	 child	 soldiers	 into	 their	 native	 communities.	 It	 is	 also	 argued	 that	 collective	
reparations	may	work	better	in	cases	of	sexual	violence	as	they	allow	victims	to	benefit	
from	 reparation	 without	 the	 need	 for	 naming	 individual	 victims	 and	 the	 types	 of	
violations	 suffered	 by	 them. 153 	However,	 whilst	 avoidance	 of	 stigmatisation	 and	
revictimization	is	an	important	element	in	the	design	and	distribution	of	reparations,	it	
remains	 equally	 significant	 to	 ensure	 that	 individual	 victims	 directly	 benefit	 from	







ineffective	 as	 a	 remedy,	 whilst	 the	 UN	 OHCHR	 study	 on	 reparations	 in	 the	 DRC	
revealed	 that	victims	of	conflict-related	sexual	violence	expressed	a	clear	preference	
for	 the	 tangible	 benefits	 of	 individual	 reparations	which	 address	 the	more	 concrete	
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only	 the	 combination	 of	 the	 two	 perspectives	 shows	 the	 complete	 picture	 of	
victimhood	arising	in	relation	to	gendered	harms.	Such	an	approach	enables	treatment	
of	the	female	victim	as	an	equal	rights	holder	but	also	emphasizes	the	extent	to	which	
gendered	harms	 affect	 the	broader	 community,	 creating	what	Ní	Aoláin	 refers	 to	 as	
‘communities	 of	 harm’.	 Accordingly,	 a	 mixed	 approach,	 combining	 individual	 and	
collective	 reparations,	 is	 recommended	 as	 the	 best	 way	 to	 achieve	 comprehensive	
reparations	for	conflict-related	gendered	harms.	
	
Another	 key	 issue	 relates	 to	 the	 manner	 in	 which	 reparations	 and	 reparation	
programmes	 for	 gendered	 harms	 are	 designed	 and	 implemented.	When	 considering	
the	harmful	effect	of	gendered	harms	arising	from	violations	of	 IHRL	and/or	 IHL,	 it	 is	
essential	 to	 take	 account	 of	 the	 wide-ranging	 impact	 and	 diverse	 nature	 of	 these	
harms.	 In	 cases	 involving	 conflict-related	 sexual	 violence	 in	 particular,	 it	 remains	
crucial	that,	as	a	part	of	reparations,	the	existing	taboos	surrounding	victims	of	sexual	
harms	 are	 challenged.	 Collective	 reparations	 have	 the	 potential	 to	 address	 such	
stereotypes	with	a	view	to	transforming	attitudes	towards	victims	of	sexual	harms,	e.g.	
through	 community	 reintegration	programmes	as	well	 as	 gender	equality	 education.	
Similarly,	the	awards	of	individual	reparations	ought	to	take	account	of	the	situation	of	
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the	 victim,	 with	 particular	 attention	 to	 how	 gender	 and	 the	 system	 of	 structural	
discrimination	 may	 have	 positioned	 her	 within	 social	 and	 economic	 structures.	
Gender-sensitive	 reparations	 must	 take	 account	 of	 structural	 inequalities	 and	
structural	discrimination	and	attempt	to	subvert	these	patterns.156		
	
Furthermore,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 ensure	 that	 reparations	 are	 accessible	 and	 inclusive	
and	that	they	actually	reach	the	intended	beneficiary.	To	that	end,	practical	obstacles	
faced	by	many	female	victims	of	gendered	harms	(such	as	the	lack	of	a	personal	bank	
account	 or	 mobility)	 should	 be	 addressed.	 In	 addition,	 the	 importance	 of	 urgent	
interim	 reparations	 was	 identified	 by	 the	 UN	 Secretary-General	 as	 a	 means	 of	





conflict-related	 sexual	 violence,	 should	 be	meaningfully	 incorporated	 into	 the	 peace	
processes	 and	 into	 peace	 agreements.	 For	 instance,	 the	 Lomé	 Peace	 Accord,	where	
women	or	women’s	groups	took	no	part	in	the	peace	negotiations	process,	established	
a	 blanket	 amnesty	 for	 crimes	 committed	 during	 the	 civil	 war,	 including	 crimes	
involving	 sexual	 violence	 or	 reproductive	 harms.158	Active	 participation	 of	women	 in	
the	 design	 of	 reparation	 programmes	 should	 form	 an	 integral	 part	 of	 women’s	
participation	in	the	peace	processes	and	peace	agreements,	which	are	the	goals	of	the	

















nationals	 and	 persons	 who	 are	 present	 within	 its	 territory.	 This	 also	 applies	 to	




However,	we	 can	go	 further:	 the	Human	Rights	Committee,	 the	CEDAW	Committee,	
and	the	ICJ	have	confirmed	that	states	also	bear	responsibility	in	international	law	for	
human	 rights	 violations	 committed	 by	 their	 state	 agents,	 including	 armed	 forces,	
acting	outside	the	state’s	territory.160	According	to	the	Human	Rights	Committee,		
“State	party	must	respect	and	ensure	the	rights	 laid	down	in	the	Covenant	to	
anyone	within	 the	 power	 or	 effective	 control	 of	 that	 State	 Party,	 even	 if	 not	
situated	within	the	territory	of	the	State	Party.	(…)	This	principle	also	applies	to	
those	within	the	power	or	effective	control	of	the	forces	of	a	State	Party	acting	
outside	 its	 territory,	 regardless	 of	 the	 circumstances	 in	which	 such	 power	 or	
effective	 control	 was	 obtained,	 such	 as	 forces	 constituting	 a	 national	
contingent	 of	 a	 State	 Party	 assigned	 to	 an	 international	 peace-keeping	 or	
peace-enforcement	operation”.161	
The	extraterritorial	 application	of	human	 rights	obligations	has	also	been	 recognised	
by	 the	 ECtHR,	 especially	 in	 the	 context	 of	 overseas	 military	 action	 or	 military	
occupation	 by	 a	 party	 to	 the	 ECHR.	 The	 ECtHR	 confirmed	 in	Al-Skeini	 and	 others	 v.	
United	 Kingdom	 that	 the	UK’s	 human	 rights	 obligations	 arising	 from	Article	 1	 of	 the	
ECHR	 (obligation	 to	 “secure	 to	 everyone	within	 their	 jurisdiction	the	 rights	 and	




CEDAW	 Committee,	 General	 Recommendation	 No.30	 on	 women	 in	 conflict	 prevention,	 conflict	 and	
post-conflict	situations	(2013),	para.9.;	Legal	Consequences	of	the	Construction	of	a	Wall	in	the	Occupied	
Palestinian	Territory,	Advisory	Opinion,	ICJ	Reports	2004,	136	paras.106-114.		











This	 scenario	 commonly	 applies	 in	 armed	 conflicts	 as	 well	 as	 situations	 of	 military	




“in	 conflict	and	post-conflict	 situations,	 States	parties	are	bound	 to	apply	 the	
Convention	and	other	 international	human	rights	and	humanitarian	 law	when	
they	exercise	territorial	or	extraterritorial	jurisdiction,	whether	individually,	for	
example	 in	 unilateral	 military	 action,	 or	 as	 members	 of	 international	 or	




IHL.	 By	 relying	 on	 the	 extraterritoriality	 principle,	 victims	 may	 in	 theory	 seek	
reparations	 for	breaches	of	 IHRL	 from	a	 state	which	exercised	effective	 control	over	
















Reparations	 for	 gendered	 harms	 arising	 from	 violations	 of	 IHRL	 and	 IHL	 form	 an	
integral	 part	 of	 transitional	 justice	 processes	 in	 which	 international	 law	 plays	 a	
significant	 role.	With	 the	 exception	 of	 the	 ICC	 reparations	mechanism,	 international	
law’s	engagement	with	reparations	to	individuals	is	limited	to	establishing	the	right	to	
a	 remedy	 (including	 reparations),	 as	well	 as	 the	 corresponding	 duty	 of	 states	 under	
IHRL	to	provide	reparations	for	victims	of	human	rights	violations	and	violations	of	IHL.	
However,	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 an	 international	 human	 rights	 court	 to	 adjudicate	 such	




The	more	precise	principles	 governing	 reparations	 for	 individuals	who	have	 suffered	
violations	of	IHRL/IHL	remain	confined	to	soft	law	instruments	such	as	the	2005	Basic	
Principles,	 the	Nairobi	Declaration	 and	2014	UNSG	Guidance	Note.	As	 discussions	 in	
this	 chapter	 demonstrate,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 apply	 the	 gender	 perspective	 to	 the	
reparations	framework	outlined	in	the	2005	Basic	Principles	to	create	and	implement	
transformative	 and	 gender-sensitive	 reparations.	 In	 order	 for	 reparations	 to	 be	
meaningful,	 the	 decision-making	 process	 leading	 to	 the	 design	 and	 award	 of	
reparations	needs	 to	 incorporate	a	 thorough	understanding	of	women’s	experiences	
of	armed	conflicts	and	take	into	account	the	multifaceted	short-,	medium-,	and	long-
term	 consequences	 of	 gendered	 harms	 suffered	 by	 them. 164 	The	 meaningful	




The	 recognition	 of	 victims	 of	 gendered	 harms	 as	 well	 as	 the	 attribution	 of	 the	
responsibility	of	the	state	for	violations	of	IHRL	and	IHL	which	resulted	in	those	harms	
remains	 the	crucial	 feature	of	 reparations.	This	also	applies	 to	actions	of	 states	 (and	
state	 agents)	 outside	 their	 territorial	 borders.	 It	 recognizes	 women	 as	 equal	 rights	
																																																								




holders	 but	 also	 places	 gendered	 harms	 on	 a	 par	 with	 other	 harms	 arising	 from	
breaches	 of	 the	 state’s	 human	 rights	 obligations.	 Furthermore,	 gender-sensitive	
reparations	must	address	 structural	 inequalities	 and	 take	 into	account	 the	particular	
ways	 in	 which	 women	 and	 girls	 experience	 harm.	 The	 transformative	 nature	 of	




Despite	 significant	normative	developments	 in	 international	 law,	 there	 remain	many	
practical	challenges	in	relation	to	effective	provision	of	reparations	for	individuals	who	
have	 suffered	 gendered	 harms.	 Access	 to	 information	 about	 the	 availability	 of	
reparations,	 the	 ability	 of	 some	 women	 to	 receive	 individual	 reparation	 awards,	
distribution	 of	 reparations	 and	 monitoring	 of	 implementation	 of	 reparation	
programmes	 are	 just	 a	 few	of	 the	 practical	 yet	 problematic	 aspects.	 Furthermore,	 a	
strong	connection	between	 legal	 reparation	and	 the	means	 to	enforce	 it	means	 that	
many	 states	 emerging	 from	 armed	 conflict	 may	 face	 real	 challenges	 in	 the	
implementation	of	reparations,	even	if	the	will	to	do	so	is	there.	Therefore,	a	stronger	
rule	 of	 law	 is	 needed	 in	 post-conflict	 situations	 in	 order	 to	 ensure	 the	 timely	 and	
effective	delivery	of	remedies	to	individuals	who	have	suffered	gendered	harms	during	
armed	conflict.	Finally,	it	is	essential	that	reparations	are	viewed	as	an	integral	tool	in	







International	 legal	 responses	 to	 the	 impact	 of	 armed	 conflict	 on	 women	 have	
developed	 considerably	 since	 the	 last	 decade	 of	 the	 20th	 century.	 Until	 then,	
international	 law’s	 engagement	 with	 issues	 surrounding	 women	 and	 armed	 conflict	
was	largely	confined	to	the	realm	of	IHL,	with	its	provisions	granting	special	protection	
to	women	during	war,	especially	 in	relation	to	protection	from	sexual	violence.	Little	
attention,	 if	 any,	 was	 paid	 to	 fostering	 a	 greater	 understanding	 of	 the	 gendered	
dimension	of	conflicts	and	to	challenging	the	idea	that	women	experience	conflicts	in	a	








Former	Yugoslavia	and	 in	Rwanda,	demonstrated	the	gross	disregard	 for	 the	rules	of	
IHL	and	IHRL	and	were	illustrative	of	the	gendered	consequences	of	armed	conflict	and	
their	long-term	impact.	In	this	context,	the	limits	of	IHL	became	even	more	apparent,	
making	 this	 body	 of	 law	 of	 limited	 utility	 in	 addressing	 the	 gender-specific	
consequences	of	armed	conflict	in	the	aftermath.	Whilst	IHL	was	not	designed	to	deal	
with	the	issues	arising	in	the	aftermath	of	conflicts,	the	continuing	effects	of	the	gross	











into	other	 specialised	branches	of	 international	 law,	 such	as	 IRL,	 ICL	 and	 IHRL.	 Legal	
developments	 took	 place	 in	 the	 context	 of,	 and	 have	 been	 partially	 influenced	 by,	
other	 changes	 within	 the	 discipline,	 including	 the	 increased	 fragmentation	 and	
specialisation	of	branches	of	international	law,	greater	attention	to	the	role	of	gender	
within	 international	 law,	 and,	more	 recently,	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	 idea	 of	 jus	 post	
bellum	 as	 a	 legal	 framework	 addressing	 post-conflict	 situations.	 Whilst	 these	





individual	 branches	 of	 the	 discipline,	 such	 as	 IRL,	 ICL	 and	 IHRL,	 facilitated	
developments	that	address	some	of	the	challenges	faced	by	women	in	the	aftermath	
of	conflicts.	However,	whilst	progressing	international	law	on	one	hand,	the	responses	
to	 the	 situation	 of	 women	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 conflict	 within	 these	 individual	
specialised	 branches	 of	 international	 law	 have	 been	 largely	 disjointed.	 The	 less	
desirable	results	of	this	disjointed	growth	are	evident	in	the	divergent	understandings	
of	the	gendered	impact	of	armed	conflicts	within	individual	branches	of	international	
law.	 They	 are	 also	 reflected	 in	 rapid	 changes	 in	 some	 fields	 (such	 as	 international	
criminal	accountability)	contrasting	with	slow	progress	 in	others	 (such	as	 reparations	
for	gender-based	harms	or	protection	of	economic,	social	and	cultural	rights	of	women	
in	 the	 aftermath).	 Furthermore,	 some	of	 the	 developments	 at	 an	 international	 level	
frequently	 resulted	 in	 a	 lack	 of	 continuity	 and	 absence	 of	 follow-up	 procedures.1	In	
addition,	 the	 continuing	 and	 gender-specific	 impact	 of	 armed	 conflict	 on	women,	 as	











international	 prosecution	 of	 gender-based	 crimes	 such	 as	 rape,	 sexual	 enslavement,	
sexualised	torture	and	forced	nudity.	The	ICC	Statute	further	contributed,	albeit	more	
on	 a	 normative	 level,	 towards	 the	 building	 of	 a	 comprehensive	 legal	 framework	
addressing	 further	 examples	 of	 gender	 based-crimes,	 including	 forced	 sterilization,	
forced	pregnancy	and	gender-based	persecution.	Nonetheless,	despite	the	inclusion	of	




Shortcomings	 in	 the	 investigation	 of	 international	 gender-based	 crimes,	 combined	
with	 procedural	 and	 evidentiary	 obstacles,	 remain	 the	 key	 barriers	 to	 successful	
prosecutions	of	such	crimes	at	the	ICC.	Furthermore,	the	conceptual	limitations	of	the	
ICL	framework	allow	prosecution	of	only	a	selected	few	(and	usually	high-profile)	cases	
arising	 from	 a	 particular	 conflict.	 The	 ICC	 in	 particular	 operates	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	
principle	of	complementarity,	placing	the	key	responsibility	for	the	prosecution	of	war	
crimes,	 crimes	 against	 humanity	 and	 genocide	 (all	 of	 which	 include	 examples	 of	






As	 discussed	 in	 the	 introduction,	 feminist	 engagements	 with	 international	 law	 in	
general,	 and	 women	 and	 armed	 conflict	 in	 particular,	 have	 brought	 issues	 of	 the	
gendered	impact	of	conflicts	on	women	to	the	forefront	of	 international	 law,	both	in	
terms	 of	 legal	 developments	 and	 political	 agendas,	 such	 as	 the	Women,	 Peace	 and	
Security	 agenda	 at	 the	 UNSC.	 However,	 the	 predominant	 focus	 on	 conflict-related	




cultural	 rights	 or	 the	 deficiencies	 and	 inadequacies	 in	 awarding	 reparations	 for	
conflict-related	gendered	harms	in	the	aftermath	of	conflicts.	Chapter	3	demonstrated	








confined	 to	 a	 soft	 law	 form	 and,	 as	 demonstrated	 by	 the	 UNSG’s	 Note,	 focus	
exclusively	on	harms	arising	as	a	result	of	conflict-related	sexual	violence.2	Chapter	6	




individuals	 to	 a	 remedy	 for	 violation	 of	 their	 human	 rights,	 the	 international	 legal	
status	 quo	 in	 relation	 to	 reparations	 for	 gendered	harms	 remains	 confined	 to	 a	 few	
soft	law	instruments,	such	as	the	2005	Basic	Principles,	the	Nairobi	Declaration	and	the	
UNSG	 Guidance	 Note.	 Furthermore,	 whilst	 the	 right	 of	 individuals	 to	 an	 effective	
remedy	is	firmly	embedded	in	IHRL,	the	actual	consideration	and	award	of	reparations	
for	conflict-related	violations	 (including	gendered	harms)	 relies	almost	exclusively	on	
the	 decisions	 of	 domestic	 courts	 as	 well	 as	 the	 readiness	 of	 the	 state	 to	 make	
reparations	 for	 violating	 its	 human	 rights	 obligations.	 Nonetheless,	 reparations	 for	
gendered	 harms	 arising	 from	 violations	 of	 IHRL	 and	 IHL	 form	 an	 integral	 part	 of	
transitional	 justice	 processes	 and	 contribute	 towards	 the	maintenance	of	 peace	 and	
security.	 Therefore,	 further	 conceptualisation	 of	 a	 normative	 framework	 for	 post-
conflict	 reparations	 and	 implementation	 of	 the	 system	 of	 reparations	 for	 conflict-
																																																								







related	 gendered	 harms	 within	 international	 law	 is	 certainly	 needed.	 Chapter	 6	
attempted	to	contribute	to	the	(at	least	partial)	closing	of	this	conceptual	gap.	
	
Whilst	developments	within	 individual	branches	of	 international	 law	continue	to	face	




the	 gendered	 impact	 of	 armed	 conflict	 on	 women	 is	 being	 addressed.	 From	 the	
narrowly	focused	area	of	IHL	protection,	the	framework	relating	to	women	and	armed	
conflict	has	expanded	and	is	now	looked	at	through	the	lens	of	human	rights,	further	
protective	 regimes,	 security,	 accountability	 as	 well	 as	 international	 criminal	 law.	 A	
significant	 change	 is	 also	 noticeable	 in	 the	 increased	 institutional	 and	 multi-agency	





Despite	 significant	 progress	 in	 addressing	 some	 of	 the	 gendered	 consequences	 of	
armed	 conflicts	 on	women,	 there	 exist	 some	 shortcomings	 in	 the	 international	 legal	
framework	relevant	to	women	in	post-conflict	settings	which	are	yet	to	be	addressed.			
International	 criminal	 accountability	 for	 conflict-related	 gender-based	 crimes	 has	
progressed	 most	 remarkably	 within	 the	 ICL	 framework,	 both	 on	 a	 normative	 and	
practical	 level.	 However,	 other	 forms	 of	 redress,	 in	 particular	 transformative	 and	
gender-sensitive	 reparations,	 are	 still	 sidelined	 (if	 not	 lacking)	 in	many	 post-conflict	
settings	 and	 have	 not	 fully	 formed,	 in	 a	 way	 that	 ICL	 instruments	 did,	 within	 the	




Yugoslav	 war	 was	 issued	 only	 in	 2015,	 20	 years	 after	 the	 armed	 conflict	 officially	 came	 to	 an	 end	





economic,	 social	 and	 cultural	 rights,	 require	 further	 analysis	 and	 coherent	
development.		
	
Despite	 rare	 exceptions,	 international	 law	 and	 international	 institutions	 largely	
continue	 to	 view	 the	 gendered	 impact	 of	 armed	 conflict	 on	 women	 predominantly	




in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 conflicts,	 a	 greater	 understanding	 of	 the	 gendered	 nature	 of	
conflict	as	well	as	 its	underlying	causes	 is	needed.	This	 is	particularly	relevant	to	any	
efforts	 to	 prevent	 gendered	 violations,	 including	 (but	 not	 limited	 to)	 conflict-related	
sexual	 violence.	 Better	 understanding	 of	 the	 underlying	 causes	 of	 conflict-related	
sexual	 violence	 can	 contribute	 towards	 the	 development	 and	 improvement	 of	 any	
efforts	 aimed	 at	 preventing	 sexual	 violence	 at	 a	 domestic	 and	 international	 level,	
which	remains	crucial	yet	most	difficult	to	achieve.		
	





confined	 to	 the	 realm	 of	 soft	 law	 and	 non-enforcement.	 Nonetheless,	 these	
developments	 constitute	 important	 markers	 of	 attitudinal	 change	 and	 can	 indeed	
become	drivers	for	meaningful	change	in	the	international	legal	framework	applicable	
to	 challenges	 faced	 by	 women	 in	 post-conflict	 settings	 if	 political	 declarations	 and	
commitments	 are	 implemented	 domestically.	 However,	 in	 order	 to	 be	 effective	 and	













addressing	 the	 situation	 of	 women	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 conflicts.	 However,	 legal	
developments	 need	 to	 be	 accompanied	by	 attitudinal,	 political,	 social	 and	 economic	
changes,	especially	at	a	national	level.		In	order	to	be	effective,	international	law	needs	










Secondly,	 in	 order	 to	 have	 any	 real	 impact,	 these	 legal	 advances	 need	 to	 be	
implemented	 by	 states.	 The	 effectiveness	 of	 international	 law	 and	 any	 of	 its	 future	
developments	strongly	relies	on	the	willingness	of	states	to	be	bound	by	international	
legal	 obligations	 and	 on	 the	 domestic	 implementation	 of	 these	 obligations.	 An	
observation	made	 by	 Chinkin	 in	 1997	 that	 “feminist	 interventions	 into	 international	
law	 can	 only	 have	 lasting	 impact	 if	 they	 are	 brought	 into	 domestic	 law	 and	 policy-
making”	 is	 equally	 applicable	 in	 the	 context	 of	 contemporary	 international	 relations	
and	 international	 law. 4 	It	 is	 therefore	 of	 paramount	 importance	 that	 soft	 law	
developments,	 as	 well	 as	 political	 commitments,	 are	 translated	 into	 legally	 binding	
obligations	of	states	under	international	law.	Moreover,	states’	compliance	with	these	
																																																								









an	 extent,	 such	 monitoring	 function.	 Although	 treaty	 bodies	 are	 concerned	 with	
monitoring	states’	obligations	with	respect	to	a	particular	UN	human	rights	treaty,	it	is	
conceivable,	 if	 not	 encouraged,	 that	 they	 incorporate	 a	 gender	 perspective	 into	 the	
process	of	 reviewing	states’	 compliance	with	human	rights	obligations	under	a	given	
treaty.	 Receptiveness	 of	 the	 treaty	 bodies	 to	 assessing	 a	 state’s	 compliance	with	 its	
human	 rights	 obligations	 in	 post-conflict	 situations	 and	 in	 response	 to	 the	 gendered	
impact	 of	 armed	 conflict	 on	 women	 is	 particularly	 encouraged.	 The	 practice	 of	 the	
CEDAW	Committee	has	demonstrated	that	a	treaty	body	can	meaningfully	engage	with	
the	 issues	 of	 human	 rights	 protection	 in	 post-conflict	 settings	whilst	 addressing	 the	
gendered	 and	 complex	 nature	 of	 the	 aftermath	 of	 conflicts.	 General	
Recommendations	 30	 and	 32	 demonstrated	 how	 a	 treaty	 body	 could	 substantively	



















emerged,	 both	 in	 soft	 and	 hard	 law	 form,	 an	 international	 legal	 framework	 which	
addresses	some	of	the	aspects	of	gendered	impact	of	armed	conflict	on	women.	With	
certain	 gaps	 to	 be	 filled	 and	 shortcomings	 to	 be	 addressed,	 the	 current	 framework	
could	benefit	 from	further	developments	and	improvements,	especially	 in	relation	to	
enforcement	measures.	A	greater	‘synchronization’	of	efforts	and	legal	developments	
across	 various	 branches	 of	 international	 law	 could	 contribute	 towards	 the	
development	 of	 a	 more	 coherent,	 adequate	 and	 gender-sensitive	 legal	 framework	




to	 bring	 these	 efforts	 together,	 at	 least	 on	 a	 normative	 level.	 Therefore,	 a	 trend	 of	
compartmentalising	 conflict-related	 sexual	 violence	 and	 other	 gendered	 harms	 as	 ‘a	
women’s	 only’	 issue	 in	 international	 law	 needs	 to	 be	 challenged.	 After	 all,	 the	
development,	 implementation	 and	 enforcement	 of	 a	 meaningful	 and	 coherent	
international	legal	framework	addressing	the	gendered	impact	of	conflicts	on	women	
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